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DNSSEC	
  in	
  .si
                                  	
  
                   Where	
  we	
  are	
  


Benjamin Zwittnig
Arnes, Register.si
Benjamin.zwittnig@register.si
Agenda

•  Past actions
•  Current status
•  Future plans
•  Conclusion
Past actions
•  Recursive DNS servers
      - Turned on validation in 2010
      - Monitoring traffic, anomalies, increase of
      TCP...
•  Authoritative zone(s)
       •  Prepare for signing .si
           - A lot of testing
               - HSM modules
               - Different rollover scenarios
               - Traffic
          - A lot of documentation
Current status
•  At the end of 2011
    - .si was signed
    - DS records were published in root zone
•  No problems with signing procedures
•  DNSSEC provisioning in the registry sistem is not
   ready yet
•  DS records for .si domains
    - cca 20 .si domains have DS records in .si
    - No real interest
Current status
•  Resolver operators
    - On 7th place acording to a RIPE report
•  Government shows some interest in
   DNSSEC
    - Validation on their recursive resolvers
    - Signing of their domains later
Current status
•  Knowledge about DNSSEC is quite low
•  Afraid of technology
•  No more zero time administration
    - Regular key rollovers
    - Difficult debugging
    - No immediate benefit from DNSSEC
•  Chicken and egg problem
Future plans
•  Adapt our registry software to support DNSSEC
•  Offer an optional DNSSEC signing service for our
   customers (as NREN)
•  Convince resolver operators to turn on validation
•  DNSSEC workshops for all interested parties
•  Marketing of DNSSEC
•  Discounts for DNSSEC signed domains ?
Conclusion
•  Although we have signed .si, we are still far from a
   full deployment
•  Some new problems
    - Transfer of DNSSEC signed domains
    - DDoS amplification attacks
•  For a real spin off we need
    - Good DNSSEC awareness among internet users
    - Critical mass
    - A good application/service which uses benefits of
    DNSSEC (maybe DANE)

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  • 1. DNSSEC  in  .si   Where  we  are   Benjamin Zwittnig Arnes, Register.si Benjamin.zwittnig@register.si
  • 2. Agenda •  Past actions •  Current status •  Future plans •  Conclusion
  • 3. Past actions •  Recursive DNS servers - Turned on validation in 2010 - Monitoring traffic, anomalies, increase of TCP... •  Authoritative zone(s) •  Prepare for signing .si - A lot of testing - HSM modules - Different rollover scenarios - Traffic - A lot of documentation
  • 4. Current status •  At the end of 2011 - .si was signed - DS records were published in root zone •  No problems with signing procedures •  DNSSEC provisioning in the registry sistem is not ready yet •  DS records for .si domains - cca 20 .si domains have DS records in .si - No real interest
  • 5. Current status •  Resolver operators - On 7th place acording to a RIPE report •  Government shows some interest in DNSSEC - Validation on their recursive resolvers - Signing of their domains later
  • 6. Current status •  Knowledge about DNSSEC is quite low •  Afraid of technology •  No more zero time administration - Regular key rollovers - Difficult debugging - No immediate benefit from DNSSEC •  Chicken and egg problem
  • 7. Future plans •  Adapt our registry software to support DNSSEC •  Offer an optional DNSSEC signing service for our customers (as NREN) •  Convince resolver operators to turn on validation •  DNSSEC workshops for all interested parties •  Marketing of DNSSEC •  Discounts for DNSSEC signed domains ?
  • 8. Conclusion •  Although we have signed .si, we are still far from a full deployment •  Some new problems - Transfer of DNSSEC signed domains - DDoS amplification attacks •  For a real spin off we need - Good DNSSEC awareness among internet users - Critical mass - A good application/service which uses benefits of DNSSEC (maybe DANE)