CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication. 2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there. 3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
December 8, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Al Murabitoun, under Mokhtar Belmokhtar, formally united with AQIM, consolidating al Qaeda’s network in
the Maghreb and Sahel and increasing the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their
resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. ISIS assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen, demonstrating the group’s growing capabilities in
southern Yemen and its ability to disrupt coalition objectives there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military
dimensions of Iran's nuclear activities following the release of its December 2 report.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri praised the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack and called on Muslims to wage jihad within
the United States and Europe in a video released on December 1. Zawahiri’s speech, entitled, “Support Your Prophet,” was
likely recorded in late spring 2015 and also included a short eulogy for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s religious scholar
Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari (d. January 31, 2015). Al Sahab, al Qaeda’s media group, issued a November 30 message
apologizing for delays in releases from Zawahiri, citing security and administrative issues as cause.
There is initial evidence loosely connecting the San Bernardino shooters to the al Qaeda network, including Syed Rizwan
Farook’s contact with individuals associated with al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and Jabhat al Nusra. A shooter pledged support
to the Islamic State just before the attack, but there is a possibility that the al Qaeda network played a part in radicalizing the
individuals.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will likely continue to pursue a long-term strategy in which it builds strength among its affiliates and benefits
from the West’s focus on defeating the ISIS threat.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed announced that peace talks will begin in Geneva on December 15. All
parties have agreed to implement a humanitarian ceasefire in Yemen in conjunction with the peace talks.
Outlook: The combatants will continue to consolidate territory and clash along the frontlines in advance of the talks.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh forces launched a series of ground assaults along the Saudi Arabian border, attacking civilian and military
targets in Jazan and Najran provinces in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi troops repulsed the attacks, though the al Houthis
claimed to destroy Saudi military equipment and infrastructure. The Saudi-led coalition continued to prepare for a transition from
combat to security operations, with Morocco pledging to send 1,500 special forces and military police to Yemen and the United
Arab Emirates announcing a plan to integrate popular resistance fighters into Yemeni government security forces in Aden.
Outlook: The Saudi-led coalition will continue its airstrike campaign in response to al Houthi cross-border attacks. The coalition
will pursue security operations, intended to bolster President Hadi’s government in Aden, in preparation for the Geneva talks.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS and AQAP activity is escalating in southern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated the Governor of Aden, Jaafar
Mohammed Saad, with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Ansar al Sharia, AQAP’s insurgent force in Yemen,
took control of two towns in Abyan governorate, including Zinjibar, the regional capital. Ansar al Sharia nominally withdrew from
the town of Ja’ar but established a local governing council there. Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, a key Ansar al Sharia leader who was
the face of AQAP in Abyan in 2011-2012, survived a reported airstrike in Zinjibar.
Outlook: ISIS and AQAP will continue to target high-profile officials and take control of territory, respectively. The increase in
ISIS and AQAP activity in southern Yemen will undermine the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts to secure Aden and reinforce the
legitimacy of the Hadi government in its de facto capital.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1) 01 DEC: Al Houthi
forces launched
ground assaults in
Jazan and Najran
provinces, Saudi
Arabia.
2) 02 DEC: AQAP-
linked Ansar al Sharia
militants overran
Ja’ar and Zinjibar in
Abyan governorate.
3) 05-06 DEC:
Gunmen assassinated
a judge, an energy
official, and two
senior security
officers in Aden city.
4) 06 DEC: ISIS
Wilayat Aden-Abyan
assassinated the
governor of Aden.
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6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Conflict between Galmudug and Puntland security forces is escalating in Galkayo city in Mudug region following the attempted
assassination of a Galmudug parliamentarian. Security forces from the two administrations violated multiple ceasefires
mediated by the Somali Federal Government (SFG). The African Union and the East African bloc, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development, condemned the violence, which has caused thousands of residents to flee Galkayo.
Outlook: The Puntland and Galmudug administrations will likely take advantage of the international pressure to gain
concessions from the SFG. The ongoing security vacuum provides an opportunity for Islamist groups to expand in the region.
Security
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) officials pledged to send peacekeepers to Galkayo if the SFG requests assistance
to stabilize the city. Additionally, a confirmed U.S. airstrike killed a senior al Shabaab commander in Kuunyo-Barrow, Lower
Shabelle region.
Outlook: An AMISOM presence in Galkayo would strain the coalition’s already overburdened resources, likely detracting from
its ability to effectively combat al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continues its efforts to stop its members from defecting to the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). An
American al Shabaab member who surrendered to the Somali government reported fleeing amid major inter-group clashes with
pro-ISIS militants. Additionally, al Shabaab attacked a former member who pledged allegiance to ISIS, indicating that al
Shabaab is selectively targeting high-profile defectors. Al Shabaab also ambushed Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) in Kenya,
indicating the group’s capability to cross the Kenyan-Somali border and evade security forces for long enough to plant
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Pro-al Shabaab social media accounts are actively calling for Kenyans to join al Shabaab.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue its efforts to open a front in northeastern Kenya.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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3
2
4
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1) 07 DEC: Al
Shabaab ambushed a
KDF patrol in
Ishakani, Lamu
County.
2) 03 DEC: A VBIED
killed a journalist in
Mogadishu, Banadir
region.
3) 05-06 DEC: SNA
forces thwarted IED
attacks and launched
a security sweep in
Bulo-Burde, Hiraan
region.
4) 04 DEC: Assailants
attempted to
assassinate a
Galmudug MP in
Galkayo, Mudug
region.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Dissenting Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) MPs endorsed
a new reconciliation framework that effectively removes the international community from the Libyan peace process. HoR
leadership and the UN opposed this decision, while GNC leadership praised the group’s efforts.
Outlook: The rise of a newly defined voting bloc within the two parliaments will derail efforts to bring the internationally-
endorsed unity plan to a vote and will further divide the HoR and GNC.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA), affiliated with the HoR, continued air operations in Ajdabiya in response to ISIS Wilayat
Barqa’s assassination campaign in the city. The LNA also intensified its air and ground operations targeting ISIS and Ansar al
Sharia-held positions in western Benghazi, Libya.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus on Ajdabiya in an attempt to prevent an ISIS takeover.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
A large ISIS Wilayat Tarablus convoy, laden with heavy weapons, departed from Harawa, Sirte, and appeared to head toward
Petroleum Forces Guard (PFG) positions near As Sidra, Libya. The convoy’s movements suggest that ISIS Wilayat Tarablus
will attack PFG positions as part of a shaping operation before attempting to seize oil wells near Ras Lanuf and Brega, Libya.
The al Qaeda-linked Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD) executed Murad al Sabaa, an alleged leader of ISIS Wilayat
Barqa, in Derna, Libya.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Tarablus forces will likely attack PFG defensive positions near As Sidra and Ras Lanuf, Libya in
preparation for an operation focused on seizing oil infrastructure in the country.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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23
4
9
1) 01 DEC: Somali and
Boko Haram
reinforcement
convoys arrived in
Sirte, Libya.
2) 01 DEC: MSCD
forces executed an
alleged ISIS Wilayat
Barqa leader in Derna,
Libya.
3) 02 DEC: Suspected
ISIS Wilayat Barqa
assassins attempted
to kill the LNA
Judiciary Minister in
Bayda’, Libya.
4) 06 DEC: An armed
ISIS Wilayat Tarablus
convoy departed from
Harawa and headed
towards PFG positions
near As Sidra, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM is consolidating its influence and reasserting its authority in the region by publishing media about the execution of traitors,
militants’ speeches to tribes, and the incitement of jihad against France. Al Murabitoun reunited with AQIM, increasing the security
threat in Mali due to the groups’ combined resources, men, and traveling routes. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Murabitoun,
has valuable ties to northern Malian communities that will benefit AQIM as it seeks to unite groups and increase control in the
region.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to increase its presence in Mali as it unifies the radical Islamist militants in the region. AQIM will
publish more statements and conduct small scale attacks against French forces throughout the region.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, an AQIM affiliate, continued to evade military operations and civilian interactions. The group did not
publish any media, contrary to its typical activity, indicating that it is laying low in response to heightened security following the
November 24 ISIS-claimed bus bombing in Tunis. Tunisian forces arrested members from ISIS-affiliated groups Jund al Khilafa in
the Beja governorate and the al Forqan Brigade in the city of Sousse.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade may begin to publish statements again calling for jihad or criticizing the military. It will continue
to avoid open conflict with the Tunisian military unless provoked by security operations near its stronghold in Mount Chaambi.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Ansar al Din in northern Mali and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) in southern Mali continued to operate against Malian, French,
and MINUSMA security forces, but did not conduct any direct attacks. The groups’ association with AQIM suggests they will also
benefit from the union of AQIM and al Murabitoun.
Outlook: Ansar al Din and its affiliates will continue to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who
cooperate with these forces, in order to destabilize the region and disrupt the implementation of the peace agreement.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
4
1) 01 DEC: ISIS
Wilayat Algeria
conducted an IED
attack in Constantine,
Algeria.
2) 01 – 03 DEC: ANP
conducted a clearing
operation and killed
seven terrorists in Tizi
Ouzou, Algeria.
3) 03 DEC: Police
arrested eight Jund al
Khilafah members
and one Ansar al
Sharia member in
Beja, Tunisia.
4) 03 - 05 DEC: Police
arrested five AQIM
members in
Medenine, Tunisia.
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3

12. ASSESSMENT:
Reactions to the Nuclear Deal
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear
explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device after 2009” in a December 2 report. The IAEA report examined the possible military dimensions (PMD)
of Iran’s nuclear activities, as stipulated by the nuclear agreement. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the
IAEA report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the
IAEA Board of Governors. The regime is strongly pushing for the closure of Iran’s PMD file, as it is concerned the West will
exploit an open file as an opportunity to re-impose sanctions.
Outlook: Evidence surrounding Iran’s past nuclear activities is unlikely to prevent the closure of its PMD file at the IAEA Board
of Governors in December.
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed during a televised speech on December 3 that he has privately warned
President Hassan Rouhani against “participating in Russian slander” toward Turkey. Erdoğan’s speech followed claims by
Russian officials and Iranian news outlets that his family has profited from the oil trade with ISIS. In response to Erdoğan’s
speech, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari issued a statement urging neighboring countries to show
“decency and mutual respect” and to avoid policies that “intentionally or unintentionally” support terrorism. Expediency
Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei also claimed on December 4 that Iranian advisors in Syria have proof that ISIS
is selling oil to Turkey.
Outlook: Iran will continue to side with Russia in disputes regarding Turkish policies.
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IRAN

13. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
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DEC 1: IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour warned that Iran will face domestic terrorism
if it does not confront terrorism in Iraq and Syria.
DEC 2: The International Atomic Energy Agency issued its report on the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear
program.
DEC 2: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the IAEA report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear
program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors.
DEC 2: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stressed that any settlement aimed at
preventing Syrian President Bashar al Assad from running for reelection would be “unacceptable.”
DEC 2: Iran and Russia reached an agreement to “continue Russian technical services” for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
DEC 3: Iranian news outlets reported that an IRGC Navy officer was killed in Syria.
DEC 3: Iran and the P5+1 began a new round of negotiations in Vienna and discussions on official procedures to close Iran’s
PMD file.
DEC 3: Russia reportedly began the delivery process of the S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran.
DEC 3: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that he warned President Hassan Rouhani against “participating in
Russian slander” after Russian officials and Iranian news outlets circulated reports claiming that Erdoğan’s family profits
from the oil trade with ISIS.
DEC 4: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari responded to Erdoğan by issuing a statement urging neighboring
countries to show “decency” and to avoid policies that “intentionally or unintentionally” support terrorism.
DEC 4: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed that Iranian advisors in Syria have recorded ISIS
selling oil to Turkey.
DEC 5: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated that Iran will not engage in direct talks
with the U.S. regarding regional issues and reiterated Iran’s support for Assad.
DEC 7: Rouhani called on the Iranian nation to vote for a “powerful” Parliament in the 2016 elections and reiterated that the
government does not support political organizations and factional blocs.
DEC 7: Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) Chief IRGC Brigadier General Second Class Kamal Hadianfar stated that FATA has
arrested 53 “ISIS supporters” and blocked 132 pro-ISIS websites in the past twenty months.
1 – 7 DEC

14. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

15. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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