ChrisPolPhil.1

CHRISTIAN ETHICO-POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREEK AND HELLENISTIC INTELLECTUAL
LEGACY, IN THE THOUGHT OF ST PAUL, AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS
Dr. Giuseppe Mario Saccone
Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you
St. Luke, 6:27
Summary
In this paper, I want to examine how the ancient Greek and Hellenistic notions of political ethics
were first superseded and then progressively developed and ultimately incorporated within an
evolving Christian thought, which emphasized the importance of agape within a Universalist
perspective. This evolution can be most clearly seen through the works of St Paul, Augustine and
Aquinas that are widely recognized as the 3 most important and influential sources of
philosophical thought within mainstream Christian religious tradition. Especially, the latter two,
are, of course, correctly deemed to be also philosophers in their own right. In this paper, I will
argue that these 3 extraordinary persons as well as great thinkers together increasingly and
incrementally advanced and elaborated a doctrine predicating the universality of Jesus’s message
but with adaptation and evolution according to the historical circumstances that required taking
into adequate consideration the Greek and Hellenistic cultural legacy, and that by doing so, they
ended up also developing a distinctively Christian ethico-political philosophy. Thus, they left an
indelible legacy to be continuously explored and rediscovered.
That is to say, St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas, certainly not merely as isolated figures operating in
a kind of intellectual vacuum but as persons both practically and intellectually engaged in their
own times, developed, arguably more than other thinkers, at least in terms of influence, widespread
recognition and to a large extent originality, not only the Christian theology but also a distinctive
and evolving Christian ethico-political philosophy, the main concern of this paper. In other words,
they set in motion, were the most famous contributors and were at least partially both engines and
agents of an intellectual process that did not exhausted itself with them but that it permanently
continued. This process still has, in our own very distant and different times, deep contemporary
resonances and implications not only theologically but also in terms of social and political
philosophy.
More specifically, as far political philosophy is concerned, I will argue that the new way of
looking at things according to Pauline cosmopolitanism, not without some initial ambiguity, ends
up setting legitimacy as the main criterion by which to assess governance and offer allegiance.
Consequently, there certainly are explicitly general, universal or cosmopolitan ethico-political
suggestions in the Christian doctrine which, if are taken seriously, are also inevitably bound to
become criteria for legitimate endorsement or allegiance by the faithful. The fundamental
Christian moral imperative to love one’s neighbour clearly has social and political implications. In
regard to this, the ethical demands of Christianity are very stringent. Accordingly, it would appear
that, in order to fulfil those demands, whenever possible, Christians should seek the right sort of
social and political context.
Specific concerns about how to develop such a context sets what, eventually, were to become the
two most historically influential answers to the questions about the role of the political structure
for the life of Christians. These answers were developed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas. Augustine holds that the most one can reasonably expect from a political structure is that
it should promote, to a greater or lesser degree, peace. And he tends to view this central political
task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of those forms of evils that most disturb civil
tranquility. For Aquinas, on the other hand, political organization, chiefly through the
instrumentality of human law, has the capacity of furthering, in a more direct or positive way, at
least the natural aspects of the human function.
1

Christian Ethico-Political Philosophy: An Historical Perspective
Introduction: reasons for, background and features of my historical perspective, i.e. selective
story or narrative about Christian Ethico-Political Philosophy
The importance of advancing moral qualities as the basis of human development and progress can
never be downplayed, and all religions have always had something to say about it, thus playing a
major positive or sometimes even negative role in influencing the behavior of people. Moreover,
as far as the governance of society is concerned, it has almost become part of conventional
wisdom, these days, to point out that religion is becoming more politically involved, and politics is
becoming more religiously involved. Thus, much to the chagrin of secularists, the two are
somehow contentiously intertwined, even though, at least in the West, they maintain a separate
identity. However, I think that it is fair to say that this is nothing new. There has always been a
contentious link (i.e., the object of different opinions and controversies) between religion, ethics
and politics, and religion has always played many roles, including supporting morality and being a
reluctant or an eager political resource. The reason has always been that religion provides identity,
meaning, and purpose in the midst of continuously mutating historical circumstances, and
governments needed this resource in order to effectively exercise their control over societies.
Hence, there has been an evolving historical, broadly intended dialectical interplay between ethics,
politics, and religion and, more generally, philosophical reflection over them, even though each of
these subjects has managed to maintain, at least in the European context, a separate identity. So,
they all evolved in strict contact with each other. The whole history of Western political thought in
particular, and, more generally, of philosophy, at least in my view, provides confirmation of this
dialectical process. Then, it should be no surprise that Christianity, the most important religious
tradition of Europe (but not the sole intellectual engine within, because pagan or pre-Christian
philosophies and religions, Judaism, Islamism, secularism, and even down right atheism have all
played some historical role in it), has not been static, but has evolved across time and
circumstances, and within its evolving doctrine(s) have found and still find expression different
cultures, identities, interpretations, and concerns.
Inevitably, in this paper, I will of course only be able to examine some components of this wider,
extraordinary intellectual process and journey, in the conduct of which a major (but by no means
exclusive) role was performed by St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas, the 3 major developers of what
is commonly considered as the traditional version (at least by the Roman Catholics, and most
Protestants) of the Christian ethico-political philosophy. Accordingly, I will be mainly examining
the role in this evolutionary and perhaps in some deeper sense even revolutionary process of their
changing relation with the Hellenic and Hellenistic classical thought. But before doing so, I would
like to add some further preliminary observations on the reasons for undertaking such study.
Many, including myself, share the pedagogical and heuristic principle that the study of any topics
in the history of ideas should be designed to foster and cultivate the spiritual and moral nature of
all those engaged in it, both readers and writers. This is more obviously the case when the subject
is the evolution of some important aspects of the ethico-political thought of one of the world major
religious traditions. All too often, we are taught and/or we ourselves teach how to do things, but
very rarely is there the inspiration to reflect on why to do them, and the reason these things and us
are here for.1
But humanities, of which philosophy and history constitute fundamental components,
1
Thus, in my opinion, the main pedagogical task of university education, ideally, ought to be not simply to transmit
knowledge by teaching what to think, but rather providing the opportunity to develop those broad analytical skills
which can enhance the quality of thinking, that is to say, it should be about teaching how to think. This could and
should be done by developing the most important dimensions of humanity itself in each person, which I take to be
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are supposed to provide such inspiration to look for reasons, thus widening us out in order to leave
a positive mark on the whole human being. They can, therefore, help us eschewing the risk of such
deep down emptiness that would render living to the fullest a meaningful life a task very difficult
to achieve. It follow that cultivating our spiritual, emotional and intellectual sides in order to
escape from the emptiness of an unexamined life, at least in my and countless others, from
Socrates on, view, means that it is necessary to speak and reflect about moral, political and
spiritual things, while always respecting a diversity of opinions. This is what I hope to be doing
next.2
However, when I start reflecting about our condition as human beings variously engaged in
intellectual, manual or other activities, I realize that we are the lucky (or unlucky, depending from
the point of view) knowing or unknowing inheritors of an array of moral, political, secular and
religious traditions.3
The contemporary West, in particular, from which I originate, is a historically
minded civilization, or so conventional wisdom would seem to suggest. But if we really want to go
beyond conventional wisdom and think outside the box of the unexamined life, we need to make
conscious and informed choices about what to accept or not, rather than simply imbibing what is
continuously repeated or public opinion dictates. In this sense, I share the view of those arguing
that to have strong, but not fanatical, that is to say, tolerant, balanced, critical, well thought and
reflected upon values, arguably is one of the best barriers against the many ills affecting
contemporary societies and polities, such as corruption, injustice, poverty, violence, apathy,
substance abuse and crime.4
If that is the case, then, there is a need to be both critically and
sympathetically aware of and to reveal all the options, underpinnings and implications that the
various historical traditions, within and without the West, can offer.5
For instance, Hinduism
self-identity, conceptual awareness and capacity for appropriate action in order to fulfill one’s aims, taking into
account and seriously caring about the aims and needs of others.
2
It is my belief that an awareness of the development of cultural and spiritual traditions and norms may help us find
our own answers to big questions of life such as where did I come from? Where am I going? Who am I? However,
merely absorbing information may not be enough to find meaningful answers. So, in many cases, it is better and
certainly always intellectually more rewarding, to understand the concepts behind the knowledge that we (are
supposed to) absorb and when teaching transmit. One way of getting this understanding is to examine how some of
these concepts developed historically, and that’s what the history of though or philosophy does.
Some of these concepts combined, into theoretical frameworks both descriptive and prescriptive, have a long history
and a wide ranging import, as they relate to and often combine ethics, politics and religion. A very important, arguably
the most influential one, among such historically developed conceptual frameworks is constituted by the wide ranging
normative principles embodied by Christian love and universalism through Jesus’ life, actions and predication, and
which, probably, finds its first written overall expression in St Paul’s letters. In many schools and academic
institutions, this conceptual framework often underpins some of the information we receive and transmit when we
ourselves are teaching courses in humanities and social sciences.
3
It is widely assumed, but not without significant distinctions over the details, that religious viewpoints mostly rely on
faith. It follows that religion, unlike science, does not rely on testable hypotheses and is not subject to peer review. It is
simply accepted or otherwise based on community or ethnic beliefs and traditions, a person’s willingness to believe in
something, and/or other historical factors and personal circumstances. A religious viewpoint is usually based on
revelatory messages, sacred writings, and the established sacred beliefs of a particular community of faithful.
4
However, my and other scholars arguments for appealing to the individuals’ rational capacity in order to strengthen
social values through the refinements obtained by critically examining them, may run counter to Edmund Burke’s
principle, upheld by much of modern conservativism, that society and its embedded or underpinning moral rules are
not properly subject to critical scrutiny, since the bondage between institutions, customs and practices would not
conform to any known or discoverable general rules. My answer to any objection based on this principle would,
probably, have to be that I never claimed to be either Burkean or conservative; I still maintain, against all odds, some
probably misguided and faltering faith in the irenic value of Enlightenment reason.
5
Certainly, there have been more radical and sinister versions of Burke’s moderate anti-intellectualism. So, for
instance, within Nazi Germany, a principal accusation against the Jews was that they were the intellectual bearers of a
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emphasizes dharma, samsara and moksa, and unity between Atman and Brahman; Buddhism
again dharma, karma, compassion and impermanence; the ethical system of Confucianism (if at all
a religion), duty, respect for the elders and hard work, as currently still mandated by the famous
Tsinghua’s university motto, which exhorts students to “strengthen self ceaselessly and cultivate
virtue to nurture the world”; the Greek one naturalism, honor, glory and courage; the Jewish
tradition orthopraxy (correct action), justice and law; the Christian one orthodoxy (correct belief),
faith, surrender, agape, and grace; the Islamic one unconditional submission to God, again
orthopraxy, and mercy; the scientific, secular tradition, often associated with enlightenment deism
or with agnosticism, reason and logic; atheism solely humanistic values; etc.
Although most values or normative rules embedded in these traditions and others, in spite of the
apparent diversity in the emphasis that each one of them places on particular aspects of their
manifestation, as mandated by different revelatory messages, sacred texts or fundamental beliefs,
are in fact universal and enduring (such as the no harm principle and/or the golden rule), their
actual justifications are based on different historical sources or principles. Moreover, they are not
always understood or acted upon in the same way by individual members of the society both
within and without each tradition. Therefore, doing the right thing can in fact mean different things
to different people, in spite of the fact that religions and even some secular ethics are supposed to
help in providing more practical and specific moral guidance. This is because, as such, normative
rules and values are often affected by personal experiences, current circumstances, and I would
argue, most importantly, as far as society is concerned, historical legacies.
However, in spite of the obvious challenges and potential for conflict that such a variety of
interpretations poses, it is my hope, that if these normative rules embedded in the various traditions
are reflected upon, also by examining their origins and evolution, and not merely acquired, so to
speak, by a sort of unquestioned and uncritical social osmosis, the criteria for taking important
decisions could be clarified, and wider and more informed consent or motivated dissent often
found. In this way, people would become better intellectually equipped, as they should in the
increasingly complex world we live in, in order to make informed and mindful judgments by
themselves in every aspect of their personal lives, including ethics, politics and religion.
Assuming that such a goal is not impossible to achieve, then, you may forgive me for all too
naively thinking that to apply some (modest) analytical skills to the examination of some of the
most important sources of the influential Christian ethico-political philosophy could be one
humble example of the many possible ways of fostering the forma mentis in which the required
attitudes and intellectual skills for making informed and mindful judgments can flourish. But if
this makes at least some sense, then, still looking on the bright side of things, all processes of
reflective, broadly intended, philosophical clarification in making judgments about important
historical legacies could indeed help us to get out of the box of the unexamined life, perhaps also,
somehow, ultimately contributing in making us better human beings.6
Nevertheless, if any such philosophical investigation and clarification could potentially do the
trick, at this point, a reader may still ask why I am choosing the particular subject I intend to deal
with. To this legitimate query, my answer would have to be that since I cannot do justice to all of
destructive and corrupting critical spirit. But fortunately, now, things have radically changed. Currently, most
Germans, no matter whether conservative or liberal, more congruently claim that critical spirit as a positive mark and
legacy of their very own, especially 19th
and early 20th
century, philosophical tradition, to which their Jewish
component gave a fundamental contribution.
6
However, I should be wary of the voice of Thomas Hobbes who endorsed a form of psychological pessimism and
political realism, shouting to me and similarly minded others from his tomb that we are some of the many victims and
perpetrators of reckless optimism.
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the great historical traditions I mentioned before and others, at once, I need to start with something
familiar to me. So, in this paper, I will be examining some of the ethico-political features of the
Christian theological tradition in St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas. In this way, I hope to make a
narrative of how inevitably only a few of the many features of the ethico-political implications of
at least one of the great above mentioned options, one with which, by the way, I have a particular
admiration beside than familiarity, have originated and developed historically.
My thesis is that the three most famous and arguably influential theologians, and, in a broadly
intended sense, philosophers of Christianity (but, ironically, St Paul has sometimes been described
as the anti-philosopher per excellence), are the critical inheritors and those who fully universalized
the Greek and Hellenistic philosophical thought about society and politics.7
I will argue that they
did so by setting in motion the process which universalized the implications of the classical thesis
of the human moral worth.8
Accordingly, my starting point is the widely accepted idea that Christian ethics stems from the
teachings and the example offered by the life of Jesus combined with Judaic monotheism, Roman
Stoicism and Greek philosophy. By creatively developing both a practical and an intellectual
synthesis of these beliefs, Christian thought claimed to embody at first a critique and then
increasingly the truest and most complete expression of their cultural legacy. While making these
claims, Christianity advanced three basic principles concerning the conduct of human life: the first
is that we are supposed to strive for what transcends any sort of state or activity achievable in this
mortal, biological existence, i.e. we should aim for spiritual regeneration or salvation, which
consists in the eternal life in communion with God, and in fellowship with the saved; the second is
that we cannot achieve this salvation solely by our own individual or social efforts, but we also
require the grace of God operating mainly by the guidance of the Church; the third is that in order
to love God, you have to love your fellow human beings, and you have to love and care for the rest
of creation.
In the following sections, I will also point out how, in turn, these ethical and religious principles
gave as well rise to a corresponding political philosophy, which over the millennia acquired an
almost universal influence and relevance. My thesis is that the universality of this message lies in
the fact that it does not embody a static doctrine but principles that are amenable to be adopted,
adapted and progressively developed and actualized according to the different and changing
historical circumstances.9
St. Paul, Augustine and Aquinas, more than others, also because of their
7
The idea that St Paul could be interpreted as an anti-philosopher was expressed again, relatively recently among
others, by the French Marxist Leninist philosopher Alan Badiou, in his book: Saint Paul: The Foundation of
Universalism (Cultural Memory in the Present), Trans. Ray Brassier, Stanford University Press, 1997, for example,
p.108.
8
Of course, it is up to the reader to figure out whether my historical interpretation and perspective is beyond plausible,
entirely convincing. But, in any case, I hope that my stand on major interpretative issues will be sufficiently clear.
However, if at all possible, at the same time, I would not want to make it too obviously partisan, when not strictly
necessary, even though mine is an overall liberal interpretation of Christian thought, with some sympathy for a
moderate version of Liberation Theology, germane, more than to any specific form of Marxism as such, to the
aspiration for social justice, hopefully, embodied by a liberal democratic form of non-authoritarian socialism.
9
As for the actualization of these universal principles in our own present historical circumstances, I would take it to be
as a concern on how to enhance: (a) human rights, worth and equality as mandated by the relevant resolutions of the
United Nations; (b) the importance of ordinary people’s role in monitoring and exercising state power, by free and fair
elections, the rule of law, check and balances, and according to liberal and democratic principles; (c) the capacity of
government to make sure that the people, especially the most vulnerable and less fortunate among them, enjoy welfare,
protection and increasing living standards; (d) the protection of the environment and of all sentient beings in it, both
locally and globally. These general ethico-political goals can be shared by people of different religious and non
religious beliefs, as well as ideological backgrounds. This, of course, implies that there should always be markedly
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fame and resonance, besides their obvious and indisputable extraordinary intellectual prowess,
were instrumental to make this possible by culturally and intellectually mediating between
Christian core beliefs and the Greek and Hellenistic cultural legacy. I hope the importance and
significance of this incorporation of values and dialogue with their own different times and
historical circumstances, operated by arguably the three most important Christian philosophers,
will become apparent in the following pages.
The Rise of Christianity as an Ethical Philosophy
You must love your neighbor as yourself
St. Paul, Letter to the Romans 13: 9
Mine is not a kingdom of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, my men would have fought
to prevent my being surrendered to the Jews
St. John, 18:36
In order to understand why Christianity could successfully develop by adapting to the changing
historical circumstances, whilst still in principle, alas, if not always in practice, adhering to its core
doctrine, it is important to bear in mind that the mediation between classical and Christian values
was made possible because Roman Stoicism inherited from Greek philosophy including, of course,
not the least from Plato and Aristotle, the idea that to be a human person is to be a moral agent
bound to act according to a normative anthropology which assumes the pursuit of justice and of the
common good as the paradigm of virtue and good behaviour in society. In principle, these classical
ideas are certainly not entirely at odds with Jesus’ message of agape. Pauline Christianity was thus
able to successfully incorporate these mostly secular ethical beliefs in its own discourse and moral
teachings without losing credibility. That is to say, to this effect, it convincingly argued that the
best implementation of these beliefs in human behaviour and society called for something more
than what pagan Greek philosophy had already argued for. To put it bluntly, it called for the
presence of the more stringent and demanding requirements of the specifically Christian religious
virtues of faith, hope, and love or charity (agape). Supposedly, only thus could the naturalistic and
secular Greco-Roman normative anthropology come to full fruition saving humanity from the
fallen state in which the original sin had confined it.
But an understanding of how this radical ethical message predicated by the early Church Fathers
was contextualized, in its original, mostly, though eventually not exclusively, Mediterranean
different opinions and practical options on how to best implement and enhance these principles. For instance, the
conservative liberal and the social democratic (or liberal socialist) options should always be available to be chosen by
the people, together with other choices between and among the dichotomies that characterize contemporary
democratic politics. Furthermore, the winner takes all mentality, the persecution of opponents, double standards,
bribery, other forms of manipulations of the letter and spirit of the rule of law such as retroactive legislation, military
and other forms of coups must be eschewed. This can only happen if there is a free, open and easily accessible press
and media, including by now the relatively new, internet based ones. For this reason, freedom of speech, thought,
assembly, of forming political organizations and trade unions, must be, most fundamentally, altogether underpinned by
the values and practices of a free and vibrant civil society. All of this is not easy to achieve, but it is essential for the
full actualization of those fundamental ethico-political principles mandating human rights, worth and equality, to
which so many pay lip service, but which are still all too often practically neglected. In spite of the many different,
more conservative interpretations, I would argue that the historical development and evolution of the Christian ethico-
political philosophy, of which St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas have arguably been the most influential intellectual
engines, has most significantly contributed to universalize as desiderata the whole implications of the idea of natural
laws first, and then, especially via other philosophers indebted to them, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, etc.,
of natural rights (i.e., the fundamental human entitlements), which is at the basis of both liberalism and democratic
theory.
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milieu requires some historical explanation. The journey that brought Christianity to a position of
religious dominance within the Roman Empire begins from the time of Augustus at the beginning
of the first century C.E. and lasts up until the time of the first Christian emperor Constantine early
in the fourth century. This journey certainly had immense political consequences, theoretical as
well as practical, but it did not happen in a kind of intellectual vacuum or without various
interactions with the dominant cultural milieu of the time. I will examine the process that led
Christianity to develop as a religion with political as well as spiritual concerns.
As the Roman Empire consolidated itself, the educated classes of its urban centres became
increasingly devoted to the cosmopolitan ideals of Stoicism.10
According to that philosophy, the
dictates of reason constituted a natural law (ius naturale) morally binding on all men, and therefore
superior to the particular enactments of any state. Thus, the ius gentium which was based on the
customs of various people was considered as a body of equity from which the ius civile, i.e. the
ancient customary law governing Roman citizens, could draw continuous improvements. On this
basis, Roman law succeeded, without interruption of its practical workings, to be brought into
harmony with the theoretical principles of equity as understood according to a kind of eclectic,
predominantly Stoic cultural philosophical framework. Hence, the development of an authoritative
legal system has always been, and still is, rightly credited as among the lasting legacies of the
ancient world of Greco-Roman culture. This is largely due to the fact that the philosophy adopted
by many Latin writers and intellectuals was a distilled version of Stoicism, which divorced from
abstruse metaphysical argument, provided the educated elites with a sort of ethical religion. The
Stoics preached that self-control through reason was the divine element implanted in man by the
Creator.11
According to this doctrine, all men, having in this respect the same original endowment,
are equally the sons of God and so should be considered as brothers to one another. It follows from
this that if a man is true to his real self, he is true to nature and to the divine order that governs the
universe, and will ask no other reward for his good behaviour in life. Stoic ideas gained popularity
through the writings of Cicero and Seneca, and came to pervade the works of later jurists as well
as the subsequent Christian philosophers.12
The popularity among large sections of the imperial
elites, already during the first few centuries of the common era, of what were, arguably, to become
perhaps the two most influential classical Latin authors points to the fact that the educated people
among the Romans of the post-republican period, if not even before, regarded the traditional
stories of gods and goddesses – whether Greek or Latin – as sheer myths. Consequently, even
though prevalently still duly performing the ritual ceremonies required by the legally prescribed
cult of the more traditional deities, and, especially, of the emperor, at least at a philosophical or
more broadly intellectual level, they rejected all religious doctrines that could not be embraced
under such a creed as Stoicism.13
10
Stoicism was founded in ancient Greece by Zeno of Citium (334-262 circa BC). This school owes its name from the
fact that members congregated in the stoa (i.e. the porch) of the agora (piazza); that is to say, the followers met in the
portico of the main central square of ancient Athens. Unfortunately, Zeno’s writings, including a work on political
philosophy entitled like Plato’s Republic, are all lost. The main features of the early Stoic thought developed by
Cleanthes and Chrysippus are a corporealist and dynamic natural philosophy, an empiricist theory of knowledge, an
absolutist conception of moral duty, and a cosmopolitan conception of social organization.
11
The Stoics were pantheists in so far as they believed that God not only orders everything for the best, but is present
in everything as Spirit, which they conceived in corporeal terms as fiery air.
12
However, the two best expositions of western Stoicism are The Discourses of Epictetus, a slave at the court of Nero,
and the Meditations of the emperor Marcus Aurelius – both of which, very significantly were written in Greek.
13
In addition to, and quite different from this majority group, it should also be mentioned, of course, the much smaller
section of intellectuals who could appreciate and follow the demanding path set by some of Plato’s inspired sectarian
and esoteric schools, of which eventually the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus (204/5-270 C.E.), arguably, became the most
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However, the situation was radically different for the uneducated or even only partially educated:
For them, philosophy could offer only slight consolation; hence unsurprisingly they tended to turn
to the new faiths imported from the east. Eventually, one of these oriental faiths was to gain
supremacy throughout the Empire, but for centuries it had to compete for popular favour against
many rivals. Christianity was thus one of several mystic faiths that swept through the Roman
world. In the first century, it remained very obscure; in the second century, it gained sufficient
prominence to awaken an increasing hostility on the part of the government; in the third century, it
grew so strong that persecution of its followers came to be increasingly recognized as useless;
finally, in the fourth century, it became the official religion of the state. Meanwhile – in the course
of bitter conflicts with the Jews, with the Empire, with various un-orthodox offshoots, and with the
pagans – the Church had developed a powerful and pervasive organization. This was because,
compared with its rivals, Christianity had many points of superiority.
In the first place, the story of Jesus is compellingly beautiful – vastly superior, as a mere story, to
the theme of any other oriental mystery. And it is itself the expression of a religious idea. Telling
of a saviour who died to redeem all men, it requires not much symbolic interpretation.
Furthermore, the ethical teachings of Jesus lay at the heart of His gospel; they were not a
supplement borrowed from Greek philosophy, intelligible only to the learned.14
Christianity, as the
event proved, appealed to all. It did not, like the cult of Mithras, exclude women; nor did it, like
the cults of Cybele and Isis, exalt a feminine principle at the expense of others. Lastly, the
Christian religion took over from Judaism an uncompromising monotheism. It was a religion that
declared every other to be false, a religion at once exclusive and aggressive. Therein lay an
avowed hostility to the Roman imperial system that was to invite persecution; yet therein lay also
the strength that was to bring triumph. But equally important to its relative autonomy from the
shortcomings and strictures of the contemporary social and political institutions as well as counter-
cultural spiritual and other-worldly claims (of prevalently Jewish origin), was the key to its
initially low but steadily increasing influence (and ultimately utter success) among the educated
elite. Most starkly put, the key to this unprecedented success of Christianity among the educated
elites lied into how early Christian thought related to the dominant cultural milieu of the time.
Roman Stoicism inherited from Greek philosophy including, of course, not the least from Plato
and Aristotle, the idea that to be a human person is to be a moral agent bound to act according to a
normative anthropology which assumes the pursuit of justice and of the common good as the
paradigm of virtue and good behaviour in society. Pauline Christianity was able to successfully
incorporate these mostly secular ethical beliefs in its own discourse and moral teachings. That is to
say, to this effect, it convincingly argued that the best implementation of these beliefs in human
behaviour and society called for something more than what pagan Greek philosophy had already
famous and accomplished expression.
14
The Gospel consists of the teachings or revelation of Christ as described in the first four books of the New
Testament. Traditionally, the author of the first book was considered to be the Apostle St. Matthew, a tax-gatherer
from Capernaum in Galilee. This attribution it is erroneous because the first Gospel, written after AD 70 (the year of
the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem by the Romans) was based largely on that written by St. Mark. The Feast
day of St. Matthew is September 21. The second Gospel, written by St. Mark, it is in fact the earliest in date. St. Mark
was an Apostle companion of St. Peter (considered as the first Pope) and St. Paul. The feast day of St. Mark the
Apostle is on April 25. Tradition attributes the third Gospel to St. Luke, a physician, possibly the son of a Greek
freedman of Rome. This Apostle was closely associated with St. Paul and was also considered as the author of the
Acts of the Apostles. St. Luke’s Feast day is October 18. The fourth Gospel is probably erroneously attributed to St.
John the Evangelist or the Divine. This Apostle was the son of a Galilean fisherman and the brother of St. James. He
was credited since very early times, together with the authorship of the fourth Gospel, also with that of the
Apocalypse, and of the three epistles of the New Testament. His Feast day falls on December 27.
8

argued for. To put it bluntly, it called for the presence of the more stringent and demanding
requirements of the specifically Christian religious virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Supposedly,
only thus could the naturalistic and secular Greco-Roman normative anthropology come to full
fruition saving humanity from the fallen state in which the original sin had confined it.
Aquinas it is usually credited to have developed, more than one thousand years later, the theory of
the continuity between the cardinal Aristotelian virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and
fortitude, and the Christian theological ones of faith, hope and love. Yet, in fact, Aquinas did not
really set a novel or original theory, but his geniality consisted in merely rationally rejuvenating
what was already there. That is to say, his great contribution to philosophy consisted in brilliantly
renewing, by expressing in rigorous and updated systematic (although still inevitably medieval)
fashion with direct references to the rediscovered original writings of Aristotle, the traditional
doctrine already developed by early Christian Pauline thought.
Indeed, especially in the major urban centres of the Mediterranean Sea, the situation offered fertile
grounds for the establishment of a religion that could fully endorse and ground philosophically the
rational and secular cultural values of the Universalist intelligentsia of the early Roman Empire.
Christianity earlier on succeeded in developing a philosophy apt to meet these aspirations. This
was possible because, as several recent scholars have pointed out, there is a natural affinity and
connection between St. Paul’s thought and that of secular, Hellenistic philosophical schools.15
There is a similarity between Paul’s conception of conversion to Christ and the Stoic theory of
oikeiosis, the theory of how a person will or may undergo a change in his or her understanding of
the good, from taking it to be constituted of what basically amounts to possession of ordinary,
material goods on the part of the individual him – or herself to a quite different understanding of it.
As the etymology of the term oikeiosis suggests, it bears the connotation of moving from seeing
oneself as a separate entity, with idiosyncratic desires, aims, and motives, to an ever wider social
identification of oneself with the surrounding cosmos, particularly with the directing, rational
element of the cosmos. For the Stoics, the ‘different understanding’ of the human function, end, or
good in which oikeiosis issues is homologia – ‘living in conformity with nature’. Homologia is an
identification of oneself with the divine reason that pervades and orders the cosmos; it is a matter
of using one’s reason for the purposes for which it is designed, that is, for reaching the truth about
the world. Knowledge of this truth includes knowledge of how particular things in the universe are
valuable for oneself. That is what preserves one’s new, rational constitution. As Cicero notes,
homologia yields the central insight that the good to which everything else is referred are acts in
conformity to moral rectitude and in moral rectitude (honestum) itself.
For the Stoics, the identification of self with the ‘cosmic reason’ and, for St. Paul, identification of
the self with Jesus Christ involve a sort of transformation of oneself – and, indeed, a
transformation where one identifies oneself not just with reason and with Christ, respectively, but
also with all other persons who have received similar insight. For both the Stoics and St. Paul, this
ontological transformation – that is, transformation in one’s ‘being’ – will (ideally) have profound
moral implications about one’s behaviour: one simply will treat others in a different way because
one sees them, and oneself, in a different way.
15
St. Paul was a Jew (also called Saul) of Tarsus, with the status of a well educated Roman citizen. He was brought up
as a Pharisee and at first opposed the followers of Christ, assisting at the martyrdom of St. Stephen. On a mission to
Damascus he was converted to Christianity after a vision, and became the Apostle of the Gentiles, and the first great
Christian missionary and theologian. His missionary journeys are described in the Acts of the Apostles, and the letters
to the Church written or attributed to him form part of the New Testament. He was martyred at Rome in 64 AD circa.
His Feast day is June 29.
9

However, at a more fundamental epistemic level, the philosophical affinity between St. Paul and
Hellenistic philosophy was theoretically viable because of the ambiguity of the Greek world
Logos, which was absorbed by Christian theology. Since Heraclitus, the notion of the Logos had
been a central concept of Greek philosophy, since it could signify “word” and “discourse” as well
as “reason”. In particular, the Stoics believed that the Logos, conceived as a rational force, was
immanent in the world, in human beings, and in each individual. That is why, when the prologue
to the Gospel of John identified Jesus with the Eternal Logos and the son of God, it enabled
Christian doctrine to be presented as a philosophy. The substantial Word of God could be
conceived as the Reason which created the world and guided human thought. Accordingly,
beginning in the second century, Christian authors called “Apologists” because they tried to
present Christianity in a form understandable to the Greco-Roman world used the notion of the
Logos to define Christianity as the one and only true philosophy. Greek philosophy, they claimed,
had thus far possessed only portions of the Logos – that is, the True Discourse and perfect Reason
incarnated in Jesus Christ. If doing philosophy meant living in conformity with Reason in order to
correctly achieve homologia then the Christians were the true philosophers because they lived in
conformity with the divine Logos. From this it followed that Christian philosophy, like Greek
philosophy before, could thus present itself both as a discourse and as a way of life. And indeed, it
presented itself as the completion of and the perfect match between the two. Most starkly put,
Christianity could credibly claim superiority over the competing Roman beliefs because of its
alleged capacity to provide not only the simple abstract knowledge of the truth, but also and most
importantly an efficacious method of salvation. This pointed to the fact that the success of
Christianity was not due merely to the inner theoretical strength and novelty of the doctrine it
developed. Theory and practice could be successfully matched because Christianity introduced a
new and unprecedented development in the ancient world: the institutional role of the Church as
both practical and theoretical provider of ethical as well as spiritual guidance and direction in
society, ultimately leading to, many centuries after, and more contentiously so, even to claims to
political leadership. I will examine next the complex process that made Christianity involved with
politics.
The Rise of Christian Political Philosophy
The state is there to serve God for your benefit
St. Paul, Letter to the Romans, 13::4
Especially at the beginning, Christian philosophy as both a discourse and a way of life was based
on a vision expressed by the principles advocated in the Gospel, and on the outcome of these
principles embodied in the living early Church which manifested to the world that the actions
which it inspired matched expectations. But, while waiting for the second coming of Christ (the
Parousia), which at the beginning was thought to be imminent, inevitably the outcomes could
meet the expectations of the growing flock of believers (which needed not only spiritual comfort in
the ritual gatherings of worship, but also moral guidance, practical help and community support
especially in time of need, a network of social and cultural activities, etc.) because the Church, in
spite of the frequent but intermittent persecutions, increasingly acquired influence and power over
society. This led to its involvement with politics. As time progressed, this involvement came to be
seen as a necessary evil by Augustine, while the Christians waited for the Parousia, and as the
fulfilment of the noble mission of the Church many centuries later by Aquinas, during the late
Middle Age. In a nutshell, Christian political theory and indeed the corresponding philosophy
10

itself, generally speaking, and not without much controversy, dissent, and even wars followed this
complex trajectory. However, I will argue next that early Pauline though already made this
trajectory theoretically possible, if not inevitable. In other words, I will examine how early
Christian thought already developed the intellectual seeds that provided the initial impetus to the
unfolding of this long term, but not predetermined historical process.
The spread of Christianity among both the elites and the masses makes it incumbent for the
Church’s Fathers to define the relation with the political .authority. It should be no surprise then
that this, given their previously mentioned Hellenistic cultural background, brought to the
foreground the philosophical questions about the source and legitimacy of political authority and
institutions. They had a variety of options concerning how to relate with or confront the state. It
was conceivable to make the Church a political rival or an authoritative but benevolent either
senior or subservient junior partner of the secular authority, in the common task of attending to the
welfare of the people. Alternatively, it was possible to make it the bearer of a model of virtue and
justice against which the legitimacy of political power may be assessed. Or the Church could
become an independent spiritual community completely unconcerned with the conduct of the
secular authority and all but unaccountable to it. Indeed, all these apparently irreconcilable
alternatives seem to have exerted at least some influence on the development of both ecclesiastical
and secular Western history. In fact, it is the case that Christian political philosophy yielded a very
complex and polyvalent interpretation of the role of politics in human life. However, that is not to
say that it is impossible to reconstruct the most general features of what became the prevalent
orthodoxy in Christian political thought.16
At the beginning, what later came to be considered as heretical or unorthodox interpretations of the
new faith acquired influence in some sectors of society, and especially among the intellectuals
attracted by esoteric Neo-Platonism. Accordingly, it was primarily among these groups, that an
apolitical sectarian version of Christian thought found expression in the various forms of Gnostic
Christianity which appeared in the second century, and which for a while may even have been
prevalent among the faithful. Gnostic doctrine predicated that elect souls are bits of divinity
temporarily imprisoned in matter. It follows that all human social and political arrangement, which
inevitably pertain to the world of matter are evil. It also argued that worldly pursuits and
possessions are forbidden to those seeking enlightenment. Most likely, in the third century,
Christian Gnosticism inspired, at least in part, and possibly together with various other Iranic and
more Easter religions originating from the Indian subcontinent such as Buddhism, the development
of Manichaeism.17
But be as it may or not in this regard, as a matter of fact, both Gnosticism and
Manichaeism were akin in advocating a sectarian conception of Christianity. However, this
16
The reference to “orthodoxy” here it is intended in the literal sense of correct belief, without (necessarily, or
primarily) referring to the views held by the Eastern Orthodox Church, which eventually set itself apart from the
Roman Catholic one after the final Schism of Orient of 1054.
17
Gnosticism refers to a collection of religious-philosophical systems particularly influential in the second and third
centuries C.E. In general, these systems emphasized the duality between spirit and matter, tended to conceive the
material world as intrinsically evil, and believed in salvation for a small group of elite souls, which is to be effected by
means of ascetic practice and reliance on secret, specialized knowledge (gnosis). In the 1940s additional knowledge of
Gnostic beliefs was gained through the discovery of texts at the Egyptian site of Nag Hammadi. Manichaeism, which
may be regarded as a particular form of Gnosticism, was founded by the Parthian religious figure Mani (216-276
C.E.). It elaborates Gnostic dualism between the spiritual (good) and the material (evil) by means of an elaborate
mythology, which includes the doctrine of a war between heavenly and demonic souls. As a result of this war, the
former (‘seeds of light’ or suffering multiple Jesus) are entrapped in some biological organism. Ultimately, there will
be complete separation of the two kingdoms. Rigorous asceticism practiced by elect souls (aided by the ministrations
of less exalted ‘hearers’) will help to effect this final separation.
11

conception appealed only to the selected few which were supposed to constitute a community set
apart, both from the other people and from all the existing political orders. In accordance with
these principles, such a purely spiritual community should set itself on a ascetic dimension entirely
distinct, radically alien, and not in competition to all political structures, be those empires,
kingdoms, republics, or others. It should then be no surprise that this elitist, sectarian and
completely apolitical vision could appeal to only relatively few people, and could never gain
widespread acceptance outside the relatively small circles of adepts, thus contradicting the
missionary aspiration of the Church of evangelizing the masses of ordinary people. This
constitutes the main reason why Gnosticism and Manichaeism, after some initial successes, were
first marginalized, and ultimately violently suppressed as heresies by the followers of what were to
become more mainstream and orthodox interpretations of Christianity.18
Mainstream Christianity always strived to maintain an uneasy equilibrium between directing its
message to a selected few and making it universal, and between disinterest and involvement in
politics. Eventually, somehow, and not without much debate and doctrinal controversies, religious
universalism and political involvement came to predominate, thus all but entirely gaining the
exclusive hallmark of correct belief, but without never entirely wiping out the two alternative
options. Indeed, religious orthodoxy, to some extent and where possible, tried to accommodate all
different interpretations. So, as far as the issue of universalism versus sectarianism goes, on the
one hand, there are ‘counsels of perfection’, to which many may be called but for which few seem
to be well suited. The result was the establishment of monastic communities relatively set apart
from the rest of society, which though, at least in principle, were still to be regarded as non-
sectarian because in communion with the ‘catholic’ (which literally means ‘universal’) church and
at the service of the larger social-political community, through their prayers, personal sacrifices,
and the administration of sacraments to the lay members. On the other hand, the Church also took
18
After Gnosticism and Manichaeism, many other heresies emerged during the relatively early stage of Christianity,
such as Arianism, Donatism, Nestorianism and later the Mono-physicist one. All had some political, beyond the more
explicit theological motivations, which mostly concerned (possibly, except for the Donatists) different interpretations
of the nature of Christ, and dissent or rejection about the officially approved doctrine of the trinity. Donatism was
arguably the most political of all the heresy because it involved a rejection of all ecclesiastical authority in the Church
as well as of sacramental ministrations which were not delivered by virtuous or saintly clergy. It caused bloody
uprisings in some parts of North Africa. But, arguably, the most influential heresy was Arianism. This doctrine named
after the Christian priest Arius, was a view according to which the Son, Jesus Christ, is a creature, superior to other
creatures and created before time but distinct in essence from God the Father. It was condemned as heretical at the
Council of Nicaea (325 C.E.). Although the division between Arianism and orthodox or Catholic Christianity may
seem to depend on a rather abstruse theological issue, the division also came to coincide with other social, economic,
and political differences. If the Son is subordinate to the Father, then also the Church which he established would have
a diminished authority, and could become therefore more likely to be considered as subordinate to the secular and
temporal power already established by the Father before the advent of Christ, especially if this power is exercised by a
Christian sovereign. For this reason, probably, this doctrine seems to have been popular among the Germanic kings
which were converted to it by a bishop who was a follower of Arius. However, not surprisingly, it never gained much
traction among the ecclesiastical authorities, and was probably ignored by the ordinary faithful who found difficult to
grasp the sophisticated theological issues involved. (As yet, we don’t know what alternative liturgical rituals, if any,
were involved.) So, eventually, it was abandoned (and very actively persecuted) thus largely felling into all but
complete oblivion when the political powers needed the support of an authoritative Church to establish or boost their
legitimacy in order to obtain the active allegiance of their subjects when facing internal or external challenges.
Nevertheless, criticism against the Trinitarian dogma of mainstream Christianity occasionally reemerged among
rationalist or empiricist philosophers, especially with the rise of modernity. For instance, John Locke and Sir Isaac
Newton seem to have endorsed views similar to the ones of Arius, and the doctrine of the Trinity, which was finally
elaborated in the present form only at the beginning of the fourth century, arguably remains the most philosophically
disputed and challenging aspect of Christian theology.
12

care of and acknowledge the importance and contribution of the increasing numbers of Christians
– from all parts of the Roman empire, and later also beyond, slave and free, male and female, rich
and poor – who could not pursue Christian perfection or the practice of ‘radical’ apostolic charity
to the full extent, but who were not for this very reason to be necessarily considered less serious in
their faith or meritorious before God. In other words, both the elected few and the more ordinary
many were welcomed among the faithful.
Similarly, concerning the issue of whether Christian doctrine was supposed to be political or
apolitical, cosmopolitan readings of Christianity as a politically neutral religion were never
officially condemned by the Church. They trace their origins at least back to St. Paul’s famous
statement: ‘there are no more distinctions between Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and
female, but all of you are one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:28). Moreover, Christianity could have
been considered from a political point of view as a relatively neutral religion, also because unlike
Judaism and Islam, the two other religions referring to the biblical prophet Abraham, it does not
mandate a specific set or code of civil laws by which to govern society. Its main focus is on
spiritual regeneration obtained through correct belief by following the teachings of the Church, and
by performing actions inspired by prayer, with an emphasis on orthodoxy rather than on Jewish
and later also Islamic orthopraxy, which both attributed greater importance to the performance of
the correct rituals. Christians as long as they were not forced to indulge in practices such as
emperor worship and idolatry, which directly contradicted their basic beliefs, were supposed to
follow the customs and laws of the community in which they lived without challenging the
existing authorities.
However, even though no Christian denied the duty to obey lawful authority, the political
implications of Christianity soon turned out to be very long ranging. It is true that Jesus preached
that we must render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, but he also and most importantly
added that we must render to God what is God’s. And this clearly means that if the two come into
conflict we must obey God rather than Caesar. This position is different from the old tradition that
made religion merely an adjunct of the state. Since the time of Alexander, and even more clearly
so in imperial Rome, it became clear to whoever was in command that in long run to maintain an
extended empire was impossible without religious support. That is to say, without the modern
feeling of national identity, the only practical bond of union was a common religion. So according
to the imperial conception of political obligation which grew stronger under Diocletian with the
spread of Easter Mithraism, the highest duty of morality and religion met in the state and were
embodied in the supreme civil authority and divinity of the sacred person of the emperor.
While this was happening, Christian belief, on the other hand, held that the duties of religion were
supreme and owed directly to God. In essence, the duties of religion were considered the
outgrowth of the relation between the spiritual deity and His manifestation in human nature.
Secular institutions existed to only provide the means of bodily and earthly existence. For this
reason, the formal ceremony of paying religious honour to the genius of the emperor could not be
accepted by the early Christians. The institution anointed to provide the medium of communication
between the individual soul and God was to be distinguished, and at least to some extent made
independent from the secular authority. In this way, Christianity raised the novel issue of the
relation between the Church and the State. This issue was to have long ranging implications in
European thought in that the concept of liberty could not have played the significant historical role
it did without religious institutions being broadly independent and in some sense superior in
importance to the state and secular law. Thus, the issue concerning the presence or absence of a
special sort of moral obligation towards the state points to the fact that Christian political
13

philosophy ended up placing a different emphasis on the nature of the allegiance owed to the state
than what the majority of the ancient pagan thinkers tended to do. That is to say, it did not bind
such allegiance merely to the promotion of self-interest or even to the common good, but to the
will of God and its consequences concerning the ordering of society and the behaviour of its
individual members. In other words, the issue of legitimacy came explicitly to the forefront with
unprecedented consequences throughout the European Medieval history and even later on mainly
because of the prominence it acquired in the Christian political philosophy. In fact, it has become
one of the enduring issues discussed by later Western political theory both secular and religious.19
At a fundamental level Christianity postulates a human nature, or purposes less naturalistic and
more ‘spiritual’ than those accounted for by the various secular normative anthropologies of
Hellenistic heritage. According to Christianity, because the biological or terrestrial nature of
human beings is merely transitory, it must be subordinated to their eternal celestial nature. If, then,
the fundamental role of political organization is to secure the common good of its citizens, it must
at the very least not be at odds with the human function postulated by Christianity, and at best
contribute in furthering it. And indeed, we do find that the purpose of Christian political
philosophy is to ensure that this is the case. Broadly speaking, at least initially, the issue of
legitimacy it is dealt with and solved according to such a blueprint: Legitimate government is a
government that does advance or does not contradict the mission of the Church of converting the
unbelievers, and of leading the faithful to the other worldly salvation. But of course, eventually the
criterion of legitimacy was progressively extended to cover issues that were not considered at the
early stages of Christianity such as the rights of succession, property laws, Salic law, detailed
limits of political power, etc. As the Church grew it was, in fact, extending its social and political
influence and needed to consolidate its growing grip on power on firm theological grounds. The
extension of the criterion of legitimacy was made theologically possible by the increasing appeal
to the principle that political structures are created by God, and that rules are (more or less
directly) divinely commissioned. Of course, this doctrine was conducive to making the believer
particularly prone to submitting to the political authority sanctioned by the Church, whatever form
it may have assumed. However, paradoxically, this doctrine also greatly increased the importance
of the criterion of legitimacy in assessing political structures, perhaps and arguably behind the
original intentions of the Church Fathers, which were still upholding some Hellenistic theoretical
principles. The political thought of classical pagan antiquity was teleological in that it emphasized,
in the assessment of the structure of a polity, its efficiency and justice in delivering whatever end it
was deemed political structures were supposed to effect. Before the consolidation of Christianity
as the dominant religion, the idea of a political legitimacy not to be identified with just and
efficient fulfilment of government, although not unknown had only a limited appeal in mainstream
political philosophy. The situation started to change after Christianity achieved social dominance.
Then theoretical accounts that trace a particular lineage of political legitimacy directly from the
action of God, his prophets, or other earthly representatives slowly began to appear and became
dominant during medieval feudalism, persisting even much later. Much later, with the rise of
modernity, in turn, these top down accounts of power and legitimacy began to lose their appeal.
This was partly due to the rise of the social contract theories, and to Sir Robert Filmer’s unpopular
19
The issue of legitimacy was not completely absent from ancient philosophy. For instance, it takes center stage in
Plato’s Crito. In that dialogue, Socrates, awaiting execution by the Athenian government, is urged by Crito and other
supporters to escape. The Crito certainly suggests a ‘special sort of moral obligation owed to the state, which is not to
be reduced to considerations of individual self-interest or (perhaps) even to the promotion of the common good.
However, the doctrine, even though well known, does not appear to have been widely or enthusiastically adopted by
Greek or Roman political philosophy.
14

defense of the Stuart’s divine right to rule seventeenth century England. Nevertheless, attention to
the principle of political legitimacy as at least to a degree autonomous from the issue of efficient
governance and justice remains important in contemporary political philosophy, and it is an
enduring legacy of how cosmopolitan and Universalist Pauline thought was interpreted and
redeveloped by the successive Christian philosophers.20
I will try, in the next section, to clarify the
main features of this principle of legitimacy in Pauline moral and political universalism.
The Criterion of Legitimacy in Pauline Moral and Political Universalism
[A] Good, wise, and law-biding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of
all more than that of himself or of any single individual.
Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, 3.64
What the Spirit brings is…: love, joy, patience, kindness, goodness, trustfulness, gentleness, and
self-control. There can be no law against things like that, of course.
St. Paul, Letter to the Galatians, 5:22-23
Prudence is the understanding of situations of radical crisis
Leonardo Boff (attributed)21
The ethical precepts of St. Paul like the ones of Hellenistic Stoicism have a markedly universal
range, and were instrumental in how the new Christian focus on the issue of political legitimacy
was introduced in European and later world history. Whereas, Aristotle inherited from Protagoras
the idea that nomos, standing for what is customary, conventional and cultural in society, in order
to play its role in the fulfillment of the human function of pursuing eudaimonia, which indicated,
broadly speaking, the individual flourishing of the Greek (male) citizens, required the proper
enculturation by a specific local polity and culture, mainstream Christianity took a more
cosmopolitan stand akin to the one of Roman eclectic Stoicism. In other words, according to
Aristotle, morality and politics to fully play their role in the construction of the virtuous citizen
require the Greek identity, therefore becoming matters of local rather than universal concern and
fruition. According to this position, there would then not be much point in looking for general
criteria of government legitimacy behind its capacity to ensure effective and fair rule. This is very
different from what St. Paul and the Stoic were arguing for. The early Christian partly inherited
and partly set by themselves a normative anthropology according to which fulfilling the human
function it is a matter of obtaining the right understanding about the universe and the role of
humans and whoever rules them. Cosmopolitanism it is thus somehow connected with the
establishment of some general, although as yet not very specific criteria for government
legitimacy. I will try to explain next how this could be the case.
For Christians, gaining the right insight about the world required correctly grasping and following
the doctrines taught by the Church. Everything hanged on coming to understand, receive, willfully
accept and implement the grace of God through the ecclesiastical administrations of the
sacraments. This implied getting at least some rational grasp of the role of the Divine providence
in achieving the proper human good and flourishing. But correctly getting such a rational insight
20
Legitimacy is the quality that transforms sheer power into rightful authority; it provides an order or command with
an authoritative or binding moral character, so that it is obeyed out of duty, rather than because of fear. Thus, the
concepts of legitimacy and authority are strongly connected and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the one from
the other. Arguably, however, authority tends to refer more to people or persons, whereas legitimacy more to systems
of government or political roles and functions.
21
See, “Jesus, un hombre de equilibrio, fantasia cradora y originalidad”, Leonardo Boff, teologo, Redes Cristianas.
2009-06-20. Retrieved 2011-12-29.
15

about God’s creation implied, besides of course gaining the proper understanding of how to
achieve the eternal bliss of salvation, required also understanding the functions that God attributed
to legitimate rulers and governance. If this were to happen, then all disorderly passions will be
blotted out, i.e. subjected to the control of a substantive notion of (practical) reason. The volitional
faculty will thus became strong and make the faithful act only according to his/her new insight and
correct belief in a process that has some resemblance with the Stoic concept of homologia. To
achieve this spiritual regeneration, it is mandatory the personal effort of the believer, but no
particular sort of socialization, enculturation, or upbringing (again not unlike what eclectic
Stoicism predicated) is necessary. In other words, it is essential for salvation to acquire knowledge
of, willfully accept and to one’s best apply the correct universal teachings of the Church, the
delivery of which legitimate rulers must not hinder. Following from these premises, it should be no
surprise that consequently, according to mainstream Christian ethics, unlike for Aristotle, no
particular (in the sense of bound by a specific local culture) secular polity it is required for humans
to achieve salvation. Then, apparently, a person’s Christian life would seem to be almost
completely independent from state politics. However, this in fact proved to be, from the beginning,
far from the truth, starting from Jesus’ crucifixion, to the apostles’ martyrdom and state
persecutions against early Christians, and then to the unfolding of the complicate relationship
between spiritual and temporal powers. Indeed, these political events constituted the essence of
Christianity and shaped the conscience of the believers.
In reality, Christian cosmopolitanism and universalism is concerned with defining the nature and
boundaries of legitimate political rule and of the allegiance which is due by the believers to the
secular authority, and indeed it does raise very profound questions about the proper role that
secular political institutions have in promoting the Christian message and its related normative
views about the purpose of human life.22
Thus, the new way of looking at things according to
Pauline cosmopolitanism also sets legitimacy as the main criterion by which to assess governance
and offer allegiance. Consequently, there certainly are explicitly general, universal or
cosmopolitan political suggestions in the Christian doctrine which, if are taken seriously, are also
inevitably bound to become criteria for legitimate endorsement or allegiance by the faithful. The
fundamental Christian moral imperative to love one’s neighbour clearly has social and political
implications. In regard to this, the ethical demands of Christianity are very stringent. Hearts must
be changed in order to fulfil the Church’s mission in solidarity with the poor and for achieving the
necessary structural changes in society which would give voice to the voiceless, as required by
Christian agape. In other words, correctly understood, the Gospel constitutes a continuous demand
for the right of the poor, dispossessed or anyway oppressed by other men or by nature to make
them heard.23
Accordingly, it would appear that, in order to fulfil those stringent demands,
22
Of course, some systematic approach may be needed when seeking a definition of the term ‘politics’ in the context
of antiquity. The word comes from the Greek word ‘polis’ meaning a human community, particularly a state. Plato and
Aristotle used this word. In Plato’s Republic, it explained ways to create a model state. So, in the past, the term
‘politics’ was often used to express a concern with ways to creation of a model community. Moreover, it was also
concerned with the means and expectations for creating a better society. This usage stemmed from the fact that Plato
and Aristotle found weaknesses in their society and discussed ways in which political thought could improve it. So a
politician would have been the one who was trying to make society better. However, the meaning of words often
changes according to uses and circumstances of an era, and also across the time. So it is also the case for the word
‘politics’, which nowadays it is often used to indicate the activity of gaining and managing power in society,
sometimes with a negative, in some cases even derogatory connotation, even though the earlier meaning it is not
entirely jettisoned. It is mostly, but perhaps not exclusively, in the earlier meaning that that I am using the term
‘politics’ and the relative adjective ‘political’ in reference to Christian philosophy.
16

whenever possible, Christians should seek the right sort of social and political context.24
The
endeavour to create such a context where these demands for justice are at least not hindered,
ideally seriously pursued or even ultimately met can thus become the criterion according to which
to assess the legitimacy of political institutions.
But, unfortunately, even though from the early stages of Pauline Christianity to our own times
there often have been calls from within and without the ranks of the Church itself to make the
delivery of a substantive principle of distributive justice that would protect the rights of the
dispossessed one of the criteria for legitimate temporal authority, these demands have largely
remained unfulfilled; indeed, their effective political implementation has been, in fact, mostly
discouraged by the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that, because of Jesus’ and St Paul’s teachings, at least in
principle, if not in fact, a criterion of legitimacy based on the delivery of justice to the needy was
always formally maintained. And this has not remained merely a lip service adherence to an
abstract principle having, in fact, from the beginning and also much later on inspired countless
23
This is the interpretative perspective of St Paul’s letters developed by liberation theology, many of whose
theological insights, even though, arguably, not the whole corresponding political ideology, now constitute integral
part of Pope Francis’ renewed message of preferential option by the Church for the poor. See: 1 Cor. 3:16-17; 1 Cor.
6:19; also, for instance, Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, ed. and trans. by Sister Caridad Inda and John
Eagleson. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990, pp.193-195, 300.
24
Liberation theology emerged at a time when nearly all Latin America was dominated by right-wing oligarchies and
repressive military dictatorships. Moreover, many Latin American bishops and other church leaders in that era had
close ties with the oligarchies, ties that proponents of liberation theology were quick to expose and challenge. As a
social movement inspired by the Christian faith, however, liberation theology does not seek to foment violence. Rather
it aims to uproot the most pernicious forms of violence, which includes institutionalized poverty, corruption and
repression, and to recover the original meaning of “church” as “followers of Jesus dedicated to the reign of God”. The
phrase “liberation theology” has a double meaning. It is used to describe a broad social movement based on grassroots
church organizations that seek to better the life of the poor. It also refers to a different way of thinking about
Christianity – “theology” – that gives special emphasis to the experience of the poor. The difference this makes is
dramatic. Like other, more traditional theologies, liberation theology reflects on the Christian promise of salvation.
But it removes any misunderstanding that salvation occurs behind our backs or only after we die. The call of Jesus to
deliver all people from slavery and suffering begins now – in this life. “Liberation” is another word for that
deliverance. All Christian theologies promote almsgiving and charity to poor people and those in need. But liberation
theology goes further. It asks: Why are these people poor in the first place? It seeks to understand poverty and to
change the social and political systems that cause it. It also seeks to learn from poor people. It wants those in need to
have a voice in their own deliverance. It is a theology of empowerment. One sees clear resonances of this view in the
preaching of Martin Luther King Jr and the prophetic genius of Mahatma Gandhi. You can find echoes of it as well in
movements like Black Lives Matter and in efforts to combat human trafficking. Liberation theology embraces the
concerns of all who suffer violence and, as Pope Francis insists, this includes the Earth herself. As an interpretation of
Christian faith that takes seriously the suffering of all God’s creation, liberation theology counters attempts to use the
Gospel to justify anything from racism to homophobia, from unbridled capitalism to wanton exploitation of the Earth.
It also criticized abstract religious piety that ignores the desperate pleas of refugees, rationalizes the wounds inflicted
by global poverty or turns a blind eye to those rejected as “losers”. The scandal of oppressive poverty and widespread
misery is not the product of “nature”, according to liberation theology, much less God’s will. It is the product of
human choices and human sinfulness, especially as these appear in the social, cultural, political and economic
structures that shape the way we live in the world. Precisely for this reason – and in concert with both Pope John Paul
II as well as Pope Francis – liberation theology makes a preferential option for the poor. It takes to hart the words of
Jesus: “Blessed are you who are poor, for the kingdom of God is yours but woe to you who are rich, for you have
received your consolation.” Creating a real option for the poor changes where we stand, who we meet and how we act.
It transforms both the interpretation and practice of the Christian faith.
Though it is a mistake to uncritically equate Pope Francis’s vision of the Catholic Church with liberation theology, he
and liberation theologians like Father Gustavo Gutierrez clearly share one key point: At the centre of their lives is an
indestructible love for Christ’s poor. And that love changes everything.
17

examples of instances of heroic dedication to the cause of the poor epitomized by the practical
works done by several outstanding figures such as St Francis of Assisi, more recently Mother
Teresa of Calcutta, and many of their less famous followers. However, these noble endeavours
have mostly (but not always exclusively) concerned the all important practical ethical activity on
behalf of the needy in the social sphere, but without directly calling to task the powers that be by
questioning their legitimacy to rule for their lack of support for the poor.
Reversing this almost apolitical tend, relatively recently, Liberation Theology, by reinterpreting
early Pauline thought, may have significantly contributed to raise a renewed sensitivity to the issue
of the import of a certain required adherence to an at least basic enforcement of an adequate level
of distributive justice in order to evaluate the legitimacy of existing political institutions.
Moreover, these demands for social justice, now, both within and without Liberation Theology, are
no longer confined merely to the economic sphere. Indeed, these pressing demands are becoming
increasingly wedded to a quest for democratic rule by governments chosen by free and fair
elections and to a quest for a broader respect of human rights within liberal constitutional
frameworks. In other words, the original Pauline introduction of a limited but novel criterion of
legitimacy, in that it was more explicit and ethically demanding in terms of the political
implications of the need to fulfil the moral Christian imperative to love one’s neighbour than the
earlier classical one concerned mostly with merely delivering efficient justice, is now being
progressively extended and actualized in order to cover the needs of the more complex
contemporary civil societies and polities.
Thus, St Paul’s universalism and the political implications that can be drawn from it in order to
assess the legitimacy of existing polities have been the object of several and often controversial
interpretations during the twentieth century. Many of these new or relatively new readings aim at
recovering, and in some cases reconstructing, an all but lost or allegedly unduly neglected by most
of the leading official authority and hierarchy of the Church, original meaning of the Pauline
message. This is not entirely different from what was done during the sixteenth century by Luther
and other reformers. What, in my opinion, is new consists in a novel focus on the liberating effect
for the oppressed by the historical sins of injustice and exploitation by the lucky have over the
unlucky have not which the active action of politically engaged Christians can deliver to the world.
So Liberation Theology sees salvation as a divine undertaking to be delivered not only in a
spiritual otherworldly dimension, but also through the historical concrete and present action
against poverty, injustice and other human rights abuses. Interestingly, similar relatively new
readings of St Paul are made not only by progressive or leftist Christian believers and theologians
such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, Giovanni Franzoni, Hans Kung, etc., but also by so
called secular non-believers of Marxist ideological orientation such as Alan Badiou, John Milbank
and Slavoj Zizek. So, for instance, according to Badiou, St Paul combines truth and subjectivity in
a way that continues to be relevant for us living in the 21st century; allegedly, he does so by
simultaneously overcoming both the ritual strictures of Judaic Law and the formal rational
conventions of the Greek Logos in a way still harbouring a genuinely liberating potential today. In
other words, St Paul plants a revolutionary seed by making the subject of the conversion to
Christianity undertake a radical and dramatic change that will make her refuse to submit to the
order of the world as we know it, with its present injustices and exploitation of the poor by the
rich, in this way, paving the way for the struggle for a new one dominated, instead, by Christian
agape.25
In other words, all traditional interpretations of St Paul are turned upside down, and the
25
See, Alan Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Cultural Memory in the Present), for example,
p.74.
18

existing power structures of society are deprived of any moral legitimacy, and their subjects,
following their inner transformation as believers in Christ, are mandated to create a new social and
political order reflecting what such inner transformation mandates.26
Moreover, according to this ‘subversive’ interpretation of early Pauline thought, the fundamental
principles of Aristotelian ethics and politics were completely rejected or reinterpreted in a radically
different way, by the early Christian base communities.27
In particular, Aristotle’s application of
his very notion of phronesis had to be changed, if conversion to the new faith was to be
meaningful. In regard to this, there needed to be a change both in the heart and mind of the
believer. For Aristotle, the apogee of practical reason, when applied to the art of governance, was
supposed to be the understanding of how to avoid situations of radical crisis in order to preserve
stable constitutional systems. But, according to how Liberation Theology interprets St Paul, as
Leonardo Boff points out, Christian agape mandates a totally different attitude from the classical
Aristotelian one. Following from the conversion, and spiritual rebirth in Christ, prudence is now
supposed to become the understanding of situations of radical crisis, and thus to indicate a new
search for wisdom and insight, which does not avoid, but enters, becomes part, shares the pain of
tragic situations with, and on the side of their victims, in order to offer spiritual and material relief,
and to contribute to solving practical problems.28
This implies a to total transformation and a sort
of rebirth, in that the believer in Christ must really look for situations of crisis and immerse herself
in them in order to help solving or at least alleviating them. It also means working for, walk with
and in a deep sense making oneself sharing the conditions and aspirations of the poor. This is of
course a very radical and revolutionary message, which implies a rejection of the political status
quo in so far as there is oppression, poverty, exploitation and injustice in society. It follows that
political legitimacy would be conditional to the powers that be effective action against all
injustices. In other words, according to this politically radical interpretation, the Christian agape
26
Although Liberation theology, which proclaims the possibility of complete emancipation from a pervasive system of
exploitation, within history itself, and not merely in an otherworldly transcendent dimension, is usually regarded as a
20th
century development, the roots of its ideas lie in the much older tradition of political millenarianism. Literally, this
means a belief in the millennium, the establishment on earth of a thousand-year Kingdom of God. Millenarian sects
and movements, such as the Diggers of the English Civil War, often espoused radical political beliefs and values, as
well as radical religious doctrines. Often, they sought to create an entirely novel way and system of living. For
example, under the guidance of Gerrard Winstanley, the Diggers predicated not only the overthrow of clerical
privilege, but also a primitive form of communism. In the same fashion, some interpretations of Liberation Theology
(but by no means all of them) similarly endorse a highly moralistic style of politics, which rejects all existing societies
as fundamentally corrupt and eagerly awaits a utopian future, exemplified or anticipated by radical revolutionary
experiments. This is why some liberals (and, of course, most conservatives) see as potentially dangerous turning the
rationalist principles of seeking justice and individual freedom into a quasi-mystical doctrine with messianic
characteristics. However, more moderate versions of Liberation Theology reject all connections with extremist
millenarianism highlighting, instead, the importance of political expediency in the historical fight for liberty and social
justice, and the necessity to combine the purity of the dove with the wisdom of the snake in order to improve and/or
change existing societies and polities.
27
According to at least one version of this ‘subversive’ view, contemporary base communities, mostly but not only in
Latin America and Europe, are supposed to follow in the steps of the original ones set up by St Paul and the Apostles.
Allegedly, for some, this would also mean that to conform to the original teachings of the Gospel, and in particular to
the preferential option in favour of the poor, it may be necessary, in some extreme cases, even to act independently
from or against explicit decisions taken by the established authority of the official Catholic Church that in the past had
prohibited believers from supporting Marxist political parties.
28
See, for instance, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, Salvation and Liberation, Transl. from Portuguese by Robert R.
Barr. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988, p.25.
19

advocated by St Paul mandates a ‘preferential option for the poor’, with all its ethico-political
implications, also as far as political legitimacy is concerned.29
Badiou’s thesis, and indeed some tenets of radical versions of Liberation Theology remain highly
controversial (in particular, their tight ideological wedding with Marxism, and association with
messianic political millenarianism), but there is no doubt that the problem of how to create a social
and political context conducive, or at least not hindering the exercise of the Christian theological
virtues necessary for salvation (faith, hope and love), was high on the agenda also of the more
traditional interpretations of Pauline thought.
Indeed, specific concerns about how to develop a social context conducive to the fulfilment of the
stringent ethical demand to love one’s neighbour (because, according to St Paul, man is the temple
of God and hence must be loved and protected) sets what, eventually, were to become the two
most historically influential answers to the questions about the role of the political structure for the
life of Christians. These answers were developed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Most
starkly put, Augustine held that the most one can reasonably expect from a political structure is
that it should promote, to a greater or lesser degree, peace. And he tended to view this central
political task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of those forms of evils that most
disturb civil tranquility. Thus, he set a very limited criterion of political legitimacy. For Aquinas,
on the other hand, political organization, chiefly through the instrumentality of human law, has the
capacity of furthering, in a more direct or positive way, at least the natural aspects of the human
function. He thus set a wider criterion of political legitimacy. However, there is a sense in which
the magisterial works of the two greatest Christian philosophers were only drawing two possible,
but different conclusions already more implicitly and less systematically set by the Apostolic and
Pauline criteria for political legitimacy, which in turn were only partly novel, finding some roots
and correspondence in earlier as well as contemporary Roman eclectic Stoicism. Both Augustine
and Aquinas together with other saintly figures, like St. Francis of Assisi, constitute the spiritual
heirs of Pauline and apostolic thought on ethics and/or politics (but St. Francis took less direct
interest in politics as an intellectual discipline, focusing instead on the practical role for spiritual
regeneration of the virtue of evangelical poverty, and respect for the natural environment). But,
unfortunately, as in all human matters, together with these noble legacies, there is also a darker
side concerning the political consequences of the new Christian way of looking into things. As
soon as it became dominant ‘the new way’ was hijacked for more expedient purposes than the
original evangelical ones and religion became a tool in the hands of the powers that be.
It follows that one important question to be asked is: what caused much of the Church over the
centuries to underestimate the gospel’s core message, which is love (agape)? Arguably, the answer
may lie in the fact that, after the emperors Constantine and Theodosius embraced Christianity, in
the fourth century, one strain in the church developed, earlier on, a pervasive spirit of power and
dominance yielding almost immediately negative consequences. However, the full effects of this
corrupting attitude can be most clearly and famously seen at work much later in the Crusades,
Inquisition, and other tragic bloody events constituting the dark side of European history. Many
members of the church, including some leaders like Pope Gregory VII, tried heroically, but
unsuccessfully, to stop this trend. And yet conversely, European rulers were successful in taking
29
However, a socially conservative view of Christianity, which has been more often dominant, takes a completely
different interpretative stand. It identifies Pauline thought with a call for a fervent, but more apolitical morality drive
relying on strict social controls as the best form of governance, and problem solving in society; underpinning this
position is the belief that no struggle to obtain fundamental political changes in the direction of liberty and social
justice is required to obtain salvation. I think, it would be fair to say that it is possible to read St Paul in many different
and not univocal ways, hence the different interpretations.
20

advantage of the situation, by staking their legitimacy on their claim to universal moral authority
and religious orthodoxy. The consequence of this was that by extension, all those who were not
religiously orthodox were considered suspect, persecuted and, in some cases, eliminated. Thus,
first, the pagans were ruthlessly disposed of; later Muslim and Jewish communities were targeted
for expulsion or worse; heretical Christian groups were eradicated by all possible means; then the
Protestant-Catholics split led to a series of bloody wars. More recently, some secularized
ideologies, like Fascism and Stalinism, which emerged in the last century at least in part as a
reaction or consequence of the way the previous bloody events shaped Europe, were either no
more forgiving or worse.
The Roman Catholic Church reacted to these tragic events especially in the 1960s, by elaborating
its own program of renewal and reform, which, through the Second Vatican Council, manifested
the intent of opening up itself more to the modern world, and by developing some new and more
inclusive doctrines that eschewed the intolerant practices, which some of its members had pursued
in the past. Accordingly, the mission of all Catholics is defined as to show people how to see the
love of God, while at the same time not imposing it on them.30
This requires the correct application
of the Golden Rule of doing unto others as you would like them to do unto you. In the same
fashion, the current Pope Francis is delivering a universal message of forgiveness, reason and
tolerance aimed at reaching the hearts and minds of all throughout the world, without making any
distinction between the race, political view, and religious creed or not of the listeners.31
According
to his views, the main challenge facing the church today is not simply to resolve long standing
controversial issues like celibacy of the clergy, admission to sacraments of the divorced, etc., but
to relearn how to communicate a deeper, more intelligent and relevant religion that leads to a life
of acceptance and love.
30
As of 2015, there is about 1, 2 billion Roman Catholic worldwide. For instance, in predominantly Theravada
Buddhist Thailand, there are about 350000 Catholics out of 700000 Christians. But it is quite remarkable, given the
relatively very small number of adherents of the faith in this country out of the very large number of Catholics
worldwide, that there are two Thai cardinals: one emeritus, Michael Michai Kitbunchu, who is 86 years old; and the
other Francis Xavier Kriengsac Kovithavanit, 66 years old. The present conclave of the Catholic cardinals, the most
important leaders of the Church appointed by the pontiff who are less than 80 years old, and, according to the rules set
by pope Paul VI, entitled to elect a new pope when the serving one dies or retires, comprises a total 125 members. The
proportion between cardinals and believers it would roughly seem to be about one for every 10 million, but of course it
is not applied mechanically, and certain countries, like for example Italy, which is where the Vatican and the Curia
which is the Church government is located, always have more cardinals than the effective number of faithful would
warrantee. Generally speaking, also for historical reasons, European countries tend to be over-represented among the
Church top hierarchy, with the third world where the majority of the faithful live being under-represented. However,
Thailand seems to be an exception. Perhaps, this constitutes recognition of the very important and unique role that the
local Church has played in the development of education and literacy in this country, as well as in the support of its
disadvantaged minorities.
31
Pope Francis has changed the tone and culture, not the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church ever since he
became pontiff in 2013. Acutely aware of the fact that Christians, in order to successfully be like leaven in the dough,
they need to make religion become, speaking figuratively, something both practical and spiritual which people want to
buy (in the sense of wholeheartedly accept) in order to make a positive change to their existence. He thus stresses with
passion and authenticity, a commitment to addressing poverty, income inequality, and climate change, more than
social issues such as abortion, divorce, contraception, and upholding a traditional interpretation of family life, which
have dominated the Catholic debate recently and still do among social conservatives. Pope Francis believes that we
need to look at the world from the peripheries to understand and make a positive impact on it, and there he often goes
to make his pastoral visits. Consequently, one of his major themes is cultural evangelization. In true Pauline spirit, he
points out that Christianity is not based on ethnicity or identity, but is (or supposed to become) a universal peace
factor.
21

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