PIM Webinar with Danielle Resnick (IFPRI) on May 8, 2019. For more information visit http://bit.ly/2UI3Hjb

2. More Crowded Policy Agenda for
Agriculture in Africa
Climate smart
Nutrition sensitive
Employment generating
Gender inclusive
25 million farm households practice CSA by 2025
(Africa Climate Smart Agricultural Visions 25x25)
Reduce stunting to 10% and underweight by 5%
by 2025 (AU Malabo Declaration)
Address urban obesity (Milan Urban Food Policy
Pact)
Create job opportunities for at least 30% of the
youth in agricultural value chains
(AU Malabo Declaration)
20% of rural women are empowered in
agriculture by 2023
(AU Malabo Evaluation Framework)

3. More Attention to the Agrifood System
to Achieve these Goals
Components
of Food
System
Productivity
enhancing
Regulatory Market-based Transfers Behavioral
Farming
Processing
Retail
Consumption
Infrastructure,
Ag R&D
expenditures,
input
subsidies
Land policy,
labor policy,
intellectual
property
guidelines,
food safety
Fiscal policy,
procurement
policies, trade
policy
Cash transfer
programs,
food subsidies
Model farmer
extension
techniques,
consumer
education
initiatives,
safe food
handling
training
Range of needed policy interventions

4. Political and Governance Considerations
to Achieve Needed Policy Interventions
Alignment - degree to which relevant stakeholders share the same interests
▪ Short versus long-term
▪ Low versus high visibility
▪ Trade-offs in harmed constituencies
▪ Ideational
Examples: input subsidy reform in Zambia, devolution of agriculture in Ghana
Capacity - presence of funding, human resources, training, and infrastructure
Example: Informal food trade in Nigeria
Commitment - sustainability of policy beyond mandates of leader or time period
Example: Nigerian land governance reform
Coordination - modalities to minimize duplication, maximize information flows, and avoid contradictions
▪ Horizontal
▪ Vertical
▪ Business-state
Example: Informal food trade in Nigeria

5. Four Examples

6. Alignment of Incentives:
Input subsidy reform in Zambia
Why did the adoption of an e-voucher for subsidized inputs in Zambia fail in
2013 but succeed in 2015?
Background
• On the policy agenda since 2008
• Subsidizes a more diverse range of inputs besides maize seed and fertilizer
• Farmers go directly to agro-dealers so reduces admin costs and improves
timeliness of input distribution
• More companies can participate and less opaque tendering
Data and methods
• Semi-structured interviews with multiple stakeholders
• Review of donor documents, Ministry of Agriculture reports, peer-reviewed
literature, media reports, and Parliamentary Hansards
• Analysis using the Kaleidoscope Model of Food Security Policy Change
FISP E-voucher Visa cards
Source: PMRC

7. Input Subsidy Reform in Zambia
Key findings: Zambia’s implementation of e-voucher in 2015 depended on winning over key veto players
who stymied the reform in 2013
Positions in 2013 Positions in 2015
Source: Resnick et al. (2018a)

8. Alignment of Incentives:
Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana
What has been the impact of devolving agricultural functions to district
governments in Ghana?
Background
• Local Instrument 1961 adopted in 2009 to initiate devolution
• Agriculture formally devolved in 2012
• Staff became members of Local Government Services and composite
budgeting system established
Data and methods
• Survey with 80 District Directors of Agriculture across all 10 regions
• Survey with 960 households
• District-level budget data
Survey Sites

9. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana
Composite
budgets
District devt plans &
composite budgets
MoFEP - Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning
MoFA - Ministry of Food & Agriculture
NDPC - National Development Planning
Commission
MLGRD - Ministry of Local Government & Rural
Development
RADUs - Regional Agriculture Departments
RCCs - Regional Coordinating Councils
MMDAs - Metropolitan, Municipal, District
Assemblies
LGS - Local Government Services
MoFA NDPC
MoFEP
MMDAS
LGS
District devt plans
Ag planning & monitoring
Intergovernmental transfers
Transfers & internally generated funds
Ag donor funding & national
programs
Rural Households
Service Delivery
MLGRD
Hiring, firing, promotions
Department of Agriculture

10. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana
Increase in Actual Public Works Expenditures, by District
Notes: The budgets are all in constant 2012 GHS
Source: Resnick (2018)
Decline in Actual Agricultural Expenditures, by District

11. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana
Key findings
Locally elected government politicians prefer using budget for
schools and clinics than for low visibility agricultural extension
• Local governments receive better information about citizen
priorities and pursue “preference matching”
• Households appreciate increased accountability that local
politicians have to citizens through devolution
• BUT, if politicians preference match, then increased accountability
can result in decreased provision of goods and services that
citizens do not prioritize, especially low “visibility” goods and
services
Ag extension motorbikes donated by Canada sitting idle
due to no fuel or licenses, Shai Osudoku, 2019
Photo: Danielle Resnick, IFPRI

12. Commitment:
Land Governance Reform in Nigeria
Why have some states in Nigeria proceeded further with systematic land tenure regularization (SLTR)
than others?
Background
• Land governance reform a priority with the AU Declaration on Land, FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, and
World Bank’s Land Governance Assessment Framework
• In 2009, late president set up President’s Technical Committee on Land Reform
• SLTR adopted as option in Nigeria after similar success in Rwanda, South Africa, and Thailand
Data and methods
• Semi-structured interviews with more than 90 stakeholders in 6 states
• Focused on seven components of implementation

13. Land Governance Reform in Nigeria
Key findings
• SLTR never driven by citizen demand
• Implementation was higher where
• There was continuity in political administration across elections
• Donors did not bypass Ministries of Land or cede key functions to external consultants
• Diversity in donor support ensured more funding for rolling out the reform
Indicators of implementation Cross River Jigawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Ondo
GIS set up Yes Partially Yes Yes No No
Land records digitized Yes Partially Yes Yes No Yes
Certificates of Occupancy titled Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Certificates of Occupancy issued Yes Yes No Yes No Nob
Budget line for SLTR Yes Yes No Yes No No
Continued cash release for SLTR No Yes No Yes No No
SLTR still ongoing? a Partially Yes No Yes No No
Source: Resnick and Okumo (2017)
Notes: a As of December 2016. b Only three CfOs were issued in Ondo.

14. Coordination & Capacity:
Informal Food Safety in Nigeria
How do local governments ensure access to safe food from informal
traders in Nigerian cities?
Background
• Informal markets and traders are major source of food for urban poor
• Food safety hazards are common in informal and wet markets
• Local governments in Nigeria often have a mandate over informal trade
Data and methods
• Survey with 1,097 informal food traders in Calabar and Minna
• Semi-structured interviews with state and LGA level officials for
institutional mapping
Source: Karl Pauw, IFPRI
Butcher, Tamale Central Market, Ghana
Street Vendor, Lusaka, Zambia
Source: Bhavna Sivasubramanian , IFPRI

15. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s
Secondary Cities
Calabar, Nigeria Minna, Nigeria
Source: Resnick et al. (2018)
Confusing Array of Actors Regulating Informal Food Trade

16. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s
Secondary Cities
Official Calabar Minna
Local government
market managers
18.7 21.2
LGA health officers 6.4 4.4
LGA revenue
officers
33.8 22.8
State-level
authorities
2.1 0.4
Task Force 23.2 0.9
Police 1.9 1.0
None 13.0 49.4
Other 0.9 0.0
Total observations 530 567
Service Calabar Minna
Trash collection 43.1 44.5
Toilets 62.1 36.2
Electricity 40.2 66.1
Clean, running water 16.7 8.9
Safe storage facilities
for merchandise
28.3 37.6
Shelter during bad
weather
28.3 55.2
Fire extinguishers 2.2 1.1
Security 74.3 82.5
Health facilities 1.9 2.9
Proper drainage 15.2 53.7
Total observations 269 348
Notes: Since access to services was limited to those who worked inside a market, the
number of observations is smaller than for the entire sample of informal traders.
Source: Resnick et al. (2018)
Government Official that Traders Engage with
Most Often in the Course of a Month (%)
Share of Respondents Reporting Access to Key
Services in the Market (%)
Source: Resnick et al. (2018)

17. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s
Secondary Cities
Key findings and policy options
• Food traders in Nigeria’s secondary cities operate in environment of benign neglect rather than
harsh repression, as in Lagos
• Multiplicity of mandates across government entities, confusion over accountability among food
vendors, low capacity to enforce
• Support “market leaders” to help monitor sanitation guidelines
• Develop scorecards to identify worst-affected markets to target enforcement

18. Politics and Governance for Policy Change
Agrifood system transformation key for delivering on the many agendas of
governments and donors, requiring policy interventions in many domains
• Alignment, capacity, coordination, and commitment key for effective
implementation
Identify ways to align technically optimal solutions with interests of veto
players
• If alignment involves trade-offs across policy goals, need to look at sequencing and
triage
Assess degree of needed commitment to have impact and whether there
is a realistic alignment of interests to sustain it
• Interventions that involve wholesale bureaucratic and cultural reforms are not
achievable in a 5-year donor cycle (e.g. land reform)
Consolidate responsibilities over informal food trade to recognize capacity
constraints and disincentives to cooperative
• Avoid regulatory frameworks that cannot be realistically enforced
Pres. Lungu launches e-
voucher, Oct.2015
Source: Lusaka Times

19. What’s Next?
Governance of informal food trade in African cities
• Expand Nigerian research to Ghana
• Analyzing survey of 1,200 traders in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale to understand when and why…
• Food safety regulations and trading laws are enforced
• Traders receive services (garbage collection, drainage, etc) in exchange for their tax payments
Binding constraints to local government capacity
• Completed interviews with over 200 bureaucrats and elected politicians in 4 Zambian provinces to
understand…
• Extent of financing for local development
• Degree to which a mayor’s party affects the autonomy a council receives from national government
• How political interference by elected councilors affects bureaucrats’ motivation and career aspirations
• Input into the Decentralization Secretariat’s revised Decentralization Implementation Plan for 2019

20. References
Resnick, D. and A. Okumo. 2017. “Subnational variation in policy implementation: The case of Nigerian land
governance reform.” Nigeria Strategy Support Program Paper 46. Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Resnick, D. 2018. “The Devolution Revolution: Implications for agricultural service delivery in Ghana.” IFPRI Discussion
Paper No. 1714. Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Resnick, D., S. Haggblade, S. Babu, S. Hendriks, and D. Mather. 2018a. “The Kaleidoscope Model of Policy Change:
Applications for food security policy in Zambia.” World Development. Vol.109(September): 101-120.
Resnick, D., B. Sivasubramanian, C.Idiong, M. Ojo, and L. Tanko. 2018b. “The Enabling Environment for Informal Food
Traders in Nigeria’s Secondary Cities.” Nigeria Strategy Support Program Paper 59. Washington, DC: IFPRI.

21. Thank you!
For more information:
d.resnick@cgiar.org
http://www.ifpri.org/profile/danielle-resnick
www.danielleresnick.com

22. Q&A session
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