Master Thesis Marketized Security The Impact of Trans-National Corporations on how Sovereignty and Rights are Configured

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Projekt- eller specialetitel:
Marketized Security: The Impact of Trans-National Corporations on how Sovereignty and Rights are Configured
Projektseminar/værkstedsseminar:
Udarbejdet af (Navn(e) og studienr.): Projektets art: Modul:
Anders Høgh Andersen - 56116 Speciale K4
Gitte Højstrup Christensen - 48288 Speciale K4
Vejleders navn:
Lars Buur
Afleveringsdato:
27-07-2016
Antal anslag inkl. mellemrum:
238.128
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240.000
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Marketized Security
The Impact of Trans-National Corporations on how
Sovereignty and Rights are Configured
‘If the natives are in different worlds,
how come we can shoot them?’
– Stephen Stich
Anders Høgh Andersen & Gitte Højstrup Christensen
Master Thesis, July 2016
Global Studies, Roskilde University
Supervisor: Lars Buur

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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with exploring the neoliberal marketization of security and risk, and what
consequences this marketization has for how transnational corporations affect sovereignty and
rights in weak states. It looks at the different actors involved in constructing socio-political risk,
security assemblages and inclusive-exclusion. A theoretical framework is constructed from these
theoretical concepts, which is used to explore the power relations within security configurations that
transcends states. Furthermore, this thesis explores the relationship between security measures of
transnational corporations (TNCs) and contemporary practices such as Corporate Social
Responsibility and Social License to Operate. It argues that there has been an increase in global
consumer awareness of corporate responsibility and human rights violations which has influenced
marked forces. This has resulted in an increased global consumer pressure on TNCs “forcing” them
to incorporate contemporary practices into their security measures. This development is portrayed
through expert interviews and cases studies of western based natural resource extraction companies
in Nigeria and Colombia. This thesis finds that these contemporary practices can be used to mitigate
risk, but they can also be used as a ways to control the local population by creating an inclusive
exclusion that determines whether or not one is posing a risk to the authority concerned.
Furthermore, by diffusing the sovereignty of the host countries, the security assemblages allow
TNCs to influence the authorities involved, or even to act as the sovereign authority themselves.

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Acknowledgements
We would like to express a sincere gratitude to our interviewees: Michael Nellemann Pedersen -
PKA, Bruno Kalhøj - Maersk Oil, Johnny Andersen - Vesper Group, Frederik Østerby - Guardian
Security Risk Management, Dr. Rajiv Maher, and Dr. Thomas Mandrup. The six of you gave us
valuable knowledge and insight into the security and risk management industry, which inspired us
to explore the impact contemporary business practices have on the development of the global
security market.
We would also like to extend our deepest appreciation and gratitude to our thesis supervisor: Dr.
Lars Buur, who has given us valuable guidance and support that made us push ourselves beyond
what we thought we were capable of.
As this is a written assignment it is required to emphasize the author of each chapter, please see
appendix B: „Individualization of the thesis‟, for this.

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Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................8
1.2. Research question......................................................................................................................9
1.3. Structure of the thesis................................................................................................................9
Chapter 2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................12
2.1. Clarification of concepts .........................................................................................................12
2.2. Interview method.....................................................................................................................13
2.3. Case studies.............................................................................................................................15
2.4. Why study Shell in Nigeria? ...................................................................................................15
2.5. Why study Prodeco and Drummond in Colombia?.................................................................16
2.6. Analysis strategy .....................................................................................................................17
2.7. Limitations...............................................................................................................................17
Chapter 3. Theoretical framework .....................................................................................................19
3.1. Introduction to the Chapter......................................................................................................19
3.2. Security Assemblages..............................................................................................................19
3.3. Socio-Political Risk.................................................................................................................22
3.4. Inclusive-exclusion and the right to security of the person.....................................................26
3.5. Our outlook on contemporary configurations of Security.......................................................29
3.6. Interim Conclusion..................................................................................................................31
Chapter 4. Neoliberal practices: global security and risk management.............................................32
4.1. Introduction to the Chapter......................................................................................................32
4.2. Neoliberalism ..........................................................................................................................33
4.3. Marketization and Financialization.........................................................................................34
4.4. Corporate Social Responsibility: making responsible investments ........................................36
4.6. Social License to Operate: managing socio-political risks .....................................................41
4.7. Interim conclusion...................................................................................................................43
Chapter 5. Nigeria: the case of oil companies and private security...................................................45
5.1. Case introduction.....................................................................................................................45
5.2 Outline of the Chapter..............................................................................................................46
5.3 Nigeria‟s security history and the Niger Delta conflict............................................................47

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5.4. Shell‟s „Other‟ security practices in the Niger Delta ..............................................................49
5.5. Pressure from the global stakeholder community...................................................................52
5.6. Security assemblages...............................................................................................................53
5.7. Re-configuration of sovereignty and rights.............................................................................54
5.8. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter ..........................................................................................56
Chapter 6. Colombia: the case of coal-mining companies and fragmented sovereignty...................58
6.1. Case introduction.....................................................................................................................58
6.2. Outline.....................................................................................................................................59
6.3 Background on the security situation in Colombia ..................................................................60
6.4. Foreign Extraction Companies and Fragmented Sovereignty.................................................61
6.5. Security Assemblages..............................................................................................................65
6.6. The Danish Connection...........................................................................................................67
6.7. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter ..........................................................................................69
Chapter 7. Discussion ........................................................................................................................72
7.1. Similarities and differences.....................................................................................................72
7.2. Conflicting security practices..................................................................................................74
7.3. Implementing soft security and practices................................................................................74
7.4. Thesis shortcomings................................................................................................................75
Chapter 8. Conclusion........................................................................................................................77
References..........................................................................................................................................78

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List of Abbreviations
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
JAAF Juan Andrés Álvarez Front
DONG Dansk Olie & Natur Gas (as in DONG Energy)
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Armed Revolutionary Forces of
Colombia)
FDI Foreign Direct Investments
FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent (of Indigenous People)
G4S Group4Securicor
GDP Gross Domestic Product
JTF Joint Task Force
MNC Mult-National Corporation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSCDC Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
OSL Outsourcing Services Limited
PAX Not an abbreviation – Latin for peace
PKA Pensionskassernes Administration
PMSC Private Military Security Company
PSC Private Security Company
SCIN Shell Companies In Nigeria
SLO Social License to Operate
SRM Security Risk Management (In Guardian SRM)
TAR Territory, Authority & Rights
TNC Trans-National Corporation
UN United Nations
UNGPBHR United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
UN ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
UN UDHR United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights
US United States

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Chapter 1. Introduction
In the globalized world of business, there has been an increase in attention towards stakeholder
communities1
and their effect on businesses including reputation and profitability (Matuleviciene et
al 2015; Ipsos 2011: 4). When combined with consumer awareness in western countries, it has
changed the way transnational corporations are conducting business across the world (Epstein-
Reeves 2010). Particularly, high-risk areas inflicted with violence and instability have been the
focal point for this newfound awareness. These high-risk areas are often located in countries with a
frail central authority and what are sometimes referred to as „weak‟ states. In this thesis, this type of
country is one of the central topics and we will regard weak states as states that are not necessarily
impoverished but in one way or another are not in full control of territory and not considered
legitimate by the populations. Operating in these kinds of countries often entail a high level of risk
for transnational corporations but also high rewards for those willing to endure what they consider
„great risks‟. We explore two cases which portray examples of this in our thesis, namely Nigeria
and Colombia. In these two countries, transnational companies based in the west endure great
security- and socio-political risk in pursuit of the vast riches that are made in and through the rich
natural resource endowments. Both countries also exemplify what we refer to as „weak‟ states.
Neither states are impoverished, primarily due to their natural resource extraction industries, but
both states‟ authority is being challenged by non-state actors as they struggle to provide security
provisions for both citizens and foreign corporations. To mitigate the risks involved with operating
in such countries, the transnational corporations are creating configurations of security that often
extends beyond what the state of the host country can provide (Kasali 2011: 32).
These configurations of security entail a degree of outsourcing of violence from the state to non-
state and private actors (Mandrup 2012). The different approaches to security and the involvement
of non-state and private actors beg the question of how they affect the already weak state authority
in the host countries and how the western understanding of rights translates into these new
configurations of security. Furthermore, it implies reconfigurations of sovereignty as well as the
immediate control of certain areas become contested between trans-national corporations (hereafter
TNCs), non-state actors and the state itself.
The consumer awareness previously mentioned pertains to these actors and the methods they use to
provide security provisions for the TNCs which often include the use of harsh and illicit measures.
However, global consumers are increasingly expecting western based corporations to uphold moral
guidelines for human rights and right to security found in their homeland even when operating
abroad. This puts the TNCs in a difficult situation as the host countries often work with different
moralities than those the TNCs are expected to bring with them. Whereas in the past TNCs have
been able to exploit the different morality of the weak host country government, in terms of
corruption, security measures, land and resource grabbing etc. Some will argue that the TNCs still
do this, but no longer can ignore the changing demands of stakeholder communities and marked
forces.
1
See definition of stakeholder communities in 2.1: „Clarification of Concepts‟

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This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between contemporary business practices and TNCs‟
security measures in weak states. Therefore, we present two interconnected aims in this thesis: one
is to explore the problematic associated with how market forces permeates the sphere of global
security and effects how TNCs interact with stakeholder communities. The other is to explore the
problematic concerning the reconfiguration of sovereignty and rights that take place between TNCs,
the state and private/non-state security actors.
1.2. Research question
How can we conceptualize the marketization of security and risk, and what are the
consequences of this marketization for how transnational corporations affect
sovereignty and rights in weak states?
Sub-questions:
 How does neoliberalism, as a mode of governance, affect how transnational
corporations approach security and risk management?
 How does marketized security affect the way transnational corporations interact with
stakeholder communities?
 How do security assemblages effect the configuration of sovereignty and the right to
security?
1.3. Structure of the thesis
In order to answer our research question and sub-questions, the analysis is divided into 4 chapters,
each addressing a sub-question, where chapter 5 & 6 address the same sub-question. In the
following outline of the thesis we present the overall structure from start to finish.
Chapter 2
This chapter addresses issues of methodology with the purpose of depicting our choice of
method(s), and it explains the methodological reflections which have guided the overall research
design of the thesis. In this chapter we describe our primary and secondary empirical data and
explain our reasoning behind conducting and incorporating semi-structured expert interviews into
parts of the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter provides an outline of our case studies and argues their
relevance with regard to our research question.

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Chapter 3
This chapter focuses on explaining our choice of theory which consists of different theoretical
concepts and ideas that we define and combine into one analytical framework used to analyze the
globalized marketization of security and risk. These theoretical concepts are “socio-political risk”,
“security assemblages” and “inclusion/exclusion”.
Chapter 4
This chapter addresses the following sub-questions: „How does neoliberalism, as a mode of
governance, affect the way transnational corporations approach security and risk management?‟ We
start out by presenting our understanding of neoliberalism as a mode of governance, showing how
the field of security has undergone a certain level of marketization and financialization. From here
we move on to interpreting contemporary practices such as corporate social responsibility and
social license to operate. We argue how these practices can be seen to result from increasing global
consumer awareness and demands which in return are affecting global marked forces.
Chapters 5
This chapter addresses the following sub-questions: „How does marketized security affect the way
transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟ This chapter is a study of
security in Nigeria with a focus on the foreign oil extraction company Shell‟s operations in the
Niger delta region. It starts out with a short introduction that outlines the main problematic
addressed in the chapter. This is followed by a historical context based on the security history of
Nigeria and the negative effects associated with Shell operations in the Niger Delta. This provides
the foundation for a deeper analysis of how stakeholder communities are pressuring Shell to
incorporate the contemporary practices presented in chapter 4. From here, the chapter moves into a
more theoretical analysis of security assemblages, and what consequences Shell‟s presence and
security practices in the Niger Delta has for the configuration of sovereignty and rights.
Chapter 6
This chapter also addresses the sub-question: „How does marketized security affect the way
transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟ This chapter presents a second
case study of security in Colombia with a focus on foreign coal extraction companies Prodeco and
Drummond. As with the previous case study, this chapter starts out presenting a short introduction
that outlines the main problematic that will be addressed. From here, a historical context is
presented providing background on the security situation in Colombia. Then the case study moves
into an exploration of fragmented sovereignty and the role of foreign extraction companies in the
Cesar region. This paves the way for an analysis of the construction of security assemblages,
inclusive-exclusions and the configuration of sovereignty and rights. Based on these we make a link

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to the transnational corporation DONG Energy, and explore how Danish consumers and media have
affected the practices of this TNC.
Chapter 7
This chapter discusses the findings of the case studies and addresses the sub-question: ‟How do
security assemblages effect the configuration of sovereignty and the right to security?‟ It starts out
by comparing the similarities and differences between the two cases, focusing on the construction
of security assemblages and the actors involved. Next we argue how TNCs seem to be portraying
contradictory security practices, due to pressure from stakeholder communities. This leads to a
discussion of the implementation of soft security and contemporary practices, arguing how these are
increasingly becoming integrated parts of the product in some companies‟ business strategies and
images. This chapter ends with a discussion and reflections on the analytical shortcomings of the
thesis.
Chapter 8
This chapter constitutes the conclusion of our thesis, where we synthesize our findings pertaining to
answering the main research question.

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Chapter 2. Methodology
To be able to answer our research question and sub-questions, we have chosen to combine two
different types of qualitative research methods: semi-structured expert interviews, and case studies.
This has provided us with a holistic understanding of the development of the global security scene
through a wide range of perspectives, ranging from boots on the ground and academic experts to
transnational corporations. The semi-structured expert interviews are our only source of primary
empirical data, whereas we include several different secondary sources of qualitative data such as
books, academic articles, journals, NGO reports, news websites and written court testimonies. This
last mentioned source of secondary data is primarily applied in the Colombia case study with regard
to the Drummond examples. Furthermore, in the Nigeria case study the Shell example incorporates
leaked quantitative data released by Wikileaks. We have chosen to include this type of unverified
data with a level of apprehension, but also in combination with verified data to obtain a higher
degree of validity in our major arguments and claims.
2.1. Clarification of concepts
In order to understand how the research question should be understood and what the analysis will
encompass, we will start by providing a clarification of the main concepts used in the research
question and the sub-questions.
Marketization: we use this concept as an umbrella term which refers to „[t]he exposure of an
industry or service to market forces‟ (Oxford dictionaries 2016), which in this thesis is the security
industry. Furthermore, marketization of the security industry is referred to as marketized security.
By this, we argue that market forces have introduced consumer awareness, demand and supply
logic, and stakeholder community relations into the security industry. This will be further explained
in chapter 4.
Stakeholder Communities: in this thesis we utilize the conceptualization by Boutilier and
Thomson (2011) to describe stakeholder communities as those „affected by the actions of a
company or who could have an effect on the company‟ (2). As we will explain in chapter 4, we
argue that TNCs affect two types of communities: at their home country and in host countries where
they operate. Therefore, the concept of „stakeholder community‟ refers to both types of
communities.
Weak State: we realize that the term „weak state‟ is highly politicized but in this thesis we will
refer to states with fragmented authority as „weak‟. By fragmented authority we refer to countries
that are not fully in control of the territory and population. Therefore, the concept will refer to
lacking or no authority in certain geographical areas of the country in question without any political
connotations.

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2.2. Interview method
In order to understand and explore the development of the global security and risk marked, we
deemed it necessary to collect empirical data about different practices and experiences within this
field. For this, expert interviews seemed most suitable, as these would allow us to gain insight into
the interviewees‟ perspectives on their lived world. This goes in line with Kvale‟s (1983)
description of a qualitative interview as „an interview, whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the
life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described
phenomena‟ (174). More specifically, we chose to conduct semi-structured interviews with all the
interviewees because these entail a fairly open framework allowing for focused, conversational,
two-way communication. This follows Kvale and Brinkmann‟s (2009) social constructivist notion
of a semi-structured interview being an interview, where knowledge is constructed through the
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (3).
We conducted six semi-structured expert interviews ranging from forty-five minutes to one and a
half hours in duration, with both academic experts and private actors who to one degree or another
effect and are affected by changes and developments in global socio-political risks and security.
The interviewees were primarily chosen through our personal and work-related networks. We
selected these academics and private company actors based on their relationship to global security
and risk, be it strictly academic, in connection with a risk assessment or private security firm, or as
the company employee concerned with making responsible investments abroad. The purpose of
interviewing such a diverse range of actors was to gather different types of knowledge about the
security field and the global marketization of security and risk. Furthermore, it was through these
semi-structured interviews that concepts such as CSR and SLO were brought up in connection with
security and risk management. This inspired us to explore the relationship between these
contemporary practices and the development of the global security market.
We chose to interview six representatives from three different lines of work concerned with global
security and risk. It was important for us to have two experts representing each field of study in
order to ensure coherence and to confirm and strengthen the validity of arguments. To represent
academic experts on security and risk, we interviewed Dr Thomas Mandrup, from the Royal Danish
Defense College, who specializes in the privatization of security (PMSCs) and issues of state
sovereignty with a focus on Africa. The other academic expert we interviewed was Dr Rajiv Maher,
who specializes in CSR, business and human rights, as well as conflict between natives and
extractive/natural resource projects. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with two
representatives from the private security industry who work for companies that supply security and
risk services of different kinds to TNCs and governments. One was analytics officer Frederik
Østerby from Guardian Security Risk Management,2
a private company that provides risk
2
http://www.guardian-srm.com/about/

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assessments for different types of client all around the world. The other was private security
contractor and team leader Johnny Andersen from Vesper Group,3
a Swedish-based company that
offers both boots on the ground and risk assessments, and is currently in charge of all operational
security (protection, transportation, etc.) at the Danish embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Our third
type of interviewee was representatives from Danish-based private corporations involved in global
business ventures and investments. One of these interviewees was investment director Michael
Nellemann Pedersen from PKA,4
a Danish pension fund that makes investments in close
cooperation with a security and risk management companies to ensure a stable and corporate
responsible return for its members. The other interviewee was Bruno Kalhøj, head of security and
crisis management at Mærsk Oil,5
an international privately owned company that has several oil
extraction partnerships around the world. Appendix A provides the general interview guide we used
during all six interviews however separate questions were added to the guide for each interview,
based on the interviewee‟s line of work and expertise area.
In the thesis we have chosen to reference the interviewees as such: (surname, year, time). Time
referring to the exact moment in the interview where the given quote or argument was expressed.
Furthermore, due to exchanges of confidential information during some of the interviews, we have
chosen not to make the sound files publically available, but these can be forwarded via e-mail upon
request. Despite this, all the interviewees agreed to let us record the, as well as to letting us usetheir
names and company/work affiliations. This might have added both positive and negative values to
the thesis. The positive value refers to the level of transparency and validity their testimonies holds,
as anyone would be able to contact them afterwards to confirm the quotes and answers depicted in
this thesis. This also portrays the negative value that refers to the responsibility that comes with not
being anonymous which, might affect the interviewees‟ willingness to speak completely freely
about certain things.
All six interviewees are experts within different parts of the security and risk field, and are all high-
level employees in their departments. We purposely chose to interview representatives at similar
employment levels with high levels of responsibility, experience and insider knowledge about the
global security and risk management industry. This arguably makes their testimonies more
compatible with one another. Had we chosen to interview mid-level employees, we might not have
been able to gain the needed insight knowledge for our analysis. Furthermore, both of the academic
experts, Mandrup and Maher, are state employees which arguably allows them to speak more freely
about the negative effects of transnational companies and private security. Our other four
interviewees, by contrast, are all employed by private companies and work with security and risk
management in their daily jobs. This might have had an influence on how willing they were to
criticize their own industry and/or employer. An example of this is that Maersk Oil required they be
3
http://www.vespergroup.se/
4
https://www.pka.dk/
5
http://www.maerskoil.com/about-us/Pages/about-us.aspx

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allowed to read and approve the quotes we used from the interview with their head of security and
crisis management, Bruno Kalhøj, before publication.
2.3. Case studies
Because the aim of this thesis is primarily exploratory we have chosen to incorporate qualitative
case studies, as these can be seen as „an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources‟ (Baxter & Jack 2008: 544). To make
the two case studies compatible with one another, we have constructed similar research designs for
both cases, which make it easier to compare and contrast. The purpose of doing so is that it allows
us to identify potential global tendencies. Furthermore, as it is essential to reflect upon our own
effect on the construction of meaning during the interviews, this is also goes for incorporating case
studies. So in line with Lund‟s (2014) methodological reflections, we acknowledge that these cases
are produced by our investigations of them, based on the analytical and theoretical lens that we have
chosen to apply (230).
Furthermore, our case studies build upon Gluckman‟s (1961) idea of the extended case method,
where he argues that
the most fruitful use of cases consists in taking a series of specific incidents affecting
the same persons or groups, through a long period of time, and showing … [the]
change of social relations among these persons and groups, within the framework of
their social system and culture. (10)
This type of method is concerned with providing detailed analyses of social processes wherein
individual strategies and choices reveal the context of everyday life. We found this especially
relevant in our analysis of how TNC effect the (re)configuration of rights, which is an essential part
of our thesis aim.
Each case study is based on a non-western state with extensive histories of violence, corruption and
weak government. Furthermore, we have chosen these two states based on the fact that they located
on different continents and are both rich in natural resources, which for decades have attracted
foreign, especially western, transnational natural resource extraction corporations. Another essential
aspect which inspired us to incorporate these two states is that they are both examples of states in
which there exists a wide range different types of non-state security actors. Each case study will be
used to explore the relationship between the state, foreign extraction companies and private/non-
state actors. Furthermore, we will use our case studies to discuss how the security practices of
foreign TNCs have increasingly become affected by market forces and contemporary stakeholder
communities.
2.4. Why study Shell in Nigeria?
The fact that Shell is a western-based TNC that operates in a high-risk area within a weak state in
and of itself makes for an interesting case study of security configuration and sovereignty. As of

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2016 Shell is the seventh largest company in the world measured by revenue (Google Finance
2016), a strong indicator of the TNC‟s immense economic influence and power. Because of this,
much has been written and recorded about Shell and its operations abroad. In particular, its strong
presence in the Niger Delta has received much attention from scholars, NGOs, investors, media, etc.
Up until the leakage of data in 2012, Shell had managed to keep its true security spending in
Nigeria from reaching the public. Furthermore, given this TNC‟s long and dominant history in the
Niger Delta, it seems relevant to use Shell as an example of the complex relationships between
foreign oil companies and public/private security. Furthermore, we want to explore to what degree
the co-dependency between Shell and the Nigerian government influences the configuration of
security, sovereignty and rights in the Niger Delta.
2.5. Why study Prodeco and Drummond in Colombia?
Our initial interest in Drummond‟s and Prodeco‟s coal-mining operations in Cesar, Colombia,
began when the Danish energy company DONG Energy was accused by a Dutch NGO, of having
bought „blood-coal‟ from Colombia. The accusation was brought to the attention of the Danish
public by various news outlets and caused a debate on responsibility, as well as whether DONG had
undertaken due diligence with their CSR programs. A further investigation of the case revealed how
the two coal-mining companies had funded and used paramilitary forces to provide security in and
around their mines in Colombia, particularly in the period from 1996 to 2006. The primary cause of
instability and violence was a left-wing insurgency, which the Colombian government tried to
combat by allowing the formation of paramilitary forces, which in turn became protectors of
capitalist ventures such as the coal mines. This highly volatile situation created an intricate division
of sovereignty and authority in the Cesar region and is a significant part of the reason why we chose
to examine this case. Another interesting aspect of this case, however, is how DONG Energy was
affected by what happened in Cesar, even though it had nothing to do with the atrocities committed
by the paramilitary forces. The case then becomes an example of how local events have global
effects through assemblages and how the configuration of these assemblages defines what governs
the actors within the assemblage.

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2.6. Analysis strategy
To provide a better understanding of our analysis strategy, we have constructed an overview table
depicting what empirical data, theoretical concepts and method(s) that are combined and applied in
the four analytical chapters.
2.7. Limitations
When conducting research for a large-scale project, one will often encounter certain limitations
associated with access, time frame and geographical location. We too have encountered all of these
in our research, which has influenced the direction we ended up going in. First of all, it is important
to reflect upon the limitations of case studies, and as Levy (2008) argues, „it is important to note
that “case” is not equivalent to observations‟ (3). Ideally, we would have preferred to be able to
travel to both Colombia and Nigeria to visit the Cesar region mines and Niger Delta oil wells. This
would have enabled us to observe the operation sites at first hand to gather our own empirical data
and acquire in-person impressions of scale, environment, attitudes etc. Also, it would have been of
great benefit to have been granted access to interview Shell and Drummond and/or Prodeco
employees and security personnel, as well as representatives of the local communities living side by
side with these extraction sites. Additionally, it would have been very interesting to have been able
How can we conceptualize the marketization of security and risk, and what are the consequences of this marketization
for how transnational corporations affect sovereignty and rights in weak states?
Chapter 4 5 & 6 7
Sub-question How does neoliberalism,
as a mode of governance,
affect how transnational
corporations approach
security and risk
management?
How does marketized
security affect the way
transnational corporations
interact with stakeholder
communities?
How do security
assemblages effect the
configuration of
sovereignty and the right
to security?
Empirical Data Interviews, academic
literature
NGO reports, academic
literature, legal documents,
leaked data
Findings from Chapters 5
and 6, academic literature
Theoretical Concepts Practices of governance,
socio-political risk
Assemblages, socio-
political risk, sovereignty,
inclusive-exclusions
Assemblages, sovereignty,
rights, inclusive-
exclusions
Method Semi-structured expert
interviews. Compiling and
comparison with academic
literature
Extended case study
method. Analyzing using
the theoretical framework
and findings of Chapter 4
Discussion. Comparing
and contrasting
similarities and
differences

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to interview key politicians from each country to acquire a better understanding of their perceptions
of the costs and benefits associated with having foreign extraction companies operate in their
respective countries. However, due to the high level of security threats associated with the natural
resource extraction sites and their surrounding areas in both Nigeria and Colombia, travelling there
to conduct fieldwork was unfortunately not a viable option. However, we contacted DONG, which
has only recently terminated its business with Prodeco, and asked to be granted an interview.
Unfortunately, this request was denied, and we were instead referred to an official statement
recently posted on DONG‟s website with regard to a recent case linking Prodeco to human rights
violations in the Cesar region of Colombia. Another aspect which we encountered as a limitation at
an early stage in our research is the lack of useful data on similar cases around the world. Therefore,
instead of incorporating many different case studies into our analysis, we chose to go in-depth with
two different, but in many ways also similar case studies: of Shell in Nigeria and Prodeco and
Drummond in Colombia. The latter was inspired by the contested business relationship with DONG
Energy.

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Chapter 3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Introduction to the Chapter
In this chapter we outline the theoretical framework that will be used in the thesis. This is built up
around three main analytical concepts: „security assemblages‟, „socio-political risk‟, „and inclusive
exclusion‟. While the two first concepts concern the first part of our research question on
conceptualizing marketized security and risk, „inclusive exclusion‟ and the right to security of
person‟ pertains to the last part of the research question concerning how transnational corporations
affect rights and sovereignty in weak states. Both examples from Nigeria and Colombia concern
local security situations with global ramifications for the TNCs involved. The security situations in
the two countries then become multi-sited, as foreign companies try to arrange the security situation
to their advantage. The theoretical concept of security assemblages, we suggest, allows us to
analyze local settings that are affected by, and effect, a larger global setting. We will use the
concept of security assemblages to analyze how different security actors are related and affect one
another. This will be followed by a presentation of the concept socio-political risk. The term „risk‟
has many different associations, and in this chapter we present some of these ideas and the types of
risk they pertain to, and combining them to come up with a suitable conceptualization that fits the
research problem this thesis addresses. The two concepts of security assemblages and socio-
political risk help us conceptualize the marketization of security, while the last concepts of inclusive
exclusion will, we suggest, enable us to understand the consequences such marketization has on
rights and sovereignty. Furthermore, in this thesis, the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics refers to
Agamben‟s idea of life being politicized through a process of inclusive exclusion, which is what can
be seen as the nucleus of sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Addressing sovereignty as such
allows us to dislocate sovereignty from pertaining to the state alone.
3.2. Security Assemblages
Analyzing global security assemblages requires a variegated understanding of power. It also
demands an appreciation of the particular place of security in modern politics, where its
status as a public good is one of the central institutional features and legitimating principles
of the sovereign state. (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 101)
This part of the thesis describes our conceptualization of the term ‘security assemblages’, which we
will use to provide substantial theoretical value to the description of contemporary security
governance arrangements. Our argument is that literature that has inspired theories of „security
assemblages‟ seem to be split into two main schools of thought, both of which emerged as a
response to global neoliberalism. One school seems to argue that the increased outsourcing to
private actors in contemporary forms of governance can be viewed as a neo-colonial wave that
especially weakens the power and authority of fragile states (Mandrup 2012) and might eventually
lead to the end of the sovereign nation state (Mandrup 2016; Levi 2002; Guéhenno 1995; Ohmae
1995). The other school seems to argue that privatization and outsourcing is a type of indirect

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governance used by weak states to regain control over their populations and territories (Abrahamsen
and Leander 2016; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Hönke 2010, 2008; Sassen 2006, 2008). Both
schools of thought raise interesting and relevant arguments for the objective of this thesis, but
scholars within the latter school especially will be used to define our understanding of the
phenomenon of security assemblages.
To fully conceptualize the term security assemblages, we will start with the idea of an assemblage,
taking our point of departure in Abrahamsen and Leander‟s definition:
[…] as a descriptive term, assemblage captures these new geographies of power that are
simultaneously global and national, public and private: diverse hybrid structures that inhibit
national settings but are stretched across national boundaries in terms of actors, knowledges,
technologies, norms and values. (2016: 134)
With this in mind, it is essential to mention that no grand theory or methodology regarding
assemblages exists, but most of our understanding of this phenomenon is embedded in Saskia
Sassen‟s conceptualizations related to Territory, Authority and Rights (TAR) (2006: 4). Sassen
describes TAR as „complex institutionalizations constituted through specific processes and arising
out of struggles and competing interests‟ (2006: 4-5). Following this trail of thought, Abrahamsen
and Williams (2010: 92) argue that „the process of partial state disassembly has been crucial to the
rise of private security‟. This means that:
in the field of security, the result of these processes of disassembly and reassembly has been
the formation of complex, multi-sited institutional orders – global security assemblages –
where a range of different security agents interact, cooperate and compete to produce new
practices and structures of security governance (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 95).
This description is significant for our understanding of security assemblages, because it implies that
these components (TAR) – what the territory is, who the authorities are, and what the right becomes
– are not static, but rather subject to change when new actors and interests enter the national sphere
– an idea that will be further scrutinized and elaborated on in our examples and analyses. Sassen‟s
three components of TAR are traditionally viewed as part of the Westphalian nation-state domain
(Sassen 2006, 2008; Hönke 2010; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010), or what Hönke (2010: 105)
more specifically calls „the Weberian ideal-type “Anstaltsstaat”‟, where the:
national sovereign gains exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time that
territory is constructed as coterminous with that authority […] this in turn gives the
sovereign the possibility of functioning as the exclusive grantor of rights. (Sassen 2006: 6)
However, Sassen argues that, due to neoliberal market power and globalization, the entry of new
international private actors is causing a reconfiguration of the traditional understanding of TAR.
With this argument, Sassen portrays globalization as a „process of realignment‟ (Abrahamsen 2016:
133) within the state, rather than a process of external forces decomposing the state from within, as
academics within the second school of neocolonialism have argued. Sassen, through Abrahamsen
and Williams, describes the reconfiguration of TAR as a three-step process:

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a process of „disassembly‟ in which previously public functions are increasingly transferred
to private actors; the development of „capacities‟ by private actors that allow them to act at a
global level; and a process of „reassembly‟ whereby these new actors and capabilities
become part of global assemblages that are embedded in national settings but operate on a
global scale. (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 91)
The increase of private actors in the global security market does not lead to a disappearing or
weakening of the state, but rather a disassembly of the national leading to the „emergence of new
types of orderings that coexist with older orderings [where] particular components of the state have
actually gained power because they have to do the work of implementing policies necessary for a
global corporate economy‟ (Sassen 2008: 63). This point is especially relevant for the focus of this
thesis, because it suggests, in line with Hönke‟s argument (2010: 106), that the extended role of
private corporate actors in security governance can be seen as a new type of „indirect governance‟
by „quasi-outsourcing‟ local governance from the host state to the home states of private actors and
multinational companies.
A useful example of a security assemblage is airport security. These assemblages involve both
national and transnational regulatory networks and are enforced by both private and state actors.
Furthermore, this specific example of a security assemblage operates in an area that transcends the
traditional boundaries of what are public and private spaces. The airport itself can be privately
operated, but the border of the nation it is located in is the state‟s domain and is regulated by official
government security forces. At the same time, private security companies regulate other domains of
the airport, such as shops, passenger screening etc. Regulations are also divided into their different
aspects, as on the one hand there are the national regulations of the country in which the airport is
located, while on the other hand there are international regulations regarding flight security
internationally.
In the same way, any actor that deals with international relations of any kind must be aware of the
different security assemblages that exist within its field, taking into account the regulations in its
home country, the applicable international regulations, and the regulations of the country it is
operating in.
In summary, our understanding of security assemblages implies a reconfiguration (disassembly and
reassembly) of power between the state and private/non-state actors. However, this does not mean
that the state necessarily experiences a weakening of its authority, but rather a decentralization and
outsourcing of certain aspects of power and authority to the private sphere. Also, security
assemblages are not one-sided but can be seen as sources of security that can be constructed as
being both in opposition to the state, serving only private interests, and also often as an integrated
part of state governance.
Taking this idea to a global level implies that global security governance is no longer solely focused
on the security apparatus of monolithic states, and that it has moved away from the traditional
Westphalian understanding of state security and security in general (Schouten 2013: 84; Sassen
2006).

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We will use this understanding of security assemblages when we analyze our two examples from
Nigeria and Colombia concerning local security situations in which the fact that foreign companies
operate in the two countries has global ramifications for rights. Therefore, the purpose of
incorporating this theoretical concept is to use it to look at security as multi-sited hybrid structures
that depart from local settings. So, instead of focusing on rigid outlines of institutional and spatial
definitions of security constructs, our understanding of security assemblages allows us to
investigate security situations in multi-sited settings and to analyze how these security situations
affect corporations, citizens, and states across borders through (re-)configuration of norms, values
and actors.
3.3. Socio-Political Risk
In recent times, there has been a significant increase in political risk for MNCs
[multinational corporations]. This is true not only for an MNC‟s operations in developing
countries, but also for those in developed countries. Governments have felt the need to
respond to various pressure groups aimed at curbing the power of MNCs. (Hood and Nawaz
2004: 9)
Several authors writing about forecasting and managing political risk have argued that certain types
of risk associated with war, local conflict or expropriation are essential elements of risk assessment
and management for foreign direct investments (FDI) (Frynas and Mellahi 2003; Moran 1998;
Herring 1983). Moran argues that „the need of international investors and financial institutions to
provide effective tools and strategies to manage risks and uncertainties of an extra-commercial
nature remains high‟ (1998: 1). The concept of „political risk‟ is ambiguous, with an array of
diversified definitions and emphasis (Kansal 2015; Kobrin 1979). Frynas and Mellahi argue that
„political risk is an important part of the international business literature, but as a concept, it is
difficult to define, and even more difficult to express in figures‟ (2003: 545). Kansal (2015) further
argues that its „obscurity is beneficial as it presents a scope to tailor the concept of political risk to
include, and attempt to mitigate, risks which may be specific to only a particular economy, sector or
a firm‟.
Even the concept of „risk‟ in and of itself has been defined within many different fields of study and
through different contexts (Douglas 2013; Sottilotta 2013; Beck 2009; Jarvis 2007; Shubik 1998).
As Beck argues, „[s]ociety is founded and administered on the basis of the ambiguity of risk‟ (2009:
6). Therefore, to use the concept as an analytical tool in our case studies and throughout the overall
analysis and discussion, a specification is needed. We have chosen primarily to use the concept of
socio-political risk throughout this project, which refers to a combination of political, financial and
social risks that are all interlinked and part of security assemblages – what the assemblages address.
We have chosen to combine these elements and merge them into one conceptual constellation
because they are impossible to separate from one another when trying to answer the research
question.

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To explain how we understand socio-political risk, it is useful to take a step back and start by
defining the concept of „risk‟ as it has been described by other scholars, because it is from these
definitions that our understanding of socio-political risk has been constructed. Shubik argued that:
Risk is only defined in the context of a specific goal structure. It cannot be assessed
independently from purpose. Probabilities or the possibility of the occurrence of an event
exists independent of purpose. The risk to an individual given that something occurs
depends upon that individual‟s goals and resources. (1983: 134)
Other, more contemporary scholars, such as Frynas and Mellahi, who come out of the CSR
literature, adopt a more business- and firm-specific approach to their definition of risk, which they
argue:
is not a tangible thing but a bundle of expectations concerning potential future instability
that have a market value and determine future earnings. In other words, risk is a subjective
perception of how instability may affect the firm, and it is assessed to predict the likelihood
of different types of instability. (2003: 545)
Some of the more prominent and widely recognized definitions of „risk‟ come from the world of
sociology and anthropology, having been put forward by scholars such as Ulrich Beck and Mary
Douglas. The conceptualizations of risk by these two scholars differ significantly, due to the
objectives of each definition. Douglas links contemporary risk with danger and taboo, and argues
that „the modern concept of risk […] is invoked to protect individuals against encroachments of
others‟ (2013: 28, 18). These are interesting definitions, which arguably refer to a „staging of risk‟,
implying that perceptions of certain types of risk are socially constructed through articulation, rather
than through objectively measurable assessments. This also implies that what is considered a risk is
not necessarily physically dangerous.
Beck argues that „chance and danger‟ are the key components of contemporary understandings of
risk, and contends that „the semantics of risk refers to the present thematization of future threats that
are often a product of the successes of civilization‟, and further, that, „through risk, the arrogant
assumption of controllability – but perhaps also the wisdom of uncertainty – can increase in
influence‟ (2009: 4, 5). For Beck, the introduction of globalization can be seen as a challenge to
state territoriality and sovereignty by weakening the state‟s and citizens‟ authority to act
independently and separately. According to Jarvis, Beck sees globalization as a phenomenon that
de-nationalises markets, creates international patterns of competition for foreign investment
and forces the state to respond to an international rather than purely domestic constituency.
The state‟s source of legitimacy is primarily internal, yet much of its material needs can be
realised only through external economic interaction. (Jarvis 2007: 26)
These arguments are relevant because they say something about how the development of modern
society by means of globalization is edging on and providing meaning to contemporary ideas of
risk. As Douglas states, „a risk is not only the probability of an event but also the probable
magnitude of its outcome‟ (Douglas 2013: 31).

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Although our understanding and use of the concept of socio-political risk has its starting point in
Douglas‟s and Beck‟s definitions of risk, it also draws heavily upon Frynas and Mellahi‟s (2003)
contemporary understanding of political risk linked to the financialization of security, in addition to
Hood and Nasaw‟s (2004) suggestion of how political risk may be defined as a „particular exposure
to risk which depends on the actions of a government, and its assessment or analysis for a TNC is a
decision-making tool for investing in foreign countries‟ (ibid.: 12). When combined in the way we
have presented it here, these ideas and definitions can act as theoretical tools used to conceptualize
the marketization of security and risk by linking socio-political risk management to the re-
configuration of rights and sovereignty. This link will become clearer by the end of this chapter,
when all the theoretical concepts and analytical perspectives have been presented and combined.
However, first we must expand upon our understanding and use of the notion of socio-political risk.
One of the main interests of this thesis is how socio-political risk is generated, and its connection to
the marketization and privatization of security. Therefore, one more theoretical concept will be
useful to add to the equations, which is Gidden‟s idea of „professional expertize‟ (1990: 27). This
idea also forms part of our understanding of socio-political risk assessment and management, and it
plays a significant role in our data analysis. Giddens argues that „the systems in which the
knowledge of experts is integrated influence many aspects of what we do in a continuous way‟
(1990: 27). This means that „non-experts‟ trust and rely on „experts‟ establishing systems that
integrate acceptable socio-political risk-levels, „but if there is disagreement amongst those
possessing expert knowledge the lay actors need to decide which experts to trust‟ (Linsley and
Shrives 2009: 494). This is where, in some (weak) states, the government‟s police, as the designated
and traditional experts on security and risk, have in some cases lost out to the expertise of private
security companies (Lupton 1999). This means that, when such disagreements appear between the
experts and non-experts, it can result in a redefinition of existing norms by „norm entrepreneurs‟
(Krahman 2013: 55-57; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895), who consist of both the non-experts
who initiate the change in norms, as well as the new private actors who are offering an alternative to
the norm, which in this project are private security companies, involving:
those moments of rupture and possible transformation when social actors re-appropriate new
norms, such as to enable new subjectivities to enter the public sphere and to alter the very
meaning of claims making in the public sphere itself. This is the promise of democratic
iterations and cosmopolitan norms in the present. (Benhabib 2009: 701)
Bigo adds to this argument by suggesting that invoking security and risk should be made plausible
through
a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease [...] larger than that of
police organizations in that it includes, on one hand private corporations and organizations
[...] and, on the other hand, intelligence services and some military people [...] a node
connecting many competing networks responding to many groups of people who are
identified as a risk. (2002: 64)

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Aitken suggests that risk assessment markets „seek to mobilize forms of everyday and non-
specialized knowledge‟ (2011: 124), an argument based on what Hayek referred to in 1945 as
„particular circumstances of time and place‟ (Hayek 1945: 521). Aitken combines Giddens‟ and
Hayek‟s ideas on the construction of expert knowledge, and uses them to explain the
financialization of security. He further emphasizes how the financialization of security, which
builds on non-expert knowledge, constitutes an attempt to commodify insecurity: „the attempt to
mobilize not expertise but forms of everyday experience‟ (Aitken 2011: 125). This matches
Gidden‟s idea of expert knowledge, implying that non-experts construct their own risk knowledges
through local encounters and observations. Therefore non-experts are continually making
assessments concerning the credibility of experts‟ risk knowledge, based on their own experiences
(Lupton 1999; Linsley and Shrives 2008). If these assessments differ too much from the expert
assessments, non-experts will turn to other sources of knowledge, which are often in the private
sector. In this way, private security companies become the new expert systems on risk assessments
and risk management. This is especially evident in weak states, where there are high levels of
corruption in government forces, and the state as the intended arena for expert systems on risk and
security is unable to provide security for its own citizens or for firms operating within its territory. It
is especially under such circumstances that private security contractors are increasing in numbers
and gaining legitimacy through risk management.
In summary, our conceptualization of what we have coined „socio-political risk‟ can be used to
provide substantial analytical value to the description of contemporary security governance
arrangements. One of the main focuses of this project is how transnational corporations (TNCs)
manage socio-political risks, and therefore we will, for the most part, refer to cross-border risks as
socio-political risks because these combined terms include the different aspects of risk that are
deemed most relevant for the focus of this thesis. Furthermore, we use the term in a holistic way,
which includes any risk that is the product of national and/or international changes in the business
environment, meaning social risk, political risk and government policy risk. This implies that the
concept of socio-political risk is an umbrella term that for the most part is firm-specific, given the
contextual significance of a company‟s own assets and capabilities, and especially the geographical
location of its operations, which affect the types or risks it faces.
Socio-political risk acts like a red thread throughout the thesis and is what ties all the different
theoretical and analytical components together. Therefore, we will apply our conceptualization of
socio-political risk as an analytical tool to explore how it plays a key role in the long-term business
strategies of TNCs when operating or investing in weak states. This applies to both of our examples
from Nigeria and Colombia. Furthermore, we will use this concept to link the main actors involved
in the configuration and re-configurations of global security. Socio-political risk will also be used to
explore how new discourses on risk are constructed and produced in the interplay between states,
civil society organizations, corporations and PSCs. The concept of socio-political risk thus points
towards the primary relationship that evolves between actors in the security assemblage and is what
connects the home state and the host state for TNCs.

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3.4. Inclusive-exclusion and the right to security of the person
To answer our research question, we also need to look at how TNCs use of private security affects
the configuration of rights and sovereignty. By rights, we refer to the right to security as inscribed
in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3, which reads: „Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person‟ (UN UDHR, Article 3).
In 1966 further additions were made in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 9:
[…] No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established
by law. (UN ICCPR, Article 9)
As such, our understanding of the right to security is that is provides a basic acknowledgement of a
person‟s right to his or her own freedom under the auspices of the law. This leads us to the
sovereignty part of our research question. It is our presumption that hitherto the right to security is
something that has been provided by the sovereign state through its monopoly on violence. As Max
Weber suggested, this is what constitutes the state as the:
only human Gemeinschaft which lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of
physical force. However, this monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area, and in fact
this limitation to a particular area is one of the things that defines a state. (Weber, 2015:
136)
But as our research question suggests, we presume that the notion of the state being the sole
provider of security in function of a right is no longer applicable in the age of globalization. A
reconfiguration of the state and of rights does not necessarily mean that the state is no longer
relevant, but we do need to theorize beyond the state and look more holistically at rights and
sovereignty. To explore this further, we will incorporate Agamben‟s concept of inclusive exclusion.
In considering how mechanisms of exclusion work, we will utilize Giorgio Agamben‟s ideas on
what constitutes sovereignty.6
Agamben rejects Foucault‟s idea of sovereignty as an archaic entity
that exists in modern biopolitics and argues that „the production of a biopolitical body is the original
activity of sovereign power. In this sense biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception‟
(Agamben 1998: 11).
As such, Agamben seeks to understand sovereignty at its core, and „bare life‟ is central to this
understanding. „Bare life‟ is simply biological life, and Agamben argues that it „has the peculiar
6
Agamben extends the examination of sovereignty found in Georges Bataille, Carl Schmitt and others through the lens
of Foucault and his concept of biopolitics (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 16).

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privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men‟ (ibid.: 12), that is, what became
those with access to citizenship.7
This form of „inclusive exclusion‟ is important, and Agamben goes back to ancient Greece, arguing
that the ancient Greeks had no single word for life; rather, they had two – bios and zoē. Zoē referred
to what we have so far called „bare life‟, a life of mere reproductive value and what is common in
all life, be it animals, men, or gods (Agamben 1998: 9). Bios, on the other hand, pertains to the
proper way of living – a qualified life.8
If we return to the notion of the city of men, bios would
describe the life of the free citizens, whereas zoē would be the common denominator in all life in
the city.9
To Aristotle, though, the bare life had a capacity for more, as he wrote: „born with regard
to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life‟ (Agamben 1998: 9). And it was this idea
of the connection between the bare life and the good life that led Michel Foucault to conceptualize
biopolitics. Foucault wrote:
For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional
capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence
as a living being into question. (Foucault 1978: 143)
Thus there is a connection between present-day politics and life, what Foucault conceptualizes as
biopolitics. Agamben sees this connection between life and politics as the incorporation of zoē into
the polis, or as the politicization of bare life, and it is within this connection that he suggests the
necessity for analyzing present-day politics and its inherent oppositions (Agamben 1998: 10). Left
vs Right, Private vs Public, Absolutism vs Democracy – these are some of the dominant oppositions
that constitute modern western politics, and it is only, Agamben suggests, through the perspective
of biopolitics – the link between bare life and politics – that we can understand what governs
modern politics (ibid.).
But as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Agamben rejects Foucault‟s idea of sovereign power as
being archaic. Instead he proposes that the link between life and politics is where true sovereign
power exists (Agamben 1998: 11). The inclusion of life into politics is the nucleus of sovereign
power. Its inclusion into modern politics happens through an exclusion where political life is
created by excluding bare life from politics. The link between bare life and politics exists when the
two oppose each other but still remain related in this very opposition. Hence bare life is included in
politics by an exclusion.
7
By „city of men‟, Agamben refers back to Antiquity, when the city consisted of free men and citizens, but excluded
the plebs, women, slaves, and other forms of „bare life‟ from the political community, even though they were still a
crucial part of the economy.
8
Plato made a distinction between three types of bios: the political life (bios politikos), the philosophical life (bios
theōrētikos), and the life of pleasure (bios apolaustikos), all three being lives of purpose and qualification (Agamben
1998: 9).
9
The plebs, women, slaves, etc. did not live up to the standards of bios for each their own reason.

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Rights, and the right to security of person, is found in the politicized life (Agamben 1998: 11-13).
In antiquity, rights were given to those who lived a qualified life, to use Plato‟s terminology, but in
modern politics rights are created through an inclusive exclusion. A person is given rights by being
included in the political life, but these rights can be taken away if the person does not qualify for a
political life. Just as inscribed in the UN ICCPR, Article9, presented in the beginning of this sub-
chapter, an individual‟s right to security of the person can be removed if that person violates a
written law. Living outside the law means exclusion from political life and the removal of certain
rights. In this thesis, we will utilize the idea of rights as an inclusive exclusion that is built upon the
concept of biopolitics to analyze the configuration of rights. This allows us to look at rights as both
juridical written laws and institutionalized ideas, but it also allows us to examine rights beyond the
realm of the state. In his book Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that the nation state cannot be
circumvented when it comes to understanding rights and sovereignty (Agamben 1998: 75-76), but
our hypothesis denotes a state-only focus. We will instead adopt the idea that true sovereign power
can be found in the link between life and politics (biopolitics) and utilized beyond the realm of the
state. We will look at assemblages of security and find the biopolitics within to analyze how
sovereignty might have been reconfigured by private security, and maybe even displaced away from
the nation state. Agamben argues that the sovereign exerts its power through practices of exception
(Agamben 1998: 15-41), but we will look at how sovereign power might be configured by more
„mundane‟ practices – in particular, practices originating in the world of business and finance.
It is within these practices of business and finance that we will try to apply Agamben‟s concept of
sovereignty. In the next chapter we will introduce the concepts of corporate social responsibility,
and social license to operate, both concepts being practices from the business world that, we argue,
have influenced the global security field. It is within these practices that we will utilize this theory
by looking at how, when combined, they create a form of inclusive exclusion. The practices we
examine are often used by TNCs, and we focus on companies operating out of a strong (western)
state but investing in a weaker state. We argue that inclusive exclusion takes place in a TNC‟s home
country as well as in the host country. In this thesis, we have chosen two cases which each
represents a host country – Columbia and Nigeria. We argue that, in the host countries, TNCs
construct new security assemblages by deploying private security actors to establish security
arrangements for their investments in addition to state-provided security. These assemblages are
created in an attempt to mitigate the socio-political risks involved in the investments. The two
practices mentioned above (CSR and SLO) are practical approaches utilized by TNCs to minimize
this risk. They are not only ways to minimize socio-political risks, but also set up the parameters of
the security assemblages created in the host countries by introducing a set of values, norms and
actors.
By combining these values and norms with the logic of minimizing risk, these assemblages create
an inclusive exclusion that seeks to exclude whatever does not conform to values and norms by
constituting them as risk. Furthermore, as we will explain in the next chapter, the described business
practices also place the lives and livelihoods of the affected population in both the home and host
country at its core. As the risks that these practices attempt to mitigate are social and political in
nature, the inclusion of life in the practices turns them into the exercise of biopolitics. In this sense,

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the practices become what governs the actors in the assemblages. And in Agambian terms, the
sovereign power exists by creating biopolitical bodies. Although we choose to move away from a
state-only focus and apply it to the assemblages, it is through the two practices that we will examine
how biopolitics are applied in the assemblages. This allows us to examine how sovereign power has
been reconfigured by the security assemblages set up by TNCs, and how such reconfigurations
affect the right to security within these assemblages.
3.5. Our outlook on contemporary configurations of Security
Combining these three theoretical concepts provides us with a map of the arrangements and
realignment between what we have identified as four separate apparatuses that are all part of the
construction and reconfiguration of security and risk: states, civil society, private security, and
corporations. In traditional Hobbesian theory, security and risk are embedded between two main
apparatuses: the state and civil society. It is the social contract „that prohibits the private use of
armed forces and invests in the Sovereign. In short it is the Sovereign‟s monopoly on the legitimate
use of collective violence that provides security‟ (Krahmann 2010: 23). Therefore, the traditional
Hobbesian configuration of security would be placed on an unbroken line between the state and
civil society. This is simplified in the figure below:
However, since the end of the Cold War, an international neoliberal discourse, with a focus on
downsizing the public sector, has dominated through the agency of globalization. This has led to the
frequent outsourcing of public goods to the private sector (Berndtsson 2009: 116), including the
right to security of person. This is in part what we refer to as the marketization of security and risk,
where a third component, private security, has been added to the international configuration of
security and risk. This implies that the right to security of the person, which is traditionally seen as
the sovereign‟s domain, is increasingly being treated as a business commodity rather than a human
right. As a result, a third element of private security is added to the original global security
configuration. This is depicted in the figure below:
Figure 1: State - Civil Society

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Our argument in this thesis is that a fourth component has also been added to the configuration of
security through the increasing neoliberal marketization of security and focus on risk. We have
chosen to label this last element, which includes TNCs, simply as the corporations. Our argument is
that corporations are constructing new security assemblages by implementing risk management and
private security in relation to their businesses abroad. This is especially evident among western-
based TNCs who operate in or have cooperative arrangements with weak states. These corporations
make deals with the host state for licenses to operate in specific locations, and as the corporations
enter these new sites, we argue that new security assemblages are constructed through their
presence, leading to a reconfiguration of rights. When the state outsources licenses to operate to
foreign corporations, it arguably outsources sovereignty to corporations that in return sub-contract
private security companies. This is especially evident in high risk areas, where extra security
measures must be taken in order to create a safe working environment. This means that
contemporary global security is constructed and re-configured between these four components. This
is depicted in the figure below:
Figure 2: State - Civil Society - Private Security

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Figure 3: Reconfiguration of the Right to Security
3.6. Interim Conclusion
We have examined three different theoretical concepts, assemblages, socio-political risk and
inclusive-exclusion, to formulate a theoretical framework that can be used to explain the relation
between state, citizen, TNCs and private security. Assemblages will be used to understand what
constitutes as the actors and how in local settings can become global. Socio-political risk will be
what connects the actors within the assemblage and constitutes the relations between them.
Inclusive-exclusion is our reconceptualization of Agamben and serves as our take on sovereignty
and the relation between sovereign and citizen. This theoretical framework will be used to examine
our cases.

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Chapter 4. Neoliberal practices: global security and risk
management
4.1. Introduction to the Chapter
This chapter seeks to answer the sub-question „How does neoliberalism, as a mode of governance,
affect how transnational corporations approach security and risk management?‟ Based on this, we
look more closely at how we can understand the marketization of security by examining the
academic literature in conjunction with our empirical interviews. In doing so, we first consider
neoliberalism as a mode of governance to outline the political parameters which lay the foundation
for the marketization of security. Our understanding of neoliberalism as a mode of governance
pertains to the Foucauldian term „governmentality‟ (Mayhew 2004).
Based on the conceptual work, we returned to our interviews, paying particular attention to the use
of specific concepts such as market forces, privatization and everyday knowledge. Furthermore,
through our interviews we identified two examples of practices of neoliberal governmentality:
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Social License to Operate (SLO). We argue that these
practices are interconnected and act as important enablers linking security and risk and forming a
vital part of the global marketization of security.
First, however, we will explore and define marketization and financialization. Marketization will be
used to describe the restructuring of state tasks and their transfer to private entities and market
forces. Financialization will be used to explain the methods and techniques mobilized within
marketization strategies. In conjunction, marketization and financialization will be used to support
our analysis of how specific aspects of the security field are being turned into financialized assets.
The first practice discussed in the chapter is CSR. We argue that the increasing emphasis on CSR in
contemporary corporate behavior points towards the interconnectedness between what corporations
do abroad and how their conduct is handled at home. Or the other way around, CSR policies and
stakeholder awareness at home also affect and shape corporate behavior abroad.
The second practice is Social License to Operate (SLO). SLO also emerged from the CSR domain,
but it goes beyond CSR by zooming in on how stakeholder communities10
influence and shape the
actions of TNCs abroad. Additionally, this field, which has the potential to influence corporations,
has become an important „market‟ field for PSCs.
The two business practices will be used together with our theoretical framework when we explore
how TNCs manage security and risk in our two examples from Nigeria and Colombia.
10
Concept used by Boutilier and Thomson (2011) to describe communities „affected by the actions of a company or
who could have an effect on the company‟ (2).

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4.2. Neoliberalism
For the purposes of our thesis, it is important to understand how the current world of security is
configured. The private security market, which is our main focus, has sprung up out of the
conventional perception of security as being state-centric. The increased use of private security and
the expansion of the private security market did not happen out of the blue. Neoliberal policy-
making and politics are often recognized as the main reason behind the increased privatization in
the security sector, or in any other sector of governance for that matter. And when we conceptualize
the current configuration of global security, we will do so by treating security as part of the
globalized neoliberal order. However, we need to establish what we mean by „neoliberalism‟, as it
has become an ambiguous term in the academic literature (Venupogal 2015: 166). The term has
been widely criticized for its usage being diffuse, including but not limited to political policy-
making processes, as well as being a label for a macroeconomic doctrine (ibid.: 166-167):
it lives […] as a problematic rhetorical device that bundles together a proliferation of
eclectic and contradictory concepts; a tableau of critical explorations of the material
world by non-economists, clustered together by a shared signifier that thematically
links them to a broader set of morally devolved referents about markets, economics,
subjectivities, state authority, globalization or neo-colonialism. (Venupogal 2015:
183)
In our thesis, we will treat the term „neoliberalism‟ as encompassing the political ideas of
privatization and market deregulation, as well as describing a cultural and ideological phenomenon.
We distance ourselves from the classic understanding of neoliberalism as a term of political
economy and instead start from an understanding of neoliberalism that elucidates power relations
(ibid.: 169). This version of neoliberalism draws theoretically on Marx, Gramsci and Foucault
(ibid.) and conveys the idea of a wealthy West imposing neoliberal ideas (the ones mentioned
earlier, privatization, deregulation, etc.) upon a less wealthy „global South‟ (ibid.: 176). As such, we
use the term „neoliberalism‟ to describe a mode of governance, as it helps us unveil how risk
management and other western practices affect how security and rights are configured.
The phrase „mode of governance‟ can be referred to the Foucaldian term „governmentality‟.
Governmentality can be understood as the organized practices of mentality, rationality and the
techniques that are used to govern subjects (Mayhew 2004). For neoliberalism, mentalities of
competitiveness and self-interest are at its core, and the ideas of a self-regulating market and of the
decentralization of state power to more localized units are some of the rationalities. The techniques
of doing so are directly adapted from the world of business and include such things as risk
management, cost-benefit analyses and quantitative measurement protocols.
This approach to neoliberalism not only draws a theoretical line under our conceptual
understandings of Agamben and assemblages (see chapter 3) through the concept of
governmentality, it also highlights the role that neoliberalism plays in the global security field. It
lets us look more closely at the practices used in the field that pertain to neoliberal governance.

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Through our interviews we have chosen to look more closely at Corporate Social Responsibility,
and Social License to Operate. These two concepts stem from the world of business and finance, but
they have also had an impact on the field of private security as well. Later in this chapter we will
expand on these terms and show how they can be seen as practices of governance. But first we will
look at how they came to be important in the security field.
4.3. Marketization and Financialization
In this thesis, we argue that the field of security has undergone a certain level of marketization and
financialization: the two mechanisms just mentioned are a sign of just that. As terms, both
marketization and financialization are related to the notion of neoliberal governance explained in
the previous section. Marketization pertains to the rationalities of self-regulating markets and the
decentralization of state power. As a concept it refers to the practice of restructuring state
enterprises to act more like private corporations and to be regulated according to market force (van
der Hoeven 1997: 101). But this definition is a bit lacking when it comes to security because neither
the police nor the military in any state is run by market force. In a more abstract sense, however,
one can view the increased number of private security actors as indicating a deficiency in the
security options available to corporations. As such, the marketization of security does not
necessarily pertain to already existing state security apparatuses but the outsourcing of certain
security-related tasks to private entities that operate within market forces. For our thesis, then, this
is how we will view marketization: as the logic of restructuring state tasks by devolving them to
private entities and market forces.
Marketization:
Our interviews provided several examples of the marketization of security. One example is how
Frederik Østerby from Guardian Security Risk Management [Guardian SRM] described the
company as a business enabler rather than a private security company (Østerby 2016: 5:59). The
logic here is that the company provides a service for which there is market need. In contrast to the
state, which has a far more defensive approach to security (ibid.: 36:54), private companies can act
more freely, while the globalized market makes the possibilities for contracts far more diverse. The
market for security services is closely related to the globalized world, and current events are deeply
affecting how the demand and supply equation is configured. At Guardian SRM they have seen an
increased demand in the field of security due to the dynamics of globalization and the increased
targeting of civilians (ibid.: 28:00). Different events around the world, such as terrorism, wars,
political instability etc., are shaping the market demand for security.
An entirely different aspect of the global security field is the investment aspect. This aspect often
influences the global security field in a more indirect way than actual private security companies
and transnational corporations. To uncover this aspect of the global security field, we interviewed
Michael Nellemann Pedersen, the investment director in the Danish pension fund, PKA. He

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described an increased focus on what he refers to as responsible investments within the large
investment groups, and in particular pension funds and similar institutions (Pedersen 2016: 07:26).
Responsible investments are investments made on the basis of a set of core values and norms often
of significance to the civil and political society that surrounds the investor. To PKA this concretely
means no investments in companies that produce controversial weaponry, heavy polluters such as
oil and coal companies, or companies that violate international codes of labor, to name just a few
(PKA 2016). By themselves, responsible investments influence the global security field by setting
up parameters for what are good and bad investments, in addition to the purely economic aspects of
investments. But even though these kinds of investments suggest some level of the incorporation of
morality, the bottom line is still what matters, and in Denmark it is even inscribed in law that
pensions funds must aim at the greatest yields possible (ibid.: 09:24). An example of this is PKA‟s
decision to no longer invest in coal-only based companies (PKA 2016). First of all, coal is no longer
a viable investment, as it is slowly but surely being phased out as a source of energy. But at the
same time there is a moral responsibility to take care of our environment, and a decision to stop
investing in coal is in agreement with this responsibility. The connection between social and
economic responsibility is also something that recurs later in this chapter when we look at
Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR] and Social License to Operate [SLO]. This connection also
shows an aspect of how security has been marketized. Responsibility towards local populations,
surroundings and the environment are no longer based solely on morality but also on economic
considerations. CSR and SLO are both examples of market practices that combine moral and
economic considerations in marketized security and provide insights into how market force affects
the global security field.
Financialization:
Financialization refer to the techniques of marketization, and as such it is a phenomenon within
marketization (Godechot 2015). As an academic term, financialization has been used widely and
across academic disciplines to try and understand the rising number of financial markets (van der
Swan 2014). Definitions of financialization thus vary greatly and spread across understandings,
from a frame through which corporations are shaped and regulated (Froud et. al. 2002) to a way to
live one‟s everyday life through ideas of capitalism and finance (Martin 2002). However, Leyshon
and Thrift propose a more tangible concept of financialization as the processes in which financial
markets convert different practices into financialized assets (Leyshon and Thrift 2007; also Aitken
2011: 127). For our thesis, this concept of financialization is most significant in relation to our
conceptualization of marketized security, since it pertains to how security is being financialized in a
more concrete way.
The fields of finance and security are in many ways intertwined. Both operate with uncertainty as
their core notion, and the two fields manage uncertainty each in its own way (Aitken 2011: 127).
„Risk management‟ is a term that recurs within both fields. In finance markets that deal with
predictions, such as derivatives and futures markets, risk management is central to carrying out
investments and to profiting from them. Managing risk includes aggregating information and

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creating knowledge in order to predict uncertainty related to the markets that are being invested in.
The creation of knowledge pertains to the concepts of expertise vs non-expertise knowledge
outlined in our chapter on socio-political risk. Here, we describe how knowledge is created by
everyday expertise combined with more scientific approaches. These „everyday‟ experiences are at
the core of all prediction markets and rely heavily on the individual experiences that form „everyday
knowledge‟ that cannot easily be put into scientific protocols. We came across this kind of everyday
knowledge during our interviews with private security companies. Guardian SRM has a wide
network of handlers, fixers, informants and other PSCs that they utilize when creating security
solutions or risk assessments for their clients (Østerby 2016: 09:00). This network is primarily
based on their aggregated experience from the founding partners who had decades of experience
working in the Danish Defense Force prior to starting the company (ibid.: 11:10). Their network
usually consists of personal relations, and trust is key to how they choose the people they work with
(ibid.: 11:16). As such, the work and the decisions they make in the company rely greatly on the
everyday knowledge that has been created and accumulated by their employees, and their
employers for that matter. Johnny Andersen confirmed this approach when he explained the hiring
process for his team at the Danish embassy in Kabul. Since it is usually former Danish soldiers who
apply for these jobs, Andersen explains that he either knows the person applying personally or at
least knows someone who knows him (Andersen 2016: 10:00). In this instance, it is also the
personal experience that sets the parameters for hiring. Bruno Kalhøj, however, argued that it is not
always possible to rely solely on personal networks and references to acquire the necessary
information, as there will always be a limit to the size of the network (Kalhøj 2016: 33:45).
However, he did acknowledge the relevance and importance of having a good network in the
security business (ibid.). If we return to Leyshon and Thrift‟s definition of financialization and how
assets are financialized, we can see how this is happening to aspects of the security field as well.
The everyday knowledge of the different actors is key to them performing their jobs, providing the
best possible products, and thus become a defining part of their value as a company. However,
Leyshon and Thrift‟s definition relates to how assets become integrated into financial markets.
What we found in our interviews was not exactly that but rather value creation. But just as in the
financial field, risk is often mitigated by the everyday knowledge of the actors involved, and their
knowledge then turns into assets that have a value in their respective fields. Even though these
assets do not necessarily enter any financial markets, this still shows how aspects of security are
becoming financialized, by value creation, or at the very least intertwined with the field of finance.
4.4. Corporate Social Responsibility: making responsible investments
Throughout several of the interviews we conducted with company representatives and academic
experts on the marketization of security and risk, corporate social responsibility was mentioned
numerous times as a key component. The interest of companies in addressing CSR initiatives and
issues was exemplified by how Michael Nellemann Pedersen, investment director of the pension
fund, PKA, brought up the importance of CSR when making investments for shareholders less than
two minutes into the interview (Pedersen 2016: 1:43). Additionally, Bruno Kalhøj, Head of Security

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and Crisis Management at Maersk Oil, argued that CSR and security are inseparable and that CSR
forms a very important part of the preventative strategy because it is through CSR that a company
builds good relations with local populations (2016: 18:20). Because of the large focus and emphasis
placed on CSR by many of our interviewees, we decided to further develop certain elements
identified within CSR and deploy our understanding of the phenomenon as a key analytical concept
throughout the thesis.
The term [social responsibility] is a brilliant one; it means something, but not always
the same thing, to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or
liability; to others, it means socially responsible behavior in an ethical sense; to still
others, the meaning transmitted is that of „responsible for,‟ in a causal mode; many
simply equate it with a charitable contribution; some take it to mean socially
conscious; many of those who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for
„legitimacy,‟ in the context of „belonging‟ or being proper or valid; a few see it as a
sort of fiduciary duty imposing higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on
citizens at large. (Carroll 1999: 280)
As the quote above emphasizes, CSR is a vague concept that has no one overarching definition, but
many different ones depending on context, interests and perspective. We are primarily interested in
the concept from a sociological business-society perspective, but as Dennis Masaka emphasizes,
„[d]ocketed definitions of CSR are not clear over its exact nature and place in the business-society
relations‟ (2008: 14). Because of this lack of precision, we have chosen to construct our own
conceptual understanding of CSR from a combination of primary and secondary sources, chosen
with a focus on their relevance with regard to our research question.
As such, our interest in CSR is bound up with the context of globalization and the current neoliberal
moment, where it can arguably be seen as a form of capitalist legitimacy. Furthermore, as Dr. Rajiv
Maher argued (2016: 12:05), we also believe that globalization plays a huge role in the development
of business-related security issues. Another aspect we wish to emphasize is how CSR policies have
been incorporated as part of many companies‟ business models, implying that CSR policies have
turned into company risk-management devices (Shamir 2011: 313-336).
As we frame our conceptual understanding of CSR, it is essential to keep some critical arguments in
mind, such as that CSR merely represents a type of discursive „window-dressing‟ used by
companies to construct a better brand image for themselves (Rosenberg 2002; Mullerat 2009; Aras
and Crowther 2010). In addition, Maher argues that many companies portray a general over-
eagerness to communicate the credentials of their CSR programs, which are not always in line with
what‟s really going on in the real world (2016: 06:17).

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