Panel I: "International Disaster and Risk Reduction, Sustainability and Resiliency" Wolfgang Kroeger, Professor, ETH Risk Center, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

1. Panel I: International Disaster and Risk
Reduction, Sustainability and Resilience
1Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference
Reflections focused on the electric power supply system
Wolfgang Kröger, Professor ETH, Executive Director, ETH Risk Center
4th Conference on Community Resilience, Davos, August 2013
August 29, 2013 | Davos

2. The Synchronized European Grid (ENTSO-E)
2Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference
Main goal: Secure (amount, quality), sustainable, and affordable power supply
Sum of physical energy flows
between ENTSO-E countries:
370786 GWh (2011)
Source: ENTSO-E Statistical Yearbook 2011
August 29, 2013 | Davos

3.  Operation of systems beyond original design parameters (high transborder
flows, integration of wind power, etc.)
 Malfunction of critical equipment and adverse behavior of protective devices;
insufficient system automation in some cases (poor investment)
 Lack of situational awareness and short-term emergency preparedness
 Limited real time system monitoring beyond TSO1) control area and weak
cross-border coordination in case of contingencies
 Inadequacy of N-1 security criterion, of its implementation/evaluation
1) Transmission System Operator
„Soft factors“ dominate and cannot be ignored
In general, “there is a growing recognition that tragic accidents and
catastrophic failures can be traced back to organizational factors that
create conditions that invite disaster” (Madni & Jackson, 2009)
Common Patterns of Recent Major Blackouts
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4. Concept of Resilience | Still Evolving
 Concept has been developed and explored in various fields;
no commonly accepted definition, in general
“the ability of a system or a system-of-systems to resist/absorb initial
adverse effects of a disruptive (shocking or creeping) internal or external
event/force (stressor) and the time/speed at which it is able to return to an
appropriate functionality/equilibrium”.
 The system boundary needs to be fixed, can be narrow (technical) or
wide (socio-technical), depending on the objectives of study.
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5. Resilience Response Behavior of a Self-Organizing System
to Endogenous or Exogenous Disruptions
Four essential patterns, (1) absorbing a shock without collapsing, (2) recovering from a shock to gain
structure, functions and essential feedback loops again, (3) adapting through self-organization and
learning, and (4) eventually transforming into a different system by altering structures, functions and feedback
loops.
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6.  The public regards electricity as common good and lacks awareness of
increasing blackout risks.
 The ENTSO1)-E grid is facing major changes in power generation
(intermittency), structure (competitive internal market, new consumer
types), technology and preferences (smartness, decentralization) as well
as a broadened set of hazards (climate change) and threats (cyber).
 Resilience is a promising concept asking for concretization (e.g. perfor-
mance measures); it allows to widen the views (from pure prevention and
mitigation) and objectives (from purely technical to socio-organizational-
technical).
 ENTSO-E shall be the suitable organization for developing codes and
standards while EU directives shall provide the regulatory framework.
1) European Network of Transmission System Operators responsible for ensuring security of
supply
Statements (I)
6Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference

7.  Methods to quantify “resilience” and provide guiding principles are still at
their infancy and call for fostered research. Principles beyond question:
Avoid system collapse and cascades, include other than technical
factors.
Strive for robust topology, avoid operating the system at its limits, include
“all hazards & treats”.
Do not use the public internet, unless more secure, for any function vital
to the control of the system.
Raise awareness that systems may fail, optimise preparations of
recovery measures (rapidity, costs).
 “Outage curves”, i.e. frequency, size and duration of blackouts, and
established target lines are considered worth pursuing.
Statements (II)
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8. 8Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference
Thank you for your attention!
August 29, 2013 | Davos

9. Blackout
Loss
[GW]
Duration
[h]
People
affected
Main causes
Aug. 14, 2003 Great Lakes, NYC ~ 60 ~ 16 50 Mio
Inadequate right-of-way maintenance, EMS failure, poor coordination
among neighbouring TSOs
Aug. 28, 2003 London 0,72 1 500´000 Incorrect line protection device setting
Sept. 23, 2003 Denmark / Sweden 6,4 ~ 7 4,2 Mio Two independent component failures (not covered by N-1 rule)
Sept. 28, 2003 Italy ~ 30 up to 18 56 Mio
High load flow CH-I, line flashovers, poor coordination among
neighbouring TSOs
July 12, 2004 Athens ~ 9 ~ 3 5 Mio Voltage collapse
May 25, 2005 Moscow 2,5 ~ 4 4 Mio Transformer fire, high demand leading to overload conditions
June 22, 2005
Switzerland
(railway supply)
0.2 ~ 3
200´000
passengers
Non-fulfilment of the N-1 rule, wrong documentation of line
protection settings, inadequate alarm processing
Aug. 14, 2006 Tokyo ? ~ 5
0.8 Mio
households
Damage of a main line due to construction work
Nov. 4, 2006
Western Europe (planned
line cut off)
~ 14 ~ 2
15 Mio.
households
High load flow D-NL, violation of the N-1 rule, poor inter-TSO
coordination
Nov. 10, 2009 Brazil, Paraguay ~14 ~4 60 Mio
Short circuit on key power line due to bad weather,
Itaipu hydro (18 GW) shut down
March 11,
2011
Northern Honshu 41 days Grid destruction by earthquake & tsunami/supply gap
Electric Power Supply System | Learning from Major Blackouts
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10. General Layout of SCADA System
HMI – Human-Machine Interface PLC – Programmable Logic Controllers
M/RTU – Master/Remote Terminal Unit IED – Intelligent Electronic Devices
Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference