Paulson, Kathleen, Unit 6 Research Proposal, HM598

Running head: [SHORTENED TITLE UP TO 50 CHARACTERS] 1
Introduction
A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United States
HM 598
Kathleen Paulson
Kaplan University

Immigration Research Proposal
Abstract
This proposal strives to establish a correlation between illegal immigration and how policies
towards embracing or encouraging illegal immigration will have disastrous effects on the
economy, the public safety, and constitutional law. The hypothesis simply states that by
authorizing amnesty for more than five million or more illegal immigrants already in the United
States, is encouraging illegal immigration into the United States, causing a burden to an already
declining economy, public safety, and ignores Federal immigration laws set in place by the
Constitution. In conjunction with illegal immigration, executive policies such the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals are studied and analyzed as contributing to an already systemic
problem. Part of this hypothesis will also include the advocacy for the benefits for illegal
immigration and open borders. The proposal will include a methodology that is quantitative and
qualitative in nature through surveys provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, the American
Community Survey and the Community Population Survey, apprehension rates from the U.S.
Border Patrol, and submitting surveys to various border cities and points of entry along the
United States and Mexico border. Data from various agencies, such as ICE, DHS, the Center for
Immigration Studies, the Pew Research Center, and various other immigration studies will be
used in conjunction with a residual method, an observational analysis, and a survey analysis.

A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United States
The nation’s borders remain unsecure and as 2014, seven hundred miles of the Southern border
remain unsecure with little security remaining at the Northern border. This is partly due to a lack
of a comprehensive strategy, a lack of ability to effectively use assets, and a lack of enforcing
immigration laws. The Department of Homeland Security established in 2003 that there were
eight to twelve million illegal aliens residing in the United States with 700,000 new illegals
entering and staying each year. As of 2014, those estimates have not shown change for eleven
years, even though the annual increase alone would result in a corrected estimate of 15.7 million
to 19.7 million illegal aliens today. This number would not allow for adjustment for President
Obama’s 2014 executive amnesty order and the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA). Since the issuance of the DACA and with the debate over larger amnesty for as many
as five million illegal immigrants, the number of individuals crossing the U.S. border illegally
has increased significantly. Lax enforcement at the border and at the State and local level, means
that most illegal immigrants will not be deported once they enter the interior of the U.S., in fact
they will most likely receive sanctuary benefits within “sanctuary cities”. This is making the
issuance of the DACA and amnesty for illegals costly on the economy and the taxpayers,
unconstitutional, a public safety concern, and an ineffective method for establishing effective
border and immigration control.

This proposal is intended to research the specific issues of illegal immigration through
various literature and studies. This research will use four questions to determine how illegal
immigration through amnesty, the DACA, and visa overstays and programs is affecting the issues
of cost, safety, and unconstitutionality. Those four questions are; how many unauthorized
immigrants enter between ports of entry; how many unauthorized immigrants enter through ports
of entry; how many unauthorized immigrants overstay their visa and become unauthorized; and
how many unauthorized immigrants reside in the United States? The proposal will develop a
valid methodology for showing how an estimated realistic number of illegal immigrants can be
determined in relation to how this number translates into an economic burden. This will be
proposed to show how the expected results can work towards establishing immigration reform
that enforces legalization and border security while promoting safety and the growth of the
economy.
Literature Review
U.S. Census Bureau figures show that ninety percent of the illegal immigration
population come from Latin America, seventy percent of that total being from Mexico. The
Center for Immigration Studies states that “within the last decade, between 1990 and 2000, the
number of illegal immigrants doubled from 4.2 million to 9.2 million, with thirty percent of the
entire foreign-born population in the United States being unauthorized” (Elbel, 2016). The U.S.
government, specifically the DHS Secretary Tom Ridge at the time, stated in 2003 that estimates
of illegal immigrants residing in the United States were at uniformly low numbers. It was
estimated by DHS that the numbers were approximately eight to twelve million, which was
disputed by the Census Bureau to be higher than ten million (Elbel, 2016). Studies from the
Border Patrol stated on their website that there are currently fifteen to twenty million illegal

aliens in this country and the real numbers could be higher because the numbers are increasing
every day since our borders are insecure (Elbel, 2016).
In 2003, Georgia State Senator Sam Zamarripa told the Georgia State Senate that “there
were more than twenty million illegal immigrants in the United States, constituting more than six
percent of the population. This was larger than most states” (Elbel, 2016). In January of 2005 the
Bear Stearns Report criticized the Border Patrol estimates of illegal immigration as being
inaccurate and incomplete. The report stated that the number may be as high as twenty million,
not the nine million estimated by the CBP. While numbers do fluctuate on a yearly basis, illegal
immigration has been steadily increasing since 1986.
Entering without inspection individuals account for six to seven million people, which is
slightly more than half of the total unauthorized population, per the Pew Hispanic Center (FAIR,
2011). Deep divisions continue to persist about the state of border security at the United States
and Mexico border, considering the absence of timely, reliable, and widely accepted indicators of
border security and immigration control, which is a fundamental obstacle (Rosenbaum,
Hipsiman, 2016, p.1). Illegal immigrants take advantage of weak border points and points of
entry by using fraudulent documents and hiding in vehicles and cargo.
The Department of Homeland Security claims the U.S. and Mexico border is more secure
than ever before and the estimated stock of unauthorized immigrants has fallen for the first time
in thirty years. “Others describe the border as out-of-control and broader reforms are needed,
especially in absence of timely, reliable, and publicly trusted indicators of immigration control.
Changes in the immigration flows and the effectiveness of policies and programs cannot be
authoritatively answered” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.5). These are verifiable reasons why
Congress and America should doubt any significant progress the DHS claims it has made.

DeferredAction for Childhood Arrivals and Illegal Immigration
“DHS requirements for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals involves; being under
the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; arrived in the United States before reaching his or her
sixteenth birthday; has continued to reside in the United States since June 15, 2007 to the
present; is physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012 at the time of making the
request for consideration of deferred action with the United States Customs and Immigration
Service; entered the United States without inspection before June 15, 2012, or the lawful
immigration status has expired as of June 15, 2012; is currently in school, has graduated and
obtained a certificate of completion from high school; has obtained a GED, or is an honorably
discharged veteran of the Coast Guard and Armed Forces of the United States; and has not been
convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and does
not pose a threat to national security or public safety” (DHS, n.d.).
Applications accepted by the United States Customs and Immigration Services, as of
June 2016, were 238,206 with an immediate eligible application rate of sixty-three percent and
potential eligible application rate of forty-eight percent. Top countries included Mexico,
Guatemala, Korea, and El Salvador (MPI, 2016). The United States eligible population for
DACA is 1,932,000, with 1,307,000 immediate eligible applications, 398,000 eligible except for
education restrictions, and 228,000 eligible in the future.
Under President Obama, the Border Patrol has been considered incapacitated since the
issuance of DACA and amnesty was issued. Illegal immigration involving children has increased
and deportation numbers have been changed to create the idea that these two programs have not
affected illegal immigration flow. It is reasonable to believe per the Colorado Alliance for

Immigration Reform that “if twenty million illegal aliens were present in 2005, thirty-eight to
forty million could have resided in 2014” (Elbel, 2016).
The DACA has essentially been compared to an administrative version of the DREAM
Act that congress repeatedly rejected. The Center for Immigration Studies called the DACA
program as a “temporary reprieve from deportation” (Miano, 2016). The estimated number of
beneficiaries has been steadily climbing, with an estimation growth of 800,000 to two million.
The fact that DACA provides what is considered a temporary reprieve from deportation is not a
guarantee from future deportation. Illegal immigrants are not protected from disclosure to ICE or
CBP in regards to immigration enforcement or immigration proceedings. With a new
administration taking office on January 20, 2017, the DACA list, as well as the Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans program, can be modified, suspended, and rescinded at any time
without notice by DHS. These programs provide no authorization to work, are independent of
having authority to be in the United States, and guaranteeing no protection against deportation.
Amnesty and Illegal Immigration
A report in 2004 by Fox News stated that between fifty to ninety percent of the illegal
immigrants apprehended claimed they were coming for the “amnesty”. Border Patrol was told
now to not collect this information and that is was simply a rumor spread beyond Mexico (Elbel,
2016). In fact, recent Border Patrol directives have been to “sit on x’s” to lower apprehensions
and sanitize published statistics. In 2004, John Kerry was quoted as stating that “President Bush
did not go far enough and he would have offered legislation offering amnesty and a path to full
voting citizenship to the millions of illegal aliens” (Elbel, 2016).
The Government Accountability Office analyzed the outcomes of “595,795 asylum
applications completed by the Department of Justice’s Executive Order for Immigration Review

Fiscal Year 1995 through 2014 and identified outcome variations both over time and across
immigration courts and judges” (GAO, 2016). Fiscal years 2008 through 2014 annual grant rates
for affirmative asylum applications, filed with DHS, at the initiative of the individuals and
referred to an immigration judge, ranged from twenty-one to forty-four percent. During that
same period, grant rates for defensive asylum applications, that is, those in which the removal
process has already begun, and has been initiated by an immigration judge is fifteen and twenty-
six percent. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) data shows that asylum grant
rates varied by immigration courts. In May of 2007 through fiscal Year 2014, the grant rate was
sixty-six percent affirmative, those that filed an I-589 application and are present in the United
States, and fifty-two percent defensive in New York. In Omaha, Nebraska, and Atlanta, Georgia
there was only a five percent affirmative and defensive rate, which shows that certain cases and
judge-related factors are associated with variance in the outcomes in the asylum applications.
If an immigrant applying for asylum is represented by legal counsel, the rate of granting
asylum affirmative was 3.1 and defensive was 1.8 times higher versus applicants not represented.
Other factors controlling the outcomes statistically was judicial experience and whether the
applicant had dependents. Tens of thousands of foreign nationals in the United States apply
annually for asylum in which EOIR judges make the decision on approval without a system of
performance measures including a baseline to regularly evaluate the effect of the EOIR judge
(GAO, 2016).
A 2010 report and internal memorandum to the U.S.CIS blatantly advised leadership and
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano “to ignore the law and to not issue Notice to Appear letters to
illegal immigrants who have no other avenue to delay their deportation. ICE began to review and

dismiss cases of non-criminal illegal immigrants, allowing them to remain in the United States”
(Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011).
The most harmful effect of the adoption of amnesty is the message it would send around
the world as the United States is periodically prepared to forgive individuals who violate our
immigration laws by granting them entitlements and jobs they came seeking. If foreigners are
encouraged by the actions of Congress to ignore the immigration laws, the United States will
have more difficulty in defending the borders.
Illegal Immigration and the Visa Program
Illegal aliens are divided into two categories; those who cross illegally and those who
entered with visas as nonimmigrants and stayed illegally. The former is considered entering
without inspection. The advocates for illegal immigration tend to “exaggerate the share of illegal
aliens who arrived with visas, believing that doing so will lessen the public’s apprehension our
borders are out of control and to minimize concern about aliens who have not been screened for
criminal records, terrorist connections, and contagious diseases” (FAIR, 2011). Estimations
placing the over-stayer share at about half and as low as two-fifths of the total illegal population
is considered misleading. Approximately one-third and one-half of illegal immigrants come into
the United States lawfully with a temporary, non-immigrant visa and remain after their visa
expires and “otherwise violate the terms of their visas” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.15). The
government went nineteen years between the last overstay report, conducted by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service in 1997, and the 2016 report conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security, which was limited to a specific sector of the non-immigrant population. This
population was those entering by air and sea carriers as visitors for business and pleasure. Many
of those in the report were scheduled to depart between October of 2014 and September of 2015,

which totaled close to forty-five million visitors. The report finds that “527,127 of these
individuals overstayed their visas for some period, with a total overstay rate of 1.17 percent”
(Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.15). More than 100,000 of these overstays had deported the
country by January 4, 2016, leaving 416,500 individuals believed by DHS to remain in the U.S.
The obstacle in this situation is that the U.S. does not require travelers to pass through an
immigration inspection process prior to exiting the country. U.S. ports of entry lack the
infrastructure for collecting this data, despite Congress requiring INS in 1996 to develop and
implement an automated entry-exit central system by 1998 that would collect and automatically
match the records of non-citizen arrivals and departures to identify and verify visa over stayers.
Past surveys, such as the Weststat Survey, were conducted among only sixty-five percent
of amnesty applicants who applied based on being in the United States for specific period. The
other thirty-five percent applied based on working in the agriculture sector. Half of the 8.4
million workers in the workforce, are in the underground economy, i.e. day laborers, independent
contractor, domestics, and pieceworkers; the other half are in the formal economy using fake or
stolen documents (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.11).
Each year, the Department of Homeland Security processes millions of applications and
petitions for more than fifty types of immigrant and non-immigrant-related benefits for persons
seeking to study, work, visit, and live in the United States and for persons seeking to become
U.S. citizens. President Bush and supporters of the McCain – Kennedy Senate bill, which
established the guest-worker program, strived for easing the path to citizenship for an estimated
eleven million already in the U.S., and creating the “Y” visa, allowing current illegal immigrants
to stay legally for the rest of their lives. The House of Representatives, specifically the
Republicans, backed a bill in 2005, HR 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal

Immigration Control Act of 2005, “requiring the illegal immigrants in the country to return home
and strengthen border security without guaranteeing any relaxation of the legal obstacles to
immigration, enforcing what many considered a more dramatic response to stricter immigration”
(Powell, 2012, p.195). The estimations that are provide by Senator McCain to establish the
McCain – Kennedy Senate Bill were over generous in apprehensions and that the claimed three
to four million that are apprehended does not include the millions that the Government
Accountability Office reports enter legally on temporary visas and continue to say after their
visas expire (Elbel, 2016). Visa overstays contribute to a significant number of illegal
immigration. The latest numbers are from 2000, with an estimated 2.3 million overstays, not
including short-term overstays. One-third to one-half of the illegal immigrant population enter
lawfully, however fail to depart when their temporary visa expires.
A common myth is that it is easy to immigrate to America, when in fact, studies have
proven that it is particularly difficult to obtain a legal visa for lower-skilled jobs. Employers must
wade through a “regulatory maze to achieve some sort of basic understanding of what is required
of them” (Anderson, 2012, p.71). Bureaucratic red tape deters employers from hiring high-
skilled foreign workers or possible entrepreneurs. Temporary visas have been considered a
method of preventing illegal immigration and even preventing possible deaths at the border of
those seeking economic opportunities. There has been great debate over the guest-worker
program stating that it only affects approximately one million of the possible eleven million
illegal immigrants in the U.S. Advocates of illegal immigration consider temporary visas to
encourage illegal immigrants as method for setting down roots and avoiding traveling back and
forth due to the hazardous conditions and the chances of being apprehended.

Mexico does not collect entry data from most southbound travelers and exit data is not
collected at the Southern border land ports. The U.S. has limited information on nonimmigrants
entering the U.S. from Mexico who fail to depart the country before their temporary visa expires.
Many of these reports are not released to the public, causing the perception of a lack of
transparency about the government efforts to identify over stayers (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016,
p.19).
Between 1975 and 2015, there were 154 foreign-born terrorists in the United States. Ten
were illegal immigrants, fifty-four were lawful permanent residents (LPR), nineteen were
students, one was on a K-1 fiancé (e) visa, 20 were refugees, four were asylum seekers, thirty-
four were on tourist visas, three were on the Visa Waiver Program, and nine others were
undetermined (Nowrasleh, 2016, p.4). These figures show that while the number of illegal
immigrants committing acts of terror are small, the number of terror acts are being committed by
individuals with specific types of Visas, and they are more likely to commit acts of terror than an
illegal immigrant. B-Tourist Visas, entrants through the Visa Waiver Program, student visas, and
asylum seekers are showing, per the Department of Homeland Security, more risk for acts of
terrorism, than those that are undocumented. The LPR visa, or the green card, has been shown to
have been taken advantage more by terrorists than any of the visa categories. Between 1975-
2015, there were fifty-four foreign born terrorists with LPR visas, which is an average of 1.32
per year. More than thirty-five million LPRs were allowed during the time between 1975-2015,
showing that for every 644,990 non-terrorists, there was one terrorist authorized for an LPR
(Nowrasleh, 2016, p.11).
Both illegal immigrants and temporary visa holders may apply for asylum by convincing
the government of the fear of persecution if they are returned to their homeland. “If they are here

legally as a nonimmigrant, this claim is referred to as an affirmative claim, and if they are
illegally here and in the deportation proceedings, they are referred to as a defensive claim”
(Martin, Rosenbaum, 2013, p.22). If the affirmative claim is denied and the individual does not
leave, the individual becomes illegal. Asylum adjudication is a multi-layered process and is
considered by many to be a never-ending legal process intended to delay deportation and extend
the individual’s stay. The individual’s case is first reviewed by an asylum officer in the Customs
and Immigrations Service division. If the claim is deemed as valid, the proceedings are referred
to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) where a hearing and decision is made. If
the applicant is denied, which most reports and statistics claim they are, they may be appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals. If the appeal is denied, the case may go to a Federal judge. As
of 2009, there was a “favorable decision rate of forty-seven percent, a grant rate of fifty-percent
for affirmative application, and a thirty-six percent rate for defensive application” (Martin,
Ruark, 2013, p.22). In the statistics of the EOIR, those who were denied, were anticipated to
become illegal aliens. Of the sixty-four percent, defensive applicants that are denied asylum
status, there is reasonable expectation that they will become illegal aliens. This implies that in
addition to breaking immigration laws to enter and stay illegally, the alien was also “attempting
to abuse the due process system and compassion of the U.S. to game the system and gain legal
residence” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.22).
Border Security immigration enforcement through DHS has not developed a process for
identifying and analyzing program risks, such as a process to evaluate prior suspected cases of
fraud in its Student and Exchange Visitor Program, a program intended to ensure that foreign
students studying in the United States comply with the terms if their admission into the country,
despite spending $120 million in 2012. (Berrick, 2013, p.2).

Illegal Immigration and the Cost to the American Economy
There is a shortcoming in academic research regarding the economics of illegal
immigration. Much of the research ignores literature on the political determinants of illegal
immigration policy and rarely examines how illegal immigration will affect income
redistribution and how fiscal spending can influence illegal immigration in an open labor market.
There are numerous articles establishing the impact of immigration on the economy including;
“wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population; the fiscal costs and benefits
of immigration; how immigration and trade interact; the immigration impact on long-term
growth; and the size and net benefit of the immigration surplus created for native citizens”
(Powell, 2012, p.195). The immigration surplus is considered the net benefit that accrues because
of immigration; however, as the size of gains to capital owners and consumers who benefit from
the services provided by the illegal immigrants increases, the labor net of the cost lowers in
terms of lower wages to the native-born for whom the illegal immigrant is considered to
represent, but substitutes. In other words, despite capital gains for the business owner and lower
prices for the consumer, wages for the legal individual lowers because of the hiring of the illegal
immigrant. In fact, by recent estimates the illegal immigrant only raises the real income for
native-born individuals by 0.2 percent (Powell, 2012, p.195). This is considered reason enough
for supporting tighter restrictions on immigration, since this increase is small compared to the
size of the U.S. economy.
The estimated annual cost of illegal immigration at the Federal, State, and local level is
about $113 billion; $29 billion at the Federal level and $84 billion at the State and local level.
The estimated tax collections from illegal alien workers for “above-ground economy and
underground economy” do not come close to the level of expenditures and are considered

“misleading as an offset to the unemployed and underemployed U.S. workers that would replace
illegal alien workers” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). The annual cost that illegal immigration burdens to
the U.S. taxpayer is an average amount per native of $1,117. The largest share of the burden is
shown to fall to the State and local taxpayers, depending on the size of the illegal immigrant
population in that location. Illegal immigration costs hundreds of billions in healthcare, housing,
education, and welfare. “The annual cost of the free tax credits alone paid to illegal immigrants
quadrupled to $4.2 billion in 2011” (Trump, 2016, p.1). For immigration to benefit the economy,
reform should encourage those that enter the country and participate for better or worse in local
economies, pay taxes, and interact with U.S. residents, and rely on government benefits and
services on a limited basis.
Education for the children of illegal aliens “constitute the single largest cost to the
taxpayers at an annual cost of nearly $52 billion, which the majority is absorbed by State and
local and government” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). At the Federal level, about one-third of the costs
are matched by tax collections from illegal aliens. At the State and local level, an average of less
than five percent of the public costs associated with illegal immigration is regained through taxes
collected from illegal aliens. Reports of taxes collected by illegal aliens’ state that “most illegal
aliens do not pay income taxes, and for those who do, they are refunded to the illegal aliens in
tax credits and returns” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). California as of 2010 through 2011, had a budget
deficit of more than $14.4 billion, with an estimated $21.8 billion in annual expenses on illegal
aliens. New York had a deficit in the same time frame of $6.8 billion and a $9.5 billion
expenditure in illegal alien costs. This cost would only increase if the amnesty of millions of
illegal immigrants continues, as did it did in the amnesty of 1986.

Recent estimates of access to medical insurance by illegal aliens, conducted by the Center
of Immigration Studies, put the share of that population with coverage from their employer or by
a spouse’s employer at thirty-eight percent. The study put the number of illegal aliens without
access to medical insurance at 6.6 million individuals. The Medicaid coverage of births to illegal
aliens, with the Federal taxpayer assuming at least half of the cost of this expense, at
$1,238,100,000. In 2009, there were nine states in which the Federal government shares exceed
seventy percent and an additional eighteen with more than sixty percent. Medicaid fraud by
illegal aliens, using fraudulent or stolen documents or ID’s, has reached more than
$2,470,000,000. However, there is no true reliable data “since medical facilities are not required
to verify the identification of patients” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.16). A final medical expense that
is used by illegal aliens is the medical costs for their children after birth. This cost, at taxpayer
expense, is more than $2,382,800,000. The child receives this benefit if the household meets the
income eligibility criteria, Two-thirds of the illegal alien population does not have insurance and
more than one-third will meet the criteria for eligibility.
Apologists for illegal aliens convince policymakers that it is “better to give those residing
in the U.S. illegally permanent access to jobs versus removing and freeing up those jobs for the
unemployed U.S. citizen and legal foreign worker” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.8). These same
advocates claim amnesty would be a plus for the economy because it would help illegal aliens
compete for better jobs and raise their income and their taxes that they pay. This makes sense
until those same advocates understand this in terms of against whom they would be competing
for better jobs; the U.S. citizens and legal residents. This essentially benefits the employers, and
not the job seekers.

The claimed benefits for amnesty is another misleading debate. Wages from the 1986
amnesty did rise. In general, wages rose for everyone due to this being an “inflationary period.
Per the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS), beneficiaries of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), amnesty raised wages by a meager fifteen percent between
1986 and 1991. In fact, legalized, this did not make any gains and more than three-fifths
remained in the same work that they had before the amnesty. Illegal immigrants showed low
probability of employment gain” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.8). Essentially, the deficit of education,
skills, and limited English proficiency dampens the proposal of their upward job movement
regardless of legal status. The implications of amnesty are that this would “bring illegal aliens
out of the shadows into the legal workforce, paying taxes, and more likely to file a tax return.
What is not mentioned and implied is the fact that giving amnesty would add another 4.7 million
claimants, causing an additional drain of more than $20.2 billion annually for EITC and an
additional $2.6 billion in child credits” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.37). Part of this debate also
includes stating that newly legalized alien workers would increase earnings, reducing the drain.
Studies from the 1986 legalized amnesty population found that “five years after legalization, the
gap between median earnings for the legalized workers and U.S. workers had not changed. Even
if typical earnings increased by fifty percent or more, the EITC could still be claimed, just for a
lesser amount” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p37). Another argument for support for amnesty is the
Social Security tax benefits. Advocates believe that amnesty will allow for contribution to social
security without having the payout these individuals. What they fail to note is that the benefits
from unclaimed payments would cease and taxes would be paid and credited towards their
retirement benefits. The key point of the social security system is that it is a redistributive tax
system in which low-wage earners receive more benefits than contributions.

Several national studies have established that illegal immigration, given its steady
increase over the decades has hurt the economy to different degrees and the labor market
opportunities of the “least skilled and experienced U.S. workers. The policy goal should be to
improve the prospects of the U.S. workers who have not graduated from high school” (Martin,
Ruark, 2013, p.10). Research, per the Federation for American Immigration Reform, shows that
changing the skill composition of legal immigrants and reducing the flow of unauthorized aliens
might be a more fruitful course of action (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.10).
The cost of welfare used by illegal aliens is primarily expended in the Free and Reduced
Meal Program; cash assistance, Temporary Assistance of Needy Families (TANF); child care;
public housing; the Earned Income Tax Credit; and the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC).
Those who receive the benefits of the free meal program, which is costing the country more than
two billion dollars, “requires the illegal individual to be at or below 130 percent of the poverty
level, and to receive the reduced meal, the individual must be between 130 percent and 185
percent of the poverty level. 25.5 percent of the illegal immigrant population participates in the
breakfast program, causing an expenditure of $612,000,000 and eighteen percent participate in
the lunch program, costing the taxpayers $1,652,600,000” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.27). TANF,
which has an expenditure of over one billion dollars to illegal immigrants, allows parents of
children born in the U.S.to collect welfare benefits, requiring that they have satisfied their five-
year waiting period and are documented. This is not the case. Many parents collect these welfare
benefits, having not satisfied the five-year waiting period and are undocumented, on behalf of
their children. The Child Welfare League of America reports that “most of the child-only
caseload includes a parent” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.28). Estimates by TANF reports show that

Federal funding to the states for the children of illegal immigrants has increased to more than one
billion, about six percent of the total TANF disbursements.
Child care is a joint Federal and State expenditure for assistance for low-income children.
In 2010, $4.9 billion was appropriated for this program towards children of illegal immigrants.
6.5 percent of those enrolled in this program are illegal immigrants. Per the Pew Hispanic
Center, “one-third of the children and one-fifth of the adult illegal immigration population live in
poverty and are much more likely to live in poverty. This nearly doubles the poverty rate for
children of U.S. born parents” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.28).
Public housing in theory, is intended to be unavailable to illegal immigrants. In practice,
this is not the case. The qualification to obtaining subsidized housing is to have at least one
legally documented individual in the household and any other family member can pay their rent,
regardless of legality. $787 million annually is spent in subsidized housing per year towards the
housing of undocumented individuals. During the Clinton administration and the Obama
administration, Congress deemed it “a violation to fail to screen out illegal aliens from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.29). Not only do
illegal immigrants benefit from public housing living arrangements, they benefit through Federal
mortgage subsidies for developers of low-cost housing. The loophole exists in the fact that the
ban on occupancy does not apply if admissions are not through HUD or are with a stolen
identification. There are as many as three million low-income families with one or more illegal
parent and U.S. born child participating in HUD. This constituted for approximately three
percent of the public housing community.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credits (ACTC) expend
more than five billion dollars combined in distributing refunds to illegal immigrants and tax

credits. A family with two dependents earning $31,200 can earn a EITC of $2,693, even if the
illegal immigrants is not paying Federal income tax. This is net drain on Federal tax revenues of
approximately $1.78 billion, representing 600,000 illegal immigrant tax returns. Many obtain an
EITC by filing a Social Security Number (SSN) assigned to a child or a fictitious SSN. Those
claiming ACTC, must have an income of less than $110,000 and have been in the U.S. for at
least half a year. This can earn an illegal alien one thousand dollars per child. “In January of
2010, Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX) submitted H.R. 4528, to change the Child Tax Credit
program to eliminate the possibility of illegal aliens applying using an Immigration Tax
Identification Numbers (ITIN)” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.36). The Internal Tax Service allows tax
credits even when there is no SSN provided on tax returns. ITINs are permitted for tax filing
purposes regardless of legal status. With 5.4 million children of illegal immigrants in the United
States, seventy-three percent being U.S. born, they are all potential ACTC deductions. Per an
Inspector General report, “the average annual spending total for the ACTC is $1.75 billion, with
seventy-seven percent claimed by illegal aliens.
Advocates for illegal immigration “argue that this population is not eligible for Federal
benefits and are not a burden to the taxpayer” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.13). This ignores that fact
that the burden falls onto the State and local government because it is compensated by the
Federal government for the major expenses they incur for; special education programs,
compensation for medical costs; and compensation for the incarceration of illegal aliens.
Two trends have been intertwining within the cost of illegal immigration: the number of
people incarcerated and inflow, and the integration of immigrants nationally (Waters, 2016,
p.34). Immigration and Customs Enforcement reports have stated to have a mandated quota of
34,000 beds per day, as obligated by law. This means that 34,000 illegal immigrants must be in

detention every day of the year for there to be a cost-benefit. In 2013, there were 441,000 illegal
immigrants in private detention facilities, local jails, state prisons, and federal facilities. The
Federal government pays state and local prisons a set amount per night for every person
detained, while claiming to reduce incarceration in conjunction with mandating a quota for
filling the detention beds. Currently, Louisiana takes in the largest number of illegal immigrant
detainees from across the country to “help cover the cost of maintaining their prisons” (Waters,
2016, p.34).
The Federal government is responsible for appropriating funds to State and local
governments to compensate for the costs they incur for incarceration of convicted illegal aliens.
The Federal government is then responsible for those individuals after their release from State
and local detention for deporting them. Recent studies found that non-citizens made up
approximately nine percent of the total local jail population (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.19). The
GAO estimates that the States spend approximately $1.7 billion to incarcerate criminal illegal
aliens. The annual cost per prisoner in Federal prison is approximately $27,700, not including
assistance while in prison or deportation costs. Total deportation and removal of illegal criminal
aliens has reached more than two billion dollars, “with ICE Air, operated by the Detention and
Removal Office, it flies six days a week costing $680 per passenger. In 2008, this cost the
taxpayers more than $142,120,000.
Other costs that affect the taxpayer is illegal immigration litigation, “Project Safe
Neighborhoods (PSN), and Operation Community Shield (OCS), which target illegal gun crime,
violent gangs and gang crime” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.21). PSN and OCS spend approximately
$39,500,000, and are considered valuable assets. In 2005, “more than eight thousand individuals
belonging to more than seven hundred different gangs were arrested. The Eighteenth Street Gang

out of Los Angeles was compromised of approximately eighty percent illegal aliens from Mexico
and Central America” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.21).
The cost of terrorism by an illegal immigrant, while small, is still approximately $26.5
million if taken from the period of 1975 through 2015, with ten committing acts of terrorism.
This states that for every illegal immigrant that resulted in being a terrorist, 2.65 million illegal
immigrants entered the United States (Nowrasleh, 2016, p.10).
Border security and immigration enforcement has cost the taxpayers more than $250
billion in expenditures over the past three decades, including the size of the Border Patrol, the
addition of hundreds of miles of fencing, and the invention of technology such as, ground
sensors and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to detect illegal entries. The United States Customs and
Border Patrol in 2015 spent $13. 3 billion, Immigration and Customs Enforcement spent $5.5
billion, and Immigration and Naturalization Service spent $3.6 billion. DHS experiences
scheduled delays and performance problems with its information technology programs for
securing the border between ports of entry and after implementing the “Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBI Net), it was cancelled after five years. It had already been installed fifty-three
miles along the Arizona border and spending had already reached one billion dollars” (Berrick,
2013, p.6). DHS has now implemented another program along the Arizona border, the Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan with an estimated life cycle cost of $1.5 billion. Congress,
key stakeholders, and the public lack significant benchmarks that could be used to track any
progress on border security as broader immigration reforms are considered, making it difficult to
evaluate existing policies and programs to make informed choices regarding the costs and
benefits of current and potential investments.

Mexico’s poverty is the ultimate source of the migration challenge. If Mexico was to
increase its economic development and its income per capita passes $8,000, Mexican immigrants
would be less likely to leave their homes and families. However, increased salaries can also
increase migration simply for the fact that the truly impoverished now have the means to leave.
Mexico and the countries south of Mexico, have highly unequal societies, even with increased
social spending in political democratization, such as anti-poverty programs. The income per
capita causes the biggest increases of illegal immigrants from Central American countries such
as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Mexico makes billions in remittances sent from illegal
immigrants to the United States back to Mexico. As of 2013, they had taken in $22 billion.
President Bush had made it clear that the immigration issue was too large to deal with
through deportation as to justify amnesty. Senator Harry Reid stated that “no one believes it is
fiscally responsible or physically possible to deport an estimated twelve million undocumented
people. No serious proposal to round up and deport all illegal immigrants is possible and there is
an alternative to amnesty” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.83).
Illegal Immigration and the Effects to Public Safety
A report by the Government Accountability Office in 2011 stated that three million
arrests were attached to the incarcerated alien population including tens of thousands of violent
beatings, rapes, and murders. It is estimated that there are an approximate 56,280 illegal alien
inmates, with sixty-two percent from Mexico. The Detention and Removal Office (DRO) of
DHS removes the illegal alien after a detainer has been placed on the prisoner, they have served
their sentence, and interviewed by ICE and DHS. DRO then deports the individual to the border
of Mexico or flies the individual to the interior of Mexico if there is a high risk of re-entering. If
the individual is not of Mexican descent, then the individual is flown to their homeland.

Per ICE records, as of October 2014, “276 jurisdictions in a study over an eighteen-
month period in 2014, reported that more than 8.100 criminal aliens who were the subject of
detainers, were released back to the streets because of local non-cooperative policies” (Vaughan,
2015). Two-thirds of these individuals had serious criminal history at the time of their release
and nearly 1,900 have re-offended. Only twenty-eight percent of those individuals have been re-
apprehended by ICE. Sanctuary cities do nothing to build trust between immigrant communities
and the local law enforcement and do nothing to improve access to law enforcement for
immigrants. They also do not show that immigrant crime victims will report crime because of
sanctuary cities. The 276 jurisdictions in the ICE study represent a small fraction of the more
than 17,000 law enforcement jurisdictions in the nation. This only represents jurisdictions with
large populations of illegal immigration, such as Chicago, San Francisco, New York City,
Philadelphia, Miami, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.
There was widespread outrage at the San Francisco Sheriff’s policies that caused the
release of a man with “five prior deportations, seven felony convictions, and the subject of an
ICE detainer, who went on to murder Kathryn Steinle. It is clear, that certain jurisdictions will
not budge from their criminal alien sanctuary policies” (Vaughan, 2015). In the study of the 276
jurisdictions in the ICE report, local law enforcement agencies refused to comply with a total of
8,811 detainers and these detainers were associated with 8,145 individuals, and were then
released from custody. “As of June 2015, the total number of detainers declined were over
17,000. Most offenders released had prior records; one-fourth were already felons. 5,132 were
previously convicted, charged with a crime, and labeled as a public safety concern” (Vaughan,
2015). 8,145 of those released, later reoffended and were arrested again. 1,867 or 23 percent
were arrested again for a criminal offense. 1,116, or sixty percent were considered at large at the

time of the study. The 1,867 that were re-arrested for a criminal offense, were arrested 4,298
times during the eight-month study and had accumulated 7,491 new charges after their release.
Ten percent involved “dangerous drugs and seven percent involved driving under the influence
(DUI). There were six instances of very serious crimes that were sought by ICE with a detainer,
but released by local law enforcement with sanctuary policies” (Vaughan, 2015).
With the implementation of Section 287 (g), allowing law enforcement entities to enter
agreements with ICE to “act in the stead of ICE agents by processing illegal aliens for removal,
law enforcement must sign Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) with ICE and participating
officers, as well as undergo a five-week training course, a background check, and mandatory
certificates” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). Before the 287 (g), law enforcement officers
would simply notify ICE after apprehension of an individual who could not demonstrate legal
presence, and wait for them to take custody of the individual. In practice, most went free and
laws were not enforced. Seven years since the creation of the 287 (g), “roughly sixty-six state
and local agencies have been deputized to enforce Federal immigration law, and more than
120,000 individuals have been identified as illegal” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011).
In 2010, ACLU and other pro-illegal immigration groups report that Section 287 (g)
programs encourage racial profiling and other undesirable consequences by law enforcement
agencies. In July of 2009, the Obama administration reported that there were plans to make the
MOAs more uniform, causing law enforcement agencies disruption in the program and
discouraging any real attempt to enforce the law. Advocates for illegal immigration tend to
exaggerate the number of illegal aliens that enter with visas to change the perception of the
public that our borders are safe and not out of control and to lessen the concern regarding illegal

aliens that have not been screened for criminal records, terrorist connections, and contagious
diseases (FAIR, 2011).
Center for Immigration Studies Mark Kirkorian was informed by the head of Border
Patrol that approximately eighty percent of the apprehensions that occur result in a “catch and
release” (OAN, 2016). While Border Patrol provides numbers of apprehensions, in reports
provided, leadership has declined to answer specific questions regarding rates of apprehensions
and evasions. Jim Koibe, previous House Representative for Arizona, stated in 2004 that the
“Border Patrol figures that there are about one out of four or five illegal aliens apprehended
crossing the border” (Elbel, 2016). Michael Nicley, Chief of the Tucson Sector of the U.S. CBP
at the time stated that it was closer to one out of seven apprehended. In a November 2006, United
States House Committee Report on Homeland Security, Federal law enforcement reported that
estimates for the apprehension of illegal aliens was approximately ten to thirty percent, with ten
to twenty percent of the drugs entering being seized. In this same report, it was estimated that as
many as four to ten million illegal aliens cross into the U.S. (Elbel, 2016). Many illegal
immigrants have the assistance of a “sophisticated smuggler or a “coyote” to cross the border,
some paying as much as $1,500. Many illegal immigrants adopt to an initial apprehension and
develop a different strategy on subsequent crossing attempts. They may also vary the portions of
the border they make the illegal crossing” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.7).
The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
passed by the House of Representatives, was intended to “make illegal immigrants felons,
increase the penalties on employers who hired illegal immigrants, and erect a fence along much
of the border between the U.S. and Mexico. This bill offered no path toward permanent
citizenship for current illegal immigrants and no guest-worker program for future immigrants”

(Powell, 2012, p.202). The goal was to move the current illegal immigrant population out in
contrast to the U.S. Senate’s 2006 McCain-Kennedy immigration reform bill which was to
provide a path to permanent citizenship and create a guest-worker program allowing
approximately more than 200,000 migrant workers in over the next five years.
Per the Migration Policy Institute, the priority at the ports of entry is to facilitate lawful
travel and trade, not the use of fraudulent documents or illegal immigrants hiding in private or
commercial vehicles or shipping containers (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.12). The COMPEX
system that is used by CBP is confined to air passengers and private vehicles at land ports,
excluding all other points of entry, including cargo containers. It does not capture the two most
common ways migrants enter illegally; through points of entry as pedestrians with false
documents and as stowaways in commercial vehicles. Fingerprints are not always collected
during COMPEX screening, which means that cases in which crossers used or borrowed stolen
documents are not detected.
The Obama administration has restricted the effectiveness of cooperative programs, i.e.
the 287 (g) under the pressure of advocacy groups. This administration has also explicitly
allowed, through the “Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), lower jurisdictions to obstruct ICE;
establishing the entire country as a sanctuary for nearly all illegal aliens by further narrowing
enforcement priorities; and restricting the ability of ICE officers to deport removable aliens,
including many with criminal records” (Vaughan, 2015). The most common reason for non-
cooperation policies is that “law enforcement needs to enable immigrants to feel comfortable
reporting crime, while this has never been substantiated” (Vaughan, 2015). Most crimes in
general are not reported, and per the Bureau of Justice statistics in 2012, “only forty-four percent
of violent victimizations and fifty-four percent of serious violent victimizations were reported”

(Vaughan, 2015). In fact, the most effective way to encourage crime reporting is through
community outreach, hiring personnel that speak the language of the community, and
establishing anonymous tip lines. Proposals to increase ICE and local law enforcement capacity,
such as through the Davis Oliver Act, have strong support to support ICE and a willingness to
assist in detaining illegal criminals.
Local sanctuary polices shield illegal aliens from detection and provide access to public
benefits and driver’s licenses’. In a 2007 Department of Justice audit, an even higher recidivism
rates after release from custody versus the 2014 ICE analysis over the eight- month period was
reported. The audit showed that in a random sample, seventy-three out of one hundred illegal
aliens had re-offended, resulting in six new crimes a piece. The argument from sanctuary
jurisdictions is that holding illegal aliens is too costly and that there was a lack of resources. The
DOJ audit found that no agency showing the release of illegal criminal aliens was not due to a
lack of resources. Detainers have been used for decades, and they have shown to help protect the
public and ICE officers by taking custody in a secure setting and not at the criminal illegal
alien’s home, in the street, or at their workplace.
The Obama administration has scaled back immigration enforcement and has created an
image of pretending to abandon enforcement due to unfavorable court rulings. Top leaders
contribute to these rulings by reversing long-standing policies and claiming that detainers were
an option for local agencies to honor. This has also been accepted by certain Federal judges
leaving local law enforcement to fend for themselves. If local law enforcement follows the
policies that have been set forth for decades, cooperate in good faith and compliance with federal
regulations, they have fear of being subjected to significant legal and financial liability. The
establishment of Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) allows local jurisdictions to obstruct ICE

by choosing to ignore requests to be notified of an illegal alien’s release date. Five of the largest
jurisdictions, per DHS, have indicated “they will still obstruct ICE and refuse to participate in
PEP, no matter how much enforcement is watered down by the prioritization guidelines”
(Vaughan, 2015). This essentially states that policy supporters need to beware of proposals that
attempt to spell out specific criminal convictions that trigger mandatory cooperation and that
Congress must clarify ICE’s authorization to issue detainers and provide qualified immunity to
legal and financial liability.
Methodology
Using government numbers are often too hard to come by and are routinely scrubbed. To
answer the first question of, how many unauthorized immigrants enter between ports of entry, a
model-based recidivism analysis would be used to produce an estimate of illegal immigrant
apprehensions compared to the number that are later apprehended. Data from migrant surveys
distributed at key ports of entry along the United States and Mexico border would be able to
estimate inflow numbers. Observational measures could be conducted with a variety of metrics
collected during Border Patrol surveillance.
Methodology to question two, how many unauthorized immigrants enter through ports of
entry, would have to be done by acquiring the percentage of admitted travelers determined
unauthorized that the United States CBP estimates through the “Random Compliance
Examination (COMPEX) program. This programs selects a random sample of cleared travelers
and subjects them to more rigorous inspection (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.2). This total of
unauthorized immigrants would have to be compared to overall admissions to estimate port of
entry inflows. A key issue in this method is to ensure that the sample collected is representative
due to the randomness of the sample.

Research for question number three, how many unauthorized immigrants overstay their
visa and become unauthorized, is a challenge. Acquiring the records of nonimmigrant arrivals
need to be compared to nonimmigrant departures with the difference being the number of
overstays. Why this is a challenge is because DHS did not provide an official estimate until
2016, nineteen years after the first official estimate. Data departures are incomplete, specifically
with people leaving through the Southwest borders. DHS is still working on developing arrival
and departure records collected by carriers at air and seaports and the Canadian government at
the Northern border. Essentially there is no definitive data that exists, so this study will be
reluctant to identify and count this population in the study.
The methodology to estimate question number four, how many unauthorized immigrants
reside in the U.S., is the most important measure and encompasses the ability to not only
determine the methodology for determining the effects of illegal immigration, but for
determining true inflow and the effects of interior enforcement and other variables. The
methodology used will be the residual method which uses the U.S. Census and DHS data to
calculate the total non-citizen population and the number of legal non-citizens, then subtracting
the legal non-citizens from the total non-citizens. The difference from the two, or the residual, is
the estimated unauthorized population. These four questions will provide a full perspective of the
scope of illegal immigrants by using a recidivism analysis, which is model based; a survey-based
analysis; and an observational analysis.
This analysis will also use the estimation of the number of illegals in the United States
that is derived from the U.S. Border Patrol apprehension rates and “got aways”. These numbers
are not reliably known, but can be estimated and this will produce a range of results versus a
single estimation. This would involve first, estimating the gross number of illegals entering the

United States including the number of those that evade apprehension by the Border Patrol. In
Border Patrol reports, a “get away” ratio is applied to the numbers of illegals entering, resulting
in a gross estimate of illegals entering and avoiding apprehension. Second, the proposed method
would need to factor in repeat apprehensions of the same individuals and legalizations out of this
estimation. What this translates to is that many that are apprehended and returned home attempt
try to return and are re-apprehended. A third step would be to factor in those considered “short-
term stays” out of the overall estimate taking into the variable that some immigrants do
voluntarily return home in less than one year. A final step would be to estimate the total number
of illegal aliens living in the United States based on the estimated illegals entering and avoiding
apprehension each year.
The survey-based analysis, while covering many years, would contribute to the
understanding of the effects of illegal immigration, while being conducted in a range of
locations, specifically migrant-sending communities in Mexico, popular immigrant destinations
in the U.S., and points along the U.S. and Mexico border. Interviewing migrants regarding their
prior and current trips to the U.S. and how many they have taken would allow for determining
the effectiveness of enforcement, whether they are entering on a specific visa, whether they
overstay that visa, their purpose of their visit to the U.S, such as seeking amnesty or asylum, or if
they are using fraudulent documentation. This would also determine if they are entering because
they currently have family in the U.S., whether they will need government assistance, and if they
are intending on pursuing employment and integrating into society. This would also determine
whether they had nefarious purposes such as drug trafficking, gang activity, human trafficking, or
any other criminal activity. This would be based on CBP authorizing admission into the U.S.
Two of the surveys that have been used in similar analyses are the “Mexican Migrant Project

(MMP) at Princeton University, and the Mexican Migration Field Research and Training
Program (MMFRP) at the University of California San Diego” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016,
p.8). The MMP incorporates ethnographic fieldwork and survey techniques to gather social,
demographic, and economic information from approximately 600 to 1,000 households in
selected communities throughout Mexico. Surveys are then conducted within the U.S. of
unauthorized migrants from the communities sampled in Mexico, resulting in a combined
binational sample. The MMFRP collects information from households, approximately 700 to
7,000 in three rural and high immigration communities in Mexico and U.S. communities, mainly
Southern California, where such migrants settle. These surveys are not intended to claim a clear
representation of the entire Mexican migrant population, which is why they should be used in
combination. Partnering with the private sector and academic researchers would gain additional
information regarding individual migration histories.
Surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, while do not provide definitive data
sources on the exact number of illegal immigrants currently living in the U.S., allow for use in
the residual method to calculate the total number of non-citizens based on census questions about
birthplace and citizenship status. These three surveys are the “American Community Survey
(ACS), which surveys a nationally representative sample of households; the Community
Population Survey (CPS), which is conducted monthly and surveys a smaller sample considered
to be a nationally representative sample of households; and the decennial Census which accounts
for every person in the country” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.20). The survey that would be
used in this proposal would be sent to various cities statistically known to have a high population
of illegal immigrants. These would include sanctuary cities. The questions would involve

birthplace, citizenship status, and length of time in the country, and exactly how they crossed.
This method would require an ethnographic method to create more reliable results.
Using the observational analysis method, which has been used by the Border Patrol since
the mid-2000’s, provides metrics based on; “turn backs”, or individuals who attempt to enter
without inspection and are deterred because of Border Patrol presence; dangerous conditions;
apprehensions; or “got aways”, which are individuals who are detected but evade arrest and cross
the border successfully. To estimate, both observations would be made in sectors with the highest
immigration inflow, in which agents use a combination of; surveillance footage that is taken by
aircraft; fixed cameras; ground or motion sensors; ground observation; or technology to observe
the terrain and track the motion of people.
Methodology will be done for estimating visa overstays. This can be done with one of
three methods; using indirect departure records; model-based estimates; and the direct collection
of exit data. Using indirect departure records would involve INS reports on the number of I-94
forms filled out by non-immigrant travelers at the time of their entry, which is returned at the
time of their departure. This however would be considered problematic considering the gap
between reports submitted by INS in 1997 and the report submitted by DHS in 2016. This also
relies on travelers submitting their own paperwork, which could be susceptible to fraud. This is
also inefficient and very labor intensive.
The model-based estimate uses the assumption that the reports submitted of the current
share of unauthorized immigrants who are visa over stayers, is broken down by country of origin
and the year of arrival. It would be possible to estimate the number of visa over stayers simply
based on a demographic picture of the unauthorized population.

Direct collections of exit data would require obtaining information from DHS regarding
four pilot programs to collect data directly from travelers at certain land and air points of entry.
This programs used biometrics, or fingerprint data collection by both CBP and TSA; Radio
Frequency Identification Data (RFID) collection at certain land ports of entry which are added to
the traveler’s documents in the form of a tag; biometric data collection at certain land ports of
entry; and in 2015 the CBP began collecting biometric exit data from passengers departing on
selected international flights from ten U.S. airports. The issue with this data collection is that it
performed by a third-party and is limited to biographical data and the pilot programs mentioned
were not expanded or made permanent. The benefits in this case do not match the costs.
The third-party exit data collection, as stated in the use of direct collections of exit data,
is limited. The primary way this is collected is through DHS exit data and through information
sharing agreements of third-parties. Again, due to cost-benefit issues and limited biographical
data, this would not be beneficial in this study.
To estimate the cost of illegal immigration, the methodology would first begin with the
number estimated from the determining the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. This would
include U.S. citizen minor children of illegal aliens. This is because generally any benefits that
are sought for the minor child will more likely be utilized by the adult illegal immigrant or if the
illegal parent (s) voluntarily or involuntarily leave the U.S., they will take their children with
them. An estimation of incarceration expenses would need to be collected from the “State and
Criminal Alien Assistance Program, which provides State and local detention facilities Federal
compensation for the cost of detention of criminal and deportable aliens” (Martin, Ruark, 2013).
State and local Data from Federal and State entities such as the Department of Education, INS,
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Health and Human

Services, would need to be obtained to determine school expenses, Limited English Proficiency
enrollment, school meal programs, university enrollment, and other public assistance programs.
Incarceration assistance could be determined by interviewing prison personnel regarding the
number of illegal immigrants currently incarcerated, as well as, any information on record
regarding benefits currently being provided. Other costs may include use of police and fire
services, but those will not be included for this study.
To determine the safety effects of illegal immigration, data from the number of detainees
refused from January 2015 through January 2016 by local law enforcement agencies and ICE in
key cities with large numbers of illegal immigrants such as Chicago, San Francisco, and Miami
could be collected and compared to how many of those same illegal aliens were re-arrested, how
many had prior arrests and records, and the crimes they had committed prior to re-arrest and
after.
Using methodology from previous estimates of the unauthorized population and using the
remainder and residual estimates after subtracting the legally permanent residents (LPR),
naturalized citizens, asylum seekers, refugees, and non-immigrants. Data is taken primarily from
DHS and the American Community Survey, a survey provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. As of
2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million unauthorized individuals in the United States, with
forty-percent entering in or after the year 2000. Since 2005, the number of unauthorized
individuals accounted for fourteen percent of the total population in the United States. Fifty-nine
percent of this population is from Mexico. There are two population estimates to derive
unauthorized population estimates from; the total foreign-born population living in the United
States since 2012, and the number of LPRs on the same data (Baker, Rytina, 2012).

Data by the Migration Policy Institute, has been estimated for forty-one states and one-
hundred and eighteen counties through application rates and top countries of origins. Eligible
population estimates at the United States level are from eighteen origin countries and application
rates by country of origin (MPI, 2016). The Population Reference Bureau is another source of
methodology that provides mid-year data for Mexico’s birth rate, death rate, emigration rates.
This also provides population breakdown by country within Mexico and the United States.
Alternative methodology could be used in this analysis to produce a much more realistic
estimate of the number of illegal aliens, which is based on Border Patrol apprehension rates and
estimates of the numbers of illegals that escaped apprehension, which is referred to as “got
aways”. This methodology would not factor in amnesty because calculations to do so would
involve the following additional steps; selecting a realistic number of illegal immigrants present
in 2007 based on this research proposal or an equivalent analysis; subtracting five million illegal
aliens who were amnestied by the Obama amnesty order; extracting the number to the current
year; and factoring in increased inflow of illegal aliens based upon the incentive if future
amnesty in addition to President Obama’s non-enforcement of existing immigration laws and de-
emphasized border security.
Expected Results
The expected results will vary based on the model and analysis used. In regards to the
recidivism analysis, this will show the measurement, to a reasonably high-degree of precision,
the number of illegal immigrants that have been apprehended and those that been re-
apprehended. This however, may be limited by the assumption that intending crosser continues
to attempt to enter illegally until they succeed and whether they are equally likely to be
apprehended on every try. A possible method to improve this is to focus on the overall

probability of successful enforcement rather than focusing on apprehensions. This may allow for
more metrics and border dynamics such as illegal inflows and how the illegal border crossers
respond to enforcement.
The survey-based research provides a more detailed approach regarding patterns and
behaviors versus generic enforcement data. This would collect data on border crossing history,
the motivations for migrating, how long they stay on a trip, and even how much they pay a
smuggler. These surveys are based on actual experiences in which data points can be measured
directly compared to being estimated. Using different surveys allows for comparison against
each other and provides an alternative to possible sanitized government data that is not
systematically released to the public. Surveys have been a proven methodology used by the PEW
Research Center, DHS, and the Migration Policy Institute. The only limitation to conducting a
survey of this size is that it may under-represent the intended population and respondents may
not always provide candid responses. To improve upon the survey to accommodate for the
underrepresentation, an investment of additional resources to expand the sample size and scope
could be done to yield more accurate and detailed information. By incorporating relevant
migration-related questions into a separate survey, such as from the American Community
Survey or the Community Population Survey, this would identify additional unauthorized
households.
The advantage of using observation analysis is that is done in real-time activity. However,
the limitation is that the surveillance is concentrated in urban areas and stretches along the border
where the most illegal immigration and smuggling activity takes place. The cameras and
technological devices used cannot be broken down into counts of illegal crossings and smuggling

activities. There is also an issue with double-counting, in the case of “got aways” and “turn
backs”.
In using the model-based estimate in determining the number of visa over stayers is,
outside of observational analysis, is uncomplicated and reliable. However, the estimates are only
as good as the many assumptions associated with them. The issue in this is that there is a
nineteen-year difference between the INS report in 1997 and the DHS report in 2016. More
accurate estimates could be discovered with updated and complete information.
The expected results of this study with the methodology used is to estimate the
unauthorized population and the illegal flow between points of entry; through points of entry;
and over stays. Part of this methodology is to also show how these inflows affect the economy
and the public safety and how adopting a fair, honest, and realistic approach to immigration
enforcement can be achieved by recognizing State and local authorities as responsible partners.
An “amnesty first” strategy would encourage more illegal border crossings and result in an
unlawful presence. The proposal is intended to demonstrate that sensible and functional border
security and immigration and workplace laws are essential to focusing resources on the pressing
security threat posed by illegal immigration and the transnational criminal cartels crossing the
border into the United States.
Conclusion
Passage of a series of immigration enforcement measures in Arizona contributed to a
steep decline of forty percent in the state’s unauthorized immigrant population between 2007 and
2012. Arizona also strived to make it more difficult for employers to hire illegal immigrants.
“Arizona enacted a law in 2010 that directs a law enforcement officer to ask about a person’s

legal status in situations of reasonable suspicion that the person stopped and detained or arrested
is lawfully present in the U.S. The Obama administration sued Arizona and demonized
Arizonians in what was considered a crass effort to further its political effort” (Mayer, Carafano,
Zuckerman, 2011). States and localities have won most of the resulting lawsuits and in June of
2010, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Arizona’s Legal Workers Act, which requires
businesses to use the E-Verify system and punish businesses that hire illegal immigrants.
Other states have moved in the opposite direction extending more legal protection, while
the Federal government has badly undermined state and level immigration enforcement efforts
by issuing executive orders that shield approximately half of the illegal immigrants currently in
the U.S. from deportations. State and local level law enforcement and ICE follow a program
called the “Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security
(ACCESS) which allows localities to take action on illegal immigration if they wish to do so.
Obama rolled back both the ACCESS program and Section 287 (g) of the Immigration and
Nationalization Act” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011).
There have been advocates of a total immigration moratorium, which was estimated by
Professor Benjamin Powell of Texas Technological University as costing $229 billion annually.
A total immigration moratorium would in no way be constitutional nor would it be a benefit to
the economy. The costs vastly exceed the benefits.
A nation without borders and laws is not a nation. Laws need to be passed in accordance
with the constitutional system of government and must be enforced. This study provides
methodology to show how illegal immigration affects the economy, the public safety, and the
visa programs. This study is intended to show policy makers, academics, and government
agencies how DACA and amnesty would only enhance the illegal immigration issue, thus,

causing further damage to the economy, especially at the State and local level, and the public
safety. Illegal immigration raises the costs of infrastructure, social service benefits, crime,
increases job loss and reduces tax revenues. Failing to use the over one million law enforcement
at the State and local level makes little sense, especially when there are only six hundred ICE
agents. These two in combination would be a great force multiplier if utilized appropriately and
in a cost-benefit method. State and local law enforcement have the most familiarity with the
communities, and are in a better position to detect, detain, and deport illegal aliens.
An immigration policy that follows immigration laws, places stricter regulations on
illegal aliens that over stay their visas, that collect welfare benefits and tax revenues and credits,
and eliminates Federal funding to sanctuary cities that have been proven to purposely protect
illegal aliens and criminals, and refuse to cooperate with ICE officers and detainers should be
eliminated. States have clear authorization to act in the interests of the public safety of their own
citizens and retain the inherent authority to enforce Federal civil law per the Constitution.
Congress needs to, possibly through methods in this proposal, examine innovative and
compassionate means to efficiently process and deport illegal immigrants, while properly
funding the Customs and Immigration Service to not place unfair costs on the backs of other
immigrants seeking entry legally.

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