Degrading al Qaeda leadership is central to American counterterrorism strategy, but the leaders today are not the same as they were in 2001. Al Qaeda leaders are no longer necessarily connected by formal networks and many operate outside of any formal affiliation to the al Qaeda network. Such a development makes it insufficient to rely solely on group membership or public identification to isolate the al Qaeda leadership group. For more information, please visit http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/hagen-aqim-leaders-and-networks-march-27-2014

1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Leaders and their networks
Andreas Hagen
AEI’s Critical Threats Project
March 2014

2. • Degrading al Qaeda (AQ) leadership is central to American
counterterrorism strategy.
• Who are al Qaeda’s leaders today?
– Not the same as in 2001
– Not necessarily connected by formal networks
– Defined by common purpose and common experiences
• Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leaders are part of al
Qaeda core leadership, with decades’ worth of common history
and experiences.
• AQIM overlaps with a number of nominally independent and
“locally-focused” groups, such as Ansar al Din and the
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA).
• These groups are part of the larger AQ family and cannot be
separated from AQ and AQIM.
UNDERSTANDING AL QAEDA’S LEADERSHIP GROUP
2Please see slide 20 for a list of abbreviations used.

3. • The al Qaeda network’s leadership is not necessarily connected,
but it is an identifiable human grouping that subscribes to a
single ideology and acts to support that ideology.
• This leadership group includes individuals who operate outside
of a formal affiliation to the al Qaeda network. It is therefore
insufficient to rely on group membership or public identification
with al Qaeda to identify this group.
• Examining the developments in the Sahel region lends insight
into al Qaeda’s leadership.
– There is a human network that connects the groups in the Sahel; how
individuals interact with that network helps to reveal their purpose.
– Individuals changed their formal group affiliation over time, but that did
not affect their overall purpose.
– Groups splintered from AQIM, but continue to coordinate activities and
function with the same purpose.
3
IDENTIFYING AL QAEDA’S LEADERSHIP GROUP

4. • According to AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel in a 2008 New York Times interview,
AQIM and al Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL) in Pakistan maintain a direct line of
communication.
– Osama bin Laden advised AQIM specifically on the treatment and handling of the
French hostages.
– Senior al Qaeda operative Younis al Mauritani wrote a letter to Osama bin Laden
in March 2010 proposing to attack soft, unconventional targets in Europe with
AQIM’s support due to its financial and operational capabilities there. Bin Laden
emphasized the importance of the plans and called for coordination from al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
– Mokhtar Belmokhtar described Mauritani as the first direct link to AQSL.
• Regional objectives compete with AQSL’s broader objectives for al Qaeda’s network.
– In a March 2013 statement, AQIM called on North African youth to fight in Mali
and Tunisia instead of traveling to Syria.
– In June 2013, al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri encouraged all Muslims to fight
in the Syrian jihad and emphasized its importance over other struggles.
– In a Sept 2013 meeting in Libya, Droukdel criticized sending fighters to Syria.
• AQSL plays an advisory role to AQIM and provides expertise or support through
communications. Financial independence permits significant operational freedom.
• Direct involvement in the affiliate’s local operations appears to be rare.
AQIM’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AL QAEDA CORE
4

5. • Al Qaeda’s affiliate in northern and western Africa.
• Recognized by AQ central in September 2006.
• Evolved from the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armée
(GIA), formed in the early 1990s.
• Financed by kidnapping and smuggling in the Sahel.
• Operates in Algeria, northern Mali, western Libya, and
parts of Mauritania and Niger.
WHAT IS AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB?
5
• Hassan Hattab, a regional GIA commander who disagreed with the group’s indiscriminate killing
of civilians, established the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for
Call and Combat, or GSPC) in 1998.
• The GSPC focused its attacks on Algerian government and military targets.
• Allegations of links to al Qaeda began surfacing in mid 2002, but the GSPC remained focused on
a nationalist Islamist agenda at the time.
• In September 2003, Nabil Sahraoui, a former GIA commander, replaced Hattab at the head of the
organization and reportedly pledged allegiance to al Qaeda.

6. • GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui pledged support for bin Laden’s jihad in
October 2003.
• The GSPC recruited and sent fighters to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) between
2003 and 2006. AQI and the GSPC publicly recognized each other’s
accomplishments in statements beginning in January 2005.
• GSPC leader Abdelmalek Droukdel asked AQI leader Abu Musab al
Zarqawi in fall 2004 to kidnap Frenchmen in Iraq; Zarqawi agreed.
• Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri, under orders from bin
Laden, publicly recognized GSPC as an al Qaeda affiliate on September
11, 2006. Droukdel pledged allegiance to bin Laden on September 14.
• Droukdel cited conversations with bin Laden when he renamed the
GSPC “al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” on January 26, 2007.
BIDDING FOR AL QAEDA AFFILIATE STATUS
6
Al Qaeda’s recognition of the GSPC as an affiliate followed GSPC
rhetorical and practical support for the global jihad movement,
particularly in Iraq.

7. GSPC AND AQI MUTUAL SUPPORT
7
GSPC and AQI exchange rhetoric:
• June 15, 2005: AQI congratulated GSPC for the June 5 attack on military barracks in
El Mreiti, Mauritania, which killed 15 soldiers.
• July 26, 2005: GSPC congratulated AQI for the July 21 kidnapping of two Algerian
diplomats in Iraq.
• July 28, 2005: GSPC praised AQI’s July 27 execution of the Algerian diplomats.
• April 29, 2006: GSPC asked AQI leader Zarqawi for spiritual support to “invigorate
Algerian jihad.”
GSPC network supports AQI:
• July 2005: Egyptian GSPC facilitator Yasser el Masri arrested in Algiers for assisting
foreign fighter travel in to Iraq via Syria.
• September 2005: Adel Saker arrested in Damascus for smuggling foreign fighters in
to Iraq. Arrest assisted in the dismantling of a recruitment cell in Morocco.
• September 2006: Abu al Ham arrested in Algiers for assisting foreign fighter travel in
to Iraq.

8. AQIM’S NETWORK
8
AQAP
AQSL
AQI*
AnsaralDin
alMurabitoun
BokoHaram
alShabaab
Mujahideen
ShuraCouncil
Ansaral
Sharia†
AQIM
JabhatalNusra
AQIM’s network extends beyond the Sahel region. Its relationships range from
cooperative to rhetorical. AQIM leadership statements have praised Ansar al Sharia in
Libya’s and in Tunisia’s efforts, as well as those of Jabhat al Nusra in Syria.
* AQIM’s current relationship
with the Islamic State of
Iraq and Sham is not clear.
† These are separate groups
operating in Tunisia and
Libya.
Ansaral
Sharia†

9. THE AQIM ECOSYSTEM
9
AQIM
GIA
GSPC AQSL
alMulathamunBrigade
alMuwaqqi’unBiddam
MUJWA
alMurabitoun
AnsaralDin
BokoHaramAQAP
AQI
MujahideenShuraCouncil
AQIM’s associates are part of a single human network that should be considered as one
common threat in the North and West Africa region.
alShabaab
JabhatalNusra
AnsaralSharia(Tunisia)
AnsaralSharia(Libya)
Merged
in 2013
Splintered
in 1998
Splintered
in 2012 Splintered in 2011
Coordination
Rhetoric
Coordination
Rhetoric
Fighters
Funding
Funding
re-named
Coordination
Rhetoric
Coordination
Rhetoric
Coordination
Rhetoric
Fighters
Rhetoric
Coordination
Rhetoric
Funding
Coordination
Rhetoric
Rhetoric
Fighters
Seeking coordination
Rhetoric
Fighters
Coordination
Rhetoric
Seeking coordination
Rhetoric
Former group
Current group
Key

10. THE HUMAN GROUPING BEHIND THE NAMES
10
• Senior leaders of the militant Islamist groups in Mali are part of the single
human network in which AQIM’s leadership operates.
• The ethnic Tuareg militant Islamist group, Ansar al Din, and AQIM splinter
group, MUJWA, seized and held territory in northern Mali starting in spring
2012 until the French military intervention in January 2013.
– Ansar al Din coordinated with the ethnic Tuareg, but secular, MNLA in
March, April, and May 2012.
– MUJWA remained closely affiliated with AQIM. AQIM’s Sahara brigades
directly cooperated with MUJWA after an initial period of friction
following the September/October 2011 founding.
– MUJWA and Ansar al Din cooperated from March 2012 forward and
played a key role in ousting the MNLA from its seized territory.
The proliferation of groups in Mali served to disguise a human grouping
working toward a singular purpose. Individuals who held high-profile
positions in AQIM, MUJWA, Ansar al Din, and other militant Islamist groups
continued to coordinate and cooperate.

11. • AQIM sought to coordinate efforts and unify the fight in Mali through close
cooperation with Ansar al Din.
– Droukdel favored policies that would win over the local population and foster
alliances with the MNLA and Ansar al Din.
– Malian groups were to undertake the political and military efforts in Mali, while
AQIM would use northern Mali as a safe haven for international operations.
– Droukdel chastised his commanders for their overzealous actions, especially the
premature declaration of an independent state in northern Mali and the
implementation of shari’a. He especially criticized the destruction of shrines, limb
amputations, and whippings, which served to alienate the population.
– He advised his fighters to adopt moderate rhetoric and downplay the jihadi
language in order not to draw too much negative attention to their cause.
• AQIM’s Shura Council criticized Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s responsiveness to commands
and raised historical grievances, as well as the absence of spectacular operations in
his area of responsibility.
– Belmokhtar left AQIM and went on to form al Muwaqqi’un Biddam (Signers in
Blood) in December 2013. The group carried out the high-profile attack in January
2013 on the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Ain Amenas, Algeria.
AQIM’S ATTEMPT TO UNITE THE JIHAD IN MALI
11

12. NAME French: Mouvement pour le Tawhid et du Jihad en
Afrique de l'Ouest
Arabic: ‫أفريقيا‬ ‫غرب‬ ‫في‬ ‫والجهاد‬ ‫التوحيد‬ ‫جماعة‬‎
DATE OF INCORPORATION September/October 2011
FOUNDERS Ahmed el Tilemsi, Sultan Ould Badi,
Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou
TYPE OF GROUP Militant Islamist group splintered from AQIM
OBJECTIVE Creation of an Islamic Emirate across West Africa
AREA OF OPERATIONS Northern Mali, operations reached to Algeria and Niger
MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA
12
ACTIVITIES
Dissatisfaction with the Algerian-born leadership caused mostly non-Algerian MUJWA
members to splinter from AQIM.
Negotiations with AQIM after split to settle differences and continue close cooperation.
Primary actor for the strict enforcement of shari’a in northern Mali in 2012.
Main source of funding likely from drug smuggling, protection for smugglers and kidnappings.
Primary actor for asymmetric warfare attacks targeting French/UN forces in Mali in 2013.
Close relations with Mokhtar Belmokhtar until their merger announcement in August 2013.

13. NAME Arabic: ‫المرابطون‬ (Trans.: The Sentinels)
DATE OF INCORPORATION August 2013
FOUNDERS Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Ahmed el Tilemsi
TYPE OF GROUP Militant Islamist group, ideologically aligned with AQ
OBJECTIVE Creation of an Islamic Emirate across West Africa
AREA OF OPERATIONS Suspected to operate in Mali, Niger, Libya, Chad, Algeria
13
AL MURABITOUN
ACTIVITIES
The leader’s identity is not known, but a communique noted he fought against both the
Soviet and US forces in Afghanistan.
Likely operates training camps in southwestern Libya.
Pledged loyalty to AQ leader Ayman al Zawahiri and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.
Areas of suspected recruitment include Sudan, Nigeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Mali, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Western Sahara, and even Canada.
AL MUWAQQI’UN
BIDDAM
MUJWA
AL MURABITOUNAQIM
Dec. 2012
Oct. 2011
Aug. 2013
subgroupAL MULATHAMUN
BRIGADE

14. NAME Arabic: ‫الدين‬ ‫أنصار‬‎(Trans.: Supporters of the Faith)
DATE OF INCORPORATION December 2011
FOUNDER Iyad ag Ghali
TYPE OF GROUP Militant Islamist group composed of Sahelian ethnic
groups including Tuareg, Berabiche Arab, others
OBJECTIVE Creation of an independent state in northern Mali
(known as Azawad) under shari’a
AREA OF OPERATIONS Northern Mali, especially the Kidal region
ANSAR AL DIN
14
ACTIVITIES
Closely cooperated with AQIM in Mali against the Malian government in 2012. (See next
slide, “AQIM’s Support for Ansar al Din.”)
Primary actor in the destruction of historic shrines in Timbuktu, Mali.
Supported a negotiated ceasefire with the Tuareg MNLA and the Malian government in
2012.
Briefly condemned its ties to AQIM in December 2012 before its military advance into
southern Mali near the cities of Mopti and Sevare.
Following the French military assault in early 2013, a fractured Ansar al Din led to the
creation of more moderate factions like the High Council for the Unity of Azawad and the
Arab Movement for Azawad.

15. AQIM’S SUPPORT FOR ANSAR AL DIN
24 JAN 2012: Aguelhok, Mali
10 MAR 2012: Tessalit, Mali
30 MAR 2012: Kidal, Mali
30 MAR 2012: Gao, Mali
01 APR 2012: Timbuktu, Mali
Nov 2012: AllianceAQIM: Fighters
AQIM Ansar al Din
AQIM Tarek Ibn Ziyad
Brigade
Iyad ag Ghali
Leader of
€400,000
15
Financial support: Iyad ag Ghali received €400,000 from the Tarek ibn Ziyad Brigade.
Military support: Ansar al Din received backing from AQIM in several kinetic
engagements with Malian armed forces between January 2012 and January 2013.
Logistical support: Ansar al Din welcomed several AQIM fighters within its ranks. In
November 2012, Ansar al Din, MUJWA, and AQIM created a formal alliance and
established shared offices north of Gao to deepen their ties.
Shared Kinetic Engagements:

16. AL QAEDA’S LEADERSHIP IN THE SAHEL
• It is possible to identify a human grouping that has
operated within AQIM’s network in the Sahel.
• Members of this group have operated under different
organizational names at different times.
• Formal organizational titles and affiliations did not
affect their overall purpose.
The following graphics display individuals’
organizational affiliations over time and continued
operational cooperation between various organizations.
16

17. 2007
2008
2009
2010
2011Jan–Sep
2011October
2011November
2011December
2012January
2012February
2012March
2012April
2012May
2012June
2012July
2012August
2012September
2012October
2012November
2012December
2013January
2013February
2013March
2013April
2013May
2013June
2013July
2013August
2013September
2013October
2013November
2013December
Abdelmalek Droukdel
Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Yahya Abu el Hammam
Abdel Hamid Abu Zeid K
Malik Abou Abdelkarim
Abu Abdelhamid al Kidali U
Mo. Lemine Ould Hacen K
Omar Ould Hamaha
Iyad ag Ghali
Sanda Ould Bouamama A S
Sultan Ould Badi A
Hamada Ould Mo. Kheirou A
Ahmed el Tilemsi A
Said Abou Moughatil
Abu Talha al Mauritani
LEGEND
Affiliation
AQIM
Unaffiliated
MUJWA
Ansar al Din
al Muwaqqi’un Biddam
al Murabitoun
Status
Arrested A
Killed-in-Action K
Surrendered S
Unknown U
The leaders of AQIM-associated groups are historically members of AQIM’s leadership network.
17
INDIVIDUALS’ AFFILIATIONS IN THE SAHEL

18. ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SAHEL
DATE EVENT TYPE LOCATION VICTIM NATIONALITY VICTIM TYPE PARTICIPANT
February 2008 Kidnapping Tunisia Austrian Tourist
December 2008 Kidnapping Niamey, Niger Canadian Diplomat
January 2009 Kidnapping Niger-Mali border Swiss, German, British Tourist
November 2009 Kidnapping Nouakchott, Mauritania Spanish Aid Worker
November 2009 Kidnapping Menaka, Mali French Aid Worker
April 2010 Kidnapping Niger French Aid Worker
June 2010 Ambush Tamanrasset, Algeria Algerian Police
September 2010 Kidnapping Arlit, Niger French, Togolese, Madagascan Foreign Worker
January 2011 Kidnapping Niamey, Niger French Aid Worker
October 2011 Kidnapping Tindouf, Algeria Italian, Spanish Aid Worker
November 2011 Kidnapping Hombori, Mali French Geologist
January 2012 Attack Aguelhok, Mali Malian Military
March 2012 Meeting Likely in Mali
April 2012 Kidnapping Gao, Mali Algerian Diplomat
April 2012 Kidnapping Timbuktu, Mali Swiss Missionary
April 2012 Meeting Timbuktu, Mali
Jun 2012 Meeting Gao, Mali
June or July 2012 Meeting Timbuktu, Mali
January 2013 Attack In Amenas, Algeria
American, Japanese, Philippine,
Norwegian, British, Malaysian,
Romanian, Colombian, French, Algerian
Foreign Worker
May 2013 Attack Agadez and Arlit, Niger Nigerien Military, Commercial
June 2013 Prison Break Niamey, Niger
November 2013 Kidnapping Kidal, Mali French Journalist
LEGEND
AQIM
Unaffiliated
MUJWA
Ansar al Din
al Muwaqqi’un Biddam
18
AQIM and its associated groups cooperated in the Sahel region. The leadership coordinated attacks
and kidnappings and attended meetings, despite operating under new names.

19. AREAS OF OPERATIONS JANUARY 2011 – MAY 2013
JOINT OPERATIONS
1. January 2012
Aguelhok, Mali
AQIM and Ansar al Din
2. March 2012
Gao, Mali
AQIM, MUJWA,
Ansar al Din
3. March 2012
Timbuktu, Mali
AQIM and Ansar al Din
4. January 2013
Mopti, Mali
AQIM and Ansar al Din
5. January 2013
Ain Amenas, Algeria
al Mulathamun and
MUJWA
6. May 2013
Agadez and Arlit, Niger
al Mulathamun and
MUJWA
AQIM
2
2
Ansar al Din
MUJWA
19
Overlap in operations reflects overlap in goals and leadership.
2
6
5
6
5
3
4
1
1
4
3
al Mulathamun

20. al Qaeda AQ
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM
al Qaeda in Iraq AQI
(known today as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham)
al Qaeda senior leadership AQSL
Groupe Islamique Armé GIA
(Armed Islamic Group)
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat GSPC
(Salafist Group for Call and Combat)
Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad MNLA
(National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
Mouvement Populaire Libération de l'Azawad MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa MUJWA
ABBREVIATIONS USED
20

21. APPENDIX 1: AQIM’S LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE
• Leaders are mostly former senior members of the GIA (1990s) or GSPC
(1998-2007) who fought during the Algerian civil war.
• The Emir, the Council of Notables (majlis al ‘ayan), and the Shura Council
(majlis al shura) are the organization’s decision-makers.
– The Council of Notables includes the emir, some regional commanders,
and the heads of the military, judicial, political, and media committees.
The medical committee head, the chief financial officer, communications
officials and others are most likely members or advisors of the council.
(See Appendix 3.)
– AQIM’s Shura Council includes members of the Council of Notables, the
heads of AQIM’s military, political, media, and medical committees, a
communications official, and AQIM judges. (See Appendix 4.)
• AQIM appears to divide operations into a “Central Emirate” (northern
Algeria, Tunisia) and a “Sahara Emirate” (northern Mali, southern Algeria,
Niger, Libya). Each sector has its own operational units or brigades.
– Task execution is delegated to brigade (katiba) commanders. They enjoy
significant freedom of operation.
21

22. APPENDIX 1: AQIM’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
EMIR
POLITICAL
COMMITTEE
JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE
MEDICAL
COMMITTEE
MILITARY
COMMITTEE
MEDIA
COMMITTEE
FINANCE
COMMITTEE†
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE†
Brigades of the Sahara Emirate (South)
YOUSSEF BEN TACHFINE
TAREK IBN ZIYADAL FURQAN AL ANSAR
AL MOULETHEMINE*
AL QAEDA IN THE
ISLAMIC MAGHREB
COUNCIL OF
NOTABLES
SHURA
COUNCIL
AL ANDALUS
MEDIA
FOUNDATION
Brigades of the Central Emirate (North)
AL FETH
AL ARKAM
AL WENCHIRAL SIDDIQ
AL NOUR
MAJOR BRIGADES
MAJOR COMMITTEES
† Assessed with moderate confidence
* Split from AQIM in December 2012
SPOKESMAN
22

23. • AQIM leaders learned guerrilla war and explosives use during the Algerian civil war.
– Some, like Mokhtar Belmokhtar, retain access to Sahelian smuggling networks.
• AQIM’s senior leaders are almost exclusively Algerian.
• Recent appointments of Mauritanians, Nigerians, and Malians to brigade command
may be a recruiting tool to build AQIM’s non-Algerian base in the Sahel region.
– Malik Abu Abdelkarim, a Malian Tuareg AQIM brigade commander related to
Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali, learned Salafi ideology in Saudi Arabia and
received paramilitary training in Pakistan.
– Abu Abdelhamid al Kidali, a Tuareg, was appointed leader of an all-Tuareg AQIM
brigade in the Sahel.
• AQIM senior leaders are part of the human network formed through shared
experience in Afghanistan.
– Mokhtar Belmokhtar claims to have trained at the al Qaeda-linked Khalden and
Jalalabad camps in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.
– The current al Murabitoun leader fought in Afghanistan against Soviet forces in
the 1980s and American forces in the 2000s.
APPENDIX 1: AQIM’S LEADERSHIP HISTORY
23
Almost all senior leaders participated in terrorism or trafficking in northern and
western Africa. Some are part of the human network that formed fighting the Soviets
in Afghanistan.

24. APPENDIX 2: PROFILES OF LEADERSHIP FIGURES
24
Emir, AQIM
Sahara Emir, AQIM
Commander
Commander
Founder, Ansar al Din
Commander
Spokesman
Abdelmalek Droukdel AKA Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, The Prince
- Militant Affiliations: GIA, GSPC, AQIM Nationality: Algerian
- Known for: GSPC bidding for al Qaeda affiliation
Yahya Abu el Hammam AKA Djamel Okacha
- Militant Affiliations: GIA, GSPC, AQIM Nationality: Algerian
- Known for: kidnappings, attacks on military targets in Mauritania
Mokhtar Belmokhtar AKA Khalid Abu al Abbas, Mr. Marlboro
- Militant Affiliations: GIA, GSPC, AQIM, al Murabitoun Nationality: Algerian
- Known for: kidnappings, smuggling, demotion and split from AQIM
Iyad ag Ghali AKA Abou el Fadl, Lion of the Desert
- Militant Affiliations: MPLA, MNLA, Ansar al Din Nationality: Malian
- Known for: Malian Rebellion (1990), hostage mediator (1999, 2003)
Omar Ould Hamaha AKA Redbeard, Hakka
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM, Ansar al Din, MUJWA Nationality: Malian
- Known for: association with Mokhtar Belmokhtar, kidnappings Killed in Action
Abu Talha al Mauritani AKA Talha, Abderrahmane
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM Nationality: Mauritanian
- Known for: occupation of Timbuktu in 2012, AQIM al Furqan Brigade
Sanda Ould Bouamama AKA Sidi Mohamed Ould Bounama
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM or GSPC, Ansar al Din Nationality: Mauritanian
- Known for: surrender to Mauritanian intelligence in 2013

25. APPENDIX 2: PROFILES OF LEADERSHIP FIGURES
25
Commander
Commander
Killed in Action
Commander
Killed in Action
Commander
Founder, MUJWA
Founder, MUJWA
Founder, MUJWA
Malik Abou Abdelkarim AKA Hamada ag Hama
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM Nationality: Malian
- Known for: Tuareg, familial relationship to Iyad ag Ghali, kidnappings, training in Pakistan
Sultan Ould Badi AKA Abu Ali
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM, MUJWA, Ansar al Din Nationality: Malian
- Known for: kidnappings, smuggling
Ahmed el Tilemsi AKA Abderrahmane Ould el Amar
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM, MUJWA, al Murabitoun Nationality: Malian
- Known for: kidnappings, multiple incarcerations (2005, 2006, 2008-2009)
Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou AKA Abou Qumqum
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM, MUJWA Nationality: Mauritanian/Malian
- Known for: smuggling
Mohamed Lemine Ould Hacen AKA Abdallah al Chinghuitty
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM Nationality: Mauritanian
- Known for: AQIM ideologue, spokesman
Abou Saïd el Djazaïri AKA Said Abou Moughatil
- Militant Affiliations: AQIM Nationality: Algerian
- Known for: Abu Zeid’s replacement, kidnapping foreigners in Niger (2010)
Abdel Hamid Abu Zeid AKA Abid Hammadou
- Militant Affiliations: FIS, GIA, GSPC, AQIM Nationality: Algerian
- Known for: kidnappings, smuggling, rivalry with Mokhtar Belmokhtar

26. APPENDIX 3: AQIM COUNCIL OF NOTABLES
The Council of Notables is believed to have 15 council members, including the AQIM
leader.
1. Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQIM emir (b)
2. Abu Obeida Yousef al Annabi, Council of Notables president (a,b)
3. Abu Hayan Assem, member from the west region, AQIM’s judge (a)
4. Abu Mohammed Abdel Nasser, head of AQIM’s military committee (a)
5. Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmed, head of AQIM’s political committee (a,b)
6. Abu Mohammed Salah, head of the AQIM’s media committee (a)
7. Abu Hazem Mawloud, member and AQIM judge of the middle region (a)
8. Abu Abdelrahim Abdullah, member from the middle region (a)
9. Abu Khaythema Ahmed Jebri, member from the middle region (a,b)
10. Abu Abdul Rahman al Taher al Jeijely, member from the east region (a,b)
11. Abu Abdullah Ammi Mohamed (b)
12. Unknown council member
13. Unknown council member
14. Unknown council member
15. Unknown council member
26
Information obtained from recovered AQIM documents in Mali:
(a) Letter from AQIM Shura Council to the Masked Brigade Shura Council, dated October 3, 2012
(b) AQIM attendance list of the 33rd Council of Notables meeting on March 16, 2012
(Members subject to change due to ongoing military operations in North and West Africa.)

27. APPENDIX 4: AQIM SHURA COUNCIL
It is not known how many individuals are on the AQIM Shura Council.
1. Abu Obeida Yousef al Annabi, Council of Notables president (a)
2. Abu Hayan Assem, AQIM’s judge and Council of Notables member from the west region (a)
3. Abu Mohammed Abd al Nasser, head of AQIM’s military committee and Council of Notables
member from the middle region (a)
4. Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmed, head of AQIM’s political committee and Council of Notables member (a)
5. Abu Mohammed Salah, head of the AQIM’s media committee and Council of Notables member (a)
6. Abu al Faraj al Hussein, head of the AQIM’s medical committee (a)
7. Abu Hazem Mawloud, judge and Council of Notables member from the middle region (a)
8. Abu Abdul Rahim Abdullah, Council of Notables member from the middle region (a)
9. Abu Khaythema Ahmed Jebri, Council of Notables member from the middle region (a)
10. Abu Abdul Rahman al Taher al Jeijely, Council of Notables member from the east region (a)
11. Abu Yasser (a)
12. Abu al Ezz Mohammed (a)
13. Shueib (a)
14. Abu Ayyad Yahya, AQIM’s communications official (a)
27
Information obtained from recovered AQIM documents in Mali:
(a) Letter from AQIM Shura Council to the Masked Brigade Shura Council, dated October 3, 2012
(b) AQIM attendance list of the 33rd Council of Notables meeting on March 16, 2012
(Members subject to change due to ongoing military operations in North and West Africa.)

28. “A Letter from the Salafist Group for Call and Combat [GSPC] in Algeria to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” SITE Intelligence Group,
April 28, 2006. Available by subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com.
“Africa's deserts used by insurgents: US General,” Associated Press, June 20, 2005,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/06/20/2003260017.
“Algerian Court Holds Trial of Islamist ‘Terror’ Group,” BBC Monitoring, July 4, 2011. Available at Lexis Nexis.
“Algerian Group Backs al-Qaeda,” BBC, October 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3207363.stm.
“Al-Qaeda in Iraq Issues Statement Congratulating the Mujahideen in Algeria for their Attack in Mauritania,” SITE
Intelligence Group, June 15, 2005. Available by subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com.
“Al-Qaeda ‘Issues France Threat,’” BBC, September 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5345202.stm.
“An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.
“AQIM Advises North African Youth to Remain to Fight Secularism,” SITE Intelligence Group, March 17, 2013. Available by
subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com.
“AQMI Place un Algérien et un Mauritanien à la Tête des Katibas ‘Tarek’ et ‘al Vourghan,’” Agence Nouakchott d’Information,
September 23, 2013, [French], http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=22781.
David Blair, “Mali: Telegraph Finds al-Qaeda Plan in Timbuktu,” Telegraph, February 13, 2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9868922/Mali-Telegraph-finds-al-Qaeda-plan-in-Timbuktu.html.
Rukmini Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, al-Qaida Left behind a Manifesto,” Associated Press, February 14, 2013,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/timbuktu-al-qaida-left-behind-strategic-plans. The original document (Al Qaida’s Sahara
Playbook) can be found at: http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf
“AP Exclusive: Rise of al-Qaida Sahara Terrorist,” Associated Press, May 29, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-
exclusive-rise-al-qaida-saharan-terrorist. The full letter text can be found at:
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-belmoktar-letter-english.pdf.
Nicholas Champeaux, “Exclusif RFI/‘Libération’: le Projet du Chef d'Aqmi pour le Mali,” Radio France Internationale, October
6, 2013, [French], http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-mali-vade-mecum-droukdel-mali-aqmi-terrorisme-al-qaida-
sanguinaire.
“Les Structures de l‘Organisation Terroriste Aqmi,” Radio France Internationale, October 6, 2013, [French],
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-structures-organisation-terroriste-aqmi.
SELECTED SOURCES
28

29. Paul Cruickshank, Tim Lister, and Nic Robertson, “New al Qaeda Document Sheds Light on Europe, U.S. Attack Plans,” CNN,
March 20, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/20/world/new-qaeda-document/index.html.
“Exclusif(ANI)--L’Emir du Grand Sahara d'AQMI Yahya Abou el Houmam: La Mauritanie Sait Comment Éviter la
Confrontation… Hollande Signe l’Arrêt de Mort des Otages,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, October 20, 2012,
[French], http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=19728.
Emily Hunt, “Al-Qaeda's North African Franchise: The GSPC Regional Threat,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
September 28, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaedas-north-african-franchise-the-
gspc-regional-threat.
“Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States?” The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, February 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus65.pdf.
European Parliament Directorate-General for External Politics of the Union, “The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in
the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World,” June 2013,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-
AFET_ET%282013%29457137_EN.pdf.
“Man detained by Algerian Authorities Believed to be Recruiting for al-Qaida in Iraq,” Associated Press, July 2, 2005.
Available at Lexis Nexis.
Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino and Margot Williams, “A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda
Lifeline,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html.
UN Security Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.A.135.13. Ansar Eddine,” press release, March 20,
2013, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13513E.shtml.
UN Security Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.M.134.12 Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (Mujao),” press release, December 5, 2012, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13412E.shtml.
Yassin Musharbash, “ Bisher Unbekanntes al-Kaida-Dokument Enthüllt Strategie für Globale Anschläge,” Die Zeit, March 20,
2013, [German], http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-03/terror-al-kaida-anschlagsplaene.
SELECTED SOURCES
29

30. Don Rassler, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Liam Collins, Muhammad al Obaidi and Nelly Lahoud, “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin
Ladin Sidelined?” Combating Terrorism Center, May 3, 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-
bin-ladin-sidelined.
Letter from Osama bin Laden to Atiyah Abd al Rahman (SOCOM-2012-0000010), dated April 26, 2011,
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000010-Trans.pdf.
Letter from Osama Bin Laden to Atiyah Abd al Rahman (SOCOM-2012-0000019), dated May 2010,
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Letter-from-UBL-to-Atiyatullah-Al-Libi-4-Translation.pdf.
Benjamin Roger, “Visuel Interactif: le Nouvel Organigramme d'Aqmi,” Jeune Afrique, October 25, 2013, [French],
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20131023095553/terrorisme-aqmi-jihad-abdelmalek-droukdel-
infographie-visuel-interactif-le-nouvel-organigramme-d-aqmi.html.
“Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) Issues a Statement about the Implementation of ‘Allah’s Sentence’ on the
Algerian Delegates,” SITE Intelligence Group, July 28, 2005. Available by subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com.
“Slain Militant Linked to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, November 26, 2002,
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/26/world/fg-algeria26.
Craig Smith, “U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists,” New York Times, May 11, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/11/world/us-training-african-forces-to-uproot-terrorists.html.
Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists, trans. Robin Bray (London: Saqi Books, 2010)
U.S. State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Iyad ag Ghali,” press release, February 26, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205196.htm.
U.S. State Department, “Terrorist Designation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion,” press release, December 18, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218880.htm.
U.S. State Department, “Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad el Khairy, and
Ahmed el Tilemsi,” press release, December 7, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201660.htm.
“Urgent: Fusion entre les Moulatahamounes et le MUJAO,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, August 22, 2013, [French],
http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=22617.
“Algeria Confirms Damascus Delivered ‘Yasser Abu Sayyaf’ Linked to Zarqawi’s Group in Iraq,” Syria-News, September 13,
2005, [Arabic], http://www.syria-news.com/readnews.php?sy_seq=11378.
SELECTED SOURCES
30

31. For more on AQIM, visit
www.criticalthreats.org/west-africa-and-maghreb
The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project
is supported by Palantir Technologies and Praescient Analytics.