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SECURE INTERNETSECURE INTERNET
BANKINGBANKING
AUTHENTICATIONAUTHENTICATION
AARTHI KANNAPPAN
DHIVYAA.R
MAHA LAKSHMI.S
2
Network SecurityNetwork Security
Introduction
Introduction
Attacks on
authentication
Online channel
Attack taxonomy
Attack taxonomy
Offline credential
objectives
Short time pwd
Conclusion
Abstract
Certificate based solution
3
PRESENTATIONPRESENTATION
OBJECTIVESOBJECTIVES
 Understand network security services
 Be aware of vulnerabilities and threats
 Realize why network security is necessary
 Highly attractive solution for valuable and
secure future.
4
The authors present two challenge response Internet
banking authentication solutions
 one based on short-time passwords
 and one on certificates
attacks on authentication
transaction-signing option
ABSTRACTABSTRACT
5
INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
 The Internet is an integral part of our
daily lives, and the proportion of people
who expect to be able to manage their
bank accounts anywhere, anytime is
constantly growing
This article describes current
Authentication threats and two proposed
solutions as well as how these solutions
can be extended in the face of more
complex future attacks
6
ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION
 Internet banking systems must
authenticate users before granting
them access to particular services.
 successful authentication
eventually enables users to access
their private information. We can
classify all Internet banking
authentication methods according
to their resistance to two types of
common attacks
 offline credential-stealing
attacks
online channel-breaking
attacks
Offline credential-stealing attacks
 Security precautions can
help users protect
themselves from
malicious software.
 For example-- installing
and maintaining a
firewall and up-to date
antivirus software,
regularly applying
operating system and
browser patches
7
Online channel-breaking attack
 The intruder noticeably
intercepts messages between
the client PC and the
banking server by
masquerading as the server
to the client and vice versa
 Online channel-breaking
attacks don’t necessarily
compromise the user’s
credentials but the
session’s credentials and
therefore typically require
the user-initiated banking
session to work properly.
8
AN ATTACK TAXONOMY
Taxonomy of Internet banking authentication methods. Methods
are classified according to their resistance against offline
credential-stealing and online channel-breaking attacks.
9
SHORT-TIME PASSWORD
SOLUTION
 It uses symmetric cryptography in combination with a hardware
security module .
User authentication works as follows:
1. The user connects to the Internet banking
2. The user claims his or her identity by entering an account number
in the bank’s login form
3. The user opens his or her smart card by entering the corresponding
PIN in the reader before entering the given challenge.
4. The user manually copies the shown response to the bank’s login
form to be checked by the bank’s authentication server.
10
The Need for Web Security 11
CERTIFICATE-BASED SOLUTION
User authentication works as
follows.
 First, the user establishes an
SSL/TLS channel between
the user PC and
the bank’s Web server by
setting up an SSL/TLS
session without client
authentication.
Once the card is available,
its certificates become visible
in the Web browser.
12
13
Conclusion
Internet banking has turned into
an arms race between financial
institutions and public network
attackers.
Both solutions offer high
security against common attacks.
However, changing legislation
and the eventually spread of e-IDs
among customers makes this
solution a highly attractive and
valuable alternative for the future.
14
THANK YOUTHANK YOU
Network
security!!!!!!!!

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NetworkSecurity.ppt

  • 2. 2 Network SecurityNetwork Security Introduction Introduction Attacks on authentication Online channel Attack taxonomy Attack taxonomy Offline credential objectives Short time pwd Conclusion Abstract Certificate based solution
  • 3. 3 PRESENTATIONPRESENTATION OBJECTIVESOBJECTIVES  Understand network security services  Be aware of vulnerabilities and threats  Realize why network security is necessary  Highly attractive solution for valuable and secure future.
  • 4. 4 The authors present two challenge response Internet banking authentication solutions  one based on short-time passwords  and one on certificates attacks on authentication transaction-signing option ABSTRACTABSTRACT
  • 5. 5 INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION  The Internet is an integral part of our daily lives, and the proportion of people who expect to be able to manage their bank accounts anywhere, anytime is constantly growing This article describes current Authentication threats and two proposed solutions as well as how these solutions can be extended in the face of more complex future attacks
  • 6. 6 ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION  Internet banking systems must authenticate users before granting them access to particular services.  successful authentication eventually enables users to access their private information. We can classify all Internet banking authentication methods according to their resistance to two types of common attacks  offline credential-stealing attacks online channel-breaking attacks
  • 7. Offline credential-stealing attacks  Security precautions can help users protect themselves from malicious software.  For example-- installing and maintaining a firewall and up-to date antivirus software, regularly applying operating system and browser patches 7
  • 8. Online channel-breaking attack  The intruder noticeably intercepts messages between the client PC and the banking server by masquerading as the server to the client and vice versa  Online channel-breaking attacks don’t necessarily compromise the user’s credentials but the session’s credentials and therefore typically require the user-initiated banking session to work properly. 8
  • 9. AN ATTACK TAXONOMY Taxonomy of Internet banking authentication methods. Methods are classified according to their resistance against offline credential-stealing and online channel-breaking attacks. 9
  • 10. SHORT-TIME PASSWORD SOLUTION  It uses symmetric cryptography in combination with a hardware security module . User authentication works as follows: 1. The user connects to the Internet banking 2. The user claims his or her identity by entering an account number in the bank’s login form 3. The user opens his or her smart card by entering the corresponding PIN in the reader before entering the given challenge. 4. The user manually copies the shown response to the bank’s login form to be checked by the bank’s authentication server. 10
  • 11. The Need for Web Security 11
  • 12. CERTIFICATE-BASED SOLUTION User authentication works as follows.  First, the user establishes an SSL/TLS channel between the user PC and the bank’s Web server by setting up an SSL/TLS session without client authentication. Once the card is available, its certificates become visible in the Web browser. 12
  • 13. 13 Conclusion Internet banking has turned into an arms race between financial institutions and public network attackers. Both solutions offer high security against common attacks. However, changing legislation and the eventually spread of e-IDs among customers makes this solution a highly attractive and valuable alternative for the future.

Notas del editor

  1. This sub-section addresses why Internet security is a problem and how it came to be that we are depending on an infrastructure with fundamental vulnerabilities. updated 2000-08-07
  2. Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Ensures that the origin of a message is correctly identified, with an assurance that the identity is not false Nonrepudiation Neither the sender nor the receiver of a message is able to deny the transmission Access Control Availability