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November 7, 2018
D&E event
Marc Witteman
Who needs IoT security?
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1. What is IoT?
2. Is IoT security important?
3. Case study
4. What’s next?
Outline
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• Traditional internet
• connects people with machines
• shares data that people create
• IoT (Internet of Things)
• connects machines to machines
• shares data that machines create
What’s new in internet?
Public
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What is the Internet of Things?
internal
4
Source: Vivante
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internal
5
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IoT example
SoC (System on Chip )
Power
management
Communication
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Security is all about the chip
7
Memory Interfaces
CPU
Test logic
Geometry
LayoutSpeed
Security
features
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SOFTWARE COMPLEXITY IN AUTOMOTIVE
Lines of Code
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1. What is IoT?
2. Is IoT security important?
3. Case study
4. What’s next?
Outline
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Is IoT security important?
Remote car hijack
Identity theft
Medical device
disturbance
Premium content theft
Smart lock bypass
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CROSSING AN
INTERSECTION
IN 2028
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How does Information Security work?
How to protect?
• Cryptography
• Access control
What to protect?
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
Primary targets
For attackers
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Are IoT devices sensitive to attacks?
• Fast growing market with new
unexperienced entrants
• Operate in an uncontrolled (hostile)
environment
• Pressure on time-to-market and cost
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How does an attacker get access?
14
Find the key
or
Break the lock
Public
How do attackers work?
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1. What is IoT?
2. Is IoT security important?
3. Case study
4. What’s next?
Outline
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Case study: IoT camera
• IoT camera bought from China
• 17 euros
• Many features
• Wi-Fi connection
• 2-way audio
• HD image
• Motors for rotating the camera
• IR light for night imaging
• Logs data to microSD card
• Phone app for Android & iOS
• ….
What can go wrong?
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Let’s look inside…
Let’s open the camera and
identify interfaces
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Inspecting the PCB…
Let’s open the camera and
identify interfaces
Google + a bit of RE:
• Ingenic T10 SoC
• Heart of the system
• MediaTek MT7601 SoM
• Wifi comms
• DoSilicon FM25Q64A
• Storage for OS (linux)
• Atmel AT24C02 I2C flash
• Storing camera model
• MAC address
• Transistor array
• Powering the motors
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We found a way in….
• Most embedded systems still have a
UART
• Of course, this camera too
UART TX
UART RX
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This camera prints all sorts
of debug information
through serial port
• Ports of the camera,
configuration files…
• Users of camera
• And passwords 
• Wifi configuration
• SSID + password 
Oops??!!
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Demo video from internet:
How to configure this camera
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This camera prints all sorts
of debug information
through serial port
• Even the configuration of
the SSID from youtube
videos 
Oops??!!
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Can we also get access to the OS?
Camera has a root password for Linux 
But all cameras have the same root password 
This thing has U-boot: can we still boot?
• Stop u-boot procedure (hit any key), and print bootargs using printenv
• Then append to the bootargs init=/bin/sh :
$ setenv bootargs 'console=ttyS1,115200n8 mem=39M@0x0
ispmem=5M@0x2700000 rmem=20M@0x2c00000 init=/linuxrc rootfstype=squashfs
rw root=/dev/mtdblock2 rw mtdparts=jz_sfc:256k(boot),2176k(kernel),
3584k(rootfs),2176k(system) init=/bin/sh'
• $ boot
And you boot without password 
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Can we recover the password?
Reverse engineering on several cameras show they all have same configuration
Interesting files:
• /etc/password
root:$1$ybdHbPDn$ii9aEIFNiolBbM9QxW9mr0:0:0::/root:/bin/sh
• /etc/shadow does not exist  hash above is a MD5 hash  collision fun
Use any password cracking program to crack the salt$hash string (or google the string)
ybdHbPDn$ii9aEIFNiolBbM9QxW9mr0 = md5(“ybdHbPDn” + “hslwificam”)
We have the root access password on all cameras
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Can we get access to other services?
We have local root: let’s login and see what is the camera exposing to internet…
Telnetd is running: default backdoor on all cameras 
But wait… there is a RTSP port in 10554 published by the camera…
What happens if you try to access it directly?
rstp://ip.of.the.cam:10554/tcp/av0_0
User: admin, no pass == access camera stream 
And in port 81: http / ONVIF interface (you can even move the camera) 
We can listen in to video broadcasted by all cameras of this type
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So, where are the cameras?
Can we go global? Let’s search for
http header strings in Shodan.io
• Loads of cameras connected
• Thousands of houses offer
free spying…
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Attack recap
Camera security fully bypassed & backdoor for free
• These cameras are used typically as baby monitors: privacy violation
• Linux system: can be used for illicit activities, e.g. bitcoin miners
• IoT botnet Mirai almost brought down DNS in parts of the world
Case 1: consequences
HW attack:
Serial port reveals root
password
Found telnet:
users & config
exposed
Access remotely
video stream &
all config
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Lessons learned
Takeaway 1: bad security practices + hardware attack == scalability
• Use hardened OS, close ports, protect services
• Need unique passwords
• Run firewalls
Takeaway 2: flawed IoT devices == stepping stone for bigger attacks
• It’s not just about the device itself, the eco system is at risk
Takeaway 3: proper security is not free
• Independent review and testing really helps exposing weaknesses and improve security
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1. What is IoT?
2. Is IoT security important?
3. Case study
4. What’s next?
Outline
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When should we fix our bugs?
• Cost of fixing goes rapidly up
• Prevention is better than cure
Source: NASA, IBM
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EU CYBERSECURITY ACT
• European cybersecurity certification
• Certificates valid in all EU countries
• Certification will be voluntary, unless ...
• Verify data confidentiality and integrity
• Assurance levels:
• Basic  documentation review
• Substantial  functional security testing
• High penetration testing
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How to make a secure product?
• Training increases security awareness and brings security capabilities
• Secure development is about secure process, design, and coding
• Certification involves testing and provides assurance that the product is secure
• Maintenance keeps an evolving product secure
CertificationTraining MaintenanceSecure development Market
introduction
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Riscure support for making secure products
• Training & Coaching
• Tools for code analysis & security penetration testing
• Evaluation & Certification
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• IoT will be everywhere
• Software is getting huge and hard to verify
• Security no longer a nice-to-have
• Certification needs secure development
• Solutions exist to make better products
Takeaways
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Riscure B.V.
Frontier Building, Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 15 251 40 90
www.riscure.com
Riscure North America
550 Kearny St., Suite 330
San Francisco, CA 94108 USA
Phone: +1 650 646 99 79
inforequest@riscure.com
Riscure China
Room 2030-31, No. 989, Changle Road, Shanghai 200031
China
Phone: +86 21 5117 5435
inforcn@riscure.com
Challenge your security

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Who needs iot security?

  • 1. 1 Restricted November 7, 2018 D&E event Marc Witteman Who needs IoT security?
  • 2. 2 Restricted 1. What is IoT? 2. Is IoT security important? 3. Case study 4. What’s next? Outline
  • 3. 3 Restricted • Traditional internet • connects people with machines • shares data that people create • IoT (Internet of Things) • connects machines to machines • shares data that machines create What’s new in internet? Public 3
  • 4. 4 Restricted What is the Internet of Things? internal 4 Source: Vivante
  • 6. 6 Restricted IoT example SoC (System on Chip ) Power management Communication
  • 7. 7 Restricted Security is all about the chip 7 Memory Interfaces CPU Test logic Geometry LayoutSpeed Security features
  • 8. 8 Restricted SOFTWARE COMPLEXITY IN AUTOMOTIVE Lines of Code
  • 9. 9 Restricted 1. What is IoT? 2. Is IoT security important? 3. Case study 4. What’s next? Outline
  • 10. 10 Restricted Is IoT security important? Remote car hijack Identity theft Medical device disturbance Premium content theft Smart lock bypass
  • 12. 12 Restricted How does Information Security work? How to protect? • Cryptography • Access control What to protect? • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability Primary targets For attackers
  • 13. 13 Restricted Are IoT devices sensitive to attacks? • Fast growing market with new unexperienced entrants • Operate in an uncontrolled (hostile) environment • Pressure on time-to-market and cost
  • 14. 14 Restricted How does an attacker get access? 14 Find the key or Break the lock Public
  • 16. 16 Restricted 1. What is IoT? 2. Is IoT security important? 3. Case study 4. What’s next? Outline
  • 17. 17 Restricted Case study: IoT camera • IoT camera bought from China • 17 euros • Many features • Wi-Fi connection • 2-way audio • HD image • Motors for rotating the camera • IR light for night imaging • Logs data to microSD card • Phone app for Android & iOS • …. What can go wrong?
  • 18. 18 Restricted Let’s look inside… Let’s open the camera and identify interfaces
  • 19. 19 Restricted Inspecting the PCB… Let’s open the camera and identify interfaces Google + a bit of RE: • Ingenic T10 SoC • Heart of the system • MediaTek MT7601 SoM • Wifi comms • DoSilicon FM25Q64A • Storage for OS (linux) • Atmel AT24C02 I2C flash • Storing camera model • MAC address • Transistor array • Powering the motors
  • 20. 20 Restricted We found a way in…. • Most embedded systems still have a UART • Of course, this camera too UART TX UART RX
  • 21. 21 Restricted This camera prints all sorts of debug information through serial port • Ports of the camera, configuration files… • Users of camera • And passwords  • Wifi configuration • SSID + password  Oops??!!
  • 22. 22 RestrictedINTRODUCTION Demo video from internet: How to configure this camera
  • 23. 23 Restricted This camera prints all sorts of debug information through serial port • Even the configuration of the SSID from youtube videos  Oops??!!
  • 24. 24 Restricted Can we also get access to the OS? Camera has a root password for Linux  But all cameras have the same root password  This thing has U-boot: can we still boot? • Stop u-boot procedure (hit any key), and print bootargs using printenv • Then append to the bootargs init=/bin/sh : $ setenv bootargs 'console=ttyS1,115200n8 mem=39M@0x0 ispmem=5M@0x2700000 rmem=20M@0x2c00000 init=/linuxrc rootfstype=squashfs rw root=/dev/mtdblock2 rw mtdparts=jz_sfc:256k(boot),2176k(kernel), 3584k(rootfs),2176k(system) init=/bin/sh' • $ boot And you boot without password 
  • 25. 25 Restricted Can we recover the password? Reverse engineering on several cameras show they all have same configuration Interesting files: • /etc/password root:$1$ybdHbPDn$ii9aEIFNiolBbM9QxW9mr0:0:0::/root:/bin/sh • /etc/shadow does not exist  hash above is a MD5 hash  collision fun Use any password cracking program to crack the salt$hash string (or google the string) ybdHbPDn$ii9aEIFNiolBbM9QxW9mr0 = md5(“ybdHbPDn” + “hslwificam”) We have the root access password on all cameras
  • 26. 26 Restricted Can we get access to other services? We have local root: let’s login and see what is the camera exposing to internet… Telnetd is running: default backdoor on all cameras  But wait… there is a RTSP port in 10554 published by the camera… What happens if you try to access it directly? rstp://ip.of.the.cam:10554/tcp/av0_0 User: admin, no pass == access camera stream  And in port 81: http / ONVIF interface (you can even move the camera)  We can listen in to video broadcasted by all cameras of this type
  • 27. 27 Restricted So, where are the cameras? Can we go global? Let’s search for http header strings in Shodan.io • Loads of cameras connected • Thousands of houses offer free spying…
  • 29. 29 Restricted Attack recap Camera security fully bypassed & backdoor for free • These cameras are used typically as baby monitors: privacy violation • Linux system: can be used for illicit activities, e.g. bitcoin miners • IoT botnet Mirai almost brought down DNS in parts of the world Case 1: consequences HW attack: Serial port reveals root password Found telnet: users & config exposed Access remotely video stream & all config
  • 30. 30 Restricted Lessons learned Takeaway 1: bad security practices + hardware attack == scalability • Use hardened OS, close ports, protect services • Need unique passwords • Run firewalls Takeaway 2: flawed IoT devices == stepping stone for bigger attacks • It’s not just about the device itself, the eco system is at risk Takeaway 3: proper security is not free • Independent review and testing really helps exposing weaknesses and improve security
  • 31. 31 Restricted 1. What is IoT? 2. Is IoT security important? 3. Case study 4. What’s next? Outline
  • 32. 32 Restricted When should we fix our bugs? • Cost of fixing goes rapidly up • Prevention is better than cure Source: NASA, IBM
  • 33. 33 Restricted EU CYBERSECURITY ACT • European cybersecurity certification • Certificates valid in all EU countries • Certification will be voluntary, unless ... • Verify data confidentiality and integrity • Assurance levels: • Basic  documentation review • Substantial  functional security testing • High penetration testing
  • 34. 34 Restricted How to make a secure product? • Training increases security awareness and brings security capabilities • Secure development is about secure process, design, and coding • Certification involves testing and provides assurance that the product is secure • Maintenance keeps an evolving product secure CertificationTraining MaintenanceSecure development Market introduction
  • 35. 35 Restricted Riscure support for making secure products • Training & Coaching • Tools for code analysis & security penetration testing • Evaluation & Certification
  • 36. 36 Restricted • IoT will be everywhere • Software is getting huge and hard to verify • Security no longer a nice-to-have • Certification needs secure development • Solutions exist to make better products Takeaways
  • 37. 37 Restricted Riscure B.V. Frontier Building, Delftechpark 49 2628 XJ Delft The Netherlands Phone: +31 15 251 40 90 www.riscure.com Riscure North America 550 Kearny St., Suite 330 San Francisco, CA 94108 USA Phone: +1 650 646 99 79 inforequest@riscure.com Riscure China Room 2030-31, No. 989, Changle Road, Shanghai 200031 China Phone: +86 21 5117 5435 inforcn@riscure.com Challenge your security