1. THE PREDICTABLE FAILURE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
J. Martin Hays, Ed.D.
ABSTRACT
Despite best intentions and lots of hard work, strategic planning most predictably fails. It is
not that strategic planning is a bad idea; instead it is that neither the planning nor the plans are
strategic. They are either over-simplifications of prevailing conditions or implementation of
planning and plans is short-changed—or both.
This paper explores how and where strategic planning goes awry and what executives can do
about it. The author deliberately and unabashedly takes a “whack” at strategic planning, long a
management icon held to be above reproach. Part of the reason for strategic planning’s
predictable failure, the author explains, is in the way it is handled in most organisations.
Essentially, you have high-level, corporate strategic planners and objective-setters at the top,
whilst implementation is left to employees way down in the organisation.
Not having been part of the problem-solving, planning, and decision-making process,
implementers lack context and rationale for implementation of new directions and priorities.
Typically excluded from activities such as risk analysis, prioritising, goal-setting, development
of performance measures, and other aspects of planning and decision-making, implementers
likely lack skills and confidence to implement. Even in the best of cases, implementing “top
down” strategy will be “dodgy.”
The solution is not to discard strategic planning, despite its fallibility, but to radically change
the way strategic planning is done. Concluding the paper, the author enumerates partial
solutions from which organisations can pick and choose. Further, an actual planning and
performance management implementation “case” is described, the success of which is
attributed to applying some of those “high-involvement,” top-down and bottom-up solution
components, employing a structured, facilitated approach.
© 2002; 2003. J. Martin Hays, Ed.D.
1

2. +Belief
“Do”
(+)
Time /
Pressures
to Produce
Shortcutting
Strategic
Planning
Weakness
of Plans
Implementation
Problems
Problematic
Consequences
(+)
THE PREDICTABLE FAILURE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
J. Martin Hays, Ed.D.
WHAT’S STRATEGIC ABOUT PLANNING?
That the failure of strategic planning should be predictable might come as no real surprise to
readers. You’ve either been an executive propounding strategy and policy and seen it fail to
inspire, motivate, or, at least, instruct the workforce in new directions or priorities; or you’ve
been the recipient of strategic directives, finding them irrelevant, confusing, conflicting, or
impossible to implement.
It is not that strategic planning—in principle—is bad. There is lots of wisdom to the saying,
“Plan your work; and work your plan.” The motto is simple, intuitively logical, and definitely
“do-able” for small tasks. Following this advice becomes increasingly difficult as the tasks
grow larger and more complex, projects become programs, or planning is entering The
Twilight Zone, that is going where no one has gone before or where the environment is
unknowable.
What is really interesting about the predictable failure of strategic planning is that we go to
such lengths to get it right—and it still fails. You’ll see, for example, the leaders of
organisations of all types and sizes going off to huddle for days at an “off-site” or corporate
retreat to problem-solve, plan, prioritise, and develop impressive lists of strategic outcomes
required and articulating bold new directions. They don’t spend a lot of time developing
strategy, however; that is, the way these outcomes are to be addressed. This is best left to the
“implementers.”
To improve the product of strategic planning, organisational leaders often undergo intense
training in planning, policy development, and decision-making. These senior managers often
have facilitators who are expert in these disciplines assist them through the process. The
resultant plans are usually embodied in carefully-crafted documents variously designed to
communicate plans, new directions, and revised priorities to diverse stakeholders. Sometimes
they are announced with great fanfare. Sometimes high-level plans initiate the performance
management cycle.
The degree to which executives undertake strategic planning determines the
depth of their belief that plans are good and that the logic and value of those
plans are self-evident, and their personal commitment to the plan. The process
produces a “shutdown in critical thinking” toward the plan in their own minds
and a corollary “just do it!” attitude. In other words, “we’ve spent sufficient
time on the plan; its value and direction should be clear, and people should implement it
without undue deliberation.” Doing the planning is inherently reinforcing, as shown in the box
at right. The “just do it” implementation order is
problematic, as discussed below.
The reality is, however, that the bulk of strategic
planning is not strategic at all. At least it is not
treated as strategic. Here are just two reasons why.
 Most strategic planning and choices—as with
any complex problem—concern many variables and
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
2

3. Perceived Failure
or Weakness
Cynicism and
Hopelessness
Lackluster,
Pessimistic Efforts
Failed
Attempts
(+)
-Belief
“Do”
(+)
perspectives. Few executive teams have the time or the inclination to explore options and
implications at length. Tackling complexity is, at best, a lengthy and difficult task, necessarily
“short-changed” at some point. Over-simplification of the problem or narrowing of options
seems to be a natural (if counter-productive) tactic. The diagram above shows that, as time and
other pressures to produce quickly increase, shortcutting strategic planning and exploration of
complexity, implications, and consequences naturally increases, producing an increase in the
weakness of plans. This weakness, in turn, produces increases in implementation difficulty and
in unforeseen consequences. This all creates a problematic, chaotic environment producing
further pressures to perform and less time and space to plan well.
 Even if the product of strategic planning and decision making has not short-changed the
complex of variables, perspectives, and alternatives, implementation is typically not accorded
the time and / or commitment of resources to see it through. Plans are evaluated on a very
short-term basis (perhaps, even quarterly). The strategic impact and consequences of new
policy, direction, or priority cannot be ascertained in
relatively short periods of time. Thus, few real
strategic plans are given a “fair” chance to succeed
[or fail!].
One unfortunate and costly result of the perceived
failure of strategy is a staccato and abbreviated
promulgation of new policy and plans, none of which
have much positive effect and most leading to in-
creased stress, cynicism, and wasted effort. This is
shown simply in the diagram at left. Failed
strategies, and even the perception of failed or weak strategy, leads to further degradation of
hope and belief, resulting in diminution of effort, and causing higher failure rates.
Despite the foregoing, the objective of this paper is not to criticise executive planning and
deciding. It can be inspired, judicious, and intelligent. The fact is that it doesn’t really matter
how good the thinking and appropriate the decisions, if they aren’t suitably and sufficiently
interpreted and adopted by the “implementers.” Expecting employees to fully understand and
embrace strategic plans, and translate and apply them at their subordinate levels is foolhardy.
How can they do so, when they haven’t struggled for days thinking them through, weighing
costs and benefits, and exploring the implications?
TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE
The tendency described above to deepen resolve to strategic plans, as a part of
the process of generating them, works oppositely with implementers. Instead of
strengthening resolve through execution, negative perceptions and beliefs are
reinforced through “doing,” as the doing has no developmental history and
context. Lacking context and rationale, implementation proceeds—perhaps
with the best of intentions—unconvincingly, with negative outcomes predictable.
Some executives believe they’ve solved this problem by pushing planning and goal-setting
“down” to their subordinate managers. And, progressive managers have for years involved
their employees or team leaders in setting goals and determining performance measures for
their respective areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, this method also fails to achieve
remarkable results.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
3

4. Discounting of
People’s Ability
or Motivation
Aversion to According
Greater Responsibility &
Learning Opportunities
Retention in
Low-Level Jobs
Inability to
Perform at
Higher levels
(+)
It is not that people are lazy or incompetent (though often dismissed as such), or that such
involvement is a bad idea. Indeed, the very foundation of this paper is that staff, and perhaps
other stakeholders, should be more intensely and intimately involved in strategic planning.
The system is to blame, not the people. As explained below, few employees know how to
create useful goals and appropriate measures of performance. And, even if they did, they
cannot be expected to create meaningful and relevant goals, because they do not possess
sufficient understanding of the organisational context to do so; that is, where they “fit” in the
organisation, where they are in the “value chain.”
The author has worked with dozens of different groups and teams whose task it was for various
purposes to develop goals and measures. In most, if not all cases, these groups and teams were
comprised of otherwise technically competent, knowledgeable, and experienced individuals,
including engineers, business analysts, and mid-level managers. While most were able to
develop meaningful and relevant goals and measures with a little assistance, few knew where
to begin. Some had had prior training—described as mediocre—while others had not. They
clearly had not really been involved in setting team or individual goals before. There was
often a more disturbing finding associated with this surprising one: few groups and teams were
able to convincingly or clearly provide larger organisational goals to which they were to
contribute, or how, exactly, they were to contribute to them.
SELF-LIMITING BEHAVIOUR IN ORGANISATIONS
The diagram at right illustrates an uncon-
scious and unintended dynamic in
organisations to “dis-able” employees by
preventing them from acquiring strategic-
level experience and skill.
Essentially, the belief that employees are
incapable of—or by virtue of role or rank in
the organisation ineligible to—make de-
cisions or be accorded greater responsi-
bility and autonomy leads unintentionally to
“holding them back.” Prevented from
opportunities to develop skills and confidence, and stuck in jobs that provide little fulfillment
or incentive to do more, they are increasingly perceived to offer little potential. Confined to
low level access and what might be perceived as trivial work, how can they be expected to
understand the workings of the organisation and see much value or point to their work? This is
especially the case when organisational leadership spends relatively little time “in the trenches”
with subordinate employees.
BRIDGING THE GULF
There is a wide schism between strategic planning at the top and goal-setting and
implementation below. Management By Objectives (MBO)1
was perhaps an attempt to bridge
the gap between high-level strategy and lower-level implementations. The idea was to
“cascade” plans and goals down through the organisation, obtaining an increasing level of
detail, practicability, and “buy-in” at respective lower echelons, while maintaining clear
linkage to the higher level plans and priorities.
1
See, for example, G. S. Odiorne’s “MBO: A Backward Glance,” in Business Horizons, October 1978.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
4

5. The author recently scrutinised the performance management and measurement system of one
public service / educational institution. The cascading approach mentioned above was deeply
ingrained in the ways many managers and at least some staff talked about their performance
management system. Some were quite wedded to the process, at least “in theory.” Elegantly
described in obscure documentation, the process, consisting of five levels and associated steps,
as shown in the diagram at right, was perfect. In reality, it was plain ineffective. The intent
was to have across-the-board involvement in performance planning and management. With
“breakdowns” all along the way, it was the object of distain and derision and cause of much
frustration. While there were a few adherents and some success stories, the majority of
managers and staff wanted little to do with the process.
Ultimately, it was not the process at all that was poorly designed, but how it had been
implemented. Few people understood it; training was minimal. The process was “propped
up” by rhetoric, but it was not sustainable. There were no real organisational supports for the
process and no incentives for participation. Further, performance and performance
management were not part of the culture; nor would they be until the process and the systems
underlying it underwent dramatic change.
MBO and similar performance management systems may be alive and well in some places
today, but the gulf between auspicious, high-level objectives and program outcomes and what
happens day-to-day down in the trenches remains great. Employees have a hard time
interpreting and applying directives (or “making them real”), and executives have little
understanding of the day-to-day realities and demands of their subordinates so far removed.
Thus, their “just do it!” admonition and or attitudes fall woefully short of helpful guidance on
what to implement, how, and why; and may just widen the rift.
That the rift persists despite efforts and initiatives of all kinds to close it is perplexing. While
seemingly elusive, there is undoubtedly a reasonable explanation into what makes closing the
gap between high-level strategy and adoption and implementation throughout and down the
organisation so difficult. Unfortunately, the explanation is probably different for each case,
and has to do with the appropriateness (or “fit”) of the implementation and the degree of
organisational commitment to it. Factors include both objective realities and subjective
perceptions, expectations, and assumptions about people’s roles, technical abilities, intellectual
maturity, and resource availability, or “who does what.” Other obvious factors include timing,
organisational change readiness, real or perceived degrees of latitude, shareholders’ sentiments,
and many others.
MAKING STRATEGIC PLANNING MORE STRATEGIC
The number of organisations whose managers and employees possess a clear and correct
picture of their own internal structure, workings, and inter-dependencies, much less an
adequate understanding of the external environment, must be few. Unfortunately, some
individuals who do hold firm views are pessimistic, exemplified by (1) we consist of a set of
silos; (2) we’re stuck in the past; (3) our (those) people can’t be trusted.
In organisations where the role of one or more elements has not been clearly established, you
will find lots of unmet expectations, ambiguity about who does what, unjust or mis-directed
criticisms, and, not surprisingly, either:
 trouble setting goals and doing good planning; or,
 difficulty or resistance to implementing directives (or both).
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
5

6. The solution, easy in concept, though difficult to put into practice, consists of some mix of the
following components (none of which, exclusively, would be a complete solution):
Rx Make the implementers the strategic planners.
Rx Identify individuals throughout the organisation with the inclination, skill, and passion for
planning and goal-setting; equip and support these “champions” to assist and lead others
through the process.
Rx Close the “gap” between the strategic planners and the implementers through greater
inclusion in the process and improved communications throughout the organisation.
Rx Involve all employees in some way in the goal-setting process; but only after or as part of
training and coaching in performance management and planning.
Rx Use goal-setting and planning as a means to educate all employees about the organisation
and where they critically fit in the value chain and strategically contribute to important
organisational outcomes.
Rx Make sure that all significant initiatives are tied directly to existing strategic goals and that
this linkage is continually communicated to employees. If necessary, craft and publicise the
new strategic goal or explain the new direction underlying initiatives.
Rx Cease calling plans “strategic” when you know they cannot be. If a plan is truly strategic
(thus crucial) be prepared to go to great lengths to bring people along.
Rx Remember that for many, planning, goal-setting, and implementing someone else’s plans
means extra work. To make them want to “go above and beyond”2
limits already stretched or
to ease them out of their comfort zones, a powerful attractor3
or an imperative4
is needed.
An attractor might be a [believed] promise of much improved working conditions or rewards.
An imperative might be an event or outcome that so jeapordises workers’ careers or security
that they will unite to stave off threat. For example, employees—if given the chance—could
be expected to turn around mediocre performance with market testing and the threat of
outsourcing looming ahead for them.
Rx Given that employee involvement and buy-in requires a great deal of work and attention,
ensure that assignment of tasks that may be perceived as “additional” or non-core work must
be accompanied by the time and other support necessary to undertake the work.
Rx Employees need to come to understand and accept that planning, goal-setting, prioritising,
and decision-making are part of their jobs; it’s their responsibility as well, not exclusively
management’s. Not all will automatically embrace these [additional] responsibilities; and
many do not possess the skills. Patience and persistence may be required to encourage their
ownership of this role and ability to deliver. Training, coaching, and cajoling may be
necessary, as are systemic changes such as crafting new role descriptions and performance
standards.
Rx Avoid the tendency to “short-change” strategic planning. Take the time to do it fully. Use
multiple methods. Require scenario planning and other means of exploring alternatives and
thinking through their possible implications and consequences. The adoption of systems
2
See M. Bolino and W. Turnley, “Going the Extra Mile: Cultivating and Managing Employee Citizenship
Behavior,” in The Academy of Management Executive, Vol 17, No. 3, Aug 2003.
3
See J. Goldstein’s The Unshackled Organization, Portland, OR: Productivity Press, 1994
4
M. F. R. Kets de Vries and K. Balazs, “Beyond the Quick Fix: The Psychodynamics of Organizational
Transformation and Change,” in the European Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 1998, pp. 611-622.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
6

7. thinking tools, such as the influence diagrams used in this paper, can be quite beneficial in
assisting individuals to better understand the complexity of problems and test out the potential
of solutions, decisions, and plans.
IMPROVING STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS: FACILITATING
THE MERGER OF TOP DOWN AND BOTTOM UP PLANNING.
A recent planning and performance measurement and management implementation in the
Information Technology Division of a large government department illustrates how some of
these ideas have been successfully interwoven. The work began as a continuous improvement
initiative built around High-Performance Teams. Parts of the government department in
question had been working in self-directed teams for several years, and this new initiative
intended to build upon prior work, while focussing more intently of performance and
continuous improvement.
A parallel (and, initially, unrelated) initiative underway was implementation of the Balanced
Scorecard.5
Implementing the Balanced Scorecard had proceeded in bumps and starts, and was
progressing slowly. Slow progress was due to, among other things, the informal nature of the
implementation and relatively few Balanced Scorecard champions in the organisation.
Not surprisingly, it wasn’t long before the high-performance and continuous improvement
implementation dovetailed with the Balanced Scorecard implementation. After all, both were
concerned with improving organisational performance. Specifically, as part of chartering and
other high-performance team-building activities, teams were:
 assessing their own performance, and their strengths and weaknesses;
 setting goals and developing associated performance measures; and,
 Action Planning
Their goals and measures, which included learning and development, slotted neatly into the
Balanced Scorecard. In contrast, areas not employing the team-building approach were not
generating useful input to the Balanced Scorecard.
The following diagrams show various aspects of the merger of the high-performance teams and
continuous improvement initiative and the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard. The
speed and ease progressing to the Balanced Scorecard must be at least partially attributed to the
collaborative nature and high-involvement of employees embodied in the approach undertaken.
In this case, the department will “win” big because it has as a central and encompassing
planning and performance measurement and management scheme the Balanced Scorecard. At
the same time, it is important to remember that the teams concerned, working together, would
have developed meaningful goals and measures on their own, with appropriate structure and
facilitation. This is how planning skills and a “performance mindset” can be created from the
bottom up.
5
This case is not specifically about the Balanced Scorecard or its implementation; nor does the author take stance,
one way or another, on the value or central nature of the Balanced Scorecard. The Balanced Scorecard, in this
instance, however, does represent a prime example of a performance measurement and management and planning
vehicle.
For more on the Balanced Scorecard, see R. Kaplan and D. Norton, The Strategy-Focused Organisation,
Cambridge MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2001; and “The Balanced Scorecard:
Measures that Drive Performance,” Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, 1992; and The Balanced Scorecard:
Translating Strategy into Action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
7

8. TOP DOWN
BOTTOM UP
Introduction to High-Performance
Teams and Continuous Improvement
Team
Chartering
Assessment and
Action Planning
Team / Section Balanced Scorecard
Corporate Mission / Outcomes
Divisional Objectives and KPIs
Divisional Balanced Scorecard
I II
III IV
Balanced
Scorecard Customer Service
Financials
Learning and Development
Business Process
Skills and
Knowledge Matrix
Skills and
Knowledge Matrix
Team
Learning Plan
Team
Learning Plan
Roles and
Responsibilities
Roles and
Responsibilities
Goals and
Measures
Goals and
Measures
Figure 1. Merging the “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to
planning, performance measurement, and performance management.
This first figure highlights that an organisation can arrive at a planning, performance
measurement, and
performance management
system using both a “top
down” and a “bottom up”
approach.
In this example,
accelerated “bottom up”
progress, facilitated by
high-performance team-
building activities and
focus on setting team
goals and measures,
promoted other lateral
efforts.
At the juncture, team /
section and divisional
Balanced Scorecards
inform one another, both
revising and improving in an iterative way.
Team chartering, showcasing goals, roles, skills, and learning, as shown briefly in Figure 1, is
explained more fully in Figure 2.
Figure 2 essentially shows a dozen components of the team charter.6
Team chartering activities
normally have teams work through some or all of the parts shown in the figure, and may
include “values,” as well as other components. The objective of the chartering process is to
build a new team or refocus an existing one through creating a common identity and mutually-
understood set of expectations regarding what the team is responsible for and how it will be
measured, and how team members will work together to achieve goals. The process fosters not
only a sense of “team” but where and how the team fits into the larger organisation, as well.
6
See J. Hays, Building High-Performance Teams: A Practitioner’s Guide, Canberra AU: Argos Press, 2003, for
a detailed discussion of team charters and the chartering process, as well as on participative goal-setting and
planning.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
8

9. As shown in the diagram, all parts of the charter and chartering activity point to goals and
measures. It is easy to see how the process enables teams to produce meaningful goals and
measures. This is not to say that team members automatically can craft relevant and precise
goals and measures, as discussed previously. They may need training and coaching to get
through this step, but most teams should be able to complete the process with a little help.
The final figure, below, termed “The Should Be View,” shows the relationship amongst five
teams, and their goals and measures, to Division, and its mission, objectives, and measures.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
9
Team
Members
Working
Together
Skills and
Knowledge
Risk
(Risk Mitigation)
CSFs
Vision
Purpose
Scope
Roles and
Responsibilities
Deliverables
Schedule
Non-
Negotiables
GOALS
MEASURES
Balanced
Scorecard
I II
III IV
I Customer Service
II Financials
III Learning and Development
IV Business Process
Relationship of
Team Charter to IT
Balanced Scorecard
Team
Charter
Figure 2. Components of the Team Charter and relationship of Team Charter to
Balanced Scorecard.
Divisional
Balanced
Scorecard
I Customer Service
II Financials
III Learning and Development
IV Business Process
IT Balanced
Scorecard
I II
III IV
Team Balanced
Scorecard
Team Balanced
Scorecard
Team Balanced
Scorecard
Team Balanced
Scorecard
Team Balanced
Scorecard
Division
Role /
Purpose
Goal
Measure
Role /
Purpose
Goal
Measure
Role /
Purpose
Goal
Measure
Role /
Purpose
Goal
Measure
Role /
Purpose
Goal
Measure
Mission
Objectives
Measures
The “Should Be” View
Figure 3. The “Should Be”: congruence and harmony in purpose, goals, and
measures of performance.

10. There is nothing new or remarkable about the theoretical perfection portrayed in Figure 3. It is
not unlike the cascading process at the public service / educational institution discussed earlier.
Such translation and adoption of corporate mission and objectives throughout the organisation
is an ideal to which many of us have aspired (or had foisted upon us). The difference in this
case example is that a good deal of goal agreement was achieved and that corporate vision and
mission were adapted (if not adopted) at levels far below the executive suite.
How they were given life in the trenches and how goals became both real and meaningful came
about through a continuous process of assessment, exploration, formulation, experimentation,
and, sometimes, abandonment. Teams struggled, managers did some “soul-searching,” and
executives “scratched their heads,” but things came together.
The high-involvement, bottom up approach may seem risky. The process may feel
cumbersome and protracted. It does take time and it does cost. Permitting people to
“workshop” goals and measures when they might be needed on other tasks (commonly called
“real work”) is disruptive and expensive. Getting people focussed on performance that matters
and continuous improvement, and encouraging them to become more involved in and
responsible for planning and decision making, takes time and effort. But the author believes—
and the Division Executive, as well as managers and staff of this government department found
—it is worth the investment.
If your response to this is “yea; but…” or think the approach too messy or uncertain, may you
contently remain in territory more certain where the failure of strategic planning is most
predictable.
CONCLUSION
This paper sets out with the declaration that strategic planning will predictably fail. Why or
how this is so was explained in terms of unintended and unconscious organisational tendencies,
using simple Causal Loop (Influence) Diagrams to illustrate the points. Despite the fallibility
of strategic planning, for the reasons suggested here—and many others—the author is leery of
recommending total abandonment of strategic planning. The logic is so compelling or the
paradigm blinders too thick to declare strategic planning a waste of time. Is it not our
experience that the better the plan, the better the outcome?
Accepting that strategic planning is likely to fail, knowing it will not be discarded until an
entirely new way of envisioning the future is available, and determined to try and make it
work, the author provides a series of partial solutions that have been applied and adapted in
numerous public and private sector organisations in the United States, Europe, and Australasia.
Individually, they seem obvious and common-sensical. Perhaps it is in combining them
variously, as suited to the organisation in a given place in time, that they add value. At the
least, they may serve as principles to guide adaptation of strategic planning systems.
The Predictable Failure of Strategic Planning
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