This presentation Jill WALKER, Commissioner, New Zealand Commerce Commission, was made during the discussion “Challenges and co-ordination of leniency programmes” held at the 127th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement on 5 June 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/2gt.
3. • Cartel provisions (civil versus criminal)
• Immunity and cooperation policies (consultation on
policy reviews)
• Capacity to share confidential information and use
compulsory powers in limited circumstances:
• S.99I Commerce Act 1986 (NZ)/s.155AAA Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (Aus)
• ss.155A&B Competition and Consumer Act 2010/ ss. 98H&99A
Commerce Act 1986 (in relation to ss.36A & 46A)
Framework for Leniency Cooperation
3
4. From marker to outcome of investigation:
• Coordinating information requests
• Coordinating investigation strategies/focus
• Coordinating case theories
• Coordinating interviews of overseas personnel
• Coordinating approach to outcomes
• Sharing experience of problems dealing with applicants (e.g. non-
cooperation)
In Practice -
Global and Trans-Tasman Cooperation
4
Largely not rely on statutory powers
Information gateways – providing assistance can
bring forth immunity applications
5. For us:
• Prioritisation of resources
• More focused investigations on international conduct
• Able to get up to speed on issues quicker
• Ensuring we have not missed anything critical in our
investigation approach and how we are assessing the
matter.
What are the benefits?
5
6. For the applicants:
• Applicants are able to satisfy the information needs of
both ACCC and NZCC in a systematic way
• Parties are able to search for material in databases in a
coordinated approach
• Less disruption to their businesses – key staff are
interviewed by both regulators in a coordinated manner
What are the benefits?
6