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Mobile Attack Implications
             Nicholas J. Percoco
Senior Vice President and head of SpiderLabs
Agenda

 •     About Trustwave SpiderLabs
 •     Attack Vector Evolution
 •     Mobile Attack Cookbook
 •     Conclusions
 •     Questions?




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Who is SpiderLabs®?
     SpiderLabs is the elite security team at Trustwave, offering clients the
     most advanced information security expertise available today.


     The SpiderLabs team has performed more than 1,000 computer
     incident response and forensic investigations globally, as well as over
     10,000 penetration and application security tests for clients -- more
     than any other provider.


     Companies and organizations in more than 50 countries rely on the
     SpiderLabs team’s technical expertise to identify and anticipate cyber
     security attacks before they happen.
Featured	
  Speakers	
  at:	
  




   Copyright Trustwave 2011
SpiderLabs – Our Mission

                  To	
  con2nually	
  deliver	
  the	
  most	
  advanced	
  
                  exper2se	
  in	
  informa2on	
  security	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  
                  protect	
  the	
  digital	
  assets	
  of	
  clients	
  worldwide	
  
                  from	
  a	
  growing	
  spectrum	
  of	
  malicious	
  a=acks.	
  

                  We achieve this by:

                  •  Recruiting top of market talent from the
                     information security community

                  •  Performing research in lab facilities in
                     Chicago, London, Sydney and Sao Paulo

                  •  Using Standardized methodologies and
                     central QA processes to ensure quality and
                     consistency
SpiderLabs International Footprint
In	
  country	
  presences:	
  Australia	
  -­‐	
  Brazil	
  -­‐	
  Canada	
  -­‐	
  Hong	
  Kong	
  -­‐	
  India	
  -­‐	
  Mexico	
  -­‐	
  Spain	
  
United	
  States	
  -­‐	
  United	
  Kingdom	
  
	
  




Languages	
   spoken:	
   English	
   French	
   Spanish	
   Greek	
   German	
   Portuguese	
   Mandarin	
  
Cantonese	
  Japanese	
  Hindi	
  	
  Zulu	
  	
  Ndebele	
  Xhosa	
  Setswana	
  Sesotho	
  Shona	
  
       Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution
Attack Vector Evolution

                                              A"ack	
  Vectors	
  Over	
  Time	
  
9	
  
8	
  
7	
                                                                                          Social	
  Networking	
  
                                                                                             Mobile	
  
6	
  
                                                                                             Client-­‐Side	
  
5	
  
                                                                                             Wireless	
  
4	
  
                                                                                             Applica2on	
  
3	
                                                                                          E-­‐mail	
  
2	
                                                                                          Network	
  
1	
                                                                                          Physical	
  

0	
  
         1950	
         1960	
     1970	
        1980	
     1990	
     2000	
     2010	
  
  Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

1980s: Physical




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

1990s: Network




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: E-mail




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: Application




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: Wireless




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Client-Side




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Client Side (Malware)


1.  Targeted Attack

2.  Drive-by Infection

3.  Manual Installation




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Mobile




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Mobile


1.  Mobile Phishing Attacks

2.  Mobile Ransomware

3.  Fake Firmware and Jailbreaks




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Social Networking




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Social Networking


1.  Malware Propagation

2.  Personal Information Exposure

3.  Data Mining




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Attack Vector Evolution

                                              A"ack	
  Vectors	
  Over	
  Time	
  
9	
  
8	
  
7	
                                                                                          Social	
  Networking	
  
                                                                                             Mobile	
  
6	
  
                                                                                             Client-­‐Side	
  
5	
  
                                                                                             Wireless	
  
4	
  
                                                                                             Applica2on	
  
3	
                                                                                          E-­‐mail	
  
2	
                                                                                          Network	
  
1	
                                                                                          Physical	
  

0	
  
         1950	
         1960	
     1970	
        1980	
     1990	
     2000	
     2010	
  
  Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook
Mobile Attack Cookbook




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Ingredients
 •  Motivation
 •  Reversing Skills
 •  Creativity
 •  Motivation

 Process
 •  Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target
 •  Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability
 •  Step 3 – Select a Payload
 •  Step 4 – Build the Payload
 •  Step 6 – Select a Payload Delivery Method
 •  Step 5 – Test it Out

Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target

                           •  Es2mated	
  are	
  20%	
  of	
  the	
  
                              Smartphone	
  Marketshare	
  
                           •  Many	
  users	
  are	
  non-­‐technical	
  
                           •  Jailbreak	
  community	
  does	
  the	
  
                              vulnerability	
  research,	
  so	
  you	
  don’t	
  
                              have	
  to	
  
                           •  Many	
  user	
  don’t	
  EVER	
  update	
  their	
  
                              device	
  to	
  the	
  latest	
  iOS	
  	
  




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability

 •  Leverage the “Jailbreakme.com” vulnerabilities
     •  Affect iOS 4.0.2 or earlier – still likely 50% of the user base

 •  What is it?
         •  The “star” PDF Exploit – Code execution
                  −  Classic stack overflow
                  −  Leverages IOSurface (IOKit) bug for privilege escalation and sandbox escape
         •  The IOKit Vulnerability – Priv. escalation / escaping the sandbox
                  −  Kernel integer overflow in handling of IOSurface properties
                  −  Calls setuid(0) inside Safari getting root
         •  The Jailbreak Phase – Set up residence on the iDevice
                  −  Patches out Kernel code signing
                  −  Installs a basic jailbreak filesystem along with Cydia (apt-get)



Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 3 – Select a Payload

 Implement a Weaponized Jailbreak

 •  Patch out a “security” check comex had incorporated
         •    The jailbreakme.com PDFs had code to ensure they’d been downloaded from
              “jailbreakme.com”.


 •  Patching out all the GUI pop-ups
         •    Didn’t want the victim to realized they were being hacked


 •  Build a modified wad.bin with our “rootkit”




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 4 – Build the Payload

 SpiderLabs Research built Custom-written iOS “Rootkit”

         •  Patched UNIX utilities like ‘ls’, ‘ps’, ‘find’, ‘netstat’ from the JB filesystem
              •  Hiding our tools from actual jailbreakers
         •  Port knock daemon called “bindwatch” fakes its name on argv[0]
         •  Spawns a bind-shell called, wait for it …. “bindshell” also fakes argv[0]
         •  Trivial app to record AIFF on the mic – remote eavesdrop
         •  Patched VNC to hide itself a little better
              •  Nice Open Source iPhone VNC server by saurik
              •  Runs via a DYLIB in MobileSubstrate
              •  Mostly just removed the GUI config plist from System Preferences
              •  Coded a trivial CLI obj-C program to configure and start VNC
                 without the GUI


Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 5 – Select an Payload Delivery Method

 Many methods can be used:
   •  Fake Jailbreak site
   •  SEO optimized site to target an organization
   •  Phishing attack
   •  Hack a popular site and install within the mobile version




Copyright Trustwave 2011
Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

 Step 6 – Test it Out




 Credit:	
  Eric	
  Mon2,	
  Trustwave	
  SpiderLabs	
  Research	
  

Copyright Trustwave 2011
Conclusions
Motivations For Attackers

 •  There	
  are	
  over	
  a	
  half-­‐billion	
  devices	
  on	
  3G	
  networks	
  

 •  By	
  2020,	
  there	
  will	
  be	
  10	
  billion	
  devices	
  

 •  60%	
  of	
  all	
  users	
  carry	
  their	
  devices	
  with	
  them	
  at	
  ALL	
  Fmes	
  
     •  For	
  high-­‐profile	
  and	
  business	
  folks	
  that	
  is	
  near	
  100%	
  

 •  A	
  typical	
  smartphone	
  today	
  has	
  the	
  same	
  processing	
  power	
  
    as	
  a	
  PC	
  from	
  8	
  years	
  ago,	
  plus:	
  
     •  Always-­‐on	
  network	
  connec2vity	
  
         •  Loca2ons	
  aware	
  thanks	
  to	
  GPS	
  

Copyright Trustwave 2011
Motivations for Attackers

 •  Users	
  accessing	
  highly	
  sensiFve	
  informaFon	
  via	
  
    smartphones	
  is	
  the	
  norm	
  

 •  Users	
  trust	
  a	
  smartphone	
  over	
  a	
  public	
  computer	
  or	
  kiosk	
  
     •  Never	
  ques2on	
  their	
  smartphones	
  integrity	
  

 •  CommunicaFon	
  Services	
  Providers	
  (CSPs)	
  must	
  allow	
  for	
  
    governments	
  to	
  access	
  subscribers	
  communicaFons	
  
     •  Case:	
  In	
  the	
  UAE,	
  E2salat	
  pushed	
  a	
  “performance	
  update”	
  
        to	
  all	
  their	
  Blackberry	
  subscribers.	
  
     •  Reality:	
  Malware	
  was	
  inten2onally	
  pushed	
  down	
  to	
  allow	
  
        intercep2on	
  of	
  data	
  communica2ons.	
  


Copyright Trustwave 2011
Conclusions

 •  It	
  is	
  possible	
  and	
  feasible	
  to	
  write	
  malware	
  for	
  a	
  mobile	
  
    device.	
  

 •  With	
  a	
  li"le	
  work,	
  automated	
  funcFonality	
  can	
  be	
  
    embedded	
  

 •  Li"le	
  a"enFon	
  is	
  being	
  paid	
  to	
  smartphone	
  security,	
  while	
  
    everyone	
  trusts	
  their	
  device	
  to	
  perform	
  criFcal	
  tasks.	
  	
  

 •  In	
  the	
  next	
  10	
  years,	
  we	
  will	
  see	
  an	
  explosive	
  growth	
  in	
  the	
  
    number	
  of	
  a"acks	
  against	
  smartphones	
  and	
  other	
  mobile	
  
    compuFng	
  device	
  plaUorms.	
  Will	
  we	
  be	
  prepared?	
  


Copyright Trustwave 2011
Questions?
SpiderLabs®

 SpiderLabs® is an elite team of ethical hackers advancing the
 security capabilities of leading businesses and organizations in
 over 50 countries.

 More Information:

 Web: https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs

 Blog: http://blog.spiderlabs.com

 Twitter: @SpiderLabs




Copyright Trustwave 2011

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AITP Security SIG April 2011

  • 1. Mobile Attack Implications Nicholas J. Percoco Senior Vice President and head of SpiderLabs
  • 2. Agenda •  About Trustwave SpiderLabs •  Attack Vector Evolution •  Mobile Attack Cookbook •  Conclusions •  Questions? Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 3. Who is SpiderLabs®? SpiderLabs is the elite security team at Trustwave, offering clients the most advanced information security expertise available today. The SpiderLabs team has performed more than 1,000 computer incident response and forensic investigations globally, as well as over 10,000 penetration and application security tests for clients -- more than any other provider. Companies and organizations in more than 50 countries rely on the SpiderLabs team’s technical expertise to identify and anticipate cyber security attacks before they happen. Featured  Speakers  at:   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 4. SpiderLabs – Our Mission To  con2nually  deliver  the  most  advanced   exper2se  in  informa2on  security  in  order  to   protect  the  digital  assets  of  clients  worldwide   from  a  growing  spectrum  of  malicious  a=acks.   We achieve this by: •  Recruiting top of market talent from the information security community •  Performing research in lab facilities in Chicago, London, Sydney and Sao Paulo •  Using Standardized methodologies and central QA processes to ensure quality and consistency
  • 5. SpiderLabs International Footprint In  country  presences:  Australia  -­‐  Brazil  -­‐  Canada  -­‐  Hong  Kong  -­‐  India  -­‐  Mexico  -­‐  Spain   United  States  -­‐  United  Kingdom     Languages   spoken:   English   French   Spanish   Greek   German   Portuguese   Mandarin   Cantonese  Japanese  Hindi    Zulu    Ndebele  Xhosa  Setswana  Sesotho  Shona   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 7. Attack Vector Evolution A"ack  Vectors  Over  Time   9   8   7   Social  Networking   Mobile   6   Client-­‐Side   5   Wireless   4   Applica2on   3   E-­‐mail   2   Network   1   Physical   0   1950   1960   1970   1980   1990   2000   2010   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 8. Attack Vector Evolution 1980s: Physical Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 9. Attack Vector Evolution 1990s: Network Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 10. Attack Vector Evolution 2000s: E-mail Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 11. Attack Vector Evolution 2000s: Application Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 12. Attack Vector Evolution 2000s: Wireless Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 13. Attack Vector Evolution 2010s: Client-Side Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 14. Attack Vector Evolution 2010: Client Side (Malware) 1.  Targeted Attack 2.  Drive-by Infection 3.  Manual Installation Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 15. Attack Vector Evolution 2010s: Mobile Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 16. Attack Vector Evolution 2010: Mobile 1.  Mobile Phishing Attacks 2.  Mobile Ransomware 3.  Fake Firmware and Jailbreaks Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 17. Attack Vector Evolution 2010s: Social Networking Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 18. Attack Vector Evolution 2010: Social Networking 1.  Malware Propagation 2.  Personal Information Exposure 3.  Data Mining Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 19. Attack Vector Evolution A"ack  Vectors  Over  Time   9   8   7   Social  Networking   Mobile   6   Client-­‐Side   5   Wireless   4   Applica2on   3   E-­‐mail   2   Network   1   Physical   0   1950   1960   1970   1980   1990   2000   2010   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 22. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Ingredients •  Motivation •  Reversing Skills •  Creativity •  Motivation Process •  Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target •  Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability •  Step 3 – Select a Payload •  Step 4 – Build the Payload •  Step 6 – Select a Payload Delivery Method •  Step 5 – Test it Out Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 23. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target •  Es2mated  are  20%  of  the   Smartphone  Marketshare   •  Many  users  are  non-­‐technical   •  Jailbreak  community  does  the   vulnerability  research,  so  you  don’t   have  to   •  Many  user  don’t  EVER  update  their   device  to  the  latest  iOS     Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 24. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability •  Leverage the “Jailbreakme.com” vulnerabilities •  Affect iOS 4.0.2 or earlier – still likely 50% of the user base •  What is it? •  The “star” PDF Exploit – Code execution −  Classic stack overflow −  Leverages IOSurface (IOKit) bug for privilege escalation and sandbox escape •  The IOKit Vulnerability – Priv. escalation / escaping the sandbox −  Kernel integer overflow in handling of IOSurface properties −  Calls setuid(0) inside Safari getting root •  The Jailbreak Phase – Set up residence on the iDevice −  Patches out Kernel code signing −  Installs a basic jailbreak filesystem along with Cydia (apt-get) Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 25. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 3 – Select a Payload Implement a Weaponized Jailbreak •  Patch out a “security” check comex had incorporated •  The jailbreakme.com PDFs had code to ensure they’d been downloaded from “jailbreakme.com”. •  Patching out all the GUI pop-ups •  Didn’t want the victim to realized they were being hacked •  Build a modified wad.bin with our “rootkit” Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 26. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 4 – Build the Payload SpiderLabs Research built Custom-written iOS “Rootkit” •  Patched UNIX utilities like ‘ls’, ‘ps’, ‘find’, ‘netstat’ from the JB filesystem •  Hiding our tools from actual jailbreakers •  Port knock daemon called “bindwatch” fakes its name on argv[0] •  Spawns a bind-shell called, wait for it …. “bindshell” also fakes argv[0] •  Trivial app to record AIFF on the mic – remote eavesdrop •  Patched VNC to hide itself a little better •  Nice Open Source iPhone VNC server by saurik •  Runs via a DYLIB in MobileSubstrate •  Mostly just removed the GUI config plist from System Preferences •  Coded a trivial CLI obj-C program to configure and start VNC without the GUI Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 27. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 5 – Select an Payload Delivery Method Many methods can be used: •  Fake Jailbreak site •  SEO optimized site to target an organization •  Phishing attack •  Hack a popular site and install within the mobile version Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 28. Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe Step 6 – Test it Out Credit:  Eric  Mon2,  Trustwave  SpiderLabs  Research   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 30. Motivations For Attackers •  There  are  over  a  half-­‐billion  devices  on  3G  networks   •  By  2020,  there  will  be  10  billion  devices   •  60%  of  all  users  carry  their  devices  with  them  at  ALL  Fmes   •  For  high-­‐profile  and  business  folks  that  is  near  100%   •  A  typical  smartphone  today  has  the  same  processing  power   as  a  PC  from  8  years  ago,  plus:   •  Always-­‐on  network  connec2vity   •  Loca2ons  aware  thanks  to  GPS   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 31. Motivations for Attackers •  Users  accessing  highly  sensiFve  informaFon  via   smartphones  is  the  norm   •  Users  trust  a  smartphone  over  a  public  computer  or  kiosk   •  Never  ques2on  their  smartphones  integrity   •  CommunicaFon  Services  Providers  (CSPs)  must  allow  for   governments  to  access  subscribers  communicaFons   •  Case:  In  the  UAE,  E2salat  pushed  a  “performance  update”   to  all  their  Blackberry  subscribers.   •  Reality:  Malware  was  inten2onally  pushed  down  to  allow   intercep2on  of  data  communica2ons.   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 32. Conclusions •  It  is  possible  and  feasible  to  write  malware  for  a  mobile   device.   •  With  a  li"le  work,  automated  funcFonality  can  be   embedded   •  Li"le  a"enFon  is  being  paid  to  smartphone  security,  while   everyone  trusts  their  device  to  perform  criFcal  tasks.     •  In  the  next  10  years,  we  will  see  an  explosive  growth  in  the   number  of  a"acks  against  smartphones  and  other  mobile   compuFng  device  plaUorms.  Will  we  be  prepared?   Copyright Trustwave 2011
  • 34. SpiderLabs® SpiderLabs® is an elite team of ethical hackers advancing the security capabilities of leading businesses and organizations in over 50 countries. More Information: Web: https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs Blog: http://blog.spiderlabs.com Twitter: @SpiderLabs Copyright Trustwave 2011