Seminar with Christopher Michaelsen, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sidney, Australia - See more at: http://www.iai.it/en/eventi/role-non-permanent-members-united-nations-security-council

1. THE ROLE OF THE NON–PERMANENT
MEMBERS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL
A/Prof Christopher Michaelsen
c.michaelsen@unsw.edu.au

2. ARTICLE 23 UN CHARTER
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United
Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the
Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members
of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security
Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the
contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of
international peace and security and to the other purposes of the
Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be
elected for a term of two years (…)

3. ARTICLE 27 UN CHARTER
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute
shall abstain from voting.

4. Background
 No E10 veto (?)
 Since 1 January 1996, of around 1200 resolutions 90% were
unanimous
 Over that period, only 4 proposed resolutions failed to get the 9
affirmative votes
 In that period, the closest to an E10 veto was in March 1999 on a
resolution in Kosovo, when only Russia, China and Namibia were in
favour of the proposal S/1999/328 (that means that 9 of the E10
were against)
 => functioning and effective Council??

5. Background
 The creation of the veto as a system of ‘power over principle’ and ‘might makes
right’.
 Many scholars identify this power imbalance as a fundamental flaw that prevents
the Council from meeting its responsibility to maintain international peace and
causes it to act in an ad hoc and unprincipled manner.
 The Council is pilloried for its inconsistency and for suffering a ‘democratic
deficit’.
 A commonly advocated strategy to combat these shortcomings is to undertake
structural reform of the Council.
 The goal of such reform is to enlarge the Council and make it more responsive
to the broader UN membership.

6. Background
 Yet the ability of the P5 to veto any proposed reform means that there is little
actual prospect of addressing what is seen to be the main problem, namely the
veto itself.
 Moreover, the unwillingness of the most powerful non-permanent countries to
set aside their own ambitions and agree on a broadly acceptable reform model
has further thwarted reform efforts.
 A striking aspect of the literature, underpinning both criticism of the Security
Council and proposals to remedy its flaws, is the assumption that the P5 are the
only members who can exercise power and exert influence over the Council’s
decision-making process and outcomes.
 This is despite the fact that the E10 comprise two-thirds of the Council and often
include states with a greater claim to objective power than some P5 members,
whether in terms of economic strength, population, or territorial size.

7. The Proj ect
 Four year interdisciplinary research project (2015-2018)
 Title: “Leveraging power and influence on the United Nations
Security Council: The role of elected members”
 Funded by the Australian Research Council as a “Discovery Project”
 Project team: Chris Michaelsen (UNSW), Jochen Prantl (ANU),
Jeremy Farrall (ANU), Jeni Whalan (UQ/UNSW)
 Events: major conference in 2017
 Collaboration

8. PROJECT AIMS
(1) provide an empirically grounded evaluation of when elected, non-permanent
members on the UN Security Council (the ‘E10’) influenced the Council’s decision-
making and norm development since 1990.
(2) identify and advance knowledge about instances of E10 influence, including by
developing a conceptual framework to understand and measure how elected
members build, exercise and maintain UNSC influence;
(3) develop a typological theory of elected member influence, based on contingent
generalisations about the conditions under which different types of influence are
possible and likely;
(4) advance pragmatic, evidence-based policy proposals designed to increase the
capacity of elected members to exercise power and influence over UNSC decision-
making and norm development; and
(5) identify the role Australia and other actors might play in promoting these proposals
globally and in our region.

9. RESEARCH DESIGN OVERVIEW
Mai n research
quest i ons
Out come t o be expl ai ned
( dependent vari abl es)
Hypot hesi sed causes
( i ndependent
vari abl es)
How do E10
members
i nf l uence UNSC
deci si on- maki ng?
Under what
condi t i ons are
di f f erent t ypes
of i nf l uence
possi bl e, and
l i kel y?
I nf l uence, obser ved as UNSC
deci si ons i n whi ch act i on
by one of mor e E10 member s
was necessar y t o t he
out come:
a) Col l ect i ve vet o: vot i ng
power under Ar t i cl e 27( 3)
b) Deci si on i n pr esence of
some degr ee of P5
opposi t i on ( hi gh t hr eshol d)
c) Deci si on i n absence of P5
act i on on, or i nt er est i n,
an i ssue ( l ow t hr eshol d)
Power , obser ved
t hr ough a
t heor et i cal l y
der i ved t ypol ogy:
a) Mat er i al power
b) Legi t i macy
c) Bur den- shar i ng
d) Del i ber at i on
e) Di pl omat i c
compet ency
f ) I nf or mal
i nst i t ut i ons

10. Phase 1: t wo anal yt i cal met hods
1. investigate perceptions of influence among expert UNSC
observers, including diplomatic representatives who have served
their countries on the Council. In semi-structured interviews with
current and former ambassadors, senior diplomatic officials, senior
policymaking officials of member states and the UN, as well as
experts from the associated epistemic community, we will ask
which E10 members they perceive to have been most influential.
2. use close document analysis (resolutions, presidential statements,
voting records, and meeting records), literature reviews, and
media analysis to critically evaluate those perceptions and thereby
determine which cases can be supported by other observable
evidence.

11. The pr oj ect t est s si x hypot heses of E10 power ( i ndependent
vari abl es) :
Material power: Influence is achieved through the structural power of an E10 member;
GDP is used as proxy measurement, with cases selected to enable comparison of
major powers (top 5 by GDP ranking), emerging economies (developing countries
ranked in the top 20 states by GDP), middle powers (developed countries ranked in
the top 20 states by GDP), small states (ranked in the top 50 states by GDP), and
weak states (ranked outside the top 50 states by GDP).
The power of legitimacy: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to
legitimize or delegitimize the Council and/or the actions of permanent members,
either within the Council, to the broader UN membership, or to some other external
constituency (Zaum 2013; Hurd 2007); we use Whalan’s (2013) legitimation
framework of source, procedural and substantive legitimacy to determine the extent of
this capacity.
Burden-sharing: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to take
responsibility for core operations of the Council, such as committee chairmanship or
‘penholding’, which provides opportunities to set agendas and shape the parameters
of decision-making (Bellamy and Dunne 2012); we use process-tracing to establish
the existence and nature of this agenda-setting power.

12. The pr oj ect t est s si x hypot heses of E10 power ( i ndependent
vari abl es) [ cont i nued]
The power of deliberation: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to
debate and contest issues before the Council, through which argument and
persuasion shape decision-making; we use Johnstone’s (2003) Habermasian
framework of ‘the power of the better argument’ to identify and evaluate this type of
power.
Diplomatic competency: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to
use diplomatic expertise, leadership, reputational resources, and administrative
capabilities to shape decision-making; we use structured interviews to determine the
relative strength of diplomatic competency (Keating 2008; Thorhallsson 2012).
Informal institutions: Influence is achieved through informal institutions – groups of
friends, core groups, contact groups – operating in and around the UNSC; we use
Prantl’s (2005) analytical framework to determine the extent to which E10 members
can influence UNSC decision-making and norm development through these informal
groups.

13. Phase 2
 Develop a typological theory of E10 influence, based on contingent
generalisations about the conditions under which different types of E10
influence are possible, and likely.
 The research design prioritizes the investigation of equifinality—the possibility
that many alternative causal paths may lead to the same outcome.
 The likelihood of such complex causality is addressed in the project by using
process-tracing, in which the researcher seeks to identify whether the
intervening causal process implied by a theory is in fact evident in the
sequence of events.
 A particular strength of process-tracing is its utility for assessing alternative
hypothesized processes; by examining histories, archival documents, interview
transcripts, and other sources, the researcher tests and seeks to eliminate
alterative causal processes that could explain the same outcome (George and
Bennett 2005).

14.
Year2(aims2&3)
Phase 2: Explaining influence through structured, focused case comparison
E10
type
Candidate cases of influence Methodology,
sources
Results
Majorpower
Germany
2011-12,
2003-04,
1995-96
Limited influence, sanctions, non-proliferation Process-tracing
methodology is
used to evaluate
6 plausible
hypotheses about
E10 power,
including
interaction
between them.
Sources:
interviews,
document
analysis,
literature
reviews.
Preliminary
typological
theory of E10
influence: under
what conditions
are different
types of E10
influence
possible, and
likely?
1 workshop at
ANU in Year 3 to
test and refine
case findings and
preliminary
theory.
Japan 2005-
06
Reforms to working methods, rules of procedure
Middle
power
Australia
2013-14
Chairing sanction committees (1267 Al Qaeda, 1737
Iran) and humanitarian aid (Syria)
Canada
1999-00
Sanctions 'naming and shaming' reform, and
protection of civilians
Year3(aims2&3)
Emerging
economy
India 2011-
12
Limited influence. Council working methods,
Brazil 2010-
11
Iran nuclear accord, and Responsibility while
Protecting initiative
Smallstate
New
Zealand
1993-94
UN oversight of US operations in Haiti, and
Presidential statement on Rwanda
Singapore
2001-02
Peacekeeping: UNSC cooperation with troop
contributing countries
Weakstate
Colombia
2011-12
Organised crime in peace operations, especially in
Haiti
Namibia
1999-00
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security