Más contenido relacionado Similar a 2012 FEPA Presentation: Larry Hjalmarson (20) Más de FloridaPipeTalk (13) 2012 FEPA Presentation: Larry Hjalmarson1. Mitigating Threats to Gas Transmission Pipelines
Florida Energy Pipeline Association
July 19, 2012
Larry Hjalmarson
Vice President of Safety, Environmental and Pipeline Integrity
Williams Gas Pipeline
Larry.Hjalmarson@Williams.com
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
2. Williams Gas Pipeline:
Williams Gas Pipeline:
15,000 miles of pipeline, 2” to 48” diameter
15,000 miles of pipeline, 2” to 48” diameter
80 compressor stations, 491 units, 2.2 MM HP
80 compressor stations, 491 units, 2.2 MM HP
1,700 employees (1,000 in field)
1,700 employees (1,000 in field)
43 districts, 7 divisions
43 districts, 7 divisions
21 states
21 states
Northwest
Northwest
Transco
Transco
Gulfstream
Gulfstream
(with Spectra)
(with Spectra)
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights 2
3. Outline
Culture of
Safety
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
4. Guiding Principles of
Pipeline Safety
> Our goal is zero incidents - a perfect record
of safety and reliability for the national pipeline
system. We will work every day toward this
goal.
> We are committed to safety culture as a
critical dimension to continuously improve our
industry’s performance.
> We will be relentless in our pursuit of
improving by learning from the past and
anticipating the future.
> We are committed to applying integrity
management principles on a system-wide
basis.
> We will engage our stakeholders - from the
local community to the national level - so they
understand and can participate in reducing risk.
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights 4
5. Threats to Pipelines
External
Corrosion
External Corrosion
Dependent
Threats
Time
Internal
Corrosion
Internal Corrosion
SCC SCC
Manufacturing Defective Pipe Seam Defective Pipe
Resident
Threats
Construction Defective Pipe Girth Weld Wrinkle Bend or Buckle Defective Fabrication Weld
Stripped threads/broken pipe/coupling failure Seal/pump packing failure
Equipment
Gasket O-ring Failure Control/Relief Failure Miscellaneous
Excavation Damage inflicted by first,
Previously Damaged Pipe Vandalism and Sabotage
Independent
Damage second, or third parties
Threats
Time
Incorrect
Incorrect Operational Procedure
Operations
Weather and Cold Weather Lightning
Outside Forces Earth Movements Heavy Rains or Floods
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
6. Mitigating Threats
External Direct Pressure Cathodic Pipe Anodes &
ILI Assessment Test Protection Coating
CIS
Ground Beds
Corrosion
Dependent
Threats
Time
Internal Direct Pressure Gas Internal Corrosion Cleaning Coupon
ILI Assessment Test Quality Site Specific Plans Pigs Monitoring
Corrosion
Pressure Direct Cathodic Discharge Field
SCC Test Assessment ILI Protection Temperature Inspections
Pressure Pipe Inspection during
Manufacturing
Test ILI Specification Manufacturing
Resident
Threats
Pressure Construction
Construction Test ILI Practices
Inspection
Preventative
Equipment Maintenance
Excavation One Call System Damage Prevention &
Patrolling
Marking Excavation
Independent
Damage Ticket Management Public Awareness and Locate Monitoring
Threats
Time
Incorrect Operating
Audits Training
Operations Procedures
Weather and Continuing Strain Emergency Preparedness
Patrolling
Outside Forces Surveillance Gauges Procedures
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
7. House Counts
Integrity Leak Reports
Management Plan INPUT: Data Close Interval Surveys
Overview Global Information System Data
Collect
DATA
DATA Validate
Integrate
Centerline Buffers
Training for Operations
HCA
HCA HCA Calculator
Quality Control and Documentation
Threats
Evaluate 3-Year Consequences
Effectiveness RISK
RISK Process Risk Model
(Annual Process) Quality Control and Documentation
Inline Inspection (smart pig)
Assess Hydrostatic Testing
Direct Assessment
Preventive and Mitigation
P&M Effectiveness of IMP
P&M Address all 9 Threats, 21 Causes
OUTPUT: Prevention Cathodic Protection Lower pipeline
& Mitigation Corrosion Inhibitor Increase patrols
Clean pipelines Line Markers
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
8. Multiple layers of defense to slow,
Multiple layers of defense to slow,
Cyber detect and counter the attack
detect and counter the attack
attacks:
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
9. Attacks on the physical assets
Similar, multi-layered defense to
Similar, multi-layered defense to
slow, detect and counter the attack:
slow, detect and counter the attack:
• Fences, gates, locks
• Cameras, intruder alarms
• Neighbors
• Law Enforcement
• Homeland Security
• Employees
• Emergency Preparedness
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
10. Pipeline Emergency Response Flow Chart
Pipeline Company Emergency Responders Public Time, minutes
0
Rupture
Stages of a Pipeline 1
-M
m
Emergency:
p
a
x
c
t
I
Recognize Hazard
-M
m
D
R
u
d
e
a
g
x
s
2
i
o
p
P
e
l
Evacuate to
> Speed all stages of response
o
p
P
e
y
r
t
Safety
5
> Advanced preparation
911 Dispatcher Call 911
– Plan 10
M
– Train
w
d
n
e
v
r
-I
i
d
n
p
Mobilize
a
E
x
s
Identify Rupture
20
– Mock emergencies
m
D
e
a
g
Order to Close
> Identify rupture Valves
ICS Unified Command
•Situational Awareness
Implement ICS 30
m
•Assessment
o
-d
b
n
e
a
g
r
f
I
> Order to Close Valves
l
i
•Safety
h
p
-P
e
a
40
r
l
i
Reach Valves •Planning Secure Site and
•Resources Evacuate
o
p
P
e
> Reach valves, consider
l
•Incident response
•Perimeter control 50
automating valves
o
p
P
e
y
•Access to site
r
t
Close, Lock, Tag
Valves •Rescue and mitigation
•Communications
60
> Close, lock, tag valves
Evacuate Gas
> Evacuate gas 90
Rescue and
> Incident Command Mitigate Damage
M
-R
o
n
a
E
g
t
i
– Unified Command Begin Root
120
Cause Analysis Return When
> Restore Service Safe
o
p
P
e
y
r
t
Restore Service Lessons Learned 2 or more days
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights
11. Questions?
Larry.Hjalmarson@Williams.com
© 2012 The Williams Companies, Inc. All rights 11
Notas del editor Explain the three pipeline systems. Toggle to highlight the 43 districts and 7 divisions. We are not one uniform culture but rather a composite of 43 cultures . Each work team is its own culture. If we follow small teams within that district, they each have their own culture and way of working with each other. If we add our engineering teams we have even more cultures. Cultures change one person at a time, one leader at a time and one work team at a time. Questions?