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Netflow &
Financial
Services
Tom Cross, Director of Security
Research
tcross@lancope.com
(770) 225-6557
Is your network secured like a house or like a bank?
“If someone breaks into your house, trying to figure where they went and
what they took is pretty difficult because, unlike a bank, you don’t have
cameras in your house, you don’t have motion sensors,” says Jason
Syversen, chief executive officer of Siege Technologies, a security firm in
Manchester, N.H. “In terms of cybersecurity, most companies are more like
a house than a bank.”
33© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Perimeter Security
• Much of the practice of computer security has to do with
making sure the doors are locked.
– When we have incidents we spend more money on prevention.
– We tend to assume that if the bad guys are in, its game over.
• Systems will stop working or money will be instantly stolen.
44© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Audit Trail Sources
• Syslog/SIEM
– Are you collecting everything?
– You can’t trust compromised
hosts
• Netflow
– Lots of breadth, less depth
– Lower disk space requirements
• Full Packet Capture
– Deep but not broad
– Expensive
– High disk space requirements
5
Tradeoffs:
• Record everything vs
only bad things
• Breadth vs Depth
• Time vs Depth
• Privacy
5© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
DMZ
VPN
Internal
Network
Internet
3G
Internet
3G
Internet
Network Visibility
6© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Transactional Audits of ALL activities
7© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Netflow Basics
• Devices with one or more Flow producing interfaces are
“Exporters”
• Exporters cache and forward records to “Collectors”
• Common Exporters include firewalls, switches, and routers
8
NetFlow Collector
Internet
DMZ
VPN
3G
NetFlow Packets
src and dst ip
src and dst port
start time
end time
mac address
byte count
- more -
How do I want to cache information
Which interface do I want to monitor?
What data do I want to meter?
Router(config)# flow record my-record
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 destination address
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 source address
Router(config-flow-record)# collect counter bytes
Where do I want my data sent?
Router(config)# flow exporter my-exporter
Router(config-flow-exporter)# destination 1.1.1.1
Router(config)# flow monitor my-monitor
Router(config-flow-monitor)# exporter my-exporter
Router(config-flow-monitor)# record my-record
Router(config)# interface gi0/1
Router(config-if)# ip flow monitor my-monitor input
1. Configure the Exporter
2. Configure the Flow Record
3. Configure the Flow Monitor
4. Apply to an Interface
9
DMZ
VPN
Internal
Network
Internet
NetFlow Packets
src and dst ip
src and dst port
start time
end time
mac address
byte count
- more -
NetFlow
3G
Internet
3G
Internet
NetFlow
NetFlow
NetFlow
Internal Visibility Through NetFlow
NetFlow
NetFlow Collector
10© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Netflow Advantages
• Its easy to configure
– Your network already speaks it
– Its standardized
– It doesn’t need to be configured on every endpoint
• Visibility down to the access layer
• Compact records are inexpensive to store
11
NetFlow Collector
Internet
DMZ
VPN
3G
NetFlow Packets
src and dst ip
src and dst port
start time
end time
mac address
byte count
- more -
Intrusion Audit Trails
1:06:15 PM:
Internal Host
Visits Malicious
Web Site
1:06:30 PM:
Malware Infection
Complete, Accesses
Internet Command and
Control
1:06:35 PM:
Malware begins
scanning internal
network
1:13:59 PM:
Multiple internal
infected hosts
1:07:00 PM:
Gateway malware analysis
identifies the transaction
as malicious
1:14:00 PM:
Administrators
manually disconnect
the initial infected host
Do you know what went on while you were mitigating?
12© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
13
Following IOC
Malware campaign
targeting your industry
has been publicly
disclosed.
A quick search of your
network audit trail
reveals an internal host
that accessed the
malicious site.
14
Following IOC
Check host details around that time
Suspicious HTTP connections right after contact- good candidate for a drive-by download
Suspicious download followed by a reverse SSH shell. Most SSH bytes sent by “client”
15
Following IOC
Attacker recons your network. Investigate any hosts contacted by the compromised host.
Additionally- look for any other hosts scanning for 445 and 135.
16
Following IOC
Since we have uncovered a new IOC (IP address controlling the reverse SSH shell), we
Should check to see if that host has touched the network anywhere else.
Another host showing a reverse shell
A Four Dimensional View of Attacker Behavior
• A sophisticated attack on a network involves a series of steps
• Traditional thinking views any system compromise as a successful breach
• Any successful action taken to stop an infection prior to data exfiltration can be
considered a win
• This is the Kill Chain concept introduced by Mike Cloppert at Lockheed
• Controls should be put in place at each stage of the chain
17
Recon
Exploitation
(Social Engineering?)
Initial
Infection
Internal
Pivot
Data
Preparation
& Exfiltration
Command
and
Control
17© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Changing Nature of Incident Response
18
Detect
RespondAnalyze
Distill
Intel
Continuous Response is the centerpiece of advanced threat defense.
18© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Factors driving the change:
• The persistent nature of the threat.
• Other organizations aren’t
necessarily experiencing the same
attacks.
• The desire to collect threat
intelligence that can be used to
detect future incidents.
Threat Intelligence Sharing
1919© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
• IT cannot address insider threat by itself
– People have a tendency to think that IT is solely responsible for all computer security issues.
• Legal: Are policies in place? Are they realistic? Does legal support IT practices?
• HR: Who is coming and going? Who has workplace issues? Are there soft solutions?
• IT: Is the privacy of end users adequately protected?
• What impact on workplace harmony are policies, monitoring, and enforcement having?
• Are you applying policies consistently?
Combating Insider Threat is a
multidisciplinary challenge
2020© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
IT
HR Legal
Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE)
• Cisco ISE is a context aware, policy based 802.1x authentication solution
• Detect
– Device type, operating system and patch level
– Time and location from which user attempting to gain access
21
User Name MAC Address Device Type
Bob.Smith
8c:77:12:a5:64:05
(Samsung
Electronics Co.,Ltd)
Android
John.Doe
10:9a:dd:27:cb:70
(Apple Inc)
Apple-iPhone
Lancope Identity 1000
22
23
User Reports
24
User Reports
25
User Reports
26
Flow Statistical Analysis
26© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
27© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Suspect Data Hoarding
Unusually large amount of data
inbound from other hosts
Scan Detection – External Recon and
Internal Pivoting
2828© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
HeartBleed Detection in StealthWatch
2007 2014
March
StealthWatch
Introduces
Suspect Long
Flow Alarm
March
OpenSSL with
HeartBleed
vulnerability
released
April 7
HeartBleed
vulnerability
publicly
disclosed
Sometime
Later…
You patched
your servers
April 8
Attackers hijack
SSL VPN
connections
with HeartBleed,
bypassing
two-factor
authentication
April 15
Teenager
arrested for
siphoning
data from
the Canadian
Revenue Agency
using HeartBleed
2012
30©2011 Lancope , Inc. All Rights Reserved. Company
Investigating Performance Issues
DDOS Attacks More Automated & Powerful
• Prolexic Q2 2012 to Q2 2013
– 33% increase in attacks
– 925% increase in bandwidth
• 4.47 Gbps to 49.24 Gbps
– 1655% increase in packets per second
• 2.7 Mpps to 47.4 Mpps
StealthWatch DDoS Dashboards
© 2012 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved. 32
Top Targeted
Hosts
Application traffic
view (drill down
into spikes)
Alarms for
Internet facing
applications
Custom Flow
Maps
Overall traffic
views (drill down
into spikes)
Top target hosts
End to End Visibility of DDoS Activity
Visualize Alarms,
traffic anomalies and
network degradation
Understand impact to
back-end applications
34
Relational anomaly detection can identify
internal pivoting
Secure Zone
34© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
Thank You
Tom Cross, Director of Security
Research
tcross@lancope.com
(770) 225-6557

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Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime

  • 1. Netflow & Financial Services Tom Cross, Director of Security Research tcross@lancope.com (770) 225-6557
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  • 3. Is your network secured like a house or like a bank? “If someone breaks into your house, trying to figure where they went and what they took is pretty difficult because, unlike a bank, you don’t have cameras in your house, you don’t have motion sensors,” says Jason Syversen, chief executive officer of Siege Technologies, a security firm in Manchester, N.H. “In terms of cybersecurity, most companies are more like a house than a bank.” 33© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 4. Perimeter Security • Much of the practice of computer security has to do with making sure the doors are locked. – When we have incidents we spend more money on prevention. – We tend to assume that if the bad guys are in, its game over. • Systems will stop working or money will be instantly stolen. 44© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 5. Audit Trail Sources • Syslog/SIEM – Are you collecting everything? – You can’t trust compromised hosts • Netflow – Lots of breadth, less depth – Lower disk space requirements • Full Packet Capture – Deep but not broad – Expensive – High disk space requirements 5 Tradeoffs: • Record everything vs only bad things • Breadth vs Depth • Time vs Depth • Privacy 5© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 7. Transactional Audits of ALL activities 7© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 8. Netflow Basics • Devices with one or more Flow producing interfaces are “Exporters” • Exporters cache and forward records to “Collectors” • Common Exporters include firewalls, switches, and routers 8 NetFlow Collector Internet DMZ VPN 3G NetFlow Packets src and dst ip src and dst port start time end time mac address byte count - more -
  • 9. How do I want to cache information Which interface do I want to monitor? What data do I want to meter? Router(config)# flow record my-record Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 destination address Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 source address Router(config-flow-record)# collect counter bytes Where do I want my data sent? Router(config)# flow exporter my-exporter Router(config-flow-exporter)# destination 1.1.1.1 Router(config)# flow monitor my-monitor Router(config-flow-monitor)# exporter my-exporter Router(config-flow-monitor)# record my-record Router(config)# interface gi0/1 Router(config-if)# ip flow monitor my-monitor input 1. Configure the Exporter 2. Configure the Flow Record 3. Configure the Flow Monitor 4. Apply to an Interface 9
  • 10. DMZ VPN Internal Network Internet NetFlow Packets src and dst ip src and dst port start time end time mac address byte count - more - NetFlow 3G Internet 3G Internet NetFlow NetFlow NetFlow Internal Visibility Through NetFlow NetFlow NetFlow Collector 10© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 11. Netflow Advantages • Its easy to configure – Your network already speaks it – Its standardized – It doesn’t need to be configured on every endpoint • Visibility down to the access layer • Compact records are inexpensive to store 11 NetFlow Collector Internet DMZ VPN 3G NetFlow Packets src and dst ip src and dst port start time end time mac address byte count - more -
  • 12. Intrusion Audit Trails 1:06:15 PM: Internal Host Visits Malicious Web Site 1:06:30 PM: Malware Infection Complete, Accesses Internet Command and Control 1:06:35 PM: Malware begins scanning internal network 1:13:59 PM: Multiple internal infected hosts 1:07:00 PM: Gateway malware analysis identifies the transaction as malicious 1:14:00 PM: Administrators manually disconnect the initial infected host Do you know what went on while you were mitigating? 12© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 13. 13 Following IOC Malware campaign targeting your industry has been publicly disclosed. A quick search of your network audit trail reveals an internal host that accessed the malicious site.
  • 14. 14 Following IOC Check host details around that time Suspicious HTTP connections right after contact- good candidate for a drive-by download Suspicious download followed by a reverse SSH shell. Most SSH bytes sent by “client”
  • 15. 15 Following IOC Attacker recons your network. Investigate any hosts contacted by the compromised host. Additionally- look for any other hosts scanning for 445 and 135.
  • 16. 16 Following IOC Since we have uncovered a new IOC (IP address controlling the reverse SSH shell), we Should check to see if that host has touched the network anywhere else. Another host showing a reverse shell
  • 17. A Four Dimensional View of Attacker Behavior • A sophisticated attack on a network involves a series of steps • Traditional thinking views any system compromise as a successful breach • Any successful action taken to stop an infection prior to data exfiltration can be considered a win • This is the Kill Chain concept introduced by Mike Cloppert at Lockheed • Controls should be put in place at each stage of the chain 17 Recon Exploitation (Social Engineering?) Initial Infection Internal Pivot Data Preparation & Exfiltration Command and Control 17© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 18. The Changing Nature of Incident Response 18 Detect RespondAnalyze Distill Intel Continuous Response is the centerpiece of advanced threat defense. 18© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved. Factors driving the change: • The persistent nature of the threat. • Other organizations aren’t necessarily experiencing the same attacks. • The desire to collect threat intelligence that can be used to detect future incidents.
  • 19. Threat Intelligence Sharing 1919© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 20. • IT cannot address insider threat by itself – People have a tendency to think that IT is solely responsible for all computer security issues. • Legal: Are policies in place? Are they realistic? Does legal support IT practices? • HR: Who is coming and going? Who has workplace issues? Are there soft solutions? • IT: Is the privacy of end users adequately protected? • What impact on workplace harmony are policies, monitoring, and enforcement having? • Are you applying policies consistently? Combating Insider Threat is a multidisciplinary challenge 2020© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved. IT HR Legal
  • 21. Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) • Cisco ISE is a context aware, policy based 802.1x authentication solution • Detect – Device type, operating system and patch level – Time and location from which user attempting to gain access 21 User Name MAC Address Device Type Bob.Smith 8c:77:12:a5:64:05 (Samsung Electronics Co.,Ltd) Android John.Doe 10:9a:dd:27:cb:70 (Apple Inc) Apple-iPhone
  • 26. 26 Flow Statistical Analysis 26© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 27. 27© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved. Suspect Data Hoarding Unusually large amount of data inbound from other hosts
  • 28. Scan Detection – External Recon and Internal Pivoting 2828© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 29. HeartBleed Detection in StealthWatch 2007 2014 March StealthWatch Introduces Suspect Long Flow Alarm March OpenSSL with HeartBleed vulnerability released April 7 HeartBleed vulnerability publicly disclosed Sometime Later… You patched your servers April 8 Attackers hijack SSL VPN connections with HeartBleed, bypassing two-factor authentication April 15 Teenager arrested for siphoning data from the Canadian Revenue Agency using HeartBleed 2012
  • 30. 30©2011 Lancope , Inc. All Rights Reserved. Company Investigating Performance Issues
  • 31. DDOS Attacks More Automated & Powerful • Prolexic Q2 2012 to Q2 2013 – 33% increase in attacks – 925% increase in bandwidth • 4.47 Gbps to 49.24 Gbps – 1655% increase in packets per second • 2.7 Mpps to 47.4 Mpps
  • 32. StealthWatch DDoS Dashboards © 2012 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved. 32 Top Targeted Hosts Application traffic view (drill down into spikes) Alarms for Internet facing applications Custom Flow Maps Overall traffic views (drill down into spikes) Top target hosts
  • 33. End to End Visibility of DDoS Activity Visualize Alarms, traffic anomalies and network degradation Understand impact to back-end applications
  • 34. 34 Relational anomaly detection can identify internal pivoting Secure Zone 34© 2013 Lancope, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 35. Thank You Tom Cross, Director of Security Research tcross@lancope.com (770) 225-6557