coralie-rigaud-DDO9-memoire-2012

1
2011-2012
ETUDIANT
NOM Rigaud
Prénom Coralie
Adresse électronique coralie67@yahoo.com
DESTINATAIRE DU TRAVAIL
NOM Monsieur Pesqueux
MASTER
DATE RECEPTION

2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Climate change causes and risks
1. Physical causes
2. Impacts
3. Anthropogenic causes
III. Behavioural deficit
1. Structural barriers
2. Information deficit
A. The Information Deficit Model
1) Ignorance about the facts
2) Ignorance about action
3) Media influence
4) Uncertainty about climate change research
B. Criticism of the Information Deficit Model
3. Socio-cultural barriers
A. Cultural structure
1) Political worldviews
2) Religious worldviews
3) Techno-centric versus eco-centric worldviews
4) American exceptionalism worldview
B. Social comparison
1) Social norms
2) Valued social achievement
4. Individual choices
A. Priorities
B. Economic consensus
C. Financial considerations
D. Goals and aspirations
E. Behavioural momentum
F. Skepticism
1) Trust
2) Perceive inadequacy
3) Denial of issue
IV. Conclusion
CLIMATE CHANGE: TRUTH OR DARE
Or why despite scientific consensus there is no social consensus about
climate change in the United States of America

3
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the last IPCC report to date, “Warming of the climate is unequivocal”.1
It is thanks to a favorable climate that today’s civilization was able to develop during
those last 11000 years. But looking back in time, we can see that earth’s climate has
not always been so stable and clement. Even if we consider the history of our
species, we can see that we have lived through four ice ages over the last 650 000
years, with the latest extending from about 90 000 to 12 000 years ago.
But what is unique about today’s changes is that they are caused by human activities.
Indeed, according to the IPCC report, there is a scientific consensus that the recent
observed climate change is of anthropogenic origin.2
And it is now accelerating from
a rate that was not detectable during a human life-time to a rate that is potentially
dangerous for the survival of our species.
Our technological progress has allowed us to change the planet to suit our needs and
it is now a necessity to change our needs and manage our actions to maintain a planet
livable for all. At the root of our impact on the planet are our perceived needs and
consumption behaviours. What was once luxury has become a necessity for many,
and glorified by the media with promises to bring “personal and social rewards”,
consumption has become a life goal pursuit for most.3
Mitigating global warming will therefore necessitate limiting our consumption habits
and setting in place policies to limit the use of greenhouse gas emitting technologies
and facilitate the transition towards a carbon free economy. In other words, as
1
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Accessible from:
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains1.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14th
2
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains2-4.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14th
3
SWIM, Janet; CLAYTON, Susan; DOHERTY, Thomas; GIFFORD, Robert; HOWARD, George; RESER,
Joseph; STERN, Paul; WEBER, Elke; “Psychology and Global Climate Change: Addressing a Multi-
faceted Phenomenon and Set of Challenges”, Report of the American Psychological Association Task
Force on the Interface Between Psychology and Global Climate Change, March 2010, accessible
from: http://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change-booklet.pdf. Last consulted
on Sept. 14
th
(p68)

4
individuals we hold the keys to mitigating climate change both as consumers and as
voters.
As we are going to see in this paper, many Americans are well aware of the risks of
climate change, but yet this is not translating into the necessary level of social action.
After defining climate change and establishing what the scientific consensus is on
future risks, this paper will focus on the overall response of Americans in the face of
such an alarming scientific message and study the different theories brought forth as
reasons for apathy and inaction.
Please note that I had trouble finding Americans to interview on their perception of
climate change. But because of the amount of polls and studies available, I am not
sure that conducting my own surveys would have added anything to my study. And,
reading my paper, I hope that you will agree with me that the amount of data
available was sufficient to conduct my research.
First let us begin by defining what climate change is.
II.CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSES AND RISKS
1. PHYSICAL CAUSES:
The climate of our planet is to a large extent controlled by the heat balance between
incoming solar energy and outgoing energy reflected or emitted back into space.
Roughly 30% of the solar energy that reaches the earth is reflected right back into
space by high albedo surfaces such as snow, ice, some clouds and other light
surfaces, while the rest is absorbed by low albedo surfaces. Approximately 17% of
this absorbed solar energy is then reflected back as heat energy in the form of
infrared radiation. This is where greenhouse gases in our atmosphere play their
warming role since they trap and reradiate back towards the earth about a third of this
heat energy.

5
(
4
)
Humans have been changing this energy balance in two ways:
1) By modifying the albedo of our planet (the amount of sunlight reflected back
into space) though the transformation of land surface for farming, forestry,
the expansion human settlements and the melting of ice and snow cover due
to global warming.
2) By adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere through the use of fossil fuels,
but also farming, deforestation, etc.
(
5
)
4
Image taken from ECOCEM, “The Albedo Effect”. Accessible from:
http://www.ecocem.ie/environmental,albedo.htm . Last consulted on Sept. 15
th
5
Graph extracted from IPCC Summary for Policymakers, accessible from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

6
According to the IPCC report, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have
increased noticeably as a result of human activities since the onset of the industrial
revolution in 1750.6
Moreover, looking at ice cores, we have been able to determine
that the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and methane far exceed the natural range
present in our atmosphere over the past 650 000 years.7
There are six main greenhouse gases, and they all differ in atmospheric lifetime,
infrared absorption potency and volume of emission.
1) Water vapour accounts for 60% of the natural greenhouse gases. According to the IPCC
report, water vapour represents the largest positive (reinforcing) feedback, though there are
still many uncertainties, notably due to the role of water vapour in cloud formation (which
can have high albedo depending on their altitude and thickness).8
2) CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas added to the atmosphere because of the quantities
emitted by human activities and its long atmospheric lifetime. It is projected to be the cause
of 70% of this century’s anthropogenic warming. The global atmospheric concentration of
CO2 increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm to 392.41 ppm in August 2012,
and according to the IPCC, the CO2 concentration increased more than ever during the years
1995 to 2005.9
3) Methane is projected to be responsible for about 20% of the global warming. It is emitted
naturally by wetlands anaerobic decay and emitted by humans through fossil fuel production
and transportation, agricultural practices such as livestock farming and rice culture, as well as
the fermentation of organic wastes in municipal landfills.
4) Nitrous oxide is projected to account for 10% of the global warming and comes from
agricultural practices, industrial activities, combustion of fossil fuels and waste management.
5) Halocarbons come from industrial processes and forest burning. They can for example be
found in refrigerant liquid and solvents. Their emission volume is small compare to CO2 but
their long persistence in the atmosphere in some cases, (up to hundreds of years, and even
thousands of years for some), makes them an important greenhouse gas.
6) Tropospheric ozone comes from photochemical smog (from vehicle emissions in warm
places), and from biomass burning. This gas has a short life time from about a week to a few
months but it is considered the third most powerful greenhouse gas.10
6
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Working Group I. Accessible from:
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-human-and.html. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th
7
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], a report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. Accessible from:
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
8
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch8s8-6-3-1.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
9
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-human-and.html. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th
10
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch7s7-4-4.html. Last consulted in Sept. 14
th

7
Most greenhouse gases will stay in the atmosphere for a long time before they are
absorbed by another sink. So even if we drastically lower our emissions, greenhouse
gases will continue accumulating in the atmosphere for a number of years, depending
on the type of greenhouse gas, before their level starts dropping.
Greenhouse gases average atmospheric life time and global warming potential is as
follow:11
Gas Lifetime Effectiveness in absorbing
infrared over 100 year
when compared to CO2
CO2 50 to 200 years -
Methane 10 to 15 years Approximately 21 times
more effective than CO2
Nitrous oxide 120 years Approximately 310 times
more effective than CO2
Fluorocarbons Very variable depending on compound.
Ranging from 9 to 3200 years
Very variable. From 725 to
23000 times more potent
Moreover, because of the slow responses of the climate system and feedbacks (e.g.
deep-sea temperature changes and the melting of large continental ice mass), many
impacts will take years before they become fully evident, and even if we were to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, climate change and sea level rise from
thermal expansion would continue for centuries.12
Delayed action to mitigate climate
change therefore increases risks of more severe global warming and further restricts
us by requiring us to achieve stabilization at even lower greenhouse gas levels.
2. IMPACTS:
It is therefore necessary to anticipate future impacts to inform policy makers of the
risks incurred. The IPCC is a world panel of scientists and experts working with UN
11
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations. Accessible
from: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
12
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-projections-of.html. Last
consulted on Sept. 14
th

8
member countries to write a report on the “state of knowledge of climate change”.13
It has been investigating different scenarios of climate change impacts to help
governments find consensus on climate change and take action to mitigate and adapt.
But this is no easy task. Many impacts are place-specific due to differences in
resource availability as well as geographic variations. There are also many
uncertainties due to gaps in scientific knowledge and unknown future economic
level, population size, mitigation trends and technological progress. It is also difficult
to predict impacts with temperature moving outside of its normal historical range.
Moreover, climate change may not necessarily follow a linear trend, so past
experiences may not accurately allow us to forecast the future.
Here is a brief summary of the most commonly anticipated impacts of climate
change:
Direct health
impact
Climate change is forecasted to affect millions of people through an increase in malnutrition due to a
decrease in crop production. Extreme weather events are anticipated to have many negative impacts,
though a warmer climate in cold regions could also reduce the amount of cold related death in northern
countries. Droughts are likely to create water issues and result in diarrhoeal diseases. An increase in
photochemical smog is likely to result in increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases. Finally, there
might be a redistribution of some infectious diseases, notably those vectored by mosquitoes.
Biodiversity According to an IPCC report, climate change is likely to affect the resilience of many ecosystems through
temperature changes, increases in droughts, flooding, pests, ocean acidification and forests fires.14
Many
species are at increased risks of extinction if the temperature increase exceeds 1.5 to 2°C.15
Rapid
temperature changes could kill species unable to adapt or migrate quickly enough, which would in turn
impact the food chain.
Sea level rise According to the IPCC report, it is very likely (90 to 100% chance), that “anthropogenic forcing contributed
to sea level rise during the latter half of the 20th century”.16
This sea level rise is caused by the thermal expansion of water and the melting of polar caps and glaciers.
According to the IPCC report, higher sea levels are likely to result in coastal erosion, salinization of
groundwater supplies, flooding of agricultural lands and destruction of infrastructures. And because of the
density of the population along the coasts, such changes are likely to affect many millions by the end of
the century.17
Increase in
extreme
Climate change will result in more frequent heat waves, heavier precipitation, and more intense tropical
storms, including in areas where such phenomena have never been seen. According to the IPCC report,
13
IPCC, Understanding Climate Change, 22 years of IPCC assessment. Accessible from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press/ipcc_leaflets_2010/ipcc-brochure_understanding.pdf. Last consulted
on Sept. 14
th
14
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Ecosystems, their properties, goods and services.
Accessible from: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter4.pdf. Last
th
15
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains3-3-1.html. Last consulted on Sept.
14
th
16
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch9s9-7.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
17
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Working Group II. Accessible from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/spmsspm-c-4-coastal-systems.html. Last
th

9
weather events heat waves will become more frequent and result in lower food production, lower water supplies, and
increased forest fires.18
Heavier precipitation will result in landslides, soil erosion and contamination of
groundwater. More intense tropical storms will result in increased epidemic risks, coastal erosion,
salinization of ground water and damages to coastal infrastructures and ecosystems.19
Impacts are likely
to differ according to the level of development of the region affected.
Increased ocean
acidity
Roughly 30% of the CO2 emitted is absorbed by the ocean, resulting in increased acidity. This corrosive
effect could impact the marine food chains by preventing zooplankton from producing shells, effectively
killing them.
Water supply About one-fifth of the human population does not have reliable access to fresh water supplies and climate
change is likely to worsen the situation with increased extreme weather events and loss of snowpack.20
A
change in water supply is also likely to affect crop production and hydropower potentials.
Agricultural
production
Agricultural ecosystems are dependent on temperature, sunlight, soil texture, pollination and water. The
idea that farmers can simply pack up and go when conditions are no longer suitable does not take into
account the need for water availability or for suitable soils. Change in moisture levels may alter salinity
and soil organisms, and new pests may appear in areas where they have no predators and no climate
control. Lower agricultural productivity would result in economic stress and increase the inequalities
between rich and poor. The impact of climate change is likely to vary depending on the region, but while a
temperature increase between 1 to 2°C is predicted to impact mainly lower latitudes, an increase above
3°C is predicted to decrease food production everywhere.21
It is however hard to predict the human capacity to adapt to change. Thomas Malthus had long ago
predicted famines linked to overpopulation, but then came the Industrial Revolution and later the Green
Revolution, which allowed for exponential increase of the human population. Moreover, knowing that
people get about 50% of their caloric intake from grains and that livestock feed uses about 35% of the
world grain, there is substantial room to relieve pressure on the food production system.22
Economic cost As we can gather, all this will come at an economic cost, and though some impacts are projected to be
beneficial for certain regions and sectors, it is very likely that all regions will experience economic loss for
temperature rise above 2-3°C.23
Extreme weather events have already costs billions of dollars and weather
dependent industries such as agriculture and tourism are likely to also be affected. Households and
businesses are likely to be impacted with higher energy bills, as well as property and infrastructure
damages. Climate refugees are also likely to have an economic toll. All these costs could potentially lead to
lower standards of living.
Security issue With likely conflict over stressed resources and migration, climate change could have national and
international security implications since diminishing resources can be the source of inter-group conflicts.
Migration
Along with economic stress, relocation is likely to cause psychological stress. Climate change can uproot
people for three major reasons:
Loss of land around coastal areas where 10% of the world population lives, including “2/3 of all cities
larger than five million people”.24
Loss of ecosystem services upon which we depend for food, water, cultural elements, etc.
Increased natural disasters.
18
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for
Policymakers. Accessible from: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
19
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Synthesis report. Accessible from:
14
th
20
EHRLICH, Paul and Ann, The dominant animal, Human Evolution and the Environment,
Washington, Island Press, 2009, 464 pages (p205)
21
14
th
22
Worldwatch Institute, Grain Harvest Sets Record, But Supplies Still Tight. Accessible from:
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5539. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
23
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Working Group II. Accessible from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/spmsspm-c-15-magnitudes-of.html. Last
th
24
CRATE, Susan, NUTTALL, Mark, Anthropology and Climate change, From Encounters to Actions,
Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2009, 416 pages. (p118)

10
Looking at Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, we can see that many of these impacts
directly threaten some of our most basic physiological and safety needs, so we could
expect that people would feel very motivated to address such risks.25
But as we will
see below, such basic needs are not perceived as threatened by a large part of the
American public, so higher needs of belonging, self-esteem and self-actualization are
privileged instead when considering the issue of climate change.
According to the IPCC scenarios, a target to limit temperature rise to 2°C above pre-
industrial levels (or an atmospheric level of 450 ppm of CO2 equivalent), should
minimize the risk of reaching tipping points and therefore limit the occurrence of
catastrophic changes such as the shutdown of the Atlantic Overturning Circulation or
the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet. There are indeed “risks of abrupt or
irreversible changes”, since, as mentioned above, climate is a non-linear system, and
threshold may be suddenly crossed that would lead to a collapse to a new “stable
state”, which might not be favorable for human life or for other species.26
3. ANTHROPOGENIC CAUSES:
As mentioned above, the IPCC report states that it is very likely (90 to 100% chance)
that most of the global warming observed since 1950 comes from human-caused
greenhouse gas emissions. Pursuing a vision of a better life, human beings have been
constructing their own ecological niche to meet their needs since the birth of our
civilization. But because of recent technological advances, humanity has now been
able to modify the planet on a global scale. Technical progress has indeed enabled us
to produce goods on an industrial scale, increase population exponentially and enable
mass consumption, increasing the standard of living of many, and making this
lifestyle desirable for many more. As quoted by Susan Crate, according to Ivan
Illich, “Things that were once distant luxuries”, have become “basic necessities that
people expect on demand for civilized life”. 27
We have been getting used to what
25
MASLOW, A. H., A Theory of Human Motivation”. Accessible from:
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm. Last consulted on Oct. 8
th
26
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains3-4.html. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
27

11
Henry James calls a “hotel civilization, obsessed with comfort, convenience,
contentment, where the lights are always on”.28
Consumerism has become a cultural
value, sign of social status and of group membership, as well as “source of self-
identity and meaning in life”.29
Such activities combined with our population size are now changing the environment
faster than ever and endangering the long term sustainability of our biosphere by
modifying our climate and threatening life support systems. According to James
Lovelock, “we have grown in number to the point where our presence is perceptibly
disabling the planet”. Indeed, the human population grew from one billion in 1850 to
seven billion in 2012 and is expected to reach eight to ten billion by 2050.30
(31
)
28
NORGAARD, Kari Marie, Living in denial: Climate change, Emotions, and Everyday Life, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2011, 279 pages. (p220)
29
on Sept. 14
th
(p72)
30
UNITED NATIONS: The world at Six Billion. Accessible from:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpart1.pdf. Last consulted on Sept.
14th
31
Graph extracted from UNITED NATIONS: The world at Six Billion. Accessible from:

12
If we look at the U.S. population, we can see that it has doubled since 1950 while the
average household size has diminished due to lifestyle changes (such as more single-
parent families, people living on their own longer, and more older people living
alone). This has resulted in more intensive use of resources (for appliances and to
heat households, for example). There is also an added increase in energy use due to
the fact that resources are harder to get to than before. There has been, of course, an
increase in energy efficiency, but this has generally been offset by a rebound effect
(the fact that people have a tendency to compensate for loss by erasing energy saving
gains with subsequent climate change damaging actions).
Taking into account the growing population, and given the current level of
technological advances, maintaining current levels of consumption would increase
greenhouse gas emissions by half by 2050.32
This problem would be amplified
greatly if per capita emissions in the developing world begin to rival that of the U.S.
The relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and population size, levels of
affluence (reflected in the level of energy consumption), technology used and
infrastructure in place (e.g. big SUVs or urban sprawl), is confirmed by the IPCC
formula inspired by John Holdren’s environmental impact formula:
GHG emissions = Population x per capita GDP x intensity of GHG
Levels of consumption are influenced by the environmental background in which
people live (such as the infrastructure available), the laws, regulations and financial
incentives in place, as well as economic development. They are also influenced by
the media’s portrayal of economic goods, as well as socio-cultural norms and
individual choices. And even if there is no positive correlation demonstrated between
happiness and consumption above a certain level, people are still pursuing material
accumulation as their goal to self-fulfillment and social achievement, and few are
32
American Psychological Association’s task Force on the Interface Between Psychology and Global
Climate Change, “Psychology and Global Climate Change: Addressing a Multi-Faceted Phenomenon
and Set of Challenges”. Accessible from: http://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-
change.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

13
willing to give it up. The same pursuit of economic growth is found at the macro
level since both developed and developing countries still view consumption as key to
their development. Indeed, measured by GDP, the wealth of a country is still
calculated according to the level of production and consumption of resources. In the
U.S., in particular, consumption has been promoted as the key solution to avoid
falling back into another Great Depression after the Second World War, and was still
portrayed as the solution to crisis in 2001, when George W. Bush told the U.S.
population to “go shopping” in the wake of the 9/11 attack.
But the message of climate scientists and environmental experts is clear: we are
living on a finite planet and over-consumption is a key factor of climate change.
Mitigating climate change will eventually require reaching a zero carbon emission
economy, and efficiency improvement would be an easy way to start acting on it.
Indeed, John Holdren’s studies show that efficiency improvements in the U.S. could
potentially reduce energy use to “a quarter of what it is now while increasing the
quality of life”.33
If we look at household consumption, we can see from this graph that 33% of US
CO2 emissions come from direct households use such as housing and transport:
33

14
(34
)
According to Gardner and Stern, 10% of US total consumption could be saved
without even changing lifestyles through direct households improvements (such as
better insulation of homes) and motor vehicles efficiency measures.35
While certainly
meaningful, this is only a small reduction when we think that the IPCC report
advocates a drop of 80 to 95% below 1990 levels of greenhouse gases emissions by
2050 to limit atmospheric CO2 equivalent to 450 ppm.36
Reaching such a scale of
emissions reduction will thus clearly require much more than applying efficiency
improvement patches. And doing so will require political will to regulate greenhouse
gases emissions on a large scale and to set-up the necessary financial incentives to
facilitate the transition to more efficient technologies. But even if the political agenda
of policymakers is motivated largely by the political campaign financing they
receive, it is people who have the final say on political decisions through democratic
elections. Individuals are therefore responsible for choosing the life and future they
want as consumers, but also as voters.
Until now, it has been easy to remain physically unaware of the impact of our
consumer lifestyle on the planet: climate change is not yet quite perceptible to most
and environmental degradation is easily exportable to poorer communities or further
countries. But as we are going to see, in our information age, it is becoming harder to
remain unintentionally uninformed about the impacts of our consumer lifestyle, and
the traditional “information deficit” excuse for inaction is increasingly being
questioned as the root of the population’s apathy in face of climate change. In fact,
according to this survey and further studies we will examine later, “concern about
climate change decreases as wealth (and by deduction education), goes up”:
34
Graph extracted from The WORLD BANK report 2010, “Overcoming behavioural inertia”.
Accessible from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-
1226014527953/Chapter-8.pdf
35
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-1226014527953/Chapter-
8.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
36
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [Online], Climate Change 2007: Working Group III. Accessible
from: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch13s13-3-3-3.html. Last consulted
on Sept. 14th

15
(37
)
This lack of concern is reflected in the level of consumption of the United States. As
we have seen, developed countries’ economies are “ultimately driven by the
relatively luxurious lifestyles” of their consumers, and according to the US
Congressional Research Service, the U.S. is the biggest contributor to atmospheric
greenhouse gases levels since the Industrial Revolution, accounting for almost one-
fifth of the rise.38
, 39
To give an order of magnitude, though having less than 5% of
the world population, the United States of America “uses about a quarter of the
world’s fossil resources, burning up nearly 25% of the coal, 26% of the oil, and 27%
37
World Bank report 2010: “Development and climate change”. Accessible from:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-1226014527953/WDR10-Full-
Text.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
38
Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2009, 416pages. (p266)
39
CONGRESSION RESEARCH SERVICE, “A U.S.-Centric Chronology of the International Climate Change
Negotiations”. Accessible from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40001.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 17
th

16
of the world’s natural gas”.40
And according to data from the World Bank, US per
capita CO2 emissions rank among the highest in the world.41
(42
)
But, despite the degree of U.S. responsibility for the problem, we find little
willingness to take measures to mitigate or even acknowledge climate change risks in
the U.S. national political discourse. Instead, many politicians, notably from the
conservative party, are openly challenging the notion of anthropogenic climate
change, or even climate change at all. And though Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto
protocol in December 1997, opposition from the Congress was already strong. In
July 1997, the Senate had voted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (95 votes to 0), opposing
the Protocol as against America’s best economic interest, notably because of the
emission reduction exemptions for developing countries. And in 2001, although the
40
The WORLD WATCH INSTITUTE, The State of Consumption Today”. Accessible from:
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/810. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
41
The WORLD BANK, “CO2 emissions”. Accessible from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
42
The WORLD BANK, “CO2 emissions”. Accessible from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC/countries?order=wbapi_data_value_2008%2
0wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&display=map. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

17
U.S. was still the biggest greenhouse gas emitter, (only surpassed by China since
2007), the Bush administration pulled-out of the agreement under the pretext that it
would harm the U.S. economy. Such an announcement had national repercussions
and contributed to refocusing the debate on “country emissions rather than per capita
emissions”, therefore minimizing the impact of individual domestic consumption.43
According to a poll commissioned by the World Bank for its World Development
Report on Climate Change and Development, 2010, we can find the same trend of
denial of the issue in individuals, since the US has by far the largest number of
citizens that believe that climate change is not a problem.44
(45
)
43
The WORLD BANK report 2010, “Overcoming behavioural inertia”. Accessible from:
8.pdf . Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
(p326)
44
WORLD BANK, World development report: Public attitudes toward climate change: findings from a
multi-country poll, 2010. Accessible from:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/CC_Poll_Report_July_01_2010.pdf.
Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
45
WORLD BANK Report, Public attitudes toward climate change: findings from a multi-country poll.
Accessible from:

18
I will now explore why, despite the scientific consensus on the urgency of the
situation, the U.S. public’s concerns (and therefore action) does not reflect this
critical need for change. Looking at different studies, I will try to define what could
be the barriers that prevent individual action.
III. BEHAVIOURAL DEFICIT
As we have seen, consumption levels are very high in the U.S., and mitigating
climate change will therefore require a lot more than a few technical tweaks here and
there. It will require a complete change in the way we view our natural resources and
a deep questioning of the basics principles of our social and economic models and of
our western lifestyle. Let us now look more in detail at what influences the
(un)willingness to act upon climate change risks.
As we are going to develop below, consumption levels and willingness to change
consumption patterns depend on the infrastructure in place, laws, regulations and
financial incentives, economic development, people’s understanding of the risks,
cultural worldviews, social norms, personal goals and values, world views and
behavioural momentum.
1. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS
There are structural barriers to change that restrict people’s ability to take action to
mitigate climate change. Beyond technical boundaries, greenhouse gas emissions
from energy use depend on:
th

19
1) The weather or constraints of where one lives. For example, colder places
will require more energy to heat houses
2) Infrastructures barriers such as urban design or location of human settlements
(e.g. in a rural locations), which might make it difficult for people not to use
their cars. Indeed, many Americans live in spread-out areas where there is no
convenient or safe public transportation. Interestingly, there is a controversy
called “The Great American Streetcar Scandal” regarding allegations that car
and tires manufacturers and petroleum companies purchased and dismantled
streetcars and railways during the course of the 1930’s and 1940’s, thereby
contributing to the creation of the car culture that we know today.46
3) Economic barriers such as available income. For example, low income
households might find it financially difficult to retrofit their houses to make
them more energy efficient.
4) Institutional barriers that distribute the burden of the cost of mitigation
between actors. For example, the laws, regulations and financial incentives
put in place by the government.
But beyond structural barriers, action is also influenced by concern, and there too
there are barriers.
2. INFORMATION DEFICIT
A. THE INFORMATION DEFICIT MODEL
An accurate perception of climate change risks is a prerequisite to undertaking action
to mitigate climate change. For nearly twenty years, the behavioural deficit in the
face of climate change has been attributed to an “information deficit”. According to
this model, the individual’s failure to respond is attributed to the information
received (or lack thereof), and it is because people do not know any better that they
46
Multimedia Histories, Columbus and Transportation Facilities. Accessible from:
http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/mmh/OldColumbus/trans.cfm. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

20
do not take action and can be misled. There is therefore an assumption that if people
knew any better, they would act differently.
Climate change is a complex issue to grasp. It is a “statistical and thus technical
concept” difficult to understand, thus far undetectable from personal experience, with
intricate causes and effects and surrounded with uncertainties.47
People must
therefore rely on “scientific models, expert judgments and reports in the media”, and
on their cognitive capacities to understand the problem.48
As a result, the public
misrepresentation of the risks surrounding climate change is frequently attributed to
the media coverage of the issue and the lack of scientific understanding of the
population. Indeed, according to the “information deficit” model, people lacking a
basic scientific literacy are unable to understand the mechanisms and impacts of
climate change. They are therefore particularly at risk of being misled by incorrect
information or to use unreliable and biased “heuristic substitutes” rather than rational
understanding to interpret the risks.49
Information deficit can be a barrier in many ways:
1) Ignorance about facts
People can be uninformed about the problem or unsure about the facts:
People can simply be unaware of the risks, either because they are not interested in
knowing, too poorly informed to realize what is at stake or unable to understand
scientific concepts.
47
from: http://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change-booklet.pdf Last consulted
on Sept. 14
th
(p33)
48
on Sept. 14
th
(p33)
49
KAHAN, Dan, Cultural Cognition Project, “The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture
Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change”. Accessible from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503 p14. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
(p5)

21
As we can see from this 2011 poll from the Pew Research Center, 28% of the people
questioned do not believe that “there is solid evidence that the earth is warming” and
17% do not think it is a problem.
(50
)
Some people are also not sure about what is causing climate change. A 2010 poll by
the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication showed a number of points of
confusion in people’s understanding:
50
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming”. Accessible
from: http://www.people-press.org/2009/10/22/fewer-americans-see-solid-evidence-of-global-
warming/. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

22
(51
)
2) Ignorance about action
People can also be unsure of what to do about climate change:
It can be hard to know what actions have the lowest impact on the climate and to be
able to “separate ‘good’ consumption from bad”.52
In this information age, we can
find any information and its exact opposite if we look hard enough for it, and
answers might not always be universal. Moreover the life cycle analyses of many
commercial products are complex because of the multitude of ingredients and
components parts. People might also be unaware of the best options available.
51
YALE PROJECT on CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION, “Americans’ Knowledge of Climate
Change”. Accessible from:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateChangeKnowledge2010.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th
52

23
3) Media influence
People can be misinformed by information received through the media:
According to the United Nation Development Programme Report on the media
coverage of climate change, mass media has had a key influence on public
understanding of and responses to climate change.53
News stories not only provide
information with their news content, but also tell the public how to frame
information, that is what they should pay attention to and what they should ignore.
Indeed, through prominent news layout and frequent coverage, media coverage
conveys importance. News pieces with big headlines or on front pages will obviously
catch the reader’s attention as a worthy subject. Frequency of stories on a subject will
also imprint the reader’s mind as a topic worthy of attention and will more likely
trigger extended research on the subject. Kenneth Andrew and Neal Caren go as far
as to say that, “the frequency of coverage and a story’s placement within newspapers
matters more than the actual content of reporting in conveying the importance of the
issue”.54
But the intensity of coverage can also lead to a decrease in interest and a loss of
attention as habituation increases. A recent Washington Post-Stanford University
poll shows that climate change is no longer considered the biggest environmental
problem by the public, and one can wonder if the frequency of media coverage has
contributed to this loss of interest.
53
UNDP, “Human Development Report 2007/2008”. Accessible from:
hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/boykoff, maxwell and roberts, j.
timmons.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
54
BRULLE, Robert, “Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors
influencing concern over climate change in the US., 2002-2010. Accessible from:
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-12ClimateChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th

24
(55
)
Media content is also influential. Journalists often seek controversies and drama and
media coverage tends to alternate portrayal of climate change between apocalyptic
descriptions by environmental militants and denial messages funded by groups with
interests in the production of greenhouse gases. On one hand, apocalyptic reporting
can cause people to tune-out or feel that the problem is outside of human control. It
can also cause environmental numbness and lower the perception of risks. On the
other hand, climate change denials messages have undermined the legitimacy of
climate change research and lowered the public’s willingness to take action, giving
people a seemingly legitimate reason to avoid feeling concerned.
In the name of offering unbiased coverage, the media has also given non-expert
opinions as much attention as peer-reviewed scientists and experts on the subject.
Such mixed messages have been a source of uncertainty for the public, and as we can
55
WASHINGTON POST-STANFORD University poll. Accessible from:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/global-warming-poll.pdf . Last
th

25
see from this survey, it has successfully given people the impression that there is no
scientific consensus and that the climate change issue is still open for debate:
(56
)
This quest for neutrality may make perfect sense when covering a political event, but
it should be seen as irrelevant to oppose non-scientists to scientists to discuss climate
change research. It has certainly harmed progress towards mitigating climate change
by keeping the debate on whether climate change is actually happening, rather than
focusing on what should be done to mitigate it.
Additionally, according to Zaller’s Receive Accept Sample model, people’s opinions
on subjects that are peripheral to their main concerns will tend to reflect the latest
media presentations.57
According to this model, such “balanced coverage” would in
consequence result in public opinion fluctuating a great deal, which is not conducive
to long term changes.
4) Uncertainty about climate change research
Another reason for information deficit is the feeling of uncertainty that surrounds the
climate change issue:
56
WORLD BANK Report, Public attitudes toward climate change: findings from a multi-country poll.
Accessible from:
th
57
ZALLER’s RAS Model. Accessible from: http://desart.us/courses/3180/RAS.html. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th

26
According the World Bank report, “behavioral economics shows that features of
human decision making under uncertainty constrain our natural instinct to adapt”.58
People will favour status quo over change, and uncertainty can be viewed as
sufficient reason to postpone action and discount the future, as we will see later.
Indeed, according to research led by Robert Gifford, “perceived or real uncertainty
reduces the frequency of pro-environmental behaviour”, giving people a justification
to favour self-interest or postpone constraining change.59
Uncertainty is an inherent part of science due to limited knowledge. As we have seen
above, climate change models are limited by gaps in scientific knowledge, notably
concerning the role of feedbacks in the climate system. They are also limited by the
very nature of future predictions since we can only guess what the future levels of
economic development, the population and mitigation trends and the technological
progress will be. Moreover, though models can establish broad trends, there are
difficulties to simulate impacts on a local scale.
Additionally, according to a study led by the University of Illinois at Champaign-
Urbana, the terminology used (see the two tables below) to convey levels of certitude
in the IPCC reports has been misunderstood by the American public, and has led the
public to underestimate the likelihood of risks.60
58
WORLD BANK report 2010, “Overcoming behavioural inertia”. Accessible from:
8.pdf . Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
(p325)
59
GIFFORD, Robert, “The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate Change
Mitigation and Adaptation”. Accessible from: http://www.scp-
knowledge.eu/sites/default/files/knowledge/attachments/The%20Dragons%20of%20Inaction.pdf .
th
60
BUDESCU, David, BROOMELL, Stephen, POR, Han-Hui, “Improving Communication of Uncertainty
in the Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”. Accessible from:
http://www.climateaccess.org/sites/default/files/Budescu_Improving%20Communication%20of%20
Uncertainty.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 24
th

27
(61
)
(62
)
But even if scientific knowledge is “tentative and incomplete”, as well as socially
constructed, it is also acquired applying well accepted “experimental systems and
procedures” of replicability, as well as peer-reviewed.63
This means that validation
from fellow scientists is required for the scientific community to accept a research
conclusion as an accurate state of the current understanding of reality. And there is
indeed a scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, which has been
confirmed by a study led by Naomi Oreskes, an American Science Historian who
61
IPCC, “Guidance Notes for Lead authors of the IPCC Fourth Assessment report on Addressing
Uncertainties”. Accessible from: https://www.ipcc-
wg1.unibe.ch/publications/supportingmaterial/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th
62
IPCC, Guidance Notes for Lead authors of the IPCC Fourth Assessment report on Addressing
Uncertainties. Accessible from: https://www.ipcc-
wg1.unibe.ch/publications/supportingmaterial/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th
63
DOUGHERTY, Michael, “Can science win over climate change skeptics”. Accessible from:
http://www.actionbioscience.org/education/dougherty.html#primer. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

28
randomly reviewed all peer-reviewed scientific papers published between 1993 and
2003.
Uncertainty is also generated by the quest for neutrality from the media and its equal
exposure of expert and lay opinion on the subject as we have seen above. It can also
arise from the distrust of experts, following the “Climate-Gate” affair for example,
and from the disinformation campaigns spread by climate deniers, as we will see
below.
5) Judgmental discounting.
Information deficit can also lead to judgmental discounting:
A short term vision, a sense that climate change is happening in faraway places along
with the time-delayed, slow-paced, statistical nature of global warming, will lead
people to underestimate the risks. This, combined with the government failure to
address the problem, the cloud of uncertainty surrounding the issue, and the optimist
sense of American exceptionalism, will favour a tendency to discount the future and
postpone constraining actions and costs to a later date.
As mentioned earlier, climate change is not yet a phenomenon experienced directly
by people in their day-to-day life and most of the risks (and thus benefits) of
mitigating climate change lie in what seems a distant future. As we will see later,
people have limited resources to commit to their everyday lives, and they will
express concern about (and favour acting on) what seems to them to be the most
pressing or important issues. Future events are constructed in abstract terms, whereas
events that seem to be closer in time will appear in more concrete terms, affecting
people’s perception of strength and impact. This difference in the “concreteness of
the representation of temporally close versus distant consequences may well lie at the
root of observed problems of self-control”, as mitigating climate change will require
sacrifice of “immediate benefits for the sake of abstract distant goals”.64
Indeed,
while taking mitigating actions may have an immediate cost, their benefits are
64
on Sept. 14
th
(p43)

29
uncertain, far-off and in the future. And, ignoring the scientific claim that postponed
action will lead to worse consequences, people will continue to focus on short term
personal benefits and discount the future of society at large, following a perfect
“Tragedy of the Commons” scenario.
6) Control issue
The perceived levels of control over the whole issue can also affect the perception of
risks and the level of actions undertaken:
Greenhouse gases pervade nearly all parts of our capitalist society and there are few
necessities or pleasures left in life that are not fueled by commercial energy. As such,
their mitigation will involve the rethinking of our economic, political and social
structures, as well as of our conception of the world and of our place in it. This is a
daunting task that can create a feeling of hopelessness, especially realizing that our
economic and political structures have not been able to handle the problem so far.
This can give rise to a feeling of helplessness that can cause people to tune out and
stop caring, if only to avoid feeling distraught. People can also choose to deny the
problem to avoid cognitive dissonance and feelings of guilt.
Solving climate change is a collective action problem: it will involve the cooperation
of many countries and many people. Its global and collective scale can make
individuals feel that they have little control over the outcome. This feeling of
powerlessness can be exacerbated by the “pervasive culture of individualism” and
related lack of trust in governmental institutions.65
Indeed, as a global commons
problem, climate change will require more governmental involvement and not less,
which can create further resistance as we will see below. In addition, some critics of
American individualism point out the “loss of political power that comes from
neglecting to unite with each other’s and the particular translation of individual
responsibility into consumerism such that people come to see themselves as
consumers rather than as citizens”.66
This loss of connection can make us feel
65
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2011, 279 pages. (p 191)
66

30
overwhelmed and powerless since individual action cannot alone affect climate
change.
Feelings of hopelessness can also result from seeing others carrying on in their
“highly consumptive behaviours”. People find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma
type of situation where they do not believe others will do their part and therefore do
not feel obligated to take action.67
According to John Immerwahr, people view others
as too greedy and self-interested to be concerned about climate change and perceive
this “moral deterioration” as being irreversible, feeling that climate change is
therefore an unsolvable problem.68
And finally, perception of the weather as outside of human control, coupled with the
long time scale of the impacts, can also contribute to this feeling of powerlessness
and to a sense of fatalism in the face of climate change.
B. CRITICISM OF THE INFORMATION DEFICIT MODEL
Though there is some validity in the information deficiency model approach, its
critics have pointed out that it assumes that as people get informed and more science
literate, they will take climate change more seriously and start taking action to
mitigate it. However, this is not necessarily the case, as we will see.
The “Tragedy of the commons risk perception study” surveyed a large number of
U.S. adults to study the explanation of the “Public Irrationality thesis” (PIT),
according to which climate change behavioural deficit is caused by science illiteracy,
a reliance on heuristic rather than rational understanding of the risks, and by cultural
67
68
IMMERWAHR, John, “Waiting for a signal: Public Attitudes Toward Global Warming, the
Environment and Geophysical Research”. Accessible from:
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/5662.pdf . Last consulted on Sept. 14
th

31
cognition, (i.e., the facts that people’s perceptions and opinions are influenced by the
sharing of a set of values with others).69
Contrary to expectation, this study found that concern over climate change was not
positively correlated with science literacy and did not increase as people became
more familiar with a rational way of thinking. Indeed, quite the opposite was
presented by the data collected: as science literacy increased, climate change concern
decreased.
(70
)
On the other hand, the results regarding cultural cognition were consistent with the
“Public Irrationality Thesis”, since groups of people subscribing to certain values
responded according to their ideological guidelines:
69
th
70
Extracted from KAHAN, Dan, Cultural Cognition Project:
th

32
(71
)
These results demonstrate that cultural values have a much stronger influence on the
perception of climate change risks than levels of science literacy and education. Such
finding is confirmed when science literacy is accounted for in the cultural cognition
results:
71
Extracted from KAHAN, Dan, Cultural Cognition Project, The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception
Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change, on
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503 p14.. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
.

33
(72
)
A previous study on “Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus” had already
demonstrated that, on culturally charged issues such as climate change, individuals
tended to accept scientific findings when they fit with their “own cultural
predispositions”.73
By showing that the more scientifically literate people were, the
more likely they were to follow their own cultural group position on the issue, “The
Tragedy of the Risk-Perceptions Common” study demonstrated that scientific
literacy led to “greater cultural polarization” rather than convergence towards
scientific consensus as would have been expected. Such an effect triggers even more
polarization, since members of a cultural group will look up to better educated
people within their group for guidance on complex issues such as climate change.
This study concluded that since a higher degree of science literacy meant that people
were more likely to seek out their cultural group’s position on the subject, the lack of
action on climate change was therefore not due to lack of knowledge but rather to the
political worldview of certain cultural groups.
This brings us to the socio-cultural barriers to accurate perceptions of climate change
risks.
3. SOCIO-CULTURAL BARRIERS
As we have seen so far, though there is a scientific consensus on the issue of climate
change, there is no social consensus. We have also seen that public response does not
seem to depend on the scientific assessment or the understanding of climate change
risks, but rather to be a cultural debate guided by cultural worldviews. According to
Clive Hamilton, it was not always so. Indeed, in the 1990’s, there was no partisan
72
Extracted from KAHAN, Dan, Cultural Cognition Project, “The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception
Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change”,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503 p14.. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
73
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503 p14. Last consulted on Sept. 14th
(p11)

34
divide and climate change views were influenced mainly by scientific findings.
Partisan divide arose with the 1997 Kyoto Treaty, which “threatened the material
interests of powerful economic and political interests, particularly members of the
fossil fuel industry”.74
As we are going to see, those private interests exploited the
public space to contest global warming and its anthropogenic cause, and to create a
public questioning of the scientific findings. This caused the climate change debate
to switch from trying to find the best and most efficient mitigating solutions, to a
polarized debate between trying to defend lifestyles and privileges on the one side
and trying to defend the validity of scientific findings on the other.
We are now going to develop why Americans’ perception of and responses to
climate change risks are mainly dependent on their cultural identity and social norms.
As Eviatar Zerubavel says, “we think not only as individuals and human beings but
also as members of particular communities with certain distinctive cognitive
traditions that affect the way we process the world in our minds”.75
Such cognitive
traditions frame the way people interpret the world around them, what Andrew J.
Hoffman calls “ideological filters”, which are people’s “identity, worldview and
belief systems”.76
Indeed, as we are going to see below, in order to gain a sense of
social belonging, acquire a cultural identity and be accepted by others, people will
behave according to pre-established social norms and will match their cultural values
to those of their cultural group (what Yale Law School professor Dan Kahan calls
“cultural cognition of risk”).77
Risks perceptions are therefore socially constructed.
74
HOFFMAN, Andrew, “Climate Science as Culture War”. Accessible from:
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/climate_science_as_culture_war. Last consulted on Sept.
14
th
75
76
14
th
77
14
th

35
A. CULTURAL STRUCTURE:
Let us first start with the influence cultural worldviews have on risk perception. As
we have seen, people’s perception of climate change risks will depend on the views
of the cultural group an individual feels affinities to.78
Indeed, as already mentioned,
in order to gain a sense of belonging and acceptance by others, people will match
their views and behaviours to those of their chosen community. People can, for
example, define themselves through their political views, religious views, perception
of technology, perception of nature, or by the lifestyle they pursue. Some worldviews
as we will see below can be strong barriers to change and lead group members to
perceive mitigation to climate change as a direct threat to their established order.
1) Political worldviews:
The “Psychology and Global Climate Change” study mentions five distinct types of
cultures that perceive risks differently: “hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian,
fatalist and hermitic”.79
Anthony Leiserowitz, director of the Yale Project on Climate
Change, also classifies American response to climate change by types, which are
“the Alarmed, the Concerned, the Cautious, the Disengaged, the Doubtful and the
Dismissive":
78
on Sept. 14
th
79
on Sept. 14
th
(p45)

36
(80
)
And each type’s conception of climate change risks can be further segmented as
follow:
80
Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, “Global Warming’s Six Americas”. Accessible
from: http://environment.yale.edu/climate/news/Six-Americas-March-2012/. Last consulted on
Sept. 14
th

37
(81
)
According to Zaller’s Receive Accept Sample model, people’s opinion on a subject
will reflect their political engagement, so we can further group different types of
cultures by political affiliation.82
The hierarchical and individualist cultural types can
be grouped under the conservative (or republican) political views. Such group
members will believe in free-enterprise capitalism and view governmental
interferences and behavioural constraints to mitigate climate change as threatening to
the proper functioning of the market, to their freedom and to the established social
ranking privileges. People following this worldview will more likely be in the
“Doubtful” or “Dismissive” categories of Americans. As an added note, according
to the A. McCright and R. Dunlap study on “Cool dudes: The Denial of climate
change among conservative white males in the United States”, there is an over-
representation of the white male population in this category, which is explained by a
high tolerance to risk. Such acceptance could be attributed to the fact that white
males hold “dominant position in the social structure”, and “create, manage, control
and benefit from” much of the actual world order we are in. 83
They can therefore feel
less inclined to challenge the hierarchy in place, more motivated to reject climate
change to protect their privileges, and more likely to react strongly against global
warming as they can perceive it as a direct threat to their cultural identity.
The egalitarian and communitarian cultural types can be grouped under the liberals
(in the American sense of the term), and democrats. They will more likely challenge
established social organizations and favour a better distribution of risks and a more
collective approach of the problem. People belonging to this worldview will more
likely fit in Professor Leiserowitz “Alarmed” and “Concerned” categories.
81
Graph taken from Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, “Global Warming’s six
Americas in March 2012 and November 2011”. Accessible from:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Six-Americas-March-2012.pdf. Last consulted on Sept.
15
th
82
Zaller’s Receive, Accept, Sample Model. Accessible from: http://desart.us/courses/3180/RAS.html.
th
83
McCRIGHT, Aaron, DUNLAP Riley, “Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among conservative
white males in the United States”. Accessible from:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095937801100104X. Last accessed on Oct. 1
st

38
We can see the strong relationship between climate change perception and political
affiliation confirmed in this poll:
(84
)
Political perception of climate change can have a strong influence on social
acceptance. For example, a person working at a local oil refinery in Oklahoma might
be rejected by his colleagues if he says that climate change is a serious issue, and the
same might apply if a liberal art professor in NYC says that climate change is a hoax.
2) Religious worldviews:
Religious affiliation will also impact climate change response. Indeed, some people
may perceive the weather as divine and beyond human interference, while others
may have a fatalistic approach and let their religious deity take care of things. Some
might believe that their god will spare them and that action is therefore unnecessary,
while some might trust god’s promise to Noah to never destroy the earth again. Some
people in the dominionist movement, (who perceive the environment as made by god
for humanity’s use), may go as far as promoting the destruction of our environment
84
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/climate_science_as_culture_war. Last consulted
on Sept. 14th

39
and actively engaging in anti-environmental and climate change denial activism to
bring us faster to the “end-of-time” and allow for the comeback of Jesus Christ.
Religion is of particular importance in the Unites States compared to many other
developed countries, and its perception of ethics is often heavily influence by
political ideology (e.g. through cultural divides on guns and abortion rights),
resulting in no clear divide between politics and religion. Politicians often talk about
god or call on the nation to pray to address problems, and the “Pledge of Allegiance”
as “one Nation under God” recited by millions of children to the American flag every
morning at school, illustrates the depth of the link between religion and politics.
Radical religious beliefs are already in direct conflict with scientific findings on
Evolution versus the Creationist movement, and the rationality of the scientific
process is not necessarily acknowledged as being more trustworthy than the heuristic
perception of faith and belief when competing on the same issue. But there are
however growing movements of progressive Christians (or “green evangelists”), that
go beyond the traditional conservative ethical issues and address the moral dilemma
of environmental degradation and climate change with a “Creation Care” approach.
3) Techno-centrist versus eco-centric worldviews:
Perceptions of nature will also influence people’s perception of, and response to,
climate change risks. Whether people perceive nature as having an instrumental or
intrinsic value will affect the level of effort they are willing to contribute to mitigate
climate change. Those believing in the instrumental value of nature are more inclined
to believe that natural capital can be replaced by man-made capital and more likely
to have a techno-centric approach to solving climate change. Conversely, people
believing that nature has an intrinsic value will be more likely to have an eco-centric
approach to climate change mitigation, or in other words, to advocate for measures
that will protect our natural capital.
A techno-centric worldview guides the main-stream approach to climate change and
the one advocated by most developed countries. Operating in a business-as-usual
manner, it sees technological innovation as the best solution to the global commons

40
problems it created. There are different levels of faith in what it can do, ranging from
partial to sole solution to climate change.
4) American exceptionalism worldview:
Citizens pursuing the American dream or following the post 9/11 American
patriotism renewal movement, might also be inclined to “justify societal status quo”
and be unwilling to challenge what they view as American exceptionalism.85
They
might perceive the material pursuit of the American lifestyle as a right and as being
exempt from criticism. Climate change mitigation is more likely to be perceived as a
cultural threat, a loss of privileges, and a freedom restriction by this group of people.
Consequently, they are more likely to resist climate change assertions.
B. SOCIAL COMPARISON
Risk perceptions are also influenced by social norms, and according to the World
Bank Report on Overcoming Behavioural Inertia, “social norms have a particularly
strong impact under conditions of uncertainty”.86
As we have already seen above, the issue of climate change is filled with
uncertainties. Moreover, in order to conceive climate change risks, people have to
take into account unfamiliar events happening outside of their immediate awareness
(such as impacts taking place in faraway places and in the future). The perception of
Climate change risks will therefore depend on individuals’ interpretation of external
information as well as on socio-cultural guidelines. Indeed, as mentioned above,
people will match their values and concerns to those of their peers, by adopting their
cultural group’s worldviews. Social norms also give guidelines that allow people to
frame their concerns and responses. Indeed, as we will develop below, social
comparison will let people know what conduct or level of concern is “appropriate
85
knowledge.eu/sites/default/files/knowledge/attachments/The%20Dragons%20of%20Inaction.pdf.
th
86
WORLD BANK report 2010, “Overcoming behavioural inertia”. Accessible from:
8.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 14
th
(p329)

41
and desirable”, thereby influencing and regulating “individual and group
behaviours”.87
Moreover, social norms have a direct impact on climate change
responses through their influence on consumption patterns (through valued social
achievement). They can also be used to justify inaction and to correct cognitive
dissonance by offering a structure of acceptable perceptions and actions, thereby
enabling the creation of a double reality. Indeed, climate change being a disturbing
issue that threatens our lifestyle and identity, social norms can be used along with
cultural cognition to reorganize the way we acknowledge (or not) the problem, in
what Eviatar Zerubavel calls the “social organization of denial”.88
1) Social norms:
According to Kari Marie Norgaard, social norms will dictate the acceptable spatial
and temporal level of awareness, the level of concern one should display, as well as
the type of emotions one should express.89
Social norms can therefore also be used as
tools to manage emotions and awareness and can serve as ways to minimize
individual responsibility and justify behaviours.
Thinking about climate change can be an emotionally charged topic, and it is rarely
good etiquette in the United States to bring up such serious subject. Moreover, as we
have seen, climate change has become a cultural debate, and according to Kari Marie
Norgaard, “expressing political views that are not shared is nothing short of bad
manners” in many parts of the United States.90
Peer norms are important as they will
structure one’s acceptance by the group. People depend on their community for
support and they will comply with social requirements to “minimize the danger of
87
on Sept. 14
th
(p71)
88
89
90

42
community estrangement” and to secure their place in the group, especially on such a
subject where their personal belief may seem to have little impact on the final
outcome of the problem.91
2) Valued social achievement:
Valued social achievement is a “typical cultural barrier to change”, as consumption
will follow social trends.92
Social-interactions will define “necessity versus luxury”
and set the level of expectations below which consumption levels may seem
insufficient and likely to cause social exclusion or sense of loss.93
Social comparison can also lead to inaction through perceived inequality. Indeed as
mentioned in the “Psychology and Global Climate Change” study, perceived inequity
can lower willingness to cooperate and be used as “justification for inaction”.94
People may wonder why they should adopt constraining behaviours when their
neighbour obviously has not. The large disparity in income distribution in the U.S.
can also create resentment and not be “conducive to the cooperative actions needed”
to mitigate climate change.95
As an example, Al Gore’s lifestyle has been turned into
an argument for inaction.
91
th
92
on Sept. 14
th
(p123)
93
on Sept. 14
th
(p72)
94
on Sept. 14
th
(p 132)
95

43
4. INDIVIDUAL CHOICES
While socio-cultural pressures can be significant, addressing climate change is also
about individual choices, choices to decide on what matters most and what is worthy
of concern and effort. Let us look now at these individual choices.
A. PRIORITIES
As we can see from this 2009 Pew Research Center survey, global warming ranked
at the bottom of the list of priorities of Americans:
(96
)
Such perception of climate change as an issue of low priority is reflected in people’s
willingness to put in time, effort and resources to address climate change.
96
PEW RESEARCH CENTER survey, “Economy, Jobs, Trump All Other Policy Priorities In 2009”.
Accessible from: http://www.people-press.org/2009/01/22/economy-jobs-trump-all-other-policy-
priorities-in-2009. Last consulted on Sept. 15
th

44
Willingness to act is also affected by the fact that people only have a “finite pool of
worry”, which means that they can only worry about a certain number of things at
once and only for a certain time, which is not conducive to the long term
mobilization that climate change mitigation will require.97
B. ECONOMIC CONCERNS
If we look at Robert Brulle’s study on “Shifting public opinion on climate change: an
empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the US,
2002-2010”, we can see that American people’s concern for climate change dropped
sharply in 2008.98
97
THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS, “The Psychology of Climate Change
Communication“. Accessible from: http://guide.cred.columbia.edu/pdfs/CREDguide_full-res.pdf.
th
98
BRULLE, Robert, CARMICHAEL, Jason, JENKINS, Craig, Shifting public opinion on climate change: an
empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the US., 2002-2010.
Accessible from: http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-12ClimateChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf.
th

45
(99
)
To understand why, this study extracted different categories of variables, (such as the
influence of extreme weather events, the release of scientific information, the amount
of media coverage, the media content, the political cues and diverse economic and
political factors such as unemployment, economic well-being of the country, energy
prices and wars). To figure out which events had the greatest impact, the study then
matched the events chronologically along a chart of public perception of climate
change risks. The conclusion was that, as covered above, media coverage, content
and political cues were most influential, but that economic cues also had a large
influence. Such correlation between economic uncertainty and climate change
concern could be interpreted as people viewing climate change as a secondary,
“luxury issue”, which is not perceived to be as serious as other more tangible
concerns.
C. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Financial investment can also be a barrier to change as we have seen, and people will
choose to hold on to a good they paid money for until it becomes too obsolete or
disadvantageous to use, even if it makes less sense to keep on doing so than to switch
to a new behaviour. For example, people will have a tendency to keep on using their
car rather than switch to bicycling or using public transportation.
People also have a tendency to adopt the easiest and least expensive solution
regardless of the difference in impact on the environment. And as described in the
“Low-cost hypothesis”, (also called tokenism), the influence of environmental
concern on environmental behaviour will diminish as behavioural costs increase.100
99
Graph extracted from BRULLE, Robert, CARMICHAEL, Jason, JENKINS, Craig, Shifting public opinion
on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the
US., 2002-2010. Accessible from: http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-
12ClimateChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf. Last consulted on Sept. 15
th
100
th

46
D. GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS
Goals and aspirations can also impact people’s willingness to take mitigating action
on climate change. The aspirations to succeed in life or to live the American dream,
as we have seen, are often associated with material success, and people may be
unwilling to give up such values and aspirations, especially if they rank climate
change as of lower importance compare to other priorities.
E. BEHAVIOURAL MOMENTUM
Habit can also have an impact on people’s willingness to address climate change.
Indeed, according to Robert Gifford, habit may be “one of the most important”
barrier to climate change mitigation.101
The resistance to change personal habits is
called “behavioural momentum”. According to the report on Psychology and Global
Climate Change, well-established habits are particularly difficult to change, and
many people, though having the choice to do things differently, will simply chose not
to change because of the personal effort it would require. Indeed, it is easier to
change one’s mind about the necessity of doing something, than to change one’s
behaviour to do things differently.
F. SKEPTICISM
Willingness to act upon what scientists tell us about climate change will also depend
on how people perceive scientists.
As we have already briefly covered above, trust of climate scientists in the U.S., was
challenged by an active denial campaign from fossil fuel and fossil fuel-related
industries, along with the George W. Bush political approach towards climate
101
th
(p5)

47
change. Indeed, under George W. Bush, the climate change problem was treated as
needing further study. Official documents were discredited, modified or dismissed to
reflect views that climate change uncertainties were too important to warrant action,
and scientists were often excluded from climate change policy discussions. This
combined with the active denial campaign organized and funded by fossil fuel and
related industries (such as Exxon Mobil and Koch Industries), challenged the
soundness of scientific research on climate change and affected people’s perception
of the seriousness of the risks. Indeed, taking advantage of people’s reluctance to
change, Exxon Mobil created an array of seemingly independent “front
organizations” (often regrouping the very same people), to create the impression of
broad contestation in the public. Misrepresenting scientific findings, distorting
scientific facts, they challenged climate change, feeding the debate with non-
scientific argumentation.
According to Kari Marie Norgaard, the climate change denial campaign’s real
achievement is that it shifted the public debate “away from what needs to be done to
whether anything needs to be done at all”.102
Such contestation allowed people to
latch onto justifications for their failure to act, and fit nicely into the “anti-
intellectualism” movement that has “deep roots in American political culture and has
gained a pronounced momentum in recent years”. 103
It also fit in well with the
patriotic resurgence after 9/11, by revaluing feelings of “American exceptionalism”
and placing America’s action and the American way of life beyond reproach.
Such positioning translated into different forms of skepticism over scientific
evidence of climate change. Indeed, according to Robert Gifford, skepticism can
range from mistrust of the scientists, to “perceived inadequacy” of the solutions
offered, to denial of the issue and to strong opposition.104
102
103
104
th

48
1) Trust:
People need to trust that science will be looking out for their best interests to
undertake climate change mitigation. Indeed, the constraint of changing one’s
behaviour, and the implied financial and social risk involved, will require a great leap
of faith.
Trust can be easily damaged, and according to Professor Leiserowitz, the “Climate
Gate” controversy created widespread distrust on “public beliefs in global warming
and trust in scientists”, even if such loss was recorded primarily among conservative
people.105
(106
)
2) Perceived inadequacy:
Most climate change mitigation programs offered so far are on a voluntary basis.
People have therefore the choice to comply or not. But, unless people feel absolute
certainty about a decision, they will be inclined to follow the path of least resistance
105
LEISEROWITZ, Anthony, “Climategate, Public Opinion, and the Loss of Trust”. Accessible from:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Climategate_Opinion_and_Loss_of_Trust_1.pdf. Last
th
106
Graph extracted from LEISEROWITZ, Anthony study on “Climategate, Public Opinion, and the Loss
of Trust”. Accessible from:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Climategate_Opinion_and_Loss_of_Trust_1.pdf. Last
th

49
in case of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, changing habit and
behaviour is harder than changing opinions about “the adequacy of a program”.107
3) Denial of the issue:
People can also choose to deny that climate change is occurring or that it is of
anthropogenic origin. People need predictability and to feel in control, and
uncertainty, along with the emotionally disturbing scientific messages coming from
climate change research, can lead to stress and anxiety and open the road for contest.
Such context, combined with mistrust and the financial and psychological costs
mentioned above, can all “easily lead to active denial of the problem”.108
IV. CONCLUSION
So, to summarize, the explanation of our behavioural deficit regarding climate
change has shifted from blaming a lack of clear or sufficient information on global
warming (the Information Deficit model), to personal and socio-cultural
responsibility, where part of the population actively reorganizes and resists available
information following socio-cultural guidance and personal choices.109
The climate
change issue being no longer perceived as a physical state of the planet, but rather as
107
th
108
th
109

50
an issue about “values, worldviews and ideologies”, clashing over what Andrew J.
Hoffman calls a “Culture War”.110
But looking at this poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication,
we can see that there are some positive signs and some reason for cautious optimism.
(111
)
Indeed, we can see that beyond the divide in perceptions of the climate change issue
in American society, there is also a large sample of Americans (49.77%) who believe
that humans could reduce climate change (against approximately 27.84% believing
that nothing can or needs to be done). And though this poll also suggests that 49.26%
of the population is unwilling to act on climate change, it can still be interpreted
110
27
th
111
Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, “Global Warming’s Six Americas”. Accessible
from: http://environment.yale.edu/climate/news/Six-Americas-March-2012/. Last consulted on
Sept. 27
th

51
favorably as a sign that at least part of the population could be open to move beyond
cultural divides and engage in a “consensus-based debate”.112
Many communities in the U.S. are beginning to directly experience some climate
change impacts. For example, Alaska has been experiencing infrastructure damages
because of permafrost melt, Western States have started to see an increase in
droughts, and hurricane Katrina has been interpreted by some as a forecast of what is
to come. And though climate change weather events did not register as having an
impact on climate change perception in the Robert J. Brulle Study, it is possible that
people who experience proximity to the problem respond differently.113
The need to
adapt can then become more tangible, (though mitigation can still not be perceived as
necessary since it involves the more abstract solution of reducing greenhouse gases
emissions). Such climate change concern has allowed for action to be undertaken at
the local and state level. Indeed, even if there is little “federal leadership”, some
states and local governments have been taking measures to address global warming.
Such local actions can have a significant impact, especially if you consider high
emissions’ states like Texas or California.
According to Andrew J. Hoffman, “the challenge is to move the debate away from
the loud minorities at the extremes and to engage the majority in the middle - the
Concerned, the Cautious, the Disengaged, and the Doubtful”. His article gives reason
for optimism in citing the cigarette smoking and cancer issue as a problem of discord
between scientific and social consensus that has been overcome. Indeed, despite
heavy lobbying on the part of the tobacco industry, the link between smoking and
cancer eventually gained general public acceptance and political attention. We can
therefore be hopeful that anthropogenic climate change will one day become
accepted by the public as a pressing problem that demands responsible answers and
political leadership.
112
27
th
113
BRULLE, Robert, “Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors
influencing concern over climate change in the US., 2002-2010. Accessible from:
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-12ClimateChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf. Last consulted on
Sept. 29
th

52
But the question about scientific uncertainties on climate change impacts remains,
and notably about how much time we have left to choose our future, before decisions
are made for us by the planet.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
American Psychological Association’s task Force on the Interface Between Psychology and
Global Climate Change, 2008-2009, “Psychology and Global Climate Change: Addressing a
Multi-Faceted Phenomenon and Set of Challenges”.
BRULLE, Robert; CARMICHAEL, Jason; JENKINS, J. Craig; Sept 2011, “Shifting public
opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over
climate change in the US., 2002-2010.
BUDESCU, David; BROOMELL, Stephen; POR, Han-Hui; 2008, “Improving
Communication of Uncertainty in the Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change”
LEGGETT, Jane A.; CONGRESSION RESEARCH SERVICE, Feb. 2011; “A U.S.-Centric Chronology
of the International Climate Change Negotiations”.
CRATE, Susan, NUTTALL, Mark, 2009, “Anthropology and Climate change, From
Encounters to Actions”, Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 416 pages.
DOUGHERTY, Michael; July 2009; “Can science win over climate change skeptics”.
EHRLICH, Paul and Ann, 2009, “The dominant animal, Human Evolution and the
Environment”, Washington, Island Press, 464 pages.
GIFFORD, Robert; May-June 2011; “The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That
Limit Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation”; American Psychologist, Vol. 66, N° 4
HOFFMAN, Andrew, Fall 2012, “Climate Science as Culture War”; Stanford Social
Innovation Review
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate change 2007 (AR4)
KAHAN, Dan; WITTLIN, Maggie; PETERS, Ellen; SLOVIC, Paul; OUELLETTE, Lisa
Larrimore; BRAMAN, Donald; MANDEL, Gregory, N.; 2011 “The Tragedy of the Risk-
Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change”.
McCRIGHT, Aaron; DUNLAP Riley; Oct. 2011; “Cool dudes: The denial of climate change
among conservative white males in the United States”. Global Environmental Change, Vol.
21, N° 4

53
NORGAARD, Kari Marie, 2011, “Living in denial: Climate change, Emotions, and
Everyday Life”, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 279 pages.
People For the American Way, 2011,“The ‘Green Dragon’ Slayers: How the Religious Right
and the Corporate Right are Joining Forces to Fight Environmental Protection”
SHOME Debika; MARX, Sabine; The Center for Research on Environmental Decisions,
2009, “The Psychology of Climate Change Communication“.
SWIM, Janet; CLAYTON, Susan; DOHERTY, Thomas; GIFFORD, Robert; HOWARD,
George; RESER, Joseph; STERN, Paul; WEBER, Elke; March 2010 “Psychology and
Global Climate Change: Addressing a Multi-faceted Phenomenon and Set of Challenges”,
Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change.
Union of Concerned Scientists; Jan. 2007, “Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air, How ExxonMobil
Uses Big Tobacco’s tactics to Manufacture uncertainty on Climate Science”
The World Bank; “World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change,
Overcoming Behavioral and Institutional Inertia”
Worldwatch Institute; Vision for a sustainable World, “Grain Harvest Sets Record, But
Supplies Still Tight” and “The State of Consumption Today”
Yale Project on Climate Change Communication; “Americans’ Knowledge of Climate
Change” and “Global Warming’s Six Americas”

coralie-rigaud-DDO9-memoire-2012

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

La actualidad más candente (20)

Destacado

Destacado (16)

Similar a coralie-rigaud-DDO9-memoire-2012

Similar a coralie-rigaud-DDO9-memoire-2012 (20)

coralie-rigaud-DDO9-memoire-2012