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KILLSUIT
• DEVOPS / SECURITY AT RANDORI
• ARCHITECT
• SECURITY ENGINEER
• CONSULTANT
• SECURITY ANALYST
• RESEARCHERS FOCUSED ON EXPLOITS
• WANTED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT “APT” POST EXPLOITATION
• ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO RESEARCH & REVERSE
• THIS HAS WORKED (A LITTLE)!
• WANTED A TECHNICAL SIDE PROJECT
• BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DANDERSPRITZ
• QUICK HISTORY OF THE FRAMEWORK(S)
• GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION
• KILLSUIT
• PERSISTENCE
• EVASION
• DATA EXFIL
• QUANTUM SHOOTER – MAN ON THE SIDE
• DANDERSPRITZ LAB
• FREAKING COOL
• A FULLY FUNCTIONAL POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK
• WRITTEN IN JAVA 
• EXTREMELY MODULAR
• “PLUGINS” (FEATURES) WRITTEN IN PYTHON / CUSTOM SCRIPTING ☺
• DESIGNED FOR STEALTH
• DESIGNED TO PREVENT DUMB OPERATORS FROM MESSING IT UP
Expanding
Pully
DanderSpritz
DanderSpritz
script rewrite
2001 2005 2011
Expanding
Pully
DanderSpritz
DanderSpritz
script rewrite
2001
KillSuit
2008
• TARGET = ATTACKED COMPUTER(S)
• LP = LISTENING POST (C&C SERVER)
• COMMAND = SOMETHING RUNNING ON TARGET
• PSP = PERSONAL SECURITY PRODUCT (AV)
• SAFETY HANDLER = DON’T MESS IT UP
• IMPLANT = MALICIOUS CODE DEPLOYED ON TARGET
GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION
Fuzzbunch Exploit DouplePulsar PeddleCheap DanderSpritz
WHAT IS KILLSUIT?
• EXTREMELY MODULAR PERSISTENCE FRAMEWORK
• MULTIPLE SUPPORTED PERSISTENCE METHODS
• CAN LOAD SEVERAL DIFFERENT ”PLUGINS”
• ENCRYPTION FOR EVERYTHING
• INSTANCE = A SPECIFC INSTANCE OF KILLSUIT (MULTIPLE CAN BE
INSTALLED)
• TYPE = A SPECIFIC KISU INSTANCE INTENDED TO SUPPORT PERSISTENCE
FOR A COMPLEX IMPLANT
• LAUNCHER = THE DRIVER EXPLOITED TO RUN KERNEL MODE CODE
• MODULE = SPECIFIC IMPLANT / CODE THAT IS INTENDED TO BE
PERSISTENT
• MODULE STORE = ENCRYPTED VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM
• MODIFIES VBR TO LOAD KERNEL DRIVER
• USES AN ENCRYPTED TRUETYPE FONT FILES AS “CONTAINERS” FOR
KERNEL DRIVER
• PATCHES WINLOAD.EXE & THE FIRST DRIVER LOADED DURING BOOT
TIME
• LAUNCHES A “KERNEL MODE ORCHESTRATOR” BY EXPLOITING A
“LAUNCHER” DRIVER
• PROVIDES ABILITY TO RUN *UNSIGNED* KERNEL MODE AND USER
MODE CODE
• BEGINS LAUNCHING IMPLANTS
• INJECTS MALICIOUS USER MODE CODE INTO PROCESSES
DEFENSE EVASION
• EVERYTHING ENCRYPTED WITH UNIQUE KEY PER TARGET
• VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM STORED IN REGISTRY
• PROCESS INJECTION FOR USER MODE CODE
• TEMPORARILY CREATE FILES
• TIME STOMPING
• PROVIDES COVERT (NON-WINSOCK) NETWORK
ACCESS FOR TOOLS
• FLEWAVENUE = IPV4 DRIVER
• DOORMANGAUZE = IPV6 DRIVER
DATA GATHERING
• STEALTHY KEYLOGGERS
• PERSISTENCE USING KILLSUIT USING THE “STLA” INSTANCE TYPE
• STORES ENCRYPTED DATA IN VBNARM.DLL (CONFIGURABLE)
• FULLY FEATURED PACKET CAPTURE TOOL
• USES BERKLEY PACKET FILTER (BPF) FILTER FORMAT
• INSTALLED ONTO AN EXISTING KILLSUIT INSTANCE
• CAPTURED DATA STORED TO AN ENCRYPTED CONTAINER
• DANDERSPRITZ INCLUDES DRIVERS TO INTERACT WITH
SEVERAL DATABASES
• CAN BE INSTALLED PERSISTENTLY WITH KISU
• MSSQL, MYSQL, SQLITE, ORACLE
• WIFI MAN IN THE MIDDLE (MITM)
• USES A SEPARATE KILLSUIT INSTANCE WITH IT’S OWN TYPE (MABE)
• INSTALLS DRIVER WITH PACKET INJECTION CAPABILITIES
STEALTHY EXFIL
STRAITBIZARRE FRIEZERAMP
• STRAITBIZARRE = IMPLANT DESIGNED FOR STEALTHY DATA EXFIL
• FRIEZERAMP = CUSTOM NETWORK PROTOCOL
• PROVIDES COVERT & ENCRYPTED NETWORKING CAPABILITIES
• USES ”ADAPTERS” TO INSERT PACKETS INTO RELEVANT TRANSPORT LAYER
• SIMILAR TO IPSEC
• DATA EXFIL VIA UN-USED / DISABLED WIFI CARDS
• USED WHEN THE TARGET IS AIR GAPPED
• CAN USE STOLEN CREDENTIALS OR SEND VIA OPEN NETWORKS
• USES A SEPARATE KILLSUIT INSTANCE WITH IT’S OWN TYPE (SOKN)
QUANTUM SHOOTER
• STRAITBIZARRE SHOOTER REDIRECTS TO FOXACID EXPLOIT
SERVER
• EXPLOIT SERVER DEPLOYS “VALIDATOR”
• VALIDATOR CONFIRMS IF TARGET IS INTERESTING
• UPGRADE TO UNITED RAKE
STORY TIME
v 0x7a43e1fa in hex
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
DANDERSPRITZ LAB
• FULLY FUNCTIONAL DANDERSPRITZ LAB IN 2 COMMANDS
• PACKER BUILD DANDERSPRITZ_LAB.JSON
• VAGRANT UP
• BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DANDERSPRITZ
• FRAMEWORK HISTORY & OVERVIEW
• GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION
• SOLARTIME
• KILLSUIT MODULES
• QUANTUM SHOOTER – MAN ON THE SIDE
• DANDERSPRITZ LAB
DANDERSPRITZ.COM
@FRANCISCKRS
DANDERSPRITZ_DOCS
DANDERSPRITZ_LAB

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BlueHat v18 || Killsuit the equation group's swiss army knife for persistence, evasion, and data exfil

  • 2. • DEVOPS / SECURITY AT RANDORI • ARCHITECT • SECURITY ENGINEER • CONSULTANT • SECURITY ANALYST
  • 3.
  • 4. • RESEARCHERS FOCUSED ON EXPLOITS • WANTED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT “APT” POST EXPLOITATION • ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO RESEARCH & REVERSE • THIS HAS WORKED (A LITTLE)! • WANTED A TECHNICAL SIDE PROJECT
  • 5. • BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DANDERSPRITZ • QUICK HISTORY OF THE FRAMEWORK(S) • GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION • KILLSUIT • PERSISTENCE • EVASION • DATA EXFIL • QUANTUM SHOOTER – MAN ON THE SIDE • DANDERSPRITZ LAB
  • 6. • FREAKING COOL • A FULLY FUNCTIONAL POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK • WRITTEN IN JAVA  • EXTREMELY MODULAR • “PLUGINS” (FEATURES) WRITTEN IN PYTHON / CUSTOM SCRIPTING ☺ • DESIGNED FOR STEALTH • DESIGNED TO PREVENT DUMB OPERATORS FROM MESSING IT UP
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14. • TARGET = ATTACKED COMPUTER(S) • LP = LISTENING POST (C&C SERVER) • COMMAND = SOMETHING RUNNING ON TARGET • PSP = PERSONAL SECURITY PRODUCT (AV) • SAFETY HANDLER = DON’T MESS IT UP • IMPLANT = MALICIOUS CODE DEPLOYED ON TARGET
  • 15. GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION Fuzzbunch Exploit DouplePulsar PeddleCheap DanderSpritz
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20. • EXTREMELY MODULAR PERSISTENCE FRAMEWORK • MULTIPLE SUPPORTED PERSISTENCE METHODS • CAN LOAD SEVERAL DIFFERENT ”PLUGINS” • ENCRYPTION FOR EVERYTHING
  • 21. • INSTANCE = A SPECIFC INSTANCE OF KILLSUIT (MULTIPLE CAN BE INSTALLED) • TYPE = A SPECIFIC KISU INSTANCE INTENDED TO SUPPORT PERSISTENCE FOR A COMPLEX IMPLANT • LAUNCHER = THE DRIVER EXPLOITED TO RUN KERNEL MODE CODE • MODULE = SPECIFIC IMPLANT / CODE THAT IS INTENDED TO BE PERSISTENT • MODULE STORE = ENCRYPTED VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM
  • 22.
  • 23. • MODIFIES VBR TO LOAD KERNEL DRIVER • USES AN ENCRYPTED TRUETYPE FONT FILES AS “CONTAINERS” FOR KERNEL DRIVER • PATCHES WINLOAD.EXE & THE FIRST DRIVER LOADED DURING BOOT TIME
  • 24.
  • 25. • LAUNCHES A “KERNEL MODE ORCHESTRATOR” BY EXPLOITING A “LAUNCHER” DRIVER • PROVIDES ABILITY TO RUN *UNSIGNED* KERNEL MODE AND USER MODE CODE • BEGINS LAUNCHING IMPLANTS • INJECTS MALICIOUS USER MODE CODE INTO PROCESSES
  • 26.
  • 28. • EVERYTHING ENCRYPTED WITH UNIQUE KEY PER TARGET • VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM STORED IN REGISTRY • PROCESS INJECTION FOR USER MODE CODE • TEMPORARILY CREATE FILES • TIME STOMPING
  • 29.
  • 30. • PROVIDES COVERT (NON-WINSOCK) NETWORK ACCESS FOR TOOLS • FLEWAVENUE = IPV4 DRIVER • DOORMANGAUZE = IPV6 DRIVER
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 34. • STEALTHY KEYLOGGERS • PERSISTENCE USING KILLSUIT USING THE “STLA” INSTANCE TYPE • STORES ENCRYPTED DATA IN VBNARM.DLL (CONFIGURABLE)
  • 35. • FULLY FEATURED PACKET CAPTURE TOOL • USES BERKLEY PACKET FILTER (BPF) FILTER FORMAT • INSTALLED ONTO AN EXISTING KILLSUIT INSTANCE • CAPTURED DATA STORED TO AN ENCRYPTED CONTAINER
  • 36.
  • 37. • DANDERSPRITZ INCLUDES DRIVERS TO INTERACT WITH SEVERAL DATABASES • CAN BE INSTALLED PERSISTENTLY WITH KISU • MSSQL, MYSQL, SQLITE, ORACLE
  • 38.
  • 39. • WIFI MAN IN THE MIDDLE (MITM) • USES A SEPARATE KILLSUIT INSTANCE WITH IT’S OWN TYPE (MABE) • INSTALLS DRIVER WITH PACKET INJECTION CAPABILITIES
  • 42. • STRAITBIZARRE = IMPLANT DESIGNED FOR STEALTHY DATA EXFIL • FRIEZERAMP = CUSTOM NETWORK PROTOCOL • PROVIDES COVERT & ENCRYPTED NETWORKING CAPABILITIES • USES ”ADAPTERS” TO INSERT PACKETS INTO RELEVANT TRANSPORT LAYER • SIMILAR TO IPSEC
  • 43.
  • 44. • DATA EXFIL VIA UN-USED / DISABLED WIFI CARDS • USED WHEN THE TARGET IS AIR GAPPED • CAN USE STOLEN CREDENTIALS OR SEND VIA OPEN NETWORKS • USES A SEPARATE KILLSUIT INSTANCE WITH IT’S OWN TYPE (SOKN)
  • 46.
  • 47.
  • 48.
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 51. • STRAITBIZARRE SHOOTER REDIRECTS TO FOXACID EXPLOIT SERVER • EXPLOIT SERVER DEPLOYS “VALIDATOR” • VALIDATOR CONFIRMS IF TARGET IS INTERESTING • UPGRADE TO UNITED RAKE
  • 53.
  • 54.
  • 56.
  • 57.
  • 58.
  • 59.
  • 62. • FULLY FUNCTIONAL DANDERSPRITZ LAB IN 2 COMMANDS • PACKER BUILD DANDERSPRITZ_LAB.JSON • VAGRANT UP
  • 63. • BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DANDERSPRITZ • FRAMEWORK HISTORY & OVERVIEW • GETTING TO POST-EXPLOITATION • SOLARTIME • KILLSUIT MODULES • QUANTUM SHOOTER – MAN ON THE SIDE • DANDERSPRITZ LAB