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The 3 disciplines
of CI/CD security
Daniel Krivelevich
Cider Security
cidersecurity.io
CTO & Co-Founder of Cider Security
Intro
● CI/CD
● Cyber
● Catchy 5 letter word
● We like Cider
cidersecurity.io
What does
CI/CD security
mean?
Shorter
time to
release
More
automation
CI/CD
IAC
Larger
diversity
in tech
stack
Rapid
adoption
of new
tech
The engineering train
moves faster
and faster...
How well is security adapting to
these changes?
cidersecurity.io
The Engineering Ecosystem
Repo CI Pipeline CD Pipeline
Artifact
Language
SCM CI CD
Artifact
Repository
Container
Registry
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
cidersecurity.io
The Challenge
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
Repo
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CI Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
CD Pipeline
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Artifact
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
Language
SCM CI CD
Artifact
Repository
Container
Registry
SCM CI CD
Artifact
Repository
Container
Registry
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Repo
Repo
Artifact
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
Collaborator
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cidersecurity.io
Github Jenkins Artifactory
ECR
EKS
The complexity
User 1 User 3
User 2 User 4 App 1 App 3
App 2 App 4
Devops Repo
Service 1 Repo
Service 2 Repo
Terraform
Pulumi
Jenkinsfile
Python
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Ruby
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Artifact 1
Artifact 2
Artifact 3
Artifact 4
Pipeline 3 (CD)
Deploy{...}
Artifactory_Read_Key
AWS_Access_Key_1
AWS_Access_Key_2
Pipeline 1 (CI)
Build {...}
Test {...}
Pipeline 2 (CI + CD)
Build {...}
Test {...}
Deploy{...}
Artifactory_write_key
R
RW
Pod 1 Pod 2
Container 2
Container 1
cidersecurity.io
For Security, maneuvering through the engineering realm,
Feels like walking through New York with a map of Tokyo
Mapping the environment
cidersecurity.io
Engineering environments have become
the new attacker’s turf
Today’s attack surface
A single insecure step in the CI, or
insecure package import - can lead to
devastating results
Engineers are also looking for ways to
bridge the gap
cidersecurity.io
CI/CD security is about
allowing engineering to
continue to move fast
Without making any
compromises on Security
cidersecurity.io
SIP
SOP
SAP
cidersecurity.io
SIP/SOP/SAP
Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment -
from Code to Deployment
SIP - Security In
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of code with
security flaws
flowing through the
pipeline
cidersecurity.io
Github
Devops Repo
Service 1 Repo
Service 2 Repo
Gitlab
Devops Repo
Service 3 Repo
Service 4 Repo
Terraform
Pulumi
Jenkinsfile
Python
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Ruby
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Ansible
Chef
Python
Java
Go
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
SIP - Security In the Pipeline
cidersecurity.io
Github
Devops Repo
Service 1 Repo
Service 2 Repo
Gitlab
Devops Repo
Service 3 Repo
Service 4 Repo
Terraform
Pulumi
Jenkinsfile
Python
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Ruby
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
Ansible
Chef
Python
Java
Go
JavaScript
Jenkinsfile
SIP - Security In the Pipeline
cidersecurity.io
Scanner Issue Description Severity Repo Location
Checkov Bad stuff Extremely Bad Repo 1 Line 1
GoSec Bad stuff Horrible Repo 2 Line 2
Bandit Bad stuff Very severe Repo 1 Line 4
Brakeman Bad stuff Not good Repo 3 Line 5
Checkov Bad stuff Fix now Repo 4 Line 2
PMD Bad stuff Fix fast Repo 1 Line 3
Nodejsscan Bad stuff So so Repo 2 Line 7
Nodejsscan Bad stuff doing ok Repo 3 Line 18
cidersecurity.io
SIP/SOP/SAP
Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment -
from Code to Deployment
SIP - Security In
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of code with
security flaws
flowing through the
pipeline
SOP - Security Of
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of the systems in
the pipeline being
compromised
cidersecurity.io
SOP - Security Of the Pipeline
Crown
Jewels
(Production)
Exploiting
workstations
endpoints
Abusing cloud
misconfigurations
Breaching the
perimeter
Abusing
software
delivery
systems/
processes
AV/EDR
/EP
WAF/IPS
/PT
CSPM
SOP
cidersecurity.io
SIP/SOP/SAP
Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment -
from Code to Deployment
SIP - Security In
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of code with
security flaws
flowing through the
pipeline
SOP - Security Of
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of the systems in
the pipeline being
compromised
SAP - Security
Around the Pipeline:
Addresses the risk
of the pipeline being
bypassed
cidersecurity.io
SAP - Security Around the Pipeline
Code/
Artifacts Production
Code/
Artifacts
Code/
Artifacts
cidersecurity.io
SIP/SOP/SAP
Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment -
from Code to Deployment
SIP - Security In
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of code with
security flaws
flowing through the
pipeline
SOP - Security Of
the Pipeline
Addresses the risk
of the systems in
the pipeline being
compromised
SAP - Security
Around the Pipeline:
Addresses the risk
of the pipeline being
bypassed
cidersecurity.io November 2021
Takeaway #1 - for
defenders
●Appsec has extended far
beyond the scope of code
scanning.
●To address today’s
challenges, we need to be
thinking about SIP, SOP
and SAP
cidersecurity.io November 2021
Takeaway #2 - for engineers
Be patient with your AppSec
teams. We have a lot to
catch up on.
cidersecurity.io November 2021
Takeaway #3 - for hackers
You’ve done your fair share
of damage for 2021..
take a break
cidersecurity.io
Thank you!

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THE THREE DISCIPLINES OF CI/CD SECURITY, DANIEL KRIVELEVICH, Cider Security

  • 1. The 3 disciplines of CI/CD security Daniel Krivelevich Cider Security
  • 2. cidersecurity.io CTO & Co-Founder of Cider Security Intro ● CI/CD ● Cyber ● Catchy 5 letter word ● We like Cider
  • 5. How well is security adapting to these changes?
  • 6. cidersecurity.io The Engineering Ecosystem Repo CI Pipeline CD Pipeline Artifact Language SCM CI CD Artifact Repository Container Registry Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator
  • 7. cidersecurity.io The Challenge Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo Repo CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CI Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline CD Pipeline Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Artifact Language Language Language Language Language Language Language Language Language Language Language Language SCM CI CD Artifact Repository Container Registry SCM CI CD Artifact Repository Container Registry Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Repo Repo Artifact Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator Collaborator
  • 8. cidersecurity.io Github Jenkins Artifactory ECR EKS The complexity User 1 User 3 User 2 User 4 App 1 App 3 App 2 App 4 Devops Repo Service 1 Repo Service 2 Repo Terraform Pulumi Jenkinsfile Python JavaScript Jenkinsfile Ruby JavaScript Jenkinsfile Artifact 1 Artifact 2 Artifact 3 Artifact 4 Pipeline 3 (CD) Deploy{...} Artifactory_Read_Key AWS_Access_Key_1 AWS_Access_Key_2 Pipeline 1 (CI) Build {...} Test {...} Pipeline 2 (CI + CD) Build {...} Test {...} Deploy{...} Artifactory_write_key R RW Pod 1 Pod 2 Container 2 Container 1
  • 9. cidersecurity.io For Security, maneuvering through the engineering realm, Feels like walking through New York with a map of Tokyo Mapping the environment
  • 10. cidersecurity.io Engineering environments have become the new attacker’s turf Today’s attack surface A single insecure step in the CI, or insecure package import - can lead to devastating results Engineers are also looking for ways to bridge the gap
  • 11. cidersecurity.io CI/CD security is about allowing engineering to continue to move fast Without making any compromises on Security
  • 13. cidersecurity.io SIP/SOP/SAP Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment - from Code to Deployment SIP - Security In the Pipeline Addresses the risk of code with security flaws flowing through the pipeline
  • 14. cidersecurity.io Github Devops Repo Service 1 Repo Service 2 Repo Gitlab Devops Repo Service 3 Repo Service 4 Repo Terraform Pulumi Jenkinsfile Python JavaScript Jenkinsfile Ruby JavaScript Jenkinsfile Ansible Chef Python Java Go JavaScript Jenkinsfile SIP - Security In the Pipeline
  • 15. cidersecurity.io Github Devops Repo Service 1 Repo Service 2 Repo Gitlab Devops Repo Service 3 Repo Service 4 Repo Terraform Pulumi Jenkinsfile Python JavaScript Jenkinsfile Ruby JavaScript Jenkinsfile Ansible Chef Python Java Go JavaScript Jenkinsfile SIP - Security In the Pipeline
  • 16. cidersecurity.io Scanner Issue Description Severity Repo Location Checkov Bad stuff Extremely Bad Repo 1 Line 1 GoSec Bad stuff Horrible Repo 2 Line 2 Bandit Bad stuff Very severe Repo 1 Line 4 Brakeman Bad stuff Not good Repo 3 Line 5 Checkov Bad stuff Fix now Repo 4 Line 2 PMD Bad stuff Fix fast Repo 1 Line 3 Nodejsscan Bad stuff So so Repo 2 Line 7 Nodejsscan Bad stuff doing ok Repo 3 Line 18
  • 17. cidersecurity.io SIP/SOP/SAP Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment - from Code to Deployment SIP - Security In the Pipeline Addresses the risk of code with security flaws flowing through the pipeline SOP - Security Of the Pipeline Addresses the risk of the systems in the pipeline being compromised
  • 18. cidersecurity.io SOP - Security Of the Pipeline Crown Jewels (Production) Exploiting workstations endpoints Abusing cloud misconfigurations Breaching the perimeter Abusing software delivery systems/ processes AV/EDR /EP WAF/IPS /PT CSPM SOP
  • 19. cidersecurity.io SIP/SOP/SAP Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment - from Code to Deployment SIP - Security In the Pipeline Addresses the risk of code with security flaws flowing through the pipeline SOP - Security Of the Pipeline Addresses the risk of the systems in the pipeline being compromised SAP - Security Around the Pipeline: Addresses the risk of the pipeline being bypassed
  • 20. cidersecurity.io SAP - Security Around the Pipeline Code/ Artifacts Production Code/ Artifacts Code/ Artifacts
  • 21. cidersecurity.io SIP/SOP/SAP Comprehensive Technical DNA of your environment - from Code to Deployment SIP - Security In the Pipeline Addresses the risk of code with security flaws flowing through the pipeline SOP - Security Of the Pipeline Addresses the risk of the systems in the pipeline being compromised SAP - Security Around the Pipeline: Addresses the risk of the pipeline being bypassed
  • 22. cidersecurity.io November 2021 Takeaway #1 - for defenders ●Appsec has extended far beyond the scope of code scanning. ●To address today’s challenges, we need to be thinking about SIP, SOP and SAP
  • 23. cidersecurity.io November 2021 Takeaway #2 - for engineers Be patient with your AppSec teams. We have a lot to catch up on.
  • 24. cidersecurity.io November 2021 Takeaway #3 - for hackers You’ve done your fair share of damage for 2021.. take a break

Notas del editor

  1. Good morning everyone, this is the 3 disciplines of CI/CD security Great honor and privileged to be speaking here
  2. A short intro I’m the Co-Founder and CTO of Cider Many people ask us why ‘what kind of a name is Cider’
  3. Releases are conducted on a daily or hourly basis The stack is comprised of more technologies It takes a much shorter time to adopt a new technology or framework Not only applications are codified, infra is And of course a lot less manual process, a lot more automation and continuous integration continuous delivery
  4. Security is struggling to keep up Especially relevant now that security is no longer a blocker
  5. when we look at the The building blocks that comprise the ecosystem Different systems moving around different types of objects and artifacts all the way from the engineers endpoint to production a fusion of human collaborators and services and applications accessing the systems and a lot of 3rd parties and access tokens and keys spread out through the environment
  6. And the challenge for us as defenders, Is that reality doesn’t really like in the slide we saw earlier it looks a little more like this Even in a small startup, definitely a big organization Each one of these building blocks being potentially connected to one or more of the others
  7. And the complexity of coping with the challange, stems from how deeply familiar we need to become with the inner working of the environment in order to understand where the risks are and what security measures are required ((click)) what repos what languages how do CI pipelines connect to repos, with what permissions what secrets are stored in CI and what is their scope how do CI and CD pipelines take code, package it, upload to artifcat repositories, which are then bundled in cotaniers and ultimately deployed to prod and which humans and which applications have access to that ecosystem unless we know all of this, it is pretty hard to understand what security risks exist in our ecosystem
  8. Coping with the challange of what is going on in this fast paced and dynamic ecosystem Very easy to get lost Have partial visibility and understanding of what’s going Don’t really know who to refer to if we have specific questions
  9. In parallel what’s evident is that engineering have become a primary area of focus for attackers some examples of that, which I’m sure many of you are familiar with - just from the past year - Solarwinds - which had their built/ci system compromised, ending with malware being shipped to 18000 orgs the codecov hack - where orgs using codecov as part of their ci had their environment variables php - that had their git infrastructure compromised and served a PHP version with a backdoor dependency confusion - where apple, msft and dozens of other giants were at the risk of having their CI compromised by managing dependencies in an insecure manner and the recent COA, RC, UA PARSES NPM packages - with millions of weekly downloads, were compromised and infected with malware So in this reality - it’s not just about security bridging the gap towards engineering
  10. We at Cider have defined 3 disciplines which, together, help organizations address the challenges and complexities we described earlier and build strong CI/CD security progrmas they are called SIP, SOP, SAP Security in the pipeline Security of the pipeline Security around the pipeline In the next slides we’ll review each one and understand what they are
  11. We have to keep in mind that , as we discussed, building strong CI/CD security programs requires us to begin a very intimate level of familiarity with the ecosystem, the technologies and the interconnectivity between the different systems. Having that “technical DNA” is basically our base layer on top of which we build our CI/CD security program let’s start with SIP Security in the pipeline is about implementing the effective measure to detect security flaws in our code
  12. CI Pipeline
  13. CI Pipeline
  14. CI Pipeline
  15. Security of the pipeline is about understanding that hackers are targeting our SCM, our CI, the rest of the systems down the pipeline, and we need to make sure they are secure enough to prevent those attacks
  16. The best way to understand SOP is to look at it from the attacker’s perspective, and that means looking at it from the crown jewels SOP is the equivalent of the solutions in blue, for the vector of abusing software delivery systems and processes for getting to production
  17. SAP - addresses the concern of our pipeline being bypassed
  18. So when we look at our ecosystem... If we think about it, it’s not enough to be perfect in SIP and in SOP, if someone can connect directly to k8s and deploy malware to production. Or connect directly to AWS and modify a lambda function in a manner that isn’t consistent with what’s stored in our SCM. (click) So SAP is about taking the measure to be able to answer 2 main questions
  19. SAP - addresses the concern of our pipeline being bypassed
  20. Daniel and I are coming from many years in the trenches and we felt the pain in our day-to-day work. Even companies like AppsFlyer that have strong security teams and strong understanding of the need for security as part of engineering (it was a competitive advantage for us) can’t handle the complexity and the security teams are struggling with working with the engineering teams. I always felt that I have so many blind spots in the engineering even after I found something I realized that there are many other issues that I’m not aware. We need to change the way we interact with engineering teams. We need to do it better and faster. This is why we established Cider.