Comrades In Conflict

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By
Joseph N. Wdowski, M.S. Ed.

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COMRADES IN CONFLICT
The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict of 1979
By
Joseph N. Wdowski, M.S. Ed.
History Thesis
Southern Connecticut State University
New Haven, CT
Academic Advisor
Dr. Michele Thompson

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INTRODUCTION
Presently the world has seen the fall and break up of the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw pact allies of Eastern Europe. Germany is once again united under a
democratic-capitalist regime. The People’s Republic of China is transforming into a
market economy. North Korea is close to ruin and Castro’s Cuba is abandoned and
adrift. It was not too long ago that the fear of a nuclear holocaust, caused by the Cold
War between The Communist East and the Western Free world, hung over all of our
heads. Today the fear of nuclear war is between India and Pakistan, for religious
reasons not political. The “Dooms Day Clock”, Nuclear Winter, and the Red Tide, are
no longer fears of today’s Western governments and no longer govern their foreign
policies or domestic budgets. The Cold War is over and the West won. Or did it?
Perhaps the Communist Nations would have fallen under their own weight? That the
containment policy, with its: covert actions, involvement in regional conflicts, and
massive military budgets, were not necessary in defeating world communism?
Perhaps, if left on its own, communism was already doomed to failure? The forces of
Nationalism and ethnic chauvinism alone would have turned out to be great enough
forces in demising the dream of global communism.

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This paper is about an event in history that marked the beginning of the end of
communism in the twentieth century. During the winter of 1979, just before the rainy
season in Southeast Asia, two of the world’s largest nuclear and conventional powers
came dangerously close to armed conflict. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) stood nose to nose in a high
risk game of “strategic chicken”; all over a fellow communist nation. A nation they
had both supported and aided in its nationalistic struggle against “Western
Imperialism.”
The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, although almost completely forgotten by
the Western world, was a major milestone in the ending of the Marxist dream of
global domination by the proletariat. Ironically the end of the dream came shortly
after the communist forces defeated the United States in Southeast Asia. To
international socialist the American defeat was a symbol of victory against the
exploitative and morally misguided system of capitalism. So what went wrong? Why
did these four separate communist nations (PRC, USSR, Vietnam and Kampuchea)
turn against each other? Why didn’t they instead solidify their position after their
victory against America and move their Marxist Revolution forward? What was the

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major source of the Conflict? Was it just a “punitive” strike by Beijing against a
“disrespectful” and “arrogant” former tributary state? Or was it really an apparition of
the much larger growing antagonistic relationship between the Soviet Union and
China? And what does this almost forgotten war mean to us today and the future of
Asia and the world. To understand these questions this paper will analyze the social,
political, economic and military events that led to the conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese
border, the conflict itself and its repercussions on today’s world.
UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE DRAGON
In one month the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suffered an estimated
42,000 casualties1
in a border war with their southern neighbor; almost matching the
numbers the Americans had lost in twelve years of fighting with the Vietnamese.
What drove Beijing to strike out so violently and costly against Vietnam?
During Vietnam’s war with America, China was Vietnam’s strongest and
greatest ally. The Chinese backed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
with arms, training, economic aid, technical instructors in the thousands, and political
1
Wallace, James “China-Vietnam Peace – Just a Façade,” U.S. News And World Report,
March 19, 1979: p28 and Middleton, Drew “Peking Warns Hanoi against any Attack During
Withdrawal,” New York Times, March 5, 1979: pA1, A12.

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support in the world arena. To understand how the Chinese and Vietnamese
relationship soured so quickly after the ending of the Second Indochina War it is
fundamentally important to understand the history between these two nations.
Jung-gwo (the Chinese word for China, meaning: “Middle Kingdom”) for
thousands of years was just that – the Middle Kingdom. It was a vast Empire, the
center of its known world in science, culture, art, and industry. The regions of East
Asia not physically occupied by Imperial Chinese forces were tributary states
heavily
connected to and influenced by their giant neighbor. Vietnam, much like the other
Asian nations that bordered the Middle Kingdom, owed much of its culture and
national identity to China. On the other hand China remained, through out the
milleniums, as the greatest threat to Vietnam’s national sovereignty and identity.
Vietnamese history is filled with stories of heroes and heroines who fought
against the Chinese. Beginning with Trieu Da (“Defender of the Homeland”), who in
the third century BC held off the expanding Han Empire (206 BC – AD 220). In 111
BC the Chinese armies of Wu Di defeated the successors of Trieu Da, taking control
of the fertile Red River Delta, which served as a convenient supply point for Han

Meaning nations paid “protection” to the Chinese to protect them from the Chinese.

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ships engaging in the growing maritime trade with India and Indonesia. China
occupied An Nam (Chinese meaning: “Peaceful South”) for the next one thousand
years. To this day the Vietnamese honor those heroes and heroines that rose up
against Chinese domination during their long period of foreign occupation.
In response to increased Chinese taxation and domination, revolts broke out in
Giao Chi, Cuu Chan and Nhat Nam, in AD 39. These revolts were led by the wife of a
Lac lord who had been executed by the Chinese, and her sister Trung Nhi. It took two
years for their open rebellion to be finally defeated by the Han General Ma Yuan. The
Trung Sisters drowned themselves to avoid being captured, immortalizing themselves
in Vietnamese history.2
The Trung Sisters were followed in AD 248 by another Vietnamese heroine;
Trieu Au (Lady Trieu). Lady Trieu led a six-month rebellion before it was also
crushed.3
In the late sixth and early seventh centuries another series of Vietnamese
revolts followed. The most famous of these revolts was led by Trieu Quang Phic (The
Father of Vietnamese Guerrillas.) In 570, Trieu Quang Phic was also defeated by the
2
Cima, Ronald J., ed., VIETNAM: A COUNTRY STUDY, Washington D.C.: Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office:1989: p8-9.
3
ibid.: p11.

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Chinese.4
Although these rebellions all ended in failure, they did establish a
Vietnamese tradition of armed rebellion against foreign forces. It was not until the
collapse of the Tang Dynasty (AD 618 – 907) in the early tenth century that the
Vietnamese, led by their nationalist hero Ngo Quyen, were able to win back their
national independence.
To prevent from being re-occupied by the newly established Song Dynasty
(960 – 1125) Dinh Bo Linh sent a successful tributary mission to the northern Chinese
empire. This mission secured Vietnam’s independence for the next 900 years. Yet
even during this protective period of being a tributary state, the Vietnamese were still
at times forced to defend their fragile national sovereignty.5
The armies of the Kublui
Khan invaded Vietnam in 1257, 1284, and 1287.
The Ming Dynasty finally took control of Vietnam in 1407, but was soon
expelled eleven years later by Le Loi. China and Vietnam have had over two thousand
years of antagonistic history. Their alliance of the 20th
Century against the French and
the United States was an abnormality.
4
ibid: p12.
5
ibid: p14-15.

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“If you analyze them [conflicts between China,
Vietnam, Soviet Union and Kampuchea] in historical terms,
[the tensions of 1979] were based on long standing geopolitical,
historical and even racial animosities. They long predated the
arrival of the Western colonial powers to Southeast Asia and the
creation of communist states in Russia, China and North
Vietnam.” –Richard Holbrook, Asst. Secretary of State for East
Asia and Pacific.6
It was the advent of colonial Western powers that brought about China’s and
Vietnam’s unnatural alliance. At the same period that the Vietnamese were giving up
their long defended independence to the French, the Chinese themselves were being
carved up by the Western and “honorary” Western powers (Japan). Due to the
pressure of “Gun Boat” diplomacy China entered an age of “unfair treaties”,
territoriality, forced trade agreements, and territorial acquisitions by foreign powers.
China discovered herself in a position in the World that was more and more similar to
6
Holbrook, Richard “U.S. Stance in Asia: Strongest ‘Since World War II’”,
U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 25, ’78 - Jan. 1 ’79, Vol. 85:25: p46.

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its former tributary state in the pacified south. The two nations finally had common
enemies.
COMMRADES IN ARMS
After the forces of capitalism and socialism had defeated the march of fascism
in Europe and in Asia, the communist nations returned to their struggle against
capitalism. The Iron Curtain dropped heavily across Europe sending shock waves
around the world and plunging it in to the Cold War that would last nearly forty years.
Soviet sponsored communist insurrections almost engulfed Greece and Turkey behind
its Iron Curtain. In the mean time, also supported by the Soviets, Mao and his peasant
army won their civil war against the Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalists: who
were supported by the West). The Cold War was on and ancient enemies were finding
unlikely allies.
In Vietnam the French returned, hoping to refill the vacuum the defeated
Japanese had left behind. Having just lifted the yoke of Japanese imperialism, the
Vietnamese were not prepared to let the French just move right back in. For seven and
a half years the Vietnamese communists fought the French. The primary military
objective (determined by Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap) was to control the

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northern boarder of the country in order to freely move supplies and personnel from
China.7
With their supply lines secured with their Chinese communist allies, the
Vietnamese guerrillas were in a position to strike at the French in the Red River Delta.
Over time the Viet Minh soon controlled more than half of the villages in the Red
River Delta area.
Losing public support on the home front, the French colonial forces were not
receiving the additional needed troops to counter the Viet Minh’s military advances.
The French commanders’ only hope was to try a strategic strike at the Viet Minh’s
supply lines with China. In November 1953, French Foreign Legion paratrooper
battalions were dropped deep in Viet Minh held territory, taking hold of Dien Bein
Phu, sixteen kilometers from the Laotian border (Which was a vital link in the Viet
Minh’s supply lines with China.) On March 13th
, with over 50,000 regulars,
over 55,000 support troops, and 100,000 transport workers, General Giap began his
siege of Dien Bein Phu. Chinese aid (consisting mainly of ammunition, petroleum,
and heavy artillery) were carried 350 kilometers from the Chinese border, aiding the
Viet Minh greatly in cutting off the French garrison of 15,000 men.8
7
Cima, Ronald J. ed. Vietnam: A Country Study, Washington D.C.: Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; 1989; p55.
8
ibid. p56.

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Surrounded, the French begged for American air support to break the siege,
but American air support never came. Eisenhower feared a repeat of the Korean War.
He was terrified that any military action so close to the Chinese border would incite
the Chinese to come streaming across the border, just as they had done during the
Korean Conflict when United Nation’s forces approached too near their border. The
doomed garrison at Dien Bein Phu fell on May 7th
, of 1954.
The Viet Minh now had the upper hand at the peace table. In Geneva,
Switzerland July 1954 the French were forced to agree to the end of the their rule in
Vietnam. The ceasefire agreement established a provisional military demarcation line
at about the 17o
N parallel and required the re-deployment of all French military forces
south of that line and all Viet Minh forces north of it.9
With the Vietnamese
communists well established in the north, the Eisenhower administration promised
support of a non-communist Vietnamese regime in the south. By January of 1955
American aid and advisors began to enter South Vietnam in support of the Bao Dai
government; the country was now firmly divided. This ended the First Indochina War
but set the stage for the Second Indochina War.10
9
Ibid: p58.
10
Ibid: p58-59.

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Nitkita Khrushchev, due to his move towards détente with the United States,
frowned upon Vietnamese communists reunifying the country by armed struggle.
Khrushchev’s push for a “peaceful transition” to socialism and reunification was
contrary to the Viet Minh’s and Mao’s support for full-scale guerrilla war to unify the
country.11
With China’s support, in 1960 the North Vietnamese began their full-scale
guerilla war against the American supported South Vietnamese government. This
action was one of the many developing rifts between communist China and
communist Russia.
BREAKDOWN: CHINA-SOVIET
North Vietnam’s struggle against the United States was becoming extremely
complicated as its two most powerful and natural communist allies began to bicker
between themselves. The Viet Minh were becoming a weapon that Moscow and
Beijing used against each other. Like the parents in a bad divorce would use the
children.
11
Chanda, Nayan Brother Enemy: The War After the War,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers; New York: 1986; p174.

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Philosophical and political differences between Mao and Khrushchev
greatened. The Chinese were upset with Khrushchev’s desire for détente,
unwillingness to support China in obtaining the bomb, and not backing China in
taking Taiwan from the Nationalist Chinese during the Quemoy-Matsu Island crisis of
1959. The Soviets were agitated by Mao’s refusal to tow the Moscow line, and his
demands for territories within the Soviet Union that Russia had acquired during the
times of the Czar. All of these disputes contributed to the growing animosity and
distrust between the two communist giants. Throughout the sixties though both
countries gave support to the Viet Minh. During the Khrushchev administration it was
China who was the principal provider of aid. After Khrushchev’s ousting in the Fall
of 1964, Moscow moved to re-establish its socialist leadership in the world.
Defending themselves against the Chinese charges of
revisionism and collusion with the United States, the new
Soviet leaders had to prove their Socialist bona fides by helping
Vietnam.12
– Nayan Chanda
12
ibid., p174

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The changes in Soviet leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev brought the
Soviet Union back into a more aggressive stance against the West. Which was what
Mao had been encouraging all along. Beijing questioned Moscow’s motives. The
more aggressive foreign policy did not seem to Mao as a Soviet move to further the
goals of the world struggle of socialism, but a blatant attempt by Moscow to further
its goals for a “Russian Empire”.
“Although determined to expand their power throughout
the world, the Soviets continue, at least under the Brezhnev
regime, to be low-risk, cautious expansionists. They are not
“high rollers” comparable to Hitler’s Germany. Their referred
pattern of expansion is to exploit internal instability in the Third
World – civil wars, regional conflicts and so forth – rather than
to intervene directly with their own military forces. By inserting
themselves into local conflicts, often with heavy shipments of
arms supplies, advisors, and offers of “friendship treaties”. The

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Soviets have succeeded in establishing considerable influence in
many of the troubled regions of the Third World.”13
China also noticed that the Soviets were also more than willing to enter their
own troops to enforce their national interests. (For example: the Soviet’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968). More importantly to the Chinese, the over 4,000 incidents
on the Sino-Soviet border along the Ussuri River from October 15th
, 1954 to March
1969 between PLA and Soviet troops. The Soviet-Sino border skirmishes finally
boiled over into major clashes in 1969 on March 2nd
, 4th
and 15th
.14
The Chinese were sure of Soviet intentions to re-establish the territorial claims
of Old Mother Russia. Beijing often referred to the Brezhnev administration as the
“New Czarist”. The Soviets too had their suspicions of Chinese foreign policy. The
Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960’s was not seen in Moscow’s eyes as a move
to confirm the continued socialist struggle, but was merely a tool of Mao’s to rid
13
Zagoria, Donald S. Editor; SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA;
Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982; p2
14
Salisbury, Harrison E.; WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA;
W.W. Norton & Company; New York: 1969; p180-181

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himself of political opposition within his own party. In doing so, he consolidated his
“imperial” powers as the “New Emperor”. In June 1969 Brezhnev illustrated to the
Assembly of Communist Parties in Moscow the Chinese threat:
“The idea of China’s Messianic role is being instilled in
Chinese workers and peasants. Mass indoctrination in the spirit of
chauvinism and vicious anti-Soviet is under way. Children are
being taught geography from textbooks and maps that assign the
land of other countries to the Chinese [State]. ‘Go hungry and
prepare for war!’ – [these are] the guidelines the Chinese people
are being given.
“In so doing no doubt is left to just what kind of war is
meant.
“In the light of all this the policy of militarization of China
takes on special meaning. We cannot help but compare the feverish
military preparation with the fanning of chauvinistic sentiments
hostile to the socialist countries, and the overall approach of

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China’s leaders to the problems of war and peace in the present
epoch.”15
The perceived threats on both sides increased in a snowball effect that began
to dwarf the Cold War between the West and the East. Vietnam, still fighting a hot
war with the United States, was drastically affected by the growing hostilities between
its two bigger and older socialist brothers.
15
ibid., p183

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VIETNAM’S WAR WITH AMERICA
China felt betrayed by the Soviets under Khrushchev when Moscow
supported and accepted a divided Vietnam after the Vietnamese victory against
French imperialism. Yet when the Brezhnev regime did an about face in its Vietnam
policy and began to support the North’s armed aggression against the American
supported south, China’s attitude towards Hanoi and Moscow became more and more
bitter as Hanoi began to accept more and more Soviet aid. China’s Chief-of–Staff of
the PLA, Lo Jui-ching, embraced this new Soviet attitude and advocated mending
relations with the Soviets, in order to take a more active role in Vietnam’s war against
America. Relations between Moscow and Beijing had deteriorated so much that Lo
Jui-ching met strong opposition from Mao, Lin Pao, Chao En-lai, and Deng Chen
(The Chinese Communist Parties’ supreme leadership at the time), reconciliation was
impossible.16
The Soviets were being seen clearly as the major threat to Chinese nationalist
interests and as problems increased between Beijing and Moscow, especially after the
16
“Peking Strategy Against Moscow”, ASIAN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. ’81; 8:3; p131-147

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border conflicts, China began to play its “American Card’. President Nixon, stuck in
an ever increasing unpopular war in Southeast Asia, took advantage of the Chinese-
Soviet rift and began to establish relations with communist China.
In 1971 “Ping Pong diplomacy” was termed with the American ping pong
team visiting China. In the shadows of the well publicized visit of the American Ping
Pong team, Henry A. Kissinger (Nixon’s Secretary of State) secretly also visited
Beijing. Both missions paved the way for Nixon famous visit to China the following
year. This visit resulted in Nixon’s and Chou En-lai’s “Shanghai Communiqué”. The
Shanghai Communiqué changed the course of Chinese-American relations, and in
turn changed the course of Chinese-Vietnamese relations.
The Vietnamese clearly took the Nixon visit to China as the beginning of
“China’s betrayal of Vietnam”.17
In a way it was, for it was Nixon’s hope to do just
that. He felt by wooing the Chinese he could persuade them to halt their support of
North Vietnam’s aggression against the South, allowing the United States to
honorably remove itself from the conflict. Vo Van Sung, Vietnam’s ambassador to
17
Cima, Ronald, J. Ed. VIETNAM: A Country Study, Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington D.C.: 1989; p218

22
France, later responded that the only reason that China had supported them was
because the Chinese wished to monopolize aid to the Communist side. Their plan had
failed because Vietnam “refused to become their tool”18
China’s distrust of the Soviet Union began to convince Beijing that the
continuation of the prolonged American-Vietnamese War was strictly only beneficial
for Moscow. The war tied up over 500,000 American troops in Southeast Asia,
freeing the Soviet’s hand to engage in subversive and military actions elsewhere in
the world. It was also hoped by the Soviets that Vietnam would be a dividing issue
between the American government, its people and the Western European Allies. In
addition the war tied up Chinese divisions on the Vietnamese border in order to deter
American strikes into North Vietnam. For the Soviets, every Chinese regiment on the
Vietnamese border was one less Chinese regiment on their border.
Beijing came to the conclusion (in spit of the socialist struggle for world
domination) that the Vietnamese war with America was not in China’s best national
interests. China’s move to the West helped to bring an end to twelve years of
American military involvement in Vietnam.
18
“Vietnamese Not Severing Diplomatic Tie to China, Their Envoy Says” NEW YORK TIMES;
Feb.19, ’79; pA6

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BREAKDOWN: CHINA - VIETNAM
The primary goals of the new Deng Xiaoping regime was its desire to
implement its "Four Modernizations” policy and to hamper and even push back
Soviet hegemonism. Both of these goals naturally moved China towards the West.
China needed the West’s technological and financial investment to achieve the Four
Modernizations. The West’s military and diplomatic might was also needed in
curtailing Soviet aggression. China needed to defrost the Sino-American Cold War,
an action that logically pushed North Vietnam further into the Soviet sphere of
influence. Without the common ideological goal to defeat the “Yankee Imperialists”
old ethnic, historical, and nationalistic tensions emerged between Beijing and Hanoi.
These Tensions consisted of problems across the spectrum. Ranging from
ancient border disputes, newly claimed economical waters, ethnic chauvinism, and
hostile alliances with each other’s enemies.
THE BOAT PEOPLE
The Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and
the military) were hoped to transform China into a modern state by the year 2000. In

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order to achieve all four goals of the Four Modernizations it was imperative to seek
outside assistance from the West. Beijing felt their best and most hopeful hopes for
aid would come from the millions of overseas Chinese, of whom many had the
education and financial resources to reinvest into the “Motherland”, hopefully
bringing China into the 21st
Century. Unfortunately, for Beijing, most overseas
Chinese had fled communist China and were stanch anti-Communists. They were the
“evil landlords”, the “capitalist routers”, intellectuals and dissidents: The enemies of
the people. They were the ones that had their homes and businesses ripped from them.
They were the ones the Communist Revolution beat and humiliated in the streets.
They were the ones that lost loved ones in the Civil War, the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution. If Beijing was to ever attract the support of overseas Chinese
they would have to change their image and try to illustrate itself as the benevolent and
protective father of the world-wide Chinese family.
When the newly united Republic of Vietnam started to persecute its ethnic
Chinese merchant class, Beijing could not stand idly by. Beijing had to show itself as
the champion of all ethnic Chinese, even the ethnic Chinese of the merchant class.

25
The Vietnamese, having just finished its long bloody wars of independence
and reunification, were now set on the task in rebuilding their war torn nation. The
animosity between China and Vietnam, along with the continued American led trade
sanctions against the victorious Vietnamese Communist government, placed Vietnam
in an extremely difficult economical position. Only the Soviet Union and its
communist block allies offered financial and technical support to the Vietnamese
reconstruction efforts. Desperate for material and financial resources the Hanoi
government accused its ethnic Chinese merchant class of disrupting its markets by
hoarding products; in order to create shortages to increase their profits on the black
market.19
Whatever the reasons, either as an excuse to cover up its own economic
policy failures or as a legitimate complaint of “counter-revolutionary” actions, the
Hanoi government moved against its ethnic Chinese population.
With the Americans gone, Vietnam now felt it was time to remove what little
influence there was on them from the Chinese. Hanoi, as it began its socialist
transition with its newly reunited southern half, began a class war against South
Vietnam’s merchant class. This happened to be dominated by ethnic Chinese.
19
Ronald, J. Cima, ed., Vietnam: A Country Study, Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.: 1989; p217

26
Throughout Southeast Asia the merchant classes of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
and Indonesia were dominated by minority ethnic Chinese. Communist China had to
show it would not tolerate the persecution of its “future investors”.
Beijing strongly protested against Vietnam’s treatment of its ethnic Chinese
population. Ironically in the past, when the Saigon government mistreated ethnic
Chinese (by banning them from eleven Chinese trades), the Hanoi government had
joined Beijing cries of protest:
“All decrees and measures of the U.S. puppet regime
regarding shall be abolished…Chinese residence have the
freedom and right to choose their nationality.”20
Hanoi responded to Beijing’s protest to their alleged systemic persecution of
ethnic Chinese, by stating that their policy was not aimed at ethnic Chinese. Hanoi
counter accused Beijing for supporting the bourgeois of Chinese descent:
20
Chang, Pao-min; “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over Ethnic Chinese”;
THE CHINA QUARTERILY: June 1982, p199

27
“…Beijing has in fact forsaken its class stand and
betrayed the spirit of the proletarian internationalism.”21
The Vietnamese also pointed out Beijing’s hypocrisy in that they had not
voiced concern for the ethnic Chinese under the Beijing supported Pol Pot regime in
Kampuchea, “Who were evicted from their homes, robbed of their property, confined
to labor camps and tortured to death.”22
Although it could be argued in the case of the
Pol Pot regime, that they did not purposely single out their ethnic Chinese population.
During the Cambodian holocaust they were equal opportunity oppressors, murders,
and tormentors.
“[Beijing], which ignored the Khmer Rouge massacre of
the generations-old Chinese community in [Kampuchea],
violently condemned the Vietnamese. Between April and
21
Ibid.; p210
22
Ibid.; p210

28
August 1978, approximately 180,000 Haos (Chinese-
Vietnamese) were repatriated…”23
Hanoi’s social reordering of its society led to the famous flood of “boat
people” who were 85% ethnic Chinese. Of the Refugees that flooded the Southern
Chinese border 95% were ethnic Chinese.24
Publicly Hanoi’s policy was only against
the “bourgeois-oriented southern communities”… which reportedly eluded every
socialist rule and regulation promulgated in the south, including the currency reform
of late 1975 and curtailment of commercial activities in 1976.”25
On March 31st
, 1978
the Vietnamese government announced a single currency of the new Vietnam Dong.
The Dong was limited per couple to trade in up to US$100 and an additional US$25
for each child, with a ceiling of US$250 for urban and US$150 for rural families. The
government confiscated all other monies. Hanoi also lashed back with land
reclamation and population redistribution. Privately, Vietnamese foreign officials
23
Klein, John “Roots of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict”
ASIAN AFFAIRS 6:6; July-Aug. ’79; p29
24
Chang,Pao-min; “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over Ethnic Chinese”;
THE CHINA QUARTERILY: June 1982, p212-213
25
Ibid.; p202

29
admitted to their foreign counterparts that Hanoi’s true intentions were to rid their
nation of the ethnic Chinese.26
Even if one was to disbelieve these allegations, the
sheer numbers of Hao people (ethnic Chinese in Vietnam) among those fleeing
Vietnam only proves that the Vietnamese having rid themselves of eating “Western
shit”, were ensuring themselves that they would not return to eating “Chinese shit”.
The United Vietnamese Government ordered residents in the South to re-
register their citizenship, heavily suggesting that ethnic Chinese see themselves as
Vietnamese. “Those Chinese who either insisted on retaining their Chinese citizenship
or showed signs of Chinese chauvinism had a heavy tax imposed on them and were
discriminated against occupationally with their food rations invariably reduced.”27
Hanoi had engaged in a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing. Chinese-Americans
responded by sending over US$ 242 million via Hong Kong to assist relatives to bribe
their ways out of Vietnam, money that could have been sent to assist China in its Four
Modernizations. To make matters worse for Beijing, it was starting to feel the pinch
of the additional financial burden caused by the flood of refugees across their
southern border. China was becoming outraged with Hanoi.
26
Ibid.; p227
27
Ibid.; p200

30
By the end of September all ethnic Chinese newspapers were ordered shut
down, followed by the shut down of ethnic Chinese run schools.28
By the end of that
year the pro-Chinese faction was purged from the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese
Communist Party. Leading to the rise of the pro-Soviet faction and a more militant
stance on the Kampuchea-Vietnamese border. This widened the rift between Vietnam
and China even more so since the Pol Pot led government of Kampuchea was strongly
supported by Beijing.
The following year of 1977, Vietnamese treatment of ethnic Chinese
worsened. In February, Hanoi ordered all ethnic Chinese to fill out forms for
“citizenship cards”. Those who failed to register as Vietnamese lost their jobs,
residence registration, food rations, and were prohibited from civil service, public
enterprise, retail trade and farming. Their freedom of movement was also hampered.
Confiscation of ethnic Chinese properties and eventual exile followed for some. By
April Vietnam established a policy of “purifying the border area”. Those regions
bordering with China were cleared out. “The increasing sensitive region of people
whose loyalty to Vietnam could no longer be trusted.” This policy resulted in many
28
Ibid.; p200

31
ethnic Chinese and non-Vietnamese minority groups crossing into China.29
When
Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian brought up the matter in his talks with Premier
Pham Van Dong in June, it was simple ignored by the Vietnamese Premier.
The ethnic Chinese problems heated up even more so in 1978. On January 4th
,
1978 of The Renmin Rebao ( The People’s Daily), the official mouth piece of the
Chinese Communist government, editorial outlined China’s policy towards overseas
Chinese:
 Overseas Chinese are part of the Chinese nation.
 Overseas Chinese are a significant force in China’s socialist revolution and
construction.
 [China] will strengthen work on overseas Chinese affairs…to form a broad
patriotic united front.
 [China] will welcome and make proper arrangements for those who wish to return
to China to take part in building up the motherland or to settle down.
 Those who took up foreign nationalities are still kinsfolk and friends30
29
Ibid.; p203
30
Ibid.; p204-205

32
In March of the same year, ethnic Chinese held demonstrations in Ho Chi
Minh City (Saigon), protesting property confiscation and physical expulsions. They
were crushed by force by the Vietnamese government. The government then clamped
down on all ‘bourgeois activities.” March 23rd
, para-security forces of 30,000 (police,
cadres and students) ransacked and confiscated property in the Chulon section of Ho
Chi Minh City, a prominently ethnic Chinese area of the city. Crack downs also took
place in other cities until mid April.31
The Spring of 1978 saw a massive exodus
across the Chinese-Vietnamese border. The Chinese claimed that between April to
mid May of 1978 over 50,000 overseas Chinese were driven out of Vietnam and into
China.32
The Vietnamese claimed that this mass excises was due to a “rumor
campaign” instituted by the Chinese via radio broadcasts and Chinese spies that had
infiltrated the Chinese communities in Northern Vietnam. These agents would pass
rumors of coming war and of a better life in China. China rejected the Vietnamese
claims that they were behind any type of rumor campaign and that it was actually the
Vietnamese themselves spreading the rumors to entice the Chinese populace to flee to
31
Ibid.; p206
32
Larkin, Bruce D. “China and Asia: The Year of the China-Vietnam War”, CURRENT
HISTORY; Vol. 77:449; Sept. ’79: p55

33
the Chinese border. Refugees though claimed that Vietnamese authorities tried to stop
the exodus by explaining that there was not going to be a war.33
China responded to this forced exodus with a major propaganda campaign in
May. Many news articles and “documentary” films were produced at this time
depicting the plight of the ethnic Chinese refugees. Some of these articles even
alleged that the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese was under the command of Moscow.34
Beijing also retaliated by suspending twenty-one factory projects promised to Hanoi.
“In order to divert funds and materials to make working and living arrangements for
the expelled Chinese.”35
This was followed by May 30th
with a suspension of fifty-
one aid projects in Vietnam and the return of 1,000 Chinese technicians. On June 17th
,
China ordered Vietnamese consulates in Canton, Kunning, and Nanning closed,
because Vietnam refused to allow the establishment of a Chinese consulate in Ho Chi
Minh City, Da Nang and Haiphong (all cities with high ethnic Chinese populations).
Beijing also withdrew its ambassador from Hanoi.36
33
Amer, Ramses “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in 1978-79 and the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam”
MULTIETHNICA; No. 21/22 1997; http://www-hotel.uu.se.multietn/Amer.html ; p6
34
Porter, Gareth “The Great Power Triangle in Southeast Asia”.
CURRENT HISTORY; Vol.70:461; Sept. ’80: p162
35
BEIJING REVIEW; June 16, 1978; p213
36
“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry”. ASIAN AFFAIRS, 6:1 Sept.-Oct. ’78; p15

34
On June 6th
, the Vietnamese agreed to permit two Chinese ships to evacuate
ethnic Chinese who wished to leave the country. Three ports were designated and
three months, to start on June 20th
, were set to allow the evacuation by ship.
Seventeen negotiation sessions were held, yet Vietnamese officials objected to
Chinese insistence that the refuges be referred to as “Chinese residence who are
victims of ostracism, persecution, and expulsion by the Vietnamese authorities.”
Hanoi insisted on referring to the refugees as “Vietnamese of Chinese decent [whom]
wish to leave Vietnam for China…” Dragging on to August with no agreement the
Chinese suggested the negotiations to be raised to deputy foreign minister level. This
too was fruitless and the Chinese ships soon returned to China empty.37
In mid July of 1978 the Chinese authorities closed their border with Vietnam.
The ethnic Chinese that still wished to leave Vietnam were forced to leave by boat,
starting the great exodus of the “Boat people”. Most were bound for Hong Kong but
also fled to other nations in the region including China.. There was a large influx of
“Boat people” in the months before and soon after the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. (see
table 1)
37
Ibid.; p17

35
ISLAND DISPUTES
Oil reserves discovered in the South China Sea brought even more tensions
between Hanoi and Beijing. In dispute were the Spartly Islands, which are
strategically located to exploit offshore drilling in the South China Sea. The Paracel
Islands were also in dispute for their riches in guano, an important source of artificial
fertilizers.
Ever since 1931 the Paracel Islands changed hands to the dominating power in
the region, first the French, then the Japanese during World War II. After the War the
Republic of China claimed the Islands, which were then occupied by the Vietnamese
in the 1960’s. By 1974 Mainland Chinese naval forces pushed the Vietnamese off the
Islands. The Chinese stated that they had laid claim to the islands since the Three
Kingdoms Period (3rd
century).

36
In 1887 China made agreements with the French government of a limit of
three nautical miles into the Gulf of Tonkin. When Hanoi announced a claim of a 200-
mile range of territorial waters, China was outraged.38
After the Second Indochina
War the Vietnamese seized six islands of the Spartly’s that were occupied by the
defeated Saigon government. China, in response, cited the 1958 letter from Pham Van
Dong, which stated that the Vietnamese recognized China’s claim to the Islands.
Hanoi simply replied that the letter was just “…diplomatic double-talk in order to
avoid antagonizing its ally during a time of war.”39
Hanoi’s “double-talk” justification
for breaking its 1958 agreement was a slap in Beijing’s face.
DREAMS OF EMPIRE
In the 1950’s President Eisenhower coined the phrase “The Domino Theory”.
He theorized that if South Vietnam fell to the communists that all the countries in the
region would also fall to communism. Like a row of dominos, if one is pushed over
the whole row is knocked down. Critics scoffed at Eisenhower’s analogy, yet history
has proven Eisenhower correct. Soon after the fall of Saigon, Cambodia (renamed
Kampuchea its original spelling, as opposed to the French “Cambodia”), and Laos did
38
Duiker, William J. VIETNAM SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON; update Edition; Ohio
University Center for International Studies; Athens, Ohio: 1989
39
Ibid.; p182

37
fall to communist governments. Communist insurgent groups threatened even
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. What Eisenhower was not able to foresee
was that the forces of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism would counter the
momentum of the falling dominoes. Hanoi was not satisfied with merely reuniting
with South Vietnam and the neighboring nations of Kampuchea and Laos joining the
communist brotherhood. It also wanted to establish an Indochina Federation led by
Vietnam. Before the unification of the South, the Vietnamese communist leaders had
made statements of national goals beyond unification:
 The army is the party; the party is the army.
 Communist Vietnam is first of all an army.
 The solution to all problems is war.40
Such a worldview is in capable of stopping its military actions at its own
national borders. General Giap’s famous statement, quoted by Bernard Fall, also
40
Mount, Frank “The Prussians of Southeast Asia”,
ASIAN AFFAIRS, 6:6; July-Aug. ’79: p381

38
demonstrates the Vietnamese communists’ desire for developing a military society
bent on continued aggressions:
“The life and death of a hundred, a thousand, or even tens
of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own
compatriots, represents really very little.” – Gen. Giap41
As far back as 1930, when Ho Chi Minh (at the time an important Comintern
agent) brought the warring communist factions of Vietnam together into a new
Indochina (not merely Vietnamese) communist party.42
Hanoi officials, decades later,
referred to themselves to American diplomat William Sullivan as the “Prussians of
Southeast Asia” destined to exercise leadership over the weaker and less disciplined
states of the region.43
Ironically the nation to feel most threatened by the aspirations
of the “Prussians of Southeast Asia” was not the United States Government that tried
41
Ibid.
42
“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry”, ASIAN AFFFAIRS, 6:1; Sept.-Oct. ’78: p2
43
Ibid.

39
to contain North Vietnam, but China, which had assisted the North in breaking south
of the 17th
parallel.
VIETNAM”S INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA
In 1975 the Khmer Rouge, Led by Pol Pot overthrew the Cambodian
government and established the communist nation of Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge
was a highly oppressive regime that forcefully experimented on its population to
create a pure Maoist communist state. Forced labor, widespread executions, and
famine ended up killing over three million Cambodians. The Vietnamese invasion of
1978 ousted the Khmer Rouge. After the invasion the Khmer Rouge were still able to
control large areas of the countryside. Using guerrilla tactics to harass the Vietnamese
occupational forces the Khmer Rouge struck back at their invaders. “The Vietnamese
and Cambodians had been fighting against each other since the days of Angkor, and,
as Cambodians of every political tendency admit, Kampuchea was saved from total
annihilation by Vietnam by the arrival of the French in the Nineteenth Century.”44
Vietnam though did not enter Kampuchea to bring a halt to the Khmer
Rouge’s genocide of its own people. Vietnam’s old ambition of a Southeast Asian
44
Karnow, Stanley “East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation”
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 57:3; ’79 p601

40
Empire was its only true purpose of occupying Kampuchea. Using border conflicts
that had started in 1977 as an excuse, the Vietnamese sent over 150,000 troops into
Kampuchea in support of the Cambodian Salvation Front (CSF). The Vietnamese
quickly set up a puppet government led by forty-four year old President Samrin.
President Samrin was a little known son of a large poor peasant family, who
ceremoniously, rose to be a division commander and a member of the CSF central
committee. At almost the same time a friendship treaty was signed between the
Samrin Regime and the Hanoi government. The treaty gave the Vietnamese the right
to station “advisors in Kampuchea and to preserve the territorial integrity”. A very
similar pact the Vietnamese had signed with Laos the year before.45
Advisors were not Vietnam’s only intentions, for the Vietnamese government
began a massive Vietnamese immigration policy into eastern Kampuchea. Over
700,000 Vietnamese citizens were reported to have moved into Kampuchea between
1979 and 1985. By 1985 the population in Phnom Penh and the eastern region were
more than sixty percent Vietnamese.46
The Kham Rouge’s previous genocide of its
45
Trumbull, Robert “Vietnam Celebrates the Signing of Pact with Cambodia”
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 21, ’79: pA8
46
Yufan Hao and Guocang Haun. THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE WORLD,
Pantheon Books, New York; 1989; p207

41
own people actually played right into the hands of the Vietnamese. Due to the
genocide and mass immigration of Vietnamese into the country Kampuchea was
disappearing as a nation. Much like the mass immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet
was assimilating Tibet into China, Kampuchea was being absorbed into Vietnam.
Supported by Beijing the Kham Rouge fought against being eliminated. Pol
Pot called for the Cambodian people to rise against the invaders. “The army and the
people, side by side, are conducting a people’s war against the hated Vietnamese
invaders. The fighting will go on for eternity if necessary until the aggressors have
been completely defeated.”47
Vietnam now had its “Vietnam”.
China reacted strongly to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea. For China was
deeply involved with the Kham Rouge even before the invasion. “Nearly 1,000
Chinese advisors (who wore civilian clothes, though their passport pictures clearly
showed them in Chinese army uniforms) joined the exodus [from Kampuchea when
the country was invaded] – leaving perhaps as many as 5,000 fellow countrymen
behind in Kampuchea.”48
Before the Vietnamese were able to take Kompong Som
(Kampuchea’s only deep water port) Chinese freighters were seen docked unloading
47
(Reuters) “Cambodia Says Invasion Is a ‘Life-or-Death Struggle’”
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 5.’79
48
Deming, Angus “Hanoi Power Play” NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, ’79; p32

42
military equipment. Once the Vietnamese took the port, the Chinese still funneled
arms into the country. According to Deng Xiaoping the arms were being sent via
Thailand. The Thai government strongly denied that arms were being shipped through
their territory. U.S. intelligence reports confirmed Deng’s statement.49
The Chinese
also evacuated former Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his wife Princess Monique from
Phnom Penh to Beijing.
Sihanouk had been overthrown in March of 1970 by the pro-American
government of General Len Loi. The Prince was exiled to Beijing where he was the
nominal head of the Communist Resistance Government. He returned to Phnom Penh
in 1975 after the communist victory and was soon placed under house arrest. When
Vietnam invaded he was taken out of mothballs to unite the Cambodian people
against the Vietnamese and to try to raise international attention of the plight of
Kampuchea under Vietnamese occupation. From Beijing, Sihanouk urged the United
States to intervene militarily in Kampuchea.
49
Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. Warns Chinese Against Attack on the Vietnamese”,
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 9, ‘79

43
“Now we like the United States, which has condemned the
Vietnamese. It is kind of you to do so. It is justice…I hope the
United States and the great American people will help us to
expel the Vietnamese from [Kampuchea]. We are ready to
forget the past and be good friends” - Sihanouk50
Surprisingly (although a logical move to generate American support),
Sihanouk also condemned the regime of the Kham Rouge, even though they were
being supported by his host nation of China.
“I don’t know why [the Pol Pot regime] chose to impose
such a terrible policy on the people, but they told me it was
genuine communism. We are not animals, not buffaloes or
oxen, to grow rice…”- Sihanouk51
50
Butterfield, Fox “Sihanouk Request Aid of U.S. and UN” NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10 ’79;
pA1,A3
51
Ibid.

44
China did not only use Sihanouk to court the American public, he was also
instrumental in gaining support in the United Nations. The Chinese were able to get
the Security Council to allow Prince Sihanouk to participate in the United Nations by
a vote of 13 to 2 (the Soviets and the Checks.)52
In contrast the Vietnamese-Soviet
supported Samrin administration was shut out of the United Nations.
52
“UN Council Talks on Cambodia Widen”, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 13, ‘79

45
SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS
Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea severely damaged Sino-Vietnamese
relations and it could be argued as the key reason for China’s invasion of Vietnam of
February of 1979. For the Chinese did not see Vietnam’s invasion as just an attack
upon a friendly government, but a strategic move by the Soviet Union against China.
Ever since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty in 1978 the Soviets
had gotten deeply involved in Vietnam and were in turn deeply involved in Vietnam’s
invasion of Kampuchea.
“Spearheading the Vietnamese invasion into the Parrot’s Beak region of
[Kampuchea] was the crack Ninth Division, which was used to capture Saigon in
1975. This division [was] equipped with highly sophisticated Soviet weapons and
other hardware, including T-62 tanks, 130mm guns, and jet aircraft, and is unlikely to
have been employed in the invasion without Russian consent. According to Phnom
Penh, Soviet advisors and technical experts accompanied the Vietnamese invaders,
and Russians drove some tanks and even acted as commanding officers on the

46
battlefield.”53
Other reports from usually reliable intelligence sources reported Cubans
had also participated in the invasion of the Parrot’s Beak.54
U.S. intelligence experts
stated that there was no evidence of Soviet or Cuban forces being directly involved in
the invasion. U.S. Intelligence did report that the Soviets were heavily involved
strategically, tactically, militarily and economically with the invasion.55
The Soviets on the other hand did not even acknowledge Vietnam’s
involvement in the invasion of Kampuchea. The official Soviet line was that
“Revolutionary armed forces” were advancing against the ‘reactionary Pol Pot Sary
clique.”56
Before 1974 Soviet aid to Vietnam was US$ 400 million. After the invasion
of Kampuchea Soviet aid to Vietnam nearly doubled. From 1978 to 1979 Soviet aid
reached US$ 5 billion in military and US$ 4 billion in economic aid.57
The Chinese saw the partnership of the Soviet Union and Vietnam as a move
against them. After the November 1978 signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, Deng Xiaoping referred to the Vietnamese as the “Cuba
53
“Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry” ASIAN AFFAIRS 6:1; Sept.-Oct. ’78; p8
54
Ibid.
55
Deming, Angus, “Hanoi’s Power Play” NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, ’79; p33
56
Whitney, Craig R. “Moscow Says Drive Into Cambodia Is by Vietnamese Supported
Rebels”, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan 5, ‘79
57
Yufan Hao and Guochang Haun, THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE WORLD,
Pantheon Books; New York: 1989; p204

47
of Southeast Asia”. Cuba, at the time was notorious for sending troops to Africa and
Latin America to support Soviet client states and subversive groups. Deng strongly
felt that the Soviets would use Vietnam as a thorn in the rear of China. Just like they
used Cuba as a thorn in the American backside. “The political and strategic context in
which the [Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship] treaty was signed makes it evident that
both Vietnam and the Soviets had anti-Chinese motives in mind when they
signed…The Vietnamese needed the security of Russia in order to neutralize China
[for their invasion of Kampuchea]. As events turned out, Hanoi made a successful
gamble.”58
“If one of the sides becomes the object of attack or of a threat of
attack, the contracting parties will quickly move to mutual
consultation with the goal of removing the threat and the taking
of appropriate effective measures for the preservation of the
peace and security of their countries.”
- Article VI of the Soviet-
Vietnamese Friendship Treaty59
58
Zagoria, Donald S. and Sheldon W. Simon “Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia”,
SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA, Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982
59
Shipler, David K. “Soviet terse in Invasion Report, Implying No Decision on Action”,

48
Hanoi hoped that its friendship agreement with the Soviets would counter any
Chinese military response to their invasion of Kampuchea. Although the treaty did not
prevent Chinese military action, it might have limited it greatly.
The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship gave Vietnam the protection of a
superpower. It also benefited the Soviets greatly. Vietnam was first of all a channel
for Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Second, the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment had
the potential of driving a wedge between China and other communist or radical states
that supported Vietnam. Third, Vietnam was a major obstacle to Beijing’s anti-Soviet
pushes in the region as well as a hindrance to China’s own influences in the area.
Fourth, Vietnam could, for the first time in history, supply the Russian Empire with
military bases in the region.60
Vietnam also benefited from their Soviet relationship economically. June of
1978 the Vietnamese joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (a Soviet
block economic alliance). Twenty percent (maybe as high as thirty percent) of the rice
Vietnam consumed was imported from the Soviets. Without the Soviet food support
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 18, ’79; pA10
60
Porter, Gareth “The Great Power Triangle of Southeast Asia”
CURRENT HISTORY. Vol. 79:458; Dec. 1980; p163

49
daily calorie intake would have dropped to 1,500 calories a day per person, just at the
UN substance level. Along with the food (and weapons), the Vietnamese imported
from the Soviets; petroleum, steel, iron, chemical fertilizers, and spare parts for their
transportation system. The Soviets funded US$ 3.5 billion of Vietnam’s five-year plan
of 1975-1980, and supported forty major industrial projects in Vietnam. The
Vietnamese were also able to send 30,000 students to the Soviet Union. The Soviets
in addition supplied the Vietnamese important support in the United Nations, for
example India’s recognizing the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.61
61
“How China Views the World, According to Teng Hsiao-ping”
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, ’79; p37

50
THE SOVIET THREAT
“The flagrant large-scale aggression against Kampuchea
by the Vietnamese is not an isolated event, but part of the global
strategy of great power [Soviet] hegemonism. Its impact is
definitely not limited to Vietnam and Kampuchea, nor even to
the Asian and Pacific region…It has an impact on the world
situation as a whole…It has been our consistent stand to support
Kampuchea against Vietnamese hegemonism and Vietnamese
aggression. While attacking Kampuchea, the Vietnamese
constantly commit provocation against China, in an attempt to
realize the strategic design of great power hegemonism.”
- Deng Xiaoping, Jan. ’7962
62
“How China Views the World, According to Teng Hsiao-ping”
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, ’79: p37

51
It was well apparent that Soviet influence was on the move. The American
defeat in Vietnam and the scandal of Watergate had severely damaged the resolve of
the American people and their government. This in turn damaged American influence
around the world. The Soviets moved forcefully against the weakened state of
Western leadership. The Soviets attacked the world’s soft underbelly: the Third
World. Soviet influences were felt in Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Latin
America and Asia. The late 1970’s also saw the re-emergence of China after its long
inner turmoil of the Age of Mao. The Great Leap Forward, and the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution for decades preoccupied the Chinese as they devoured
themselves. The reign of Deng Xiaoping ended China’s self-destructive period. Deng
moved China to modernize and to look beyond her borders. For Moscow, this new
emerging China had the potential of becoming its primary threat.
In the Asia of that time (excluding the East –West division of the Koreas) the
greatest divisions were between the heavily armed and heatedly debated borders of
the communist nations of the Soviet Union (3/4 of its land mass was located in Asia),

52
China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. Common ideology was losing its binding effect to
the ancient antagonistic concepts of geography and nationalism.63
“In the Asian – Pacific region the region the Soviets
have a variety of incentives for wanting to increase their power
and influence. 1) The United States, Moscow’s principal
adversary, has a powerful coalition of allies and friends in East
Asia, a coalition stretching from Japan to Australia. The Soviets
seek to counter that American alliance system and to develop a
counter-coalition of states friendly to themselves. 2) Moscow
seeks to isolate and encircle China in an effort to keep China
weak, should China become a great power, the Soviets know
that, in the long run, it will almost certainly become Moscow’s
most dangerous adversary.”64
63
Zagoria, Donald S. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA, Yale U. Press; New Haven: 1982; p5
64
Ibid.; p2-3

53
Between 1977 and 1980 the Soviets increased their Pacific fleet to 270,000
tons, making it the Soviets largest of their four fleets.65
Between their naval bases in
Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (both built by the Americans) and Vladivostok,
USSR, the Soviets were capable of covering the entire Chinese coastline. They were
also in the position to cut off China’s vital sea-lanes that connected her to the
economically and technologically superior Pacific Rim Nations, including the United
States (which is often forgotten to also be on the Pacific Rim).
The Soviets intentionally moved against China, yet keeping to their low risk
strategy they were successfully using against the United States in the Western World.
Through Vietnam, Moscow was able to make its presence felt indirectly in Indochina.
65
Ibid.; p18

54
Vietnam was becoming Moscow’s “Cuba of the Orient,” as stated by Deng Xiaoping
“…swashbuckling unchecked in Laos, Kampuchea, and even on China’s [southern]
border.”66
“In itself, whether tiny isolated Kampuchea is pro-
Soviet or not matters little to Moscow. What is important is that
China has lost an ally in Southeast Asia. Beijing inability to
protect its friends in Asia has been demonstrated, and Vietnam,
now a close Soviet Ally, has substantially enhanced its power
and influence in Indochina.
-Robin Knight (Moscow correspondent)67
Soviet encirclement of China increased with their involvement in Afghanistan.
In 1973 Mohammed Daoud, after overthrowing the Afghan monarchy, accepted
Soviet military and economic aid. Daoud needed Soviet support, especially in arms, to
66
Cowan, Edwin “Carter Calls for Quick Withdrawal by China in Message”
NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 28, ’79; pA1
67
“Another War Over Indo-China for the U.S. ?”
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT; Jan.22, ’79; p46

55
help in taking lands known by the Afghans as Paktoonistan, which were occupied by
Pakistan. Soviet support came with a price. By 1978 Daoud attempted to curtail
Soviet influence over his country. This resulted in a Marxist coup by Soviet trained
Afghan army officers. The Soviets followed by sending in 3,000 to 4,000 advisors
along with additional military and economic aid. China responded by sending aid to
Pakistan to buffer Soviet actions in Afghanistan. This aid increased in December of
1979 when the Soviet’s forces invaded Afghanistan in support of its besieged puppet
government by the radical Islamic Mujhadeen guerrillas.
China though was not strong enough economically, militarily, and technically
to offset Soviet aggression single handedly. Although a nuclear power, China was far
from being a super power. Only the United States still had the ability to offset Soviet
hegemonism. China would need to court the support of the Americans. Nixon’s visit
to China had helped greatly in deforesting the Sino-American Cold War, but the
American government still did not officially recognize the Beijing’s communist
government. The exiled Kuomintang government of the Republic of China on Taiwan
was still seen as the legitimate government of China proper. Before any Chinese-
American united front against the Soviet Union could be made, the Beijing

56
government would have to have America switch its recognition from Taipei to itself.
In true Chinese style the Chinese didn’t directly court the Americans. Instead they
first attempted to win support of the American “family” before pursuing the “bride.”

57
THE JAPANESE CARD
On February 16th
, 1978 China and Japan signed a trade agreement worth over
twenty billion U.S. dollars. It was mostly a trade of Chinese oil for Japanese steel and
factories. In opening relations with China, the Oshira administration also saw a great
opportunity in China’s one billion potential consumers for Japanese goods. The
Japanese were also starting to share Beijing’s concern about Soviet movement into the
region. A Soviet base in Vietnam could severely threaten shipping lanes to Middle
Eastern Oil: the lifeblood of Japanese Industry.
“The Soviet Union’s bullying tactics, which included
continued blunt rejection of Japanese hopes of resolving a
dispute over four islands off Hokkaido, also served to drive
Japan into China’s embrace.”68
68
Karnow, Stanley “East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation”
FOREIGN AFFAIRS; 57:2; 1979; p595

58
On August 12th
, 1978 Japanese Foreign minister Sonoda and China’s Foreign
Minister Haung Hua signed a treaty of peace in Beijing. An anti-hegemony clause
was added to the document on Japan’s insistence. The clause was targeted at the
Soviets, which pleased the Chinese. The clause though was a double edge sword. It
was hoped by the Japanese to also deter future Chinese hegemony. Neither the less
the treaty symbolized China’s acceptance by one of America’s closest allies.

59
THE AMERICAN CARD
Since the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 the result of it was the
exchange of “friendship Delegations”. The Chinese in the early 1970’s still viewed
the United States as merely the lesser of the two evils between the world super
powers. By the late 1970’s China’s stance became much harsher towards the Soviet
Union. The United States and its Western allies were being perceived as the enemy’s
enemy. As the old proverb states: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” America
was becoming a potential friend. China and the United States still had difficulties in
normalizing relations due to the Taiwan problem. As long as the United States
recognized the exiled government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, there was no
hope for diplomatic normalization between Washington and Beijing. Even though the
majority of Americans did support normalization with Communist China, they also
felt whole-heartedly opposed to turning their backs on Taiwan, a long term friend and
ally.
The very delicate Taiwan issue was going to take a major effort for the
American Presidential administration to resolve. The Nixon administration was

60
distracted by the Watergate scandal and the following Ford administration was
hampered by the fall of Southern Vietnam to the North and their desperate campaign
for re-election in 1976. It was not until the Carter administration that the American
Presidency had the luxury to give China the full attention it needed.
President Carter began by sending his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance to
Beijing in August of 1977. Vance’s five-day visit was given an unenthusiastic
welcome by the Beijing government. Vance had suggested to the Chinese to trade
embassies between the two countries, while the United States would keep a liaisons
office in Taipei. The Chinese rejected the proposal completely, insisting on their three
points for Sino-American diplomatic normalization. First: that the United States
terminate diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Second: that the
Americans withdraw from its 1954 defense treaty with Taiwan. Third: that the
Americans withdraw all American forces from Taiwan. The Vance team said they
would agree to the Chinese three points for normalization if the Chinese would agree
to promise that they would not try to take Taiwan by force. The Chinese refused to
give such a promise. The Vance trip resulted in nothing.

61
Back in February of 1977 President Carter asked Huang Chen, China’s
Liaison’s office chief for the PRC for a White House visit. During his visit Huang
emphasized strongly the Soviet influence in each topic they talked about.
“…When he spoke of the Soviet Union he grew
antagonistic and distrustful, and contradicted any suggestion on
my part that the Soviet leaders might be sincere in wanting to
preserve the peace and control atomic weapons.
“…He urged me to maintain a strong American presence
in the Western Pacific, and was concerned about the possibility
of any resurgence in Japanese military strength.(The later
position was to change. As our ties with the Chinese were
strengthened, their concerns about a possible Japanese threat
diminished, and they began to urge that Japan’s defense
capabilities be improved.)” - President Jimmy Carter69
69
Carter, Jimmy KEEPING THE FAITH: Memoirs of A President
Bantam Books; New York; 1982; p189

62
The Soviets were China’s only real threat to its security. Due to Beijing’s
interest in developing its Four Modernizations policy, they knew that they could not
afford to engage in an arms race with the Soviets. China needed the co-operation of
other nations to curtail Soviet expansionism, even if it meant making alliances with its
former archenemies; the “decadent American Imperialists” and even the “Ywe Bin
Gwei-dz” (Japanese Devils).
Remembering his meeting in February with Huang Chen, in May of 1978,
Carter sent National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to Beijing for a three-day
diplomatic mission. Brzezinski, a Cold War warrior and well-known advocate for
curtailing the Soviet Union, received a much warmer welcome from the Chinese.
Brzezinski did not emphasize the differences between the United States and China but
their common interests, mainly both countries’ concern with the Soviet Union. In
Beijing Brzezinski laid out clearly the American advantages in opening full
diplomatic relations with a strong China.
“The President of the United States desires friendly
relations with a strong China. He is determined to join you in

63
overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way of full
normalization or our relations…[The United States is also
committed to resisting] the efforts of any nation which seeks to
establish global or regional hegemony…Neither of us
dispatches international marauders who masquerade as non-
aligned to big-power ambitions in Africa. Neither of us seeks to
enforce the political obedience of our neighbors through
military force.
- Zbigniew Brzezinski70
Brzezinski backed these words by revealing two American government
documents to the Chinese that clearly stated American policy: Presidential Review
Memorandum 18 (which assessed the world strategic situation), and the Presidential
Directive 18 (which was Carter’s international security policy plan). The Chinese
were extremely pleased with Brzezinski’s approach. His diplomatic mission moved
70
Immanual C.Y. His THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA; 4th
Edition;
Oxford University Press; New York; 1990; p787

64
Sino-American relations forward for the first time since Nixon’s historical visit to
China five years ago.
In December of 1978 the United States and the People’s Republic of China
established full diplomatic relations to begin on January 1st
, 1979. Also in January of
1979 Deng Xiaoping made a diplomatic mission to the United States. Officially he
was there to seal the normalization of relations between the two countries and to sign
an agreement on cooperation in science and technology and a cultural agreement.
Deng was also there to prepare the United States for China’s planned “punitive strike”
on Vietnam. Throughout his visit, nearly every speech, press conference, and
interview he gave, Deng sounded the warning bell against the Soviet Union and its
undisciplined “Cuba of Asia”; Vietnam.
“… Vietnam controls Laos by military means, and the
Vietnamese made a major invasion of Kampuchea with more
than ten divisions. And then if we go further east, do we see that
the Soviet military forces have been strengthened or weakened
in the Asian and Pacific region? At least its navy and airforce

65
have been strengthened. The Soviet fleet is now equal in
strength to the Atlantic…We consider the true hot bed of war is
the Soviet Union, not the United States.” – Deng Xiaoping71
Since October of 1978 tensions between Vietnam and China had never been so
high. Border clashes between Vietnamese and Chinese troops were becoming
common. The Chinese supported Pol Pot Regime was pushed to the Western
mountains bordering Thailand. Fighting had even crossed over the Thai border. China
warned sternly that it would not stand idly by if the Vietnamese entered Thailand.
(The United States had also given such warnings publicly and indirectly through the
Soviets in relations to a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand.)
Since the beginning of Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea Beijing had howled
and threatened for Vietnam to pull out of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese, under their
protective shield of a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, blatantly ignored
Beijing’s saber rattling. As long as Vietnam remained in Kampuchea the Chinese
looked like a toothless paper tiger, far from being a nation to be respected, feared or
71
“An Interview with Teng Hsiao-p’ing” TIME Feb. 5, ’79; p33

66
taken seriously. As stated in Bui Diem’s article: A New Kind of War in Southeast
Asia; “…China [needed] to regain ‘face’ (surely it is not necessary to remind the
reader that ‘face’ is still an important factor in Asian Politics.)”72
Deng was not going
to be ignored and disrespected. At an American press luncheon Deng laid it out on the
line.
“One, for us Chinese, we mean what we say. The
Second point: We Chinese do not act rashly.”
- Deng Xiaoping73
The Soviets and Vietnamese did not view Deng’s trip as a friendly jester
between nations looking to normalize relations. They perceived the Deng visit as a
search for America’s blessing for Chinese military actions against Vietnam. The
Vietnamese Press Agency harshly forewarned Deng that if he did try to put meaning
72
Bui Diem “A New Kind of War in Southeast Asia” ASIAN AFFAIRS May-June ’79; p277
73
Fromm, Joseph “Teng Face to Face: ‘Controlled, Tough, Confident’”
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Feb. 12, ’79; 24

67
behind his words he would only “…bring [the Chinese] unpredictable disasters. If
they want to learn a lesson, let them learn from their U.S. masters.”
In Jimmy Carter’s Memories he mentioned a private meeting he held with
Deng during his visit to Washington. According to President Carter’s book Deng did
not seek any type of blessing from the Carter administration for a strike against
Vietnam. He did though mention that China was interested in avoiding war for the
next thirty years in order to give China time to implement the Four Modernizations.
Carter responded that he wished to avoid war indefinitely.
Deng felt in order to prevent war for the next thirty years it was imperative
that the United States remain a presence in Asia. Deng opposed strongly Carter’s
desires to shrink the American military from a “Two and Half War standing”
(meaning that the United was prepared to fight two major wars and a minor conflict
all at the same time) to only a “One and a Half War” standing. China also preferred a
continued American presence in Korea as opposed to a United Korea in alliance with
the Soviet Union. Interestingly the Soviets also preferred the United States remaining
in South Korea, for they feared a united Korea under Chinese influence.

68
Carter also mentioned that the Chinese had contacted him back in the early
part of 1978 encouraging the United States to try to reopen relations with Vietnam.
The Chinese at the time looked at an American-Vietnamese relationship as a way to
moderate Vietnam’s behavior in the region and also hamper its leaning towards the
Soviet Union. The Americans, especially the American people, were not yet
emotionally ready to make reconciliation with communist Vietnam. It would take
nearly twenty years for the Americans to heal enough to even begin the process of
normalizing relations with Vietnam (a severely economical weakened Vietnam after
the fall of the Soviet Union and with a still hostile China as its neighbor). This
weakened Vietnam enabled the Americans to return to Vietnam in a position of
strength to help rebuild Vietnam and hopefully jump-starts its fledgling market
economy.
In 1978 the Soviet Union was still much alive and Deng was determined to
instill in the American President and the American people the threat of the Soviet
Union. He continuously preached for a Chinese-American (and it allies) united front
against the Soviets. The Soviets felt that such a Chinese-American alliance would
offer the Americans little. Since China had little it could give America in return for its

69
economical, technological and military support. Dec. 27th
, 1978 Brezhnev sent a letter
to Jimmy Carter. According to President Carter the letter was ‘…almost paranoid
about the PRC and demanding that I prevented our western allies from selling any
defensive weapons to the PRC.”74
Even though the Soviets knew that the superpowers
would still have to deal with each other directly, they still feared a stronger China.
74
Carter, Jimmy KEEPING THE FAITH: Memoirs of a President Bantam Books; New York; 1982;
p201

70
BUILD UP TO WAR
Soon after Deng’s return from the States, the PLA began to deploy along the
Vietnamese border. The Chinese had not had an ambassador in Vietnam for the past
six months. Che Chih-fang was withdrawn June 15th
for “reasons of health” at the
height of the exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The Chinese envoy to Vietnam
in December of ’78 was Yang Kung-su the director of Government Tourism and
Travel Bureau. During all the tensions between China and Vietnam at the time the
Vietnamese ambassador to China, Nguyen Trong Vinh was never recalled, even as
60,000 Chinese troops massed on his nation’s border. February 10th
, 1979 Beijing
described these troops as main force divisions (Striking forces of the PLA) supported
by eight local divisions. They also brought near the Vietnamese border fifteen
squadrons (consisting of ten aircraft each) of Chinese copies of Soviet MIG 17’s,
MIG 19’s and MIG 21’s. In contrast the Vietnamese were able to put in the air 120
new Soviet built MIG 23’s, a few high altitude MIG 25’s and 75 captured American
F5’s.75
75
Middleton, Drew “Chinese Options for Any Move on Vietnam” NEW YORK TIMES
Feb.10, ’79; pA3

71
With or without an actual American blessing for China’s invasion of Vietnam,
Deng behaved as if he had received one. As Vietnam had hoped to shield itself from a
Chinese assault with its alliance with Russia, China, justifiably or not, used Deng’s
trip to America as a sign that China was now under the protection of the American
shield. It was thought that their newfound relationship with the United States would
counter any aggressive reactive moves on the part of the Soviets.
As an extra diplomatic bonus for China, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (India’s Foreign
Minister) went to Beijing for talks with his Chinese counter-part Huang Hua. In 1967
India and China had clashed on their common border. Vajipayee’s visit was to release
the tensions between the two countries. The released tensions on China’s Indian
border freed up to at least 150,000 Chinese troops to be re-deployed onto their Soviet
and Vietnamese borders.
In spit of all these troop build-ups, the Vietnamese continued to harass
Chinese border forces with minor clashes on and just behind the Chinese border. The
Vietnamese insisted that the French in exchange for trade concessions had unjustly
given Vietnamese territory to the Qing Dynasty in 1897. In January during a fierce

72
three-day clash, both the Chinese and Vietnamese admitted to losing up to 1,900
troops on their common border.
By Feb 14th
one third of China’s 5,000 combat aircraft were positioned in
striking range of Vietnam. By February 16th
over 650,000 Chinese troops were
deployed on the Chinese-Vietnamese border. Meo Mountain nomads of Laos
supported by the Chinese formed a resistance against Vietnamese occupation troops.
Out of a population of three million a quarter of a million people fled their homes in
Laos for refugees camps in Thailand. The Khem Rouge also became more active as
the winds of war blew strong from China. The Soviets in response to all the tensions
increased their air patrols on the Soviet-Chinese border. The Soviets, according to
American intelligence sources, by January of 1979 had already built up their own
forces ‘qualitatively and quantitatively’ on China’s Northern boarder.76
The Chinese
had placed their forces on high alert in China’s Northwestern region Dung-Bei (East
North: Manchuria). Dung-Bei was China’s industrial and natural resource heartland
with only the Amur River dividing it from the Soviet Union.
76
Karnow, Stanely “East Asia in 1978 The Great Transformation”
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 57:3; ’79; p590

73
The Chinese also worried about the Soviets making a western assault into
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (The Tarim Basin) China’s most western province North of
Tibet and bordering on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The old Silk Road, China
ancient link to the Middle East and Europe, moved west from China through the Jades
Gates Pass into Xinjiang where the road splits and runs along the northern and
Southern boundaries of the Tarim Basin. Senator Henry Jacksons (D) of Washington,
was told by the Chinese that the government ordered the evacuation of a city in
Xinjiang with a population of 300,000 people in case of Soviet retaliatory strike into
the basin.
“As ideal terrain for a Soviet tank offensive,
sparsely populated [Xinjiang] is one of China’s most vulnerable
regions should confrontation with Vietnam lead to a wider war
with the USSR. For this reason [Xinjiang’s] potential defenses
must be strengthened as much as possible before any decision to
‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ is taken, some analysts suggest.”77
77
Meritz, Federic A. “Friendly India Visit May Trigger China Troop Shift to USSR Area”
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Feb. 16, ’79; p10

74
WAR
“I would bet it won’t happen – but we are very much in
danger of a Third World War” – Sen. Daniel Moynihan of NY78
On February 17th
, 1979 China struck along their common border with
Vietnam. The theater of battle was remote, heavily wooded and mountains with little
infrastructure for either side to mobilize large modern armies. From the outset of the
military operation the Chinese officials said that the military operation would be
limited in scope and duration. It was said to be in response to continued Vietnamese
attacks along and across their common border. General Hsu Shih-yu, the 73-year-old
ranking general of Southern China was put in command of the whole operation. Hsu
was instrumental in bringing Deng back into power.
In second-in-command, and the actual tactical commander of the invasion,
was General Yang The-chih. The 69-year-old general had commanded the Chinese
forces in Korea, explaining, perhaps, the common Chinese tactic of human wave
78
“A War of Angry Cousins” TIME; March 5,’79; p26

75
attacks on Vietnamese positions (The same tactic that was used against the Americans
in Korea). General Yang was born in 1910 the son of a poor blacksmith in Hunan
province. As a boy he worked as a coal-miner and a porter. He joined the communist
party and moved up through the ranks. He ended up commanding the vanguard
regiment during the Long March. He later fought the Japanese during World War
Two. During the Korean conflict he at first commanded three armies and for the last
year of the conflict he became the theater commander. Yang was lucky that the
Cultural Revolution had not touched him. An experienced military commander and
loyal and honored member of the party, Yang though was not prepared for the
Vietnamese.
General Yang’s and General Hsu’s opposites were first of the all the world
famous General Vo Nguyen Gaip. At 67 General Gaip was younger than his Chinese
counterparts, but he did not lack experience. General Gaip led the Vietnamese armies
in defeating the French in the First Indochina War and the Americans in the Second
Indochina War. Although suffering from Hodgkin’s disease since 1974, he had at his
command a battle-hardened army that was more than a match for the People’s

76
Liberation Army. General Van Tien Doug who had captured Saigon, was the 61-year-
old second in command at the time of the Chinese invasion.
At 04:00 Hours (Beijing time) Saturday morning the Chinese attacked with
150,000 troops supported by armor and under the cover of air support. They crossed
the border at so many points it was unknown to the Vietnamese what were the
Chinese true objectives. The invasion seemed to catch the Vietnamese completely by
surprise. At the time of the invasion most of Vietnam’s top leadership was in Phnom
Penh. This included Prime Minister Phan Van Dong, Army Chief of Staff General
Van Tien Dung, Foreign Minister Trinh, and Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Ngn.79
To make matters worse most of the Vietnamese regular army units were preoccupied
in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese were using only local militias to face the brunt of the
PLA offensive. Luckily for the Vietnamese, due to the tension that was brewing
between the two countries, the Vietnamese frontier with China was honeycombed
with, barbed wire, tank traps, and trenches. These defenses added greatly to the
militia’s ability to obstruct the advancing Chinese.
79
Butterfield, Fox “Details are Sketchty”; NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79; pA10

77
As the days passed the main thrusts of the Chinese were along the rail lines
that connected the two nations. The lines had been constructed during the Second
Indochina War to support the North Vietnamese against the Americans. Before the
out break of hostilities between China and Vietnam, all passenger traffic had been
halted on the northern railroads due to the massive troop build ups along the Sino-
Vietnamese border. By the 18th
of February, it was clear that the PLA’s main pushes
were along these rail lines, yet their true objectives were still unknown. Was this a
limited harassing assault, a plunge deep into Vietnam to strike at Hanoi the
Vietnamese capital, or was this an invasion of conquest to seize large sections of
Vietnam’s northern frontier? China at the time made no mention of their war
objectives, and did not make any demands on the Vietnamese. Surprisingly the
Chinese did not tie in their assault to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, their ties
with the Soviets, their mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, or the disputed sovereign of
the Paracel or Spartly Islands.
The Chinese purposely did not place any conditions on the Vietnamese or state
any objectives in order to leave them (if things did get too hairy) a flexible position to
withdraw at any moment, without the risk of losing face. To third nation diplomats to

78
the United Nations the Chinese described their full scale invasion as merely
“…another skirmish and that the more important issue was the…Cambodian
complaint.”80
In a coordinated effort, guerrilla activity in Kampuchea increased
greatly against Vietnamese forces.
The Soviets at first responded to their ally being attacked by China with only
oratorical assaults and saber rattling.
“China’s attack against Vietnam is added proof of Beijing’s
grossly irresponsible attitude to the destinies of peace and of the
criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership turns to arms.
“The heroic Vietnamese people, which [have] become
victims of a fresh aggression, [are] capable of standing up for
[themselves] this time again, and furthermore [they have] reliable
friends. The Soviet Union will honor its obligation under the
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
80
Teltsch, Kathleen “Vietnamese Seek ‘Appropriate Measures’ by U.N.” NEW YORK TIMES;
Feb.18,’79; pA11

79
“Those who decide policy should stop before it is too late.
“Hands off Socialist Vietnam!” - TASS81
After two days of fighting within Vietnamese territory the Soviets had still not
acted upon their agreement with the Vietnamese. Actually during the whole month
long conflict the Soviets never did enter the war. One of China’s suggested objectives
crystallized: The invasion of Vietnam showed that the Soviet Union was a “Paper
Polar Bear”. The Soviet’s lack of direct action illustrated that Vietnam and other
nations that coveted Soviet protection were not safe from China’s wrath. It also
depicted to the Western powers that the Soviets were not the bogeyman. The Soviets
throughout the conflict continually threatened Beijing that they would enter on the
side of the Vietnamese if the Chinese did not, without hesitation, withdraw from
Vietnam. Yet the Soviets never did enter the conflict directly. The Chinese called the
Soviet’s bluff (unless one considers one month of fighting and then withdrawing as
withdrawing “without hesitation.”)
81
Butterfield, Fox “Chinese Border Commander: Yang The-Chih”; NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79;
pA11

80
The Soviets did posture themselves to strike. All military leaves were
cancelled. The Soviets sent two naval task forces into the waters off the Vietnamese
coast. Other Soviet naval forces were deployed to shadow Chinese ships (Those
Soviet vessels were in turn shadowed by American ships.) Military aid to Vietnam
was increased greatly by the Soviets. All along the Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-
Mongolian borders more than 30 Soviet ground divisions and air units were beefed up
and placed on high alert. This included the Soviet’s “elite” 6th
Airborne Division at
Khabarovsk.82
The Soviets were poised to open up the conflict on China’s
northwestern and northern flanks.
In spite of China portraying the Soviets as a “Paper Polar Bear” to the world,
they were still playing it safe. Japanese sources reported that the Chinese had
evacuated civilians from at least three areas along the Chinese-Soviet border.83
Most
of China’s 3.6-million man army still faced the Soviets not Vietnam.
Deng even made it clear that they had contemplated the possibility of Soviet
retaliation but decided “If we are afraid of that, other people would think us soft.”84
82
Lewis, John “Soviets Beef up Pacific Might on Kuriles” CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; Feb.
16, ’79; p7
83
“Why China Shakes its fist” U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT; March 5, ’79; p21-24
84
Kramer, Barry “Teng says that China Might Withdrawal Troops From Vietnam in about 10 Days”
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL; Feb. 27, ‘79

81
Deng also added “We estimated that the Soviet Union will not take too big an action.
If they should really come, there is nothing we can do about it. We are prepared
against them. I think our action is limited, and it will not give rise to a very big
event.”85
“The invasion revealed some limits to Soviet power by
demonstrating that an ally of the Soviet Union could be molested
with relative impunity. This was a lesson bound not to be lost on a
number of observers, notably those potentially threatened by the
Soviet Union.” –Brzezinski86
To this day it is still debated who called who’s bluff. Did the Chinese show the
world that the Soviets were not to be feared or trusted as an ally? Or did the Chinese
purposely shorten the conflict with Vietnam and never clearly state their objectives in
the conflict because they did actually fear Soviet intervention? Throughout the entire
85
Cowan, Edwerd “Carter Calls for Quick Withdrawal by China in Message to Its Leaders” NEW
YORK TIMES; Feb. 28, ’79; pA1
86
Young, Marilyn B. THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990; Harper Collins; New York; 1991; p311

82
invasion the Chinese repeatedly stated that the invasion would be “limited and of
short duration.” To best answer this question one can only hypothesize what the
Chinese would have done if there were no Soviet threat.
Maybe the Chinese would have driven all the way to Hanoi if it were not for
the Soviet threat. Or perhaps it was the PLA’s own incompetence that deterred the
Chinese from striking for the Vietnamese’s jugular. Being a modern power or not the
Chinese could have crushed Vietnam with the sheer weight of numbers of its military
force. Yet during the whole conflict the bulk of China’s military forces were tied up
on the Soviet border. Therefore it can be safely assumed that the Soviet factor did
play heavily upon Beijing’s decision-making process during the conflict. The Soviet’s
relationship with Vietnam did protect Vietnam from the Chinese, much as the United
States relationship with Taiwan is, to date, still deterring Chinese military action
against the island nation.
By February 21st
the Chinese had advanced 10 miles into Vietnam. They had
taken the city of Lao Cai, which is 175 miles northwest of Hanoi. The city is located
on a direct rail line between the Vietnamese Capital and Yunnan. The Chinese paused
to re-supply and consolidate their positions. Due to Chinese logistical difficulties they

83
were continuing to use Korean War tactics of advancing in short bursts. The PLA was
discovering its shortcomings as a modern military force. Vietnam, which claimed it
was the third greatest military force in the world, was successfully harassing the PLA
supply lines with Mao’s own guerrilla war tactics. PLA troops reported going without
fresh drinking water for up to two days and nights.87
The Vietnamese claimed that they had inflicted on the Chinese in the first 48
hours of the conflict the same number of loses the United States Army suffered during
the Normandy landing.88
The mountainous northern terrain of Northern Vietnam was
ideal for guerrilla war tactics. The outdated Chinese Soviet modeled T-34 tanks and
supply columns were forced to move through narrow passes making them extremely
vulnerable to Vietnamese troops armed with Soviet supplied Sagger anti-armor
missiles. The Vietnamese were also armed with captured American 177mm and
130mm Howitzers, which outranged the antiquated Chinese copied Soviet artillery.
Along the coastal plain the Chinese sent three divisions into Vietnam. Two
divisions spearheaded the assault with the third division held in reserve. Yet their
momentum was halted as the units waited to be re-supplied. The Chinese though
87
Chinese Veterans interviewed on “The Great Wall of Iron”; prod. Stephen Amezdroz; BBC; 1990
88
Middleton, Drew “Questions Persist on China’s Military Goal” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb.21,’79;
pA8

84
claimed that they were inflicting great losses upon the Vietnamese. In spite of these
difficulties the Chinese at the time claimed to wiping out three Vietnamese divisions,
killing and wounding up to 10,000 troops while losing only 2-3,000. These claims are
difficult to believe. During the whole conflict both sides seemed to make wild claims
of success in the face of the enemy. Without objective reports on either side of the
conflict it is extremely difficult to determine what truly happened on the front at the
time. Both sides even accused each other of using chemical weapons, yet to date there
has been no third party verifications that either side resorted to chemical weapons.
Interestingly as both sides heightened their propaganda campaigns to win
international support, the Chinese keep their war rhetoric to a very low key on the
home front. For this paper several Chinese nationals (that were living in China at the
time of the conflict) were interviewed. All of those interviewed mentioned that there
was almost no mention of the war by the Chinese government. This was a direct
contradiction of typical Chinese Communist Party (CCP) practices whenever they
engaged the PLA in a foreign war. During the Korean War, the political propaganda
was so heated that Chinese citizens would name their children at the time with names

85
such as “Hands off Korea”, “Support our Korean Brothers” and “End American
Imperialism”, for example.
During the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict there were no wall posters to rally the
people to support the war effort. Only the Chinese Press Agency was authorized to
disseminate news of the conflict. This was extremely limited. The first shreds of
information about the war were not released to the Chinese public until February 26th
,
1979, nine days after the outbreak of the war. The report spoke only of PLA soldiers
sacrificing themselves so their units could advance, refuting ‘Vietnamese
invincibility”, and connecting the invasion to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea.
Most notably was that casualty figures were not at all given. The Chinese
intentionally downplayed the conflict on the home front in order for it not to affect the
daily lives of the average Chinese. According to those interviewed for this paper the
only real knowledge of the war was from families that had sons, husbands, brothers or
cousins serving in the PLA and were actively involved in the fighting. The one image
that all most recalled was the number of Chinese soldiers returning home with
missing limbs or in body bags.

86
All those interviewed stated that what little reporting the people did receive
from the government about the war, most did not believe anyhow “We had learned
from the Cultural Revolution not to believe anything the government claimed” one
interviewee stated. Draft dodging was epidemic in China. Families feared for their
relatives to be called up to serve in Vietnam and assisted in helping them escape from
the military. Self inflicted wounds were also reported as common among those
avoiding military service and from troops already on the front in order to be sent back.
Draft dodgers on the most part were caught by the authorities and punished.
The Government did not seem to want to get the public into a war fever during
the conflict, or they were too embarrassed in their lack of success in obtaining a
deceive blow against the Vietnamese. It was not until the conflict was over that the
government aired a “documentary” about their war with Vietnam. The main argument
of the film was how the Vietnamese had bitten the hand that fed them. Films were
shown of captured arms stores that the Chinese had sent to the Vietnamese to fight the
Americans, but were “instead being hoarded and stashed near the Chinese border to
be used against the [Chinese] in some future date.” The documentary also reiterated

87
how the Chinese forces were victorious in the war. They had “taught Vietnam a
lesson” and “exploded the myth of the invincibility of the Vietnamese army.”
Originally the PLA invaded Vietnam at 26 points along the border. As the
invasion progressed they consolidated their offensive to five main thrusts.89
Most
notabile were the offensive pushes along the coast towards Mon Cai, the northeast rail
line towards Lang Soong, the northwest rail line from Yunnan and another major
thrust for Cao Bang 110 miles north-northeast of Hanoi.[see Map: Sino-Vietnamese
border]
February 23rd
the Battle of Lang Soon (80 miles northeast of Hanoi) raged. For
the first time Vietnamese Regulars were engaged along with the paramilitary forces
that had been alone conducting the defense of the nation. By the 24th
the Chinese
massed up to 70,000 troops outside Lang Soon. Both sides at the time were moving
heavy equipment into the battle theater of Lang Soon. The Vietnamese were dug in
South and Southwest of the city. The Chinese held the high ground to the Northeast
and Northwest of Lang Soon. The airforces of both sides were very active but
avoiding each other. Dogfights were unheard of. They both reserved their air power to
89
Chanda, Nayan BROTHER ENEMY: THE WAR AFTER THE WAR Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
publisher; San Diego; 1986; p356

88
support ground units. Lang Soon seemed to be China’s main objective. It was a
provincial capital laying on the important rail line that ran from deep inside China to
Hanoi. It was also the one spot on the theater of operation that the Chinese faced
Vietnamese regulars. If they could win a decisive victory at Lang Soon the Chinese
could claim they had defeated the Vietnamese best.
Meanwhile at the United Nations in New York the Soviets and the Chinese
faced each other for world support. Mikhail A. Kharlamov, the Soviet ambassador
lashed out against the Chinese as “a nation bent on expansion”. He did not only
criticize the Chinese for the invasion of Vietnam but for also arming anti-government
forces in a number of countries. Chen Chu (The delegate to the U.N.) accused the
Soviets of encouraging Vietnam into reckless expansionism. He once again spoke the
now official CCP line that Moscow was using Vietnam as a “pawn or Cuba” in
Asia.90
The Communist world and its allies seemed to be mostly in support of
Vietnam. For it was perceived by the World’s left that China was led by a “Capitalist
Roader” who was leaning his Communist nation to the West. In Prague 1,000 Check
90
Teltsch, Kathleen “U.S., in U.N., calls for invader to Quit Vietnam and Cambodia” NEW YORK
TIMES; Feb. 24, ‘79

89
and Vietnamese youth demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy. “…Cubans were
ready to shed their blood in defense of Vietnam” Quoted Garnma (official Cuban
government newspaper).91
The leftist Labor Party of Great Britain responded by
criticizing the government’s plans to sell Harrier jump jets to China.
“We openly declare that we stand on the side of Vietnam
against the Chinese invasion…[China’s invasion was]
incomprehensible for a power which is supposed to be on the side
of progressive forces.” – Saleh Khalef (abu lyad) Second in
command of the PLO92
In the West the governments did not seem to take sides at all in the conflict.
The British government stated that all foreign troops should return home. Referring
not to just the Chinese forces in Vietnam but also the Vietnamese forces in
Kampuchea. This was also the official position of the United Stated States.
91
Reuters “Cuba Condemns China” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 19, ’79; pA6
92
“Palestinian Guerrillas Assail China for Vietnam Strike” NEW YORK TIMES; Feb. 21, ’79; pA8

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