1. 1
Advocacy from the Shadows:
The Hybrid Nature of Burmese Cross-Border Advocacy Work
By Leslie Campbell
A thesissubmitted to Professor James Radner and Professor Paul Kingston as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for a Bachelor of Science Specialist in International Development Studies,
University of Toronto at Scarborough
April 2008

2. 2
Acknowledgements
I am deeplygrateful tomythesissupervisor,ProfessorJamesRadner,whosepatience anddirection
were an incredible helpinguidingme throughthisprocess. Yourencouragement,suggestionsand
insightwere invaluable inhelpingputthistogether. Thankyoualsoto ProfessorPaul Kingstonforyour
guidance andsupervision.
My deepthanksalsotomy friendsandfamilyfortheirsupportandencouragementbothduringmy
placementandinwritingmythesis. Iam alsoindebtedtoCorinne, SamandKayfor theirtirelessediting
assistance,thoughtfulconversationandadvice.
In addition,Iowe adebtof gratitude toall of those inSoutheastAsiawhohelpedmake thisresearch
possible. Tomy friendsandworkcolleaguesinChiangMai,andto the membersof the Burmese
organizationswhowere sopatientandopenwithme indiscussingtheirorganizations,your
contributionswere whatmade thisresearchpossible.
Finally,aheartfeltthankyoutothe Burmese studentswhofirstinspiredme to researchtheircountry,
and whotaught me so muchabout the meaningof kindness.

3. 3
List of Acronyms
AFPFL Anti-FacistPeople’sFreedomLeague
ASEAN Associationof SoutheastAsianNations
BSPP Burmese SocialistProgramParty
INGO International NongovernmentOranization
MMCWA Myanmar Mothersand ChildWelfare Association
MRC Myanmar RedCross
NGO NongovernmentOrganization
NLD National League of Democracy
UN UnitedNationas
SLORC State Law and OrderRestorationCouncil
SPDC State Peace and DevelopmentCouncil
USDO UnionSolidarityandDevelopmentOrganization

4. 4
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................................2
List of acronyms ...............................................................................................................................................................3
Chapter 1: Introduction..................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 The research question..........................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Significance of the study......................................................................................................................................8
1.3 Outline of the paper .............................................................................................................................................9
Chapter 2: Methodology ..............................................................................................................................................11
2.1 Research approach.............................................................................................................................................11
2.2 Methods ...............................................................................................................................................................13
2.3 Limitations............................................................................................................................................................16
2.4 Positionality .........................................................................................................................................................16
Chapter 3: A History of Bumese Authoritarianism ..................................................................................................18
3.1 The Origins of Burmese Authoritarianism......................................................................................................18
3.1.1 World War II to Independence (1942-1948)..........................................................................................18
3.1.2 Coalition Rule (1948-1962) .......................................................................................................................20
3.1.3 The Socialist Period (1962-1987).............................................................................................................21
3.1.4 1988 Uprisingand the Rise of the SLORC ...............................................................................................23
3.1.5SLORC/SPDC Rule in Burma (1988-Present)............................................................................................24
3.2 The Perpetuation of Burmese Authoritarianism...........................................................................................26
3.3 Cracks in the Armor: Weaknesses in the Burmese Authoritarian Regime ...............................................30
3.4 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................33
Chapter 4:Burmese Civil Society .................................................................................................................................34
4.1 A Discussion of the Terms .................................................................................................................................34
4.1.1 The Issue.......................................................................................................................................................34
4.1.2 The State.......................................................................................................................................................36
4.1.3 Civil Society ..................................................................................................................................................37
4.1.4 The State and Civil Society: The Case of the Transformative State ...................................................39
4.1.5The Spectrum of Outcomes for State-Society Interaction ...................................................................42
4.2 State and Civil Society in Burma.......................................................................................................................43
4.2.1 Civil Society during the Pre-colonial and Colonial Periods (Pre-1948)..............................................45
4.2.2 Civil Society during the Parliamentary Period (1948-1962)................................................................50
4.2.3 Civil Society during the Socialist Period (1962-1988)...........................................................................53
4.2.4Contemporary Civil Society in Burma (1988-Present)...........................................................................55
Chapter 5: Case Study: Burmese NGOs in Northern Thailand...............................................................................62
5.1 An Overview of the Organizations Studied....................................................................................................63
5.2 A Discussion of the Interview Data ..................................................................................................................76
5.2.1 Civil Society during the Pre-colonial and Colonial Periods (Pre-1948)..............................................76

5. 5
5.2.2 Limited Adherence to Migdal’s Spectrum..............................................................................................78
5.2.3 Purcell’s Contributions to Understanding the Paradox .......................................................................82
5.2.4Shadow Networks ........................................................................................................................................87
5.2.5The Hybrid Nature of Organizational Activities......................................................................................88
5.3 Organizational Challenges .................................................................................................................................90
5.3.1 Security and Organizational Restrictions................................................................................................90
5.3.2Trust...............................................................................................................................................................91
5.3.3 Access to Conflict Zones ............................................................................................................................95
5.4 Strategic Commonalities....................................................................................................................................96
5.4.1 Working with Authorities ..........................................................................................................................96
5.4.2 Use of a Training of Trainers Methodology............................................................................................98
5.4.3 Capitalizing on Kin Networks ....................................................................................................................99
5.4.4 Working with Other Organizations to Increase Legitimacy..............................................................100
5.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................................102
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Further Research.......................................................................................................103
6.1 An Areas for Further Research......................................................................................................................103
6.2 Concluding Thoughts.......................................................................................................................................105
Reference List..............................................................................................................................................................109
APPENDIX A .................................................................................................................................................................112
APPENDIX B .................................................................................................................................................................113
APPENDIX C .................................................................................................................................................................114
APPENDIX D .................................................................................................................................................................115
APPENDIX E..................................................................................................................................................................116

6. 6
Chapter 1: Introduction
In May 2008, I began a twelve month placement in Chiang Mai, Thailand working with a
local partner organization of CUSO, a Canadian volunteer sending organization1. My placement
organization was an unregistered Burmese run NGO that operated a model farm project and
training program for students who would arrive from Burma to receive 10 months of
environmental awareness and sustainable agriculture training before returning to Burma.
As I learned more about the organization’s activities and about the local context, I
became more and more intrigued by their ability to strategically position themselves so that
they could operate within what appeared to be a very tightly controlled Burmese state. My
organization was moving students back and forth across the Thai-Burma border illegally for this
training and conducting sensitive research inside Burma. Either of these activities would be
grounds for the organization’s termination, and it immediately became clear that hiding aspects
of the organization’s work was of the utmost importance if it was to continue to operate. At
the same time, the organization was using the information it gathered inside Burma to inform
high profile advocacy campaigns and publications in an attempt to raise the awareness of
environmental issue and human rights abuses inside Burma. While these activities brought
attention to important issues in Burma, they also raised the organization’s profile, increasing
the risk that its unregistered activity would be discovered.
In getting to know the Burmese NGO community in Chiang Mai and along the Thai-
Burma border, I realized that there were many organizations employing similar strategies,
appearing to put themselves at risk in order to raise the profile of important issues in Burma,
1 See Appendix E for a map of Thailand

7. 7
yet continuing to operate over long periods of time in a risky and restrictive operating
environment. The apparent contradiction in the operating strategies of these organizations
motivated me to investigate the nature of this contradiction more closely, and my search
revealed some surprising results.
1.1 The Research Question
This thesis is the result of my attempts to explain what is so distinctive about how
Burmese cross-border organizations deal with the restrictive operating environments inside
Burma and in a broader sense, to explain how that fits into the academic frameworks regarding
the complex relationship between state and civil society. In answering these questions, I
identified three main challenges and four common strategies these organizations use to
address these challenges. What becomes clear through analysis and comparison with the
literature is that these organizations are not modifying parts of different strategies in order to
combine them and form new ones. Instead they are taking each strategy as it is and using it in
an unmodified fashion, in combination with a unique set of other strategies to form a hybrid set
of strategies designed to facilitate their operations. To use a metaphor, if these strategies were
colors, the organizations would not be mixing blues and reds to make purples, but using a set of
complementary colors to paint a unique picture of the organizational activity. This activity is
partly obscured outside the realm of the state, allowing organizations to operate clandestinely
inside Burma and partly in plain view in terms of their advocacy campaigns and lobbying work.
In this way, these organizations have carved out a unique position straddling the divide
between the formal and informal sectors.

8. 8
1.2 Significance of the study
This study is important to Burma given the recent increases in NGO activity there. Since
the early 1950s, NGOs have played an increasingly important role in the political economy of
development. This has occurred in combination with increased collaboration between
governments and aid agencies based on the belief that NGOs could offer an alternative
development model (Mercer, 2002). NGOs are just one type of civil organization that are said
to prosper within the larger arena referred to as civil society. Civil society refers to the spaces
outside of the state and the marketplace that contains advocacy groups, agents of social
movements, the voluntary sector and other societal actors involved in working for change (Van
Rooy, 2008). An examination of civil society in reference to Burma provides a unique case,
because of the long and complex history of restrictive authoritarianism which has shaped the
state and affected the development of civil society.
In a world where many governments are still authoritarian and there is interest in the
nature of transitions to democracy, understanding the roles that NGOs play is both valuable
and interesting. According to Liddel (2000)
The development and maintenance of civil society[…] depends upon the citizens of any
state being able to enjoy fundamental freedoms: freedom of thought, opinion,
expression, association and movement. Underscoring and defending these freedoms
must be an independent judiciary and the guarantee of the rule of law. In Burma today,
none of these conditions exist. (54)
Despite the claims that Burma lacks the elements necessary for the development of civil
society, my observations of Burmese organizations tells a different, more complicated story.

9. 9
My research will shed light on this gap between academic rhetoric on state-civil society
relations and reality. In doing so, it also highlights some significant shortcomings in the
literature, which is unable to capture the nuances of the environment in which these
organizations operate.
Overall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature on civil society in
authoritarian contexts by providing a case study analysis of civil society organizations that have
adapted to their unique circumstances to forge a relationship with the state and with each
other that cannot be fit into dominant frameworks. It highlights the important fact that
situations in reality tend to be significantly more complex than their theoretical counterparts.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
This paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter one has given an introduction to the
research question and its significance, while Chapter two details the methodology and
limitations of this research. Chapter three is an examination of the history of authoritarianism
in Burma, tracing its roots from its time as a British colony and chronicling the rise of
authoritarian rule in Burma. It also takes a close look at the contemporary Burmese state,
examining the mechanisms by which it asserts its domination as well as the weaknesses in its
position, weaknesses civil society organizations capitalize on to secure their positions. With the
context of the authoritarian state well established, Chapter four shifts focus to the relationship
between the Burmese state and civil society and examining how civil society developed and
changed alongside the development of the Burmese state. It also examines relevant theoretical
literature on state-civil society relationships and discusses their applicability to the Burmese

10. 10
case. Chapter five introduces the case study of Burmese cross-border organizations and
discusses the considerable complexities of cross-border work, highlighting the use of seemingly
contradictory strategies in careful combination as the major adaptation of these organizations
to their unique operating environment. Finally, Chapter six provides a summary of the research
findings and highlights a number of areas for potential further research.

11. 11
Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Research Approach
My research changed focus and direction a number of times before settling on the
topics that make up this final product. These shifts were informed by my experiences gathering
information and going through the process of conducting first hand research. I knew that my
interests lay in the Burmese NGO sector, a sector I conveniently happened to be working in at
the time, and that I wanted to explore the ways in which this sector interacted with its unique
context in Burma and Northern Thailand. I was especially interested in the operational
differences between Burmese organizations operating in Burma and those working from
Thailand and originally hoped to do a comparative study of the two, but I was soon told I would
not be allowed to travel to Burma. In response I shifted my focus to the cross-border portion of
the Burmese NGO sector, a portion that was heavily represented in Chiang Mai. I was also
conscious of the fact that being a staff member of one of the type of organizations on which I
would base my research would give me a unique perspective and would put me in a better
position to critically examine the literature on the subject.
My research allowed me to get an insider’s view of the reality faced by local NGOs and
to compare it to the relevant academic theory. I was working within a cross-border Burmese
NGO and was also integrated into the tightly knit Burmese NGO community in Chiang Mai,
helping my organization forge connections which I eventually came to realize were an integral
part of its operations. These connections also became useful when it came time to select
organizations to include in my research, but this will be discussed later.

12. 12
My co-workers were aware that I was going to be conducting a research project and
were very supportive of it out of an appreciation of the benefits of further research on the
Burmese NGO sector. They encouraged me to ask questions and were very open and
accommodating of my efforts to gain a better understanding of its complexities. The more I
learned, the more I was struck by the nuanced ways in which these organizations were shaped
by their environments operating cross-border, while at the same time trying to shape social
space inside Burma. It took some time for me to feel that I had an adequate enough
understanding of Burmese NGOs to begin asking informed questions, but when I did they were
focussed on the unique combinations of strategies these organizations employed and how this
contributed to their effectiveness in pursuing their goals. This was the focus of my research
interviews. These interviews took place near the end of my time in Thailand and the analysis of
my data took place once I was back in Canada.
After conducting my research and conducting a rigorous search of the literature on
effectiveness, I found that I unfortunately did not have the data I would need to conclusively
answer my initial questions on whether or not these organizational strategies were truly
effective. As a result, my analysis shifted its focus from the effectiveness of these various
strategies to the strategies themselves. Further literature review from this perspective
revealed a fascinating and nuanced element to my data, and trends began to appear. By
thoroughly analyzing my interview data for patterns and comparing it to both my personal
observations and my findings from an extensive sweep of the relevant literature, I was able to
bring all of the elements of my research together to form my thesis.

13. 13
2.2 Methods
Participant observation took place over the course of 12 months living and working in
close proximity to the Burmese NGO sector in Chiang Mai, Thailand. I took every opportunity to
participate in NGO activities, visit other organizations and travel around Northern Thailand to
better inform my picture of the NGO sector. During this time I kept a regularly updated journal
of my activities, and also carried around a notebook whenever possible to write down things
potentially relevant to my research. These measures proved invaluable in allowing me to
inform my thesis with personal observations made while in the field.
Qualitative research in the form of detailed one on one and small group interviews were
conducted with seven different organizations between April and May 20082. The majority of
interviews took place with the organization founder and/or director although some staff
members were also interviewed. All interviews took place in or just outside the city of Chiang
Mai, Thailand.3
The organizations involved in my research were chosen based on the fact that they were
conducting cross-border work inside Burma while also operating in Chiang Mai Thailand. This
gave me easy access to the organizations and also provided a self limiting set of research
subjects. It had the further benefit of ensuring that the organizations were as similar as
possible which increased the simplicity and accuracy of results comparison and trend analysis. I
gained a list of most of the cross-border NGOs in Chiang Mai by asking six of my personal
contacts from different organizations in the Burmese NGO community. No accurate formal list
2 For a description of the organizations and the people interviewed from each one, pleasesee Appendix C.
3 WhileI had originally planned to conduct a comparativestudy by doingresearch in Burma as well as in Thailand,I
was unableto get permission to travel insideBurma and had to limitmy research to ChiangMai instead.

14. 14
exists because many of these organizations are unregistered. The lists were virtually identical,
which led me to believe that it was complete. There were a number of organizations that I was
unable to interview because of scheduling constraints and limited research time, but I feel
confident that the organizations included in this study represent an accurate sample of the
larger body of cross-border Burmese organizations operating in Chiang Mai and included mostly
Burmese but also some foreign staff members.
The interview process itself was a rigorous one, closely following the instructions for
qualitative interviews outlined in Densecombe (2007). I began by creating a list of interview
questions designed to gain as much relevant information as possible about each organization.
These questions can be found in Appendix A.
I began each interview by giving the interviewees background information on who I was
and what my research was focussed on, making sure to give interviewees the chance to ask
questions if there was anything they were unsure of. Before beginning the questions, I also
went over an Interview Consent Form with each of the interviewees, a copy of which can be
found in Appendix B.
Interviews began with simple questions about the organization itself before moving into
more probing questions about the general operating structures of the organizations. After a
picture of the organization had been formed, questions changed focus to examine the
challenges, these organizations face working cross-border and the strategies they used to
address these challenges. After my first two interviews, I modified the wording of the
questions, making them clearer and thus more easily understood by interview participants. I
followed the interview questions loosely, using a mixture of structured and unstructured

15. 15
interview techniques. My main goal was to gain as much information as possible about each
organization and I asked follow-up questions to explore areas highlighted by the interviewee if
they were not covered by my interview questions. Occasionally questions were skipped, either
because of time constraints or because the interviewee was unable to understand what was
being asked.
If interviewees consented, I would use a recording device during the interviews while
also taking notes on what was said and on the overall demeanor of the interviewee, noting
things that would not be captured by the audio recording4. While the use of a recording device
appeared to make some participants nervous, as evidenced by their fidgeting with the recorder
during the interview or appearing uncomfortable, these signs of nervousness quickly
disappeared as the interviewees became more comfortable with me. Qualitative data on each
organization was also gathered from internal documents, newsletters, journal publications,
promotional brochures and websites from the various organizations.
Following the interviews, I transcribed the recordings in their entirety. From these
transcriptions, I developed a set of informational notes on each organization, which were later
transferred to a matrix to allow for side by side thematic analysis as a way to look for trends
within the data. I then conducted a thorough search of the secondary literature, and reviewed
each organization from the perspective of the various categories identified by my secondary
research.
4 Organization Hwas the only organization not comfortable with me record our interview. To compensate for the
lack of a recording,I was especially detailed in my notes from this interview, although no quotes from this
organization arecontained in the text.

16. 16
2.3 Limitations
My research was severely limited by the fact that I was unable to gain security clearance
to travel to Burma to conduct interviews. While I was able to gain enough information about
the activities of the organizations that participated in my study to comment on their work in
Burma, it would have been far easier and would potentially have provided a more accurate
picture of their work had I been permitted to go and see it for myself.
I was also limited by the sensitive nature of my research topic. While participants were
for the most part very open about their activities, some were not comfortable sharing certain
aspects of their organizational activities. In some cases participants asked me to skip certain
questions about their activities, but there were a number of other instances in which I
suspected that interview participants were not being entirely truthful in their answers based on
my prior knowledge of their organizational activities.
2.4 Positionality
I feel that my position as a young Canadian university student assisted in my conducting
research in various ways. I found that I was able to get an audience with the executive
directors of some organizations on very short notice, and found that I was often treated with a
level of respect beyond what I would have expected had I been conducting the same research
in Canada. Considering the nature of the interview subjects, I found NGO staff incredibly open
and willing to discuss the nature of their work with me for the purposes of my research.
Despite my conscious efforts not to be overly exploitative of this position of power, I still feel

17. 17
that it had an impact on the information I was able to gather and on the way the research
process took place.

18. 18
Chapter 3: A History of Burmese Authoritarianism
In order to fully understand the spaces in which Burmese NGOs operate, it is first
necessary to examine the unique nature of authoritarianism in Burma. Despite the
authoritarian stranglehold of the military regime on Burmese civil society, there still appears to
be spaces it has not managed to close. It is within these informally created spaces that much of
the clandestine NGO work that goes on in Burma takes place. Section 3.1 in this chapter places
the dictatorial nature of the contemporary Burmese state within a historical context by
examining the origins of authoritarian rule in Burma. Section 3.2 moves on to discuss the
mechanisms by which the government continues to maintain tight control over NGO activity.
Section 3.3 then goes on to examine the nature of weaknesses in the Burmese state despite its
best efforts to curtail counter-authoritarian activity and put forth an image of strength. This
chapter paints a picture of the state in Burma as inflexible and authoritarian, yet unable to
exert total control. The importance of this context becomes evident in Chapter 4 which
discusses the ways in which this authoritarian state has shaped civil society in Burma.
3.1 The Origins of Burmese Authoritarianism
3.1.1 World War II to Independence (1942-1948)
Although the history of Burma extends back to the founding of the kingdom of Bagan in
849AD, this discussion of the development of the origins of Burmese authoritarianism begins
with the post-independence period in Burma. Prior to 1942, issues of state legitimacy in Burma
were largely irrelevant due to the external power of the ruling British-Indian Empire, which
allowed the colonial state to maintain dominance in spite of its perceived illegitimacy.

19. 19
Beginning in 1942 with the commencement of the Second World War, Burma experienced a
radical alteration in the relationship between state and civil society as the state lost its
previously hegemonic position as the creator of political order and economic direction (Taylor,
2009). As the World War 2 began, British forces withdrew and were briefly replaced by
invading Japanese forces who filled the now empty political positions formerly held by Burma’s
imperial rulers with a mixture of Japanese army officers and Burmese politicians who agreed to
abide by the terms of the new regime. This removal of British power represented a weakening
of the Burmese state, and in response political groups mobilized in support of Burma’s
independence causing the political environment to become increasingly tumultuous (Taylor,
2009). The end of World War 2 and the Japanese defeat brought the brief restoration of
colonial authority, as British and Indian forces attempted to re-institute themselves as the
Burmese rulers. This was a task that was quickly proven to be more difficult than expected.
The sudden dislocation of the imperial state in 1942 had meant that those formerly on
the periphery of colonial society were able to gain new positions and wealth unhindered by old
authority structures. This involved everything from the assumption of abandoned property by
indigenous groups to the filling of governing roles by those previously shut out of the political
process (Taylor, 2009). As a result of this, British officials met heavy resistance when they
attempted to take back positions that had been held by Burmese during the war. Their task
was made even more difficult by the fact that British prestige had suffered during the
intervening years of the war, leading to the strengthening of ideological opposition to the
colonial structures (Mutebi, 2005). Despite ideological disagreements, major political
opposition groups put aside their differences and came together under the Anti-Fascist People’s

20. 20
Freedom League (AFPFL) to apply pressure on the British to depart from Burma. Recognizing
the danger in attempting to hold onto power in the face of such widespread armed resistance,
Britain agreed to grant Burma’s independence (Taylor, 2009)
3.1.2 Coalition Rule (1948-1962)
From independence in 1948 until the military coup in 1958, Burma was ruled by the
AFPL political coalition. Burma was for the most part economically stable during this period and
was heavily involved in international trade, especially out of the capital of Rangoon (Lintner,
1988). During this period of coalition government, the Burmese political systemincluded
legally contested plural centers of power much different than those seen today. There was an
active and critical opposition party, courts ran largely unimpeded, and minority groups were
represented in the bicameral National Assembly. Although minority areas of the country had
limited autonomy, their partial self-governance was part of the pluralist state structure (Selth,
2000).
This is not to say that the period of parliamentary rule was without friction. The years of
the coalition were also characterized by constant civil war, and continual changes to the public
administration system as officials attempted unsuccessfully to improve on the bureaucratic
system that had been in place under British rule (Mutebi, 2004). A stable administration
system, like those eventually established in India and Sri Lanka after the withdrawal of Britain
was never reached. The state had become a rival object for control. Opposition groups sought
to dislodge those who were in power and the capture of state power became the purpose of
almost all political action. No group was willing to allow the state to rule unimpeded, resulting

21. 21
in a stalemate. This was one of the only periods in Burma’s history where non-state institutions
were often seen as more powerful than the state itself (Taylor, 2004).
3.1.3 The Socialist Period (1962-1987)
Burma’s pluralist experiment came to an end on March 2, 1962 when the military,
headed by General Ne Win seized power in a military coup, carried out in the name of ensuring
the continued unity of the nation in the face of ethnic rebellions (Taylor, 2004). This signaled
the beginning of a period of heavy-handed authoritarian rule in Burma that was to continue
through the rest of the 20th century, and into the 21st.
Following the coup, Burma’s experiment with parliamentary rule came to an abrupt
halt. Socialismwas the central rationale during this period, and an authoritarian ruling style
was seen as the best way to put necessary policies in place. The military portrayed itself as
leading the country towards a glorious socialist future, following a set of policies that it dubbed
“The Burmese Way to Socialism” (Selth, 2000). All legal centers of pluralism were ordered to
be destroyed. Burma’s borders were sealed off and ties were cut with neighboring country in
an attempt to purge foreign economic influence and control and solidify authoritarian state rule
(Stone, 1988). Freedom of the press was abolished as television and radio became heavily
censored (Steinberg, 2000). The public education system was also changed and tightly
controlled by the state. All students were required to take ideological orientation courses on
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ as the government attempted to ensure its continued rule long
into the future (Selth, 2000). The military quickly established a ‘Revolutionary Council’, closed
the National Assembly, took control of the legal systemand abolished local state government

22. 22
(Selth, 2000; Mutebi, 2004). Burma had officially become a one party state. The military was in
now entirely in control, establishing the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and declaring
all other political parties to be illegal. It has been argued that this unwillingness to allow any
sort of political pluralism and refusal to address citizen concerns was what eventually led to the
decay of the BSPP regime (Selth, 2000).
Beginning as a small political party, the BSPP headed by General Ne Win quickly grew
into a mass party with several million members. There were both youth and adult wings of the
party, which were virtually the only ways to increase one’s status in society, a fact that likely
contributed to the large number of Burmese who joined this party (Selth, 2000). This was one
of the main ways in which the BSPP attempted to gain support from Burma’s population and
ensure that its position went unchallenged (Steinberg, 2000; Selth, 2000).
The military regime ruled by decree until 1974 when BSPP rule was officially secured
with the writing of a new Constitution (Burma Centre Netherlands, 2000). The Constitution
maintained the existence of seven sub-national states, each of which was named after one of
Burma’s dominant ethnic groups. In an effort to promote unity, a key concern of Burma’s
authoritarian rulers, the Constitution eliminated all economic, political, judicial and
administrative differences between these states (Mutebi, 2004). This firmly cemented the
BSPP’s position of power and the state was generally accepted by the population as inevitable
in its domination of national institutions (Taylor, 2009).

23. 23
3.1.4 1988 Uprising and the Rise of the SLORC
It was poor finances that eventually toppled the BSPP regime. Its largely ineffective
attempts to generate economic surplus in the form of fiscal austerity policies in combination
with the acceptance of large foreign loans meant that by the mid 1980s, the BSPP was in debt
$5.6 million US and finding it increasingly difficult to make its loan payments while trying to
manage an increasingly difficult financial situation (Taylor, 2009). Rapidly rising debts caused
an abrupt deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in Burma. Food prices rose as wages
remained inert and unemployment levels grew. Between 1981 and 1988, the consumer price
index rose by almost 200% (Ministry of Planning and Finance, 1990). Finally, in 1988, the
continually worsening conditions finally brought citizens into the streets. Six straight months of
rioting and demonstrations forced General Ne Win to declare his resignation in July of 1988, a
final admission that he was unable to solve Burma’s financial difficulties (Taylor, 2009).
The economic crisis remained unsolved and demonstrations continued throughout the
summer of 1988 until the Burmese army cracked down in a military coup, deploying a strike
force to crush civilian demonstrations and once again seized power on the grounds that they
would soon hold multi-party elections (Callahan, 2000; Taylor, 2009). The new military rulers
established a central/regional/local hierarchy which it called the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC). Burma would soon find that it had swapped one authoritarian
ruler for another.

24. 24
3.1.5 SLORC/SPDC Rule in Burma (1988-Present)
After gaining power, the SLORC quickly dispensed with the 1974 constitution, filling
newly empty cabinet positions with senior military officers regardless of their political
background or training. Military General Saw Maung initially appointed himself prime minister
and defense minister, but was soon replaced by General Than Shwe in 1992 (Callahan, 2000).
Order and stability were the prime concern of the new SLORC regime, which prompted a
massive expansion of armed forces. Over eight years, military membership grew from 146,000
to almost 400,000 as new recruits were hired quickly and often indiscriminately (Selth, 2000).
These new recruits became undisciplined daily reminders of the state’s presence in Burmese
society and were often the subject of complaints (Callahan, 2000). During this period,
construction of military infrastructure such as new schools, hospitals and universities catering
to the military was made a priority over the construction of facilities for the general population.
As promised, the junta held elections in 1990 in which the opposition party, the popular
National League of Democracy (NLD), as well as other independent regional and minority led
parties were permitted to run. There were high hopes for this election, as many citizens saw it
as a welcome opportunity to topple the regime’s power by legitimate means. This election had
the highest rate of participation of any in Burma’s history. The NLD won the election in a
landslide victory with 60% of the votes. Following the election results, SLORC officials refused
to meet with any political parties, defiantly unwilling to acknowledge the results of the election.
Shortly thereafter, the leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung Saan Suu Kyi was
placed under house arrest, and the party’s activities were legally restricted (Taylor, 2009). To

25. 25
date, there has not been another election in the country and Aung Saan Suu Kyi remains under
house arrest.
In 1997, the SLORC leadership structure was reorganized and renamed the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC). This reorganization was part of the junta’s recent move to
distance itself somewhat from Burma’s cabinet. After seizing power, the SPDC got rid of some
of the most powerful cabinet ministers thus reducing the cabinet’s power somewhat, although
popular perception is that the junta and cabinet are equally oppressive. Critics of the regime
also make little distinction between local or regional commanders and the junta. As part of its
reorganization of state structure, the SPDC gave these commanders de facto authority over
local or provincial affairs. This is the level upon which most individuals encounter the state and
thus these commanders are often the ones criticized when one hears conversational criticismof
“the military” in Southeast Asia (Callahan, 2000;)5.
Today in Burma, state censorship of the media is widespread and heavy-handed.
Internet access is restricted, and cellular phones have been reportedly monitored. Laws against
the formation of Unions and the lack of freedom of association make it difficult and very
dangerous to publicly express critical opinions of the regime. Arbitrary arrest of those
suspected to be involved in counter-authoritarian activity has also been reported (Selth, 2000)6
State control also extends to formerly independent religious organizations, many of which were
traditionally at the forefront of social justice movements (Liddel, 2000)7.
5 Author’s observations,January 2009.
6 Author’s observations,April 2009.
7 Author’s Observations,October 2008.

26. 26
Before 1988, the Burmese armed forces were feared but generally commanded respect
of most citizens of central Burma, with the majority of the ire against the state targeted at
corrupt, heavy handed local police officers (Callahan, 2000). After 1988 these views shifted to
seeing the military as the new authoritarian oppressor, views that are still widely in evidence
today (L. Campbell, personal observation, December 18, 2008).
3.2 The Perpetuation of Burmese Authoritarianism
There are a number of factors that explain the ability of the Burmese junta to maintain
its position as the authoritarian ruling structure in Burma despite its structural flaws. The first
has to do with the traditionally Burmese perceptions of power as finite. In more pluralist
societies where power is viewed as infinite, larger numbers of people sharing power result in
the greatest benefits for everyone (Anderson, 1972). A more finite perception of power
reinforces the idea that power must be kept at all costs, and that the ascension of another
group to power would be equivalent to giving away one’s position as supreme leader. This way
of thinking greatly discourages the sharing of power, and helps to explain why Burmese
governments have historically tended to employ an authoritarian dictatorial style of rule.
Burmese authoritarianism has also been said to be a very personalized brand of power.
When the structure of power becomes personalized, compromise becomes more difficult
because it immediately becomes disloyal to question the ideas or theories of the body holding
the power. As a result, Burma never developed the sort of meritocratic civil service that would
have acted to prevent the rise of dictatorial authoritarian leaders (Selth, 2000). This is widely
evidenced by the fact that recruitment into the military or the ruling bodies (often one and the

27. 27
same) was heavily based on loyalty to the leader of the time, or to the military itself. This
tendency can be traced back to the colonial period in Burma, when the British first imposed
lateral state control throughout the country, from the capital all the way out to the newly
established and now rigidly delineated frontiers. This eliminated the traditional hereditary
position of local village headman, who had been the top village official through Burmese history
to that point. Under the new administration, this position became the lowest level of
government appointee, and the village headman became a state representative. Although this
increased the efficiency of regional governance, it eliminated village level autonomy over local
affairs. This allowed the state to intervene more easily in local affairs, and vastly extended its
reach in the more remote areas of the country. This pervasion of the state in local affairs is one
of the defining characteristics of Burmese authoritarianism, one that still remains today
allowing the state to maintain control (Selth, 2000).
Another reason for the perpetuation of Burmese authoritarianism is the overarching
resonance of many of the military’s views of society with large and important segments of the
population. The regime claims that national solidarity and unity are two of its main values, and
that these values are constantly under threat pointing to political pluralism as a top source of
disunity (Callahan, 2000). These are sentiments that resonate with the population of central
Burma. No administration has ever managed to integrate many of the ethnic groups that reside
in more remote areas of the country and along Burma’s borders (Smith, 1999). Many of these
groups have rebelled against the imposition of Burmese government rule in efforts to preserve
their cultural history and identities, and in an expression of resistance to the homogenizing
forces of the Burmese regime in wars that have been ongoing since 1948 (Callahan, 2000; L.

28. 28
Campbell, personal observation, April 21, 2009; Smith, 1999). Although ceasefires have been
reached, these have been said to be superficial and not representative of any real change in the
relationship between the central government and ethnic groups. The SLORC’s “one nation, one
race, one religion” ideology can be viewed as simultaneously strengthening regime support in
central Burma, and reducing it in more remote and ethnic areas (Liddel, 2000).
Buddhism is another important value of the authoritarian junta, one that has always
been very important for its legitimization in the eyes of the population due to the fact that
Burma is 85% Buddhist. The generals of the BSPP, SLORC and now the SPDC have all taken care
to demonstrate their commitment to religion to the Burmese population by paying appropriate
homage to monks and building extravagant pagodas. Buddhist organizations, run by
monasteries have historically been one of the few important social forces for change in Burma.
They were a huge force in the anticolonial movement to remove the British from power, and it
has been said that in Burma, “the bayonetalone isnomatch for the lotus” (Selth,2000: 101).
Religious organizations have huge potential for unifying the focus of the population on an area
of popular dissatisfaction but by demonstrating a commitment to popular religion, the regime is
able to gain legitimacy thereby reducing this threat to its stability (Selth, 2000).
The maintenance of tight control over all aspects of Burmese society during the socialist
period was a particularly effective tactic employed by ruling groups to secure their continued
grip on Burma. Beginning during the era of the BSPP, Academic research had to be centrally
approved before it was released to ensure that no research was published with results that
disagreed with the stated policies of the regime (Selth, 2000). Religious groups also came
under state control and in 1980 all monks were made to register themselves with the

29. 29
government. Farmers were told what they were permitted to plant and when it should be
planted, and those that did not comply could legally have their land confiscated (Selth, 2000).
Agricultural credit could be purchased each season from the state institution, but private land
tenure was prohibited. During this period, all household necessities had to be purchased at a
government owned co-op store, owned and controlled by the Ministry of Cooperatives (Selth,
2000).
The massive militarization of the country following the SLORC rise to power also meant
that due to aggressive recruiting campaigns, most families ended up having some connection to
the military through kin ties. Connections within the military were useful because they often
allowed access to food or education that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive or simply
unavailable (Callahan, 2000). By controlling the population and its access to resources, the
BSPP, SLORC and SPDC regimes have ensured that citizens remain wholly dependent on them,
thus allowing them to remain uncontested in positions of authoritarian power.
Finally, there is a lack of trust that permeates Burmese society which precludes
potential civic action against the junta. In a 1999 article, Pyes succinctly outlines the issue:
Burmese culture evinces a deep ambivalence about power. Everyone wants it but
people are too timid to try for it. Nobody wants to be a subordinate because inferiors
are vulnerable and cannot trust anyone with power…Burma has the most intractive
problems [related to democracy in the region]. Since its culture aggressively socializes
distrust, it offers limited capabilities for collective action. (774-75)
The aggressive socialization of distrust to which Pyes alludes refers to techniques employed by
the junta that involve the spreading of rumors, use of secret informants and the tapping of

30. 30
phone lines and internet connections by the junta making people very suspicious of their
neighbors (Liddel, 2000, L. Campbell, personal observation, September 2, 2008). This
atmosphere of distrust extends beyond the general population to include the military, as 3 of
the 23 government detachments responsible for gathering intelligence are tasked with
monitoring navy, air force and army personnel and rely heavily on military informants
(Callahan, 2000). These tactics and others make it very difficult to know who can or cannot be
trusted, and who one can speak freely with. This greatly hinders the ability of both individuals
and organizations to engage in subversive activities or build strong movements in opposition to
the SPDC.
It is doubtful whether or not the SPDC has a significant base of support within the
population of Burma, although quantifying this would be next to impossible due to the
repressive atmosphere, the lack of freedom of speech and the overarching fear of punishment
for speaking out against the regime (Callahan, 2000). Although the SPDC regime is engaged in
numerous activities to ensure its continued control of Burma, it also has a number of important
weaknesses, many of which contribute to the creation of spaces in Burma in which NGOs can
find a foothold.
3.3 Cracks in the Armor: Weaknesses in the Burmese Authoritarian Regime
It has been said that since the 1988 elections, the regime has been almost constantly on
the verge of collapse (Rundland and Pedersen, 2000). Despite continued efforts to build
legitimacy and win supporters, the SPDC continues to run into difficulty for a number of
reasons.

31. 31
One of the regime’s key flaws is that there is a disconnection between the regime’s
ability to run an effective state apparatus and its capability to maintain its position of power.
The 1990s can be viewed as a string of attempts to obscure the weaknesses in the regime as
the SLORC and later the SPDC attempted to repair its damaged structure while maintaining a
position of authority. The vast majority of the regime’s budget is spent increasing the power of
the military, some years this has amounted to 40% of government spending. This comes at the
expense of other sectors, as evidenced by the closure of universities around the country, and
the falling wages of public servants (Selth, 2000).
The inability of the centrally based regime to extend its reach and impose itself on more
remote, often ethnically controlled areas of Burma is another indicator of weakness in the
regime.8 Despite an altered institutional hierarchy to better incorporate border regions, there
remains less government jurisdiction and more scorn for the regime in these areas of the
country. This is especially true in areas formerly held by insurgency groups. In attempts to
bring opposition under its control, the government has been engaged in civil war with rebel
insurgencies since the BSPP came to power in 1962. Unfortunately, innocent populations living
in war-torn regions are often caught in the cross-fire. The government has been known to cut
off food to certain areas and arbitrarily burn or confiscate the crops of those suspected to be
supplying food to rebel armies9 (Callahan, 2000). Instead of bringing more regions under state
control, these tactics tend to do little more than undermine the junta’s base of support in these
areas.
8See Appendix D for a map of Burma
9 Author’s personal observations,December 2008.

32. 32
The construction of numerous new facilities and the founding of government run civilian
organizations was another attempt to bring the population more securely under control that
backfired for the regime. These new state extensions were planned to be under the control of
Burmese military leaders operating out of Burma’s capital. In actuality, responsibility for
deciding admissions to schools, hospitals and regional branches run by the military have fallen
under the de facto rule of regional commanders instead (Callahan, 2000). This resulted in a
decentralization of the influence generated by these institutions, rather than the other way
around as had been intended.
It has been noted that military officers with very little education or expertise hold top
administrative positions in the regime (Callahan, 2000). Recruitment tends to take place based
on loyalty to the regime, personal connections and kin ties rather than competence or level of
qualification. This tactic also means that talented professionals of value to the regime are often
let go in the event that their loyalty to the regime falls into question. Often when a high level
official is let go, all those who were loyal to them are also fired from their positions (Selth,
2000). As a result of this hiring strategy, the regime often loses opportunities to employ
Burma’s top thinkers when forming policy because they are considered disloyal and a liability to
the regime. A hiring policy based around loyalty also discourages any sort of criticismof regime
methods and policies due to the fear of job loss for being perceived as disloyal.
During Burma’s socialist period, the BSPP would not readily share power, but recognized
the need to address local problems, especially if it was to address the increasingly violent ethnic
rebellions. In response to this it instituted a formal mechanism whereby members of
parliament would travel to their districts to gather information on local affairs and community

33. 33
grievances. They would then bring this information back to central regions so that action might
take place to address these problems. This systemwas ultimately a failure because of the
atmosphere of fear in Burma, which heavily discouraged people from voicing their grievances
to those in high position. In turn, local politicians were hesitant to report what they learned to
central authorities, who were also afraid to report these to top leadership. This meant that the
regime was constantly being shielded from pluralist ideas (Selth, 2000). This is an issue that
continues to be a problem, and allows the regime to remain largely out of touch with the needs
of the population.
3.4 Conclusion
The junta in Burma is clearly worried about the potential weaknesses in its position.
These weaknesses have increased the regime’s preoccupation with maintaining control of the
country, control which has come at the expense of national development. One article
summarizes the problem by saying “As the capacity of the state deteriorates, it generates fewer
resources and uses them less efficiently; It then has to divert more resources into simply
maintaining control, further reducing its capacity.” (Rudland and Pedersen, 2000, p. 8) This
increasing preoccupation is evidenced by expanded intelligence and information gathering
operations, propaganda campaigns, its attempt to raise the status of the military in the eyes of
the Burmese population. As a result, the needs of the population have increasingly gone
unmet. This is where civil society organizations play a crucial role. In providing services not
provided by the government, these organizations attempt to bridge the gap between supply
and demand for services. The following chapter will outline the history of civil society in Burma
and examine its complex relationship with the state.

34. 34
Chapter 4: Burmese Civil Society
With the historical context of the state established, this chapter shifts the focus of the
discussion to examine Burmese civil society and how it has formed within the restrictive
authoritarian state. Civil society in a particular context is highly dependent on the form taken
by the state in that same context, thus one would expect the form taken by civil society in the
authoritarian context of Burma would be different than say the form of civil society found in a
more pluralist context. This chapter begins in section 4.1 with a critical examination critically
examining the dominant ideas in the literature concerning civil society, what it is, how it
develops and how it functions in relation to the state. Section 4.2 moves on to look at the
Burmese case specifically, chronicling the history of civil society in Burma through the stages of
state development. This chapter provides a historical overview of Burmese civil society, one
that helps explain the nature of contemporary civil society in Burma and establishes the basis
for a more detailed examination of a specific case study example in Chapter 5.
4.1 A Discussion of the Terms
4.1.1 The Issue
There has recently been a shift from theories of civil society that focused mostly on the
civil society itself, to ones that take the role of the state into account to a greater degree, which
is seen as a more effective approach (Migdal, 1994). This shift has prompted some scholars to
argue that simply changing the approach is not enough because this shift fails to overcome the
main impediment to a true understanding of both the essence of and the interactions between
state and civil society. The problem, according to Migdal (1994) is that dominant thinking still

35. 35
views both the state and civil society as undifferentiated masses with coherent, single-minded
goals and aims. Outcomes of state-societal interaction were thought to be heavily dependent
on the amount of power possessed by each group, with the more powerful group often
imposing its will on the less powerful group. But this is a gross oversimplification of what are
actually complex and multifaceted entities. The patterns of dominance observed in a society
actually result from the constant interactions and conflicts between actors and organizations at
different levels of the state that take place within a constellation of simultaneously competing
social forces in multiple areas. Migdal (1994) argues that “…to glean the patterns of
domination, one must focus on the cumulation of struggles and accommodations in society’s
multiple arenas” (100). What he is saying is that to really gain an understanding of the nuances
of the state-society interactions that determine “the agenda”, one must break down the many
different elements of both state and society and examine how they pull in different directions.
These are the competing elements that combine to determine the outward appearance of what
has often been assumed to be homogenous states and societies. To better understand the
implications of a more heterogeneous state or society, one must establish a definition for these
important terms.
Most definitions of the state are based on the theories of Max Weber. These definitions
emphasize the state’s specific functions, for example the making and enforcing of rules, and its
institutional character as an organization or set of organizations (Migdal, 1994). In enforcing
the rules, the state is said to be the sole entity in a society that possesses the right to use
physical force against society’s members, with violence often portrayed as being in the name of
the greater good by ensuring order. Mann (1989) also contributes to this argument by

36. 36
highlighting the infrastructural power of the state. This constitutes the state’s ability to
penetrate the various realms of civil society.
Where these definitions fall short is in explaining the translation of the state’s goals into
reality. They consistently overstate the power and autonomy of the state, focusing too much
on top leadership. These definitions ignore the fact that resistance to the imposed will of the
state can and often does modify its social and ideological foundation which alters the agenda of
the state in significant ways (Migdal, 1994).
When a state moves beyond simply penetrating society and begins to attempt to shape
the entire moral order of the population, it is said to be a transformative state (Migdal, 1994).
In their attempt to impose total control, transformative states cannot let any attempts to defy
their dominance go unchallenged because in the eyes of the population this could indicate
weakness on the part of the regime. To this end, state leaders often try to create the
impression of the state as an invincible force to reduce the chances that citizens will contest its
authority, thus reducing the need for enforcement by the state. Based on this definition,
Burma would be classified as a transformative state.
4.1.2 The State
According to Migdal, the state can be divided into four levels. At the lowest level are
the officials responsible for carrying out state directives. This often is the level that meets most
resistance because it is in closest contact with members of the general population. Above this
level are the dispersed regional field offices, which contain the courts, military, and all other
legal bodies operating within a specific territory inside the state. Above this are the central
offices of the agency. Often found in the capital city, these offices formulate the overriding

37. 37
national policies of the state and are directly responsible to the top state leaders. These
leaders sit atop the state hierarchy and depend on lower levels for the imposition of their will
(Migdal, 1994). It is upon this these top leaders that all other levels of both state and society
attempt to exert their influence. To differentiate the state even further, Migdal also identifies
three sublevels present at each tier of the state. Supervisors, underlings, and general staff at
each level all operate with different personal agendas. This model begins to give an idea of the
truly complex nature of the state, and explains why states generally don’t produce a singular
response to a problem. The various units have unique responses based on their position and
thus the overall response of the state represents an aggregation of these many different
approaches to a solution. As a result of this cacophony of competing responses from both state
and society to a given problem, the actions of the state often look very little like those of the
state’s original scheme. The extent to which this hierarchy is present and what this means in
the context of the Burmese authoritarian state apparatus will be explored in a later section.
Migdal argues that a more anthropological approach to the study of the state is needed;
one that disaggregates its various features and examines its different levels. This will
encourage theorists to go beyond the study of basic power relationships to explore the
multifaceted interactions of power involved in state-society interactions. These are the
nuanced interactions that this chapter will attempt examine in the context of Burma.
4.1.3 Civil Society
Like the state, civil society is a heterogeneous entity. It is not a cohesive unit with an
aggregative and inclusive hegemony of fundamental ideas (Migdal, 1993). According to Migdal

38. 38
(1994) the seemingly cohesive social classes espoused in Marxist thinking are very rarely
observed in reality. Like the state, one cannot assume there to be a unifying framework within
society to explain overall patterns of domination and distribution. A homogenous view
obscures much in examining the strategies, institutions and power relationships in civil society.
Instead, civil society should be viewed as a network of societal forces each trying to impose
their will on various aspects of both the state and societal arenas.
Foley and Edwards (1996) present a similar view, describing civil society as a dense network
of various civil associations often credited with resisting effectively the imposition of
authoritarian rule. Depending on one’s interpretation, this implies an important connection
between the existence of civil society and a pluralistic rather than hegemonic state power
structure.
They classify dominant definitions of civil society into two broad categories. First there are
those that focus on the ability of associational life to cultivate certain patterns of ‘civility’.
These definitions are for the most part apolitical in nature, drawing heavily from the writings of
theorists such as Alex de Tocqueville (1899). The other far more political class of definitions
focuses more on civil society as a sphere of political action independent to the state. These
definitions see civil society as a network of politically mobilized social actors acting as the
energizing force behind resistance to tyrannical and often authoritarian regimes. Actors
independent to the state and able to act independently are another important aspect of a
pluralist society (Foley and Edwards, 1996).
White (1994) presents a third slightly alternate interpretation. This view sees civil
society as associated with the

39. 39
...demonology of the state, functioning often as an idealized counter-image, an
embodiment of social virtue confronting political vice: the realm of freedom versus the
realm of coercion, of participation versus hierarchy, pluralism versus conformity,
spontaneity versus manipulation, purity versus corruption. (376/377)
In this sense, the state and civil society are each effectively defined by the existence of the
other. In a way this view presents a civil society that acts as a counterbalance to the state,
preventing it from becoming too radical. White’s interpretation also links civil society with
democracy.
Based on these observations, it might be assumed that an authoritarian
“transformative” state such as Burma would preclude the existence of all but the most
apolitical of civil societal activity. My research indicates that this is not at all the case, but
before exploring further, one must examine one more crucial aspect of state-societal relations,
the interface between the two.
4.1.4 The State and Civil Society: The Case of the Transformative state
According to Migdal (1994), it is the state that delineates the boundaries of civil
society, despite the fact that, as previously discussed, they are also mutually transformative
entities. Through their local interactions, state and social organizations form the basis of the
recursive relationship between state and social forces. The complexity of this relationship is
what results in all nation-states being so unique, regardless of what the broad terms of
prevailing theorists would lead one to believe (Migdal, 1994).

40. 40
Migdal states that transformative states share a number of common goals.
These goals include creating a dominant presence within society, creating integrated agencies
of control, imposing universal rules and coercing their populations using military or law
enforcement agencies. Most if not all of these end goals are evident in the actions of the
Burmese authoritarian regime.
The regime constantly tries to create a hegemonic presence within Burmese society,
and to deeply penetrate it in order to shape how its members identify themselves. An
interesting example of this can be seen in the Burmese government’s attempt to use the image
of a national icon to increase their support within the population. Military general Aung San is
credited with initially founding the Burmese Military. In the eyes of the Burmese population,
his image is synonymous with the struggle against foreign oppression and the fight to end
colonial rule (Callahan, 2000). He is almost seen as a father figure to the population, guiding
the military to protect them. The idea of Aung San is central to ideas of national identity in
Burma, a fact that the military has recognized. In response they have attempted to raise the
status of contemporary military institutions above that of Aung San. New museums and
exhibitions put on by the regime feature a new set of national heroes, mostly contemporary
military figures. Aung San’s face has historically featured prominently on the Burmese
currency but it was replaced during the 90’s, during which time the regime also attempted to
use military propaganda to shape its image in the eyes of society (Callahan, 2000). These
measures were all part of the military’s attempt to integrate themselves with the image of
Aung San, in the eyes of the population. The idea of the military as a paternal force, taking care

41. 41
of the population and defending them from foreign oppression as Aung San once did is part of
the military’s attempt to increase the extent to which its citizens identify with the regime.
The military has also taken measures to ensure that its strategies in this regard are not
criticized. Scholarly work focused on historical questions that could lead to informed critiques
of the links between the army, national identity and Aung San is forbidden. As a result,
informed debate over the true nature of the connections between the image of this historical
icon and the authoritarian regime seen in Burma today has never taken place (Callahan, 2000).
Moving on to the second goal of transformative states, the regime has worked hard to
incorporate vertically connected agencies in order to promote state systems of meaning and
legitimacy in Burma. The most prominent example of this sort of strategy involves cooption of
the public education system by the military. The Burmese education systemis tightly
controlled in terms of what gets taught and what does not. Employing rote learning
techniques, the military ensure that school aged children are not exposed to critical ideas or
messages in opposition to it.10 From public primary and high schools, students who graduate
often attend military supported universities. In many cases this is the only option to students
looking for post secondary education as the majority of other post secondary institutions were
closed following the rise of the SPDC to power in 1988 in order to divert more funds to military
spending (Selth, 2000).
The regime in Burma also attempts to impose and execute of universal rules within the
country using legislative bodies and government bureaucracies. Throughout the Burmese
Socialist Program Party period between 1962 and 1988, the government had adopted a
10 Author’s personal observations,January 2009.

42. 42
comprehensive plan aimed at achieving an industrialized, socialist state (Mutebi, 2004). The
private sector had already shrunk considerably with the BSPPs rise to power, as most private
enterprises were nationalized, an act that stemmed from the authoritarian desire to control all
aspects of society and development. Unfortunately, state led enterprises involved huge
amounts of bureaucracy, forcing citizens to apply for permits, buy tickets and request official
permissions for all but the simplest of daily tasks (Mutebi, 2004). During this period, the
military attempted to exert control over all of the Burmese population, a move which caused
considerable concern within ethnic minority communities far from centers of power (Selth,
2000). Although the attempts of the Burmese government to exert total control over the
country have met with varying degrees of resistance, the overarching goal of a unified Burma
universally subject to the laws of the military remains unchanged.
Finally, the Burmese government also attempt to coerce their population with the help
of military or law enforcement figures and to use a court systemto adjudicate disputes or
complaints within the population. These aspects of the Burmese state-societal relationship are
under total state control, further evidence of its transformative nature.
4.1.5 The Spectrum of Outcomes for State-Society Interactions
Migdal (1994) goes on to say that despite the best efforts of the state, the outcomes of
these state-society interactions fall along a broad spectrum. This spectrum of outcomes is
found within all states, and is not unique to the Burmese case, although as mentioned in the
previous section transformative states do try harder to control the outcomes that occur.

43. 43
The most extreme outcome of these interactions is total transformation. In these
situations, the state manages to successfully co-opt and subjugate local forces to its
domination. In many cases this results in the destruction of local autonomy, although this does
not rule out the possibility of the state being itself transformed as this process of incorporation
occurs (Migdal, 1994). This is often the overarching goal within transformative state contexts.
Total transformation was also the outcome when the state removed authority of village level
traditional autonomous ethnic ruling structures after the BSPP came to power.
A second outcome involves state incorporation of existing social forces. This happens
when the appropriation of existing social forces results in novel patterns of domination and
involves a change on the part of both the state and the organizations it is attempting to act
upon (Migdal, 1994). In Burma, the founding of state-run NGOs such as the Myanmar Red
Cross (MRC, the Union Solidarity and Development Organization (USDO) and the Myanmar
Mothers and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA) are all examples of the state’s effort to
incorporate existing avenues of social participation. It was fairly common for people to join civil
society organizations and the government recognized this and started its own in an effort to
lure citizens from other organizations thereby altering the patterns of government domination
within social space in Burma. Also, NGOs that freely chose to work in conjunction with the
SPDC regime starting around the early 1990s were always controversial for this reason (Purcell,
2000). Following changes to the regime policy, a number of local organizations began operating
but in order to do so legally they had to work closely with the government. It was feared that
their affiliation with the state would allow their cooptation as tools used by the state to further
exercise its control over the population. By working with the regime they were also seen as one

44. 44
of the forces increasing its legitimacy (Purcell, 2000). State incorporation of existing social
forces also extends to those previously autonomous local officials and village headmen co-
opted by the British administration and incorporated into the state as the lowest level of
central government structure during Burma’s colonial period (Selth, 2000).
In other situations, the opposite outcome is also possible, in which social organizations
manage to incorporate the state apparatus (Migdal, 1994). In these scenarios, the presence of
the state causes dominant social forces to adapt but does not significantly alter the existing
patterns of domination. In rare instances, this outcome can also generate new patterns of
domination in which non-state forces rise up above those of the state. It seems as if this result
would be most likely to occur when state and social forces are initially in delicate equilibrium
until state efforts to co-opt social forces result in its delegitimization. Given this scenario, there
is a reasonable likelihood that social forces would rise above those of the state. Examples of
this are rare in Burma, despite the arguably low levels of state legitimacy in the eyes of the
populace (Pederson, Rundland and May, 2000). This is due to the considerable military and law
enforcement power yielded by the regime, allowing it to continue to maintain its position of
power regardless of whether or not it has the support of the wider population.
The final outcome as outlined by Migdal (1994) is that the state may fail to penetrate
local organizations altogether. As a result, there is little transformative effect from state level
actions on either society or the state. This outcome is most likely to occur in areas far away or
outside of the reach of centralized state control. At first glance it would seem that many of the
organizations I spoke to in gathering my research would fall within this category. They operate
for the most part in spheres that lie beyond the reach of the state, most of them are

45. 45
unregistered and lack any formal connection to the state apparatus, but are they really
independent? The repressive activity of the authoritarian state still plays a fundamental role in
determining their operating structure and organizational strategies in that they must be very
careful to stay within these spheres, outside of government control. In this sense, these
organizations are very much altered by state operations and thus may be more appropriately
placed in a fifth category, in which social forces are altered by the state but are not necessarily
incorporated into its structure.
4.2 State and Civil Society in Burma
Now that we have established a clearer picture of state and society in general, let us
move into a more explicit examination of state and civil society as they manifest themselves in
Burma.
Despite the fact that the pre-colonial, colonial and contemporary Burmese state all
operated within the same geographical and ecological parameters, there were significant
differences between these eras of the state. The succession of leading personnel continuously
reoriented the state, ruling it based on different ideas of the correct relationship between the
population and the state (Taylor, 2009).
4.2.1 Civil Society during the Pre-colonial and Colonial Periods (Pre-1948)
Traditionally, the Burmese authority structure was based on the Weberian
concept of the charismatic leader. Such leaders were skilled in trade and warfare, and

46. 46
commonly capitalized on their kinship ties to exercise jurisdiction over people and territories
(Ganesan, 2007)11. This use of kinship ties continues to manifest itself in both state and civil
societal activity today in Burma, as will be discussed in a later section.
The power of these pre-colonial rulers was in large part determined by their ability to
forge alliances with local elites (Taylor, 2009). This often resulted in the formation of patron-
client ties, which quickly grew to form integrated social networks linking Burmese rulers to
certain groups in society. These societal groups were generally comprised of those belonging to
the elite class in Burma, and as a result these were the groups that generally gave the strongest
support to the state apparatus. The advent of the colonial state destroyed these pre-existing
social networks and replaced them with more bureaucratized social networks less based on
personal relationships (Taylor, 2009). This would have distanced the state somewhat from the
population.
Although formal organizations were not formed in Burma until the beginning of the
colonial period, there was a strong pre-existing tradition associated with rich associational life
in Burma (Hlaing, 2007). Informal community organizations could be found in almost every
village. These organizations carried out the function of formal organizations, but their reach
generally did not extend too far beyond the level of the community. This all changed with the
advent of colonialismin Burma which brought with it Western ideas, introducing concepts such
as sovereignty, territoriality and statehood to Burmese society (Ganesan, 2007). The colonial
11 Chapter 4.2 draws heavily from Ganesan’s “State-society relations in SoutheastAsia”found in Ganesan and
Hliang’s 2007 Myanmar: State, society and ethnicity. This work chronicles thehistorical evolution of civil society in
Burma. Whilethe historical facts contained therein are broadly accurate,collected through a series of interviews
and the author’s personal observations,itis a somewhat biased account. Ganesan is very critical of the actions of
the Burmese government and his retellingof historical events is sometimes contradictory,though this may have
been the resultof conflictingreports fromthe interview process.

47. 47
government was very open when it came to its views of civil society and did not prevent the
formation of any civil organizations or associations, even when said organizations were
engaged in anti-government activity. The government tended to arrest the specific members
identified as being engaged in oppositional activity, rather than disband the organizations
themselves (Ganesan, 2007).
As a result, the colonial period in Burma saw an explosion in the number of formal
associations and organizations, especially those representing indigenous groups. These
organizations fell into nine general categories: labour unions, student unions, community
organizations, professional associations, business organizations, social welfare organizations,
political parties and organizations, religious organizations and ethnic associations. Labour
unions and student unions were seen as the most modern of these new organizations, likely
because they represented more modern institutions. Colonialismalso brought with it post
secondary education systems and new labour organization structures. These unions were the
first true formal organizations to emerge in Burma, with leaders elected democratically by
union members (Ganesan, 2007).
Though diminutive in size and scope, these first formal organizations were very
politically influential. In 1920, the Rangoon University College Student Union staged one of the
first modern social movements in Burma, when they organized protests against colonial
government policies that marginalized indigenous people. These student unions were also the
starting point for many future politicians and nationalist leaders in Burma (Ganesan, 2007).
Labour unions were also active during this period, organizing strikes to pressure factory owners
to improve working conditions for their workers. Many of the initial labour organizations were

48. 48
comprised mainly of foreign workers. When Burmese workers observed the advantages of
collective bargaining, they formed their own labour unions. These first unions were generally
focused on improving the welfare of their respective members (Ganesan, 2007).
Over time, labour unions became more and more political. By the mid 1930s,
nationalist political leaders began to work with labour unions, incorporating them as part of the
nationalist movement. It was one of these politically active unions that led the largest
anticolonial demonstration ever held in Burma. The demonstration was widely supported by
students and political leaders and signalled that labour unions had truly become political forces
in Burma (Ganesan, 2007).
Buddhist, Christian and Muslim religious groups were also quite active during the
colonial period in Burma (Ganesan, 2007). Buddhist organizations, often referred to as sangha
identified themselves as politically conscious non-political organizations, meaning that they
held political opinions but did not normally act on them. Christian and Muslim organizations on
the other hand mainly engaged in missionary activities and preferred to remain completely
politically neutral (Ganesan, 2007).
The colonial period also lacked a focus on Buddhism within the government apparatus
and as a result, the popularity of Buddhism as the dominant religion in Burma began to decline
(Ganesan, 2007). In response, many of the remaining monks came together to form
organizations with the aim of ensuring the continuation of the Buddhist religion. These
organizations also led protests against the colonial government because they felt that
Buddhism would be unable to flourish under the auspices of a non-Buddhist leader.

49. 49
Social welfare organizations were also active during this period. These organizations
acted as mediators between the state and each organization’s respective members (Ganesan,
2007). Most of these organizations were founded by politically conscious citizens who had
problems with or were negatively impacted by the colonial government policies. They tended
to function like traditional organizations in Burma, with organizational effectiveness often
heavily dependent on the capability and well-connectedness of organization leaders. When
leaders retired or passed away, or when the specific issue or focus of the organization was
solved, organizations often disbanded
Business associations flourished in colonial Burma. Initially, British and Indian
businesspeople formed business organizations after starting operations in Burma. These
foreign business organizations refused to allow indigenous businesspeople to join, so
indigenous businesses formed their own separate organizations. Business associations helped
to coordinate business activities in their local areas, and acted, like social welfare associations,
as an intermediary body between the state and individual business owners. They also
advocated for the rights of their members in a similar fashion to labour unions, organizing
strikes when local officials raised taxes (Ganesan, 2007).
Overall, a wide range of civil societal activity took place during the colonial period.
Aside from arresting those engaging specifically in anti-government activity, the colonial
administration did not stifle the emergence or growth of new religious, social or political groups
in Burma (Ganesan, 2007). As a result of this growth of formal civil society institutions, citizens
generally became more politically conscious, actively demonstrating against colonial rule. This
increasing political participation eventually earned Burma its independence.

50. 50
4.2.2 Civil Society during the Parliamentary Period (1948-1962)
While pluralist, the existence of true democracy during the coalition rule period
has been questioned by some scholars who say that the AFPL still dominated Burma’s
population and effectively prevented the rise of opposition groups, but overall it is agreed that
civil society was active and seen as important (Gyi, 1983).
Independence in Burma brought with it the emergence of a large number of new civil
associations and organizations. The open parliamentary system that remained as a legacy of
the colonial period allowed citizens to form political organizations freely and political leaders
supported this growth, although in many cases the distinction between civil society
organization and political organization was often unclear (Ganesan, 2007).
For example, the ruling party, the Anti Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) formed
a number of its own civil society organizations, in an effort to prevent the perceived threat of
communist penetration in Burmese society. These organizations targeted local peasants and
business organizations, in that they gave their members access to senior officials and to the
resources of the state. Politicians used these organizations to build bases of support within the
population by distributing resources such as agricultural loans and business licenses among
their members. As these organizations grew, it became the norm for people looking to gain
access to state resources to join the ruling party or its affiliated social organizations (Ganesan,
2007). In this sense, political allegiances spurred much of the civil societal activity in Burma
during the independence period and were in large part based on rewards given to party
supporters.

51. 51
This politicization of civil societal activity meant that the majority of the organizations
that emerged between 1948 and 1962 in Burma were tied in some way to the ruling party.
Estimates show that 95% of small business organizations and labour unions during this period
were allied with the ruling AFPL, with the other 5% being affiliated with the opposition party,
the National United Front and their civil organizations (Ganesan, 2007).
Buddhist sangha organizations experienced more freedom during the independence
period in Burma. Following the removal of the colonial government Buddhism experienced a
resurgence, especially among the ranks of government officials. This meant that the sangha
were able to promote religion and pursue their political agendas more freely and effectively
than during the colonial period (Ganesan, 2007). They would often put their support behind
the political parties that promised the desired religious and socio-political reforms. These
parties were usually the parties that ended up in positions of power. This may have also been
affected by the fact that Buddhism is the dominant religion in Burma and monks were highly
venerated. Thus, if monks put their support behind a certain cause or political party, large
numbers of the population were likely to do the same. This is not to say that these
organizations simply served the interests of the state. Sangha also used their political power to
protest against undesirable state policies (Ganesan, 2007). Overall, these civil society
organizations were an important player in the political arena of the independence period.
While it has been said that student unions were more autonomous of the government
than religious organizations during the parliamentary period in Burma, the evidence indicates
that they too were highly politically involved. The main difference between these organizations
and the Sangha in terms of their political stance was that student groups usually spoke out in

52. 52
opposition to the AFPL government, instead of supporting it as religious groups often did
(Ganesan, 2007) Unions were often involved in anti-government demonstrations, and were
active on university campuses, championing the cause of the students in disputes between the
student body and the university administration, likely seen as being closely linked with the
government.
Many indigenous minority groups also became politically active during this period. Not
directly affiliated with any political party, they demanded the right to self governance and for
autonomous status for their respective states (Gramsci, 2007).
In 1958, disagreements within the leadership of the AFPFL caused the party to split into
the AFPL (Clean) and the AFPL (Stable) (Gramsci, 2007). By forming an alliance with the left
wing opposition National United Front party, the AFPFL (Clean) managed to stay in control of
the state while the AFPFL (Stable) became the new opposition. Because virtually all civil
society groups were affiliated with a political party, this also caused a rift in the social
organizations of Burma. Those groups affiliated with the newly formed AFPFL (Clean) found
that they had lost their access to state resources. To add insult to injury, the government also
punished these groups by refusing to grant them business permits, and by rescinding on
previously arranged loan agreements (Gramsci, 2007)
Overall, the independence period in Burma was a time of vibrant civil society activity
and political life, though the line between the two was often difficult to distinguish. It has been
speculated that many more civil society organizations would have emerged in the years
following this period, if the country hadn’t been taken over by the military in 1962 effectively
ending Burma’s period of parliamentary rule (Gramsci, 2007).

53. 53
4.2.3 Civil Society during the Socialist Period (1962-1988)
The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) rose to power following a military coup in
1962 and immediately instituted policies that radically changed the social, economic and
political systems in Burma (Ganesan, 2007). It was during this time period that the Burmese
state re-oriented itself, establishing the goals of a transformative state as outlined in section
4.1. These policies had a huge impact on the relationship between the state and civil society
in Burma and had lasting implications on the nature of the space in which social organizations
operated in the country.
The BSPP have been referred to as the murderers of civil society in Burma due to their
insistency on the elimination of dissidence within the population (Burma Centre Netherlands,
2000). Following the coup, the new ruling party wasted no time in passing the National Security
Act which disallowed the formation of new political organizations (Ganesan, 2007).
Conveniently, the law did not contain an explicit definition of a political organization, so it was
up to the discretion of government officials to determine organizations were allowed and which
were not.
All pre-existing civic or voluntary organizations were either co-opted by the state or
disbanded in an effort to quell political activity in what had been a quickly growing sector of
Burmese society (Selth, 2000). The leaders of these organizations were arrested, including top
monks from Sangha organizations (Ganesan, 2007). The new laws also discouraged people
from joining any organizations that could be perceived as politically active.

54. 54
To replace independent civil society organizations, the government founded its own
public organizations, which were advertised to the people as formal channels by which the
public could voice their concerns to higher levels of government, in a similar fashion to the
organizations affiliated with the AFPL during the parliamentary period (Ganesan, 2007).
Unfortunately, these government-run “civil society” organizations generally operated as an
extension of the government apparatus. Although they did afford some peasants and labourers
greater access to party leadership, the government used these organizations to quell dissent in
the public sector and to monitor for potential threats to the party.
Although the BSPP dominated all spheres of social activity during this period, pluralism
continued to exist thought it was mostly relegated to the periphery of the social sphere (Burma
Centre Netherlands, 2000). Many organizations were able to continue to operate by
maintaining a low profile and downplaying the political nature of their activities, a strategy still
employed by many organizations in Burma today (Ganesan, 2007). Only welfare and religious
organizations that maintained a safe distance from politics and spheres of power were allowed
to continue, and even then their presence was merely tolerated. Village religious activities
remained autonomous of the state, and Buddhist and Christian ceremonies still took place
(Selth, 2000). It is informally speculated that these religious activities were used in some cases
as a front to hide more political activities such as informal political discussion and reading
groups whose meetings were held inside monasteries to avoid suspicion, but literature to
support this speculation has not been found.12 Minorities, having lost their right to self
governance, felt oppressed by military rule by the ethnic Burman population. Ethnic-minority
12 Author’s personal observation,June 2009.

55. 55
led rebellion groups began to emerge, especially along the border areas where the centralized
control of the Burmese government was more difficult to impose (Selth, 2000).
Informal organizations also formed during the socialist period, although they were
unable to formalize their activity because the nature of their activities would have made them
illegal (Ganesan, 2007). These first groups were usually formed by students and other
academics who would gather in secret to discuss banned political literature and other subjects
of common interest. Some groups secretly rebelled against the BSPP regime by distributing
pamphlets and writing anti government graffiti.
These clandestine activities were certainly not without an element of danger. In 1974,
members of an informal student groups managed to stage the first formal demonstrations since
the BSPP had come to power. The demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the
government, which quickly caused the movement to go back to operating outside of the formal
sector(Ganesan, 2007)
As described earlier, the pro-democracy citizen protests of 1988 finally managed to
topple the BSPP regime, but it was quickly replaced with another military junta, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
4.2.4 Contemporary Civil Society in Burma (1988-Present)
On gaining power, the SLORC regime’s primary objective was to control societal
unrest. To this end, the SLORC passed the ‘Law Related to Forming Organizations’ soon after
coming to power which mandated that civic organizations have a legal form separate to those
of political institution, thus precluding the potentially political roles of this civic activity (Taylor,