NASH EQUILIBRIUM INTEGRATION WITH THE DELPHI POLICY MODEL_ChinaStudyAbroad_151001-01(pdh)3rdedit__Chap5 Pol Section

SECURING A CAREER PLACEMENT EDGE:
HIRING FOR POTENTIAL,
AN ADVANCED APPROACH TO STUDENT STUDY ABROAD, ALIGNING PURPOSE
WITH EXPERIENCE
CHINA IMPACT 2012 – 2025
中国冲击
2012 - 2025
一部综合性的关于中国政治，经济，国际化领导力及
本国经济政策之调查分析与建议
Volume 1
1st
Edition
APPLYING THE SPELIT MODEL AS A FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY AND EXPLORE
CRITICAL LITERATURE SO AS TO ADVANCE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING BY
FOCUSING ON
IN-COUNTRY RESEARCH AS A PRELUDE TO INTEGRATING THE SALDANA AND
DELPHI MODELS
By:
Patrick. D. Huff

PUBLICATION INFORMATION
Huff, P. D. (2015). Securing A Career Placement Edge: Hiring for Potential, An Advanced Approach to Student Study Abroad,
Aligning Purpose With Experience (1 ed., Vol. 1). (C. Zabilski, E. B. Huff, J. L. Huff, J. L. Huff, Eds., & P. D. Huff,
Trans.) Woodland Hills, CA, USA: GPS-AG, Inc. doi:ISBN-13:978-1508426882
Key Words: Student, Study, Abroad, Advanced, SPELIT, Saldana, Delphi, University, Collegiate, Employment,
Potential, Leadership, Social, Political, Economic, Legal, Intercultural, Technology, Infrastructure, Teaching,
Methods, Instructional, Personal, Development, Ethics, Organizational, Behavior, International, Global, Language,
China, Pepperdine
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Copyright © 2012 by GPS-AG, Inc. Publishing Division, All rights reserved, no part of this work covered by the copyright may
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no portion of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission
of the author or this publisher.
Printed in the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America
ISBN-13: 978-1508426882
ISBN-10: 1508426880
xvii

ABSTRACT
The author undertakes an analysis of China’s political, economic, legal, and technology
environments in the context of leadership and policy developments. The research design is a
bound longitudinal study with the initial immersion occurring 21 May to 31 May 2012. The
research covers a total of four immersions of relatively equal duration. The study and supporting
research is based on a mixed-method approach that touches on an ethnological phenomenon
(Wolcott, 1999) within China. The approach is weighted 83 percent on qualitative literature
reviews and 17 percent on original quantitative data. The purpose of the study is to assist in
closing a gap in the literature on China, act as a collegiate (post-graduate level) primer in support
of in-country studies and experiential learning with a focus on an empirical investigation into the
country’s future direction and priorities.
Original data is collected using face-to-face open-ended surveys or narrative interviews
conducted during each immersion. Each immersion focuses on observations of China’s
environment through the lens of ethnic differences within each of its regions or provincial
sovereigns. Background survey participants include academic scholars, government officials,
industry leaders, faculty advisors, and common Chinese “worker class”. These surveys assist in
determining the study’s initial focus, significance, development of preliminary inquiries, and the
final direction of the research.
Stage one of this study includes the initial discoveries pertaining to environmental factors
identified by using the SPELIT Power Matrix Model as a process to frame the in-country
research and analysis of phenomena. In this stage a total of 4 cities, 5 provinces, and 7
organizations were visited and observed. These form the domains from which all in-country data
was designed to be collected. A total of seven surveys (N=7) are designed with a total sampling
of (n = 26) in-country participants taken in different locations. This stage includes the
development of 19 Structured Literature Reviews (SLRs) in accordance with Pan’s Relevant
Literature Review Model. This series of SLRs are focused on four areas of interest (factors) in
order to identify the relevancy of the study’s core research questions.
Stage two of the study design examines the in-country data and literature by subjecting it
to assessment and analysis for critical reoccurring themes and codes using Saldana’s Model and
by applying a weighted Likert scale to determine each elements degree of significance.
Stage two requires the identification of a panel of (n=12) survey participants in order to
apply the Delphi Policy Model. Hegelian Theory is utilized as an underlying and controlling
dialectic process throughout all stages of the SLR and subsequent Delphi survey process. Each
participant will be selected on the basis of cultural bias and subject matter expertise (SME). The
model includes a three-round survey series which integrates subsequent round evaluations by the
participants to identify, validate, and determine the significance of findings. The series of
surveys (N = 3) represents a total sample population (n = 36) necessary to acquire a relevant
body of evidence. This stage concludes with the assessment of findings, and conclusions derived
from the process.
Stage three of the study will summarize the conclusions and concise recommendations
for future study and offered for the consideration of policy decision-makers. Key to this study’s
findings is the estimate of China’s top priority and the direction its leadership will set over the
next 10 years.
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ABSTRACT
These recommendations will subsequently be tested using Wheatley’s Complexity
(Grobman, 2005) and Trompenaars’ Change Across Cultures Theory (Hampden-Turner,
Trompenaars, 2000) as methods of analysis and evaluation of China’s leadership through the lens
of Quinn’s Competing Values Model so as to formulate corollaries between the study’s findings,
China’s leadership characteristics, behavior, and probable actions that will define China’s Impact
on the international community between 2016 and 2025.
Keywords: Student, Study, Abroad, Advanced, SPELIT, Saldana, Delphi, University, Collegiate,
Employment, Potential, Leadership, Social, Political, Economic, Legal, Intercultural, Technology, Infrastructure,
Teaching, Methods, Instructional, Personal, Development, Ethics, Organizational, Behavior, International, Global,
Language, China, Pepperdine
xx

CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions
There is no body of methods; or comprehensive methodology for the study of the impact of public
policy as an aid to future policy. James Samuel Coleman, 1972
Introduction
This study emphasizes exploring four aspects of China’s society. Each aspect paints a
distinct picture about the Middle Kingdom. This investigation included a review and assessment
of individual political, economic, legal, technology, and infrastructural environmental factors.
The study endeavors to discover the potential impact of these factors within a time and space bias
as a set of potential influencers. These influencers will drive the future direction of mainland
China as it navigates its needs, objectives, goals, and desires. These will in turn drive the
priorities of its leadership. Further, these priorities will serve to impose a series of significant and
disruptive innovations and change in the global community over the next decade.
Since the 1990s, China has achieved incredible success in its economic development.
However, this author’s survey shows there are still potential risks to the country should it sustain
its current pace of development. Evidence surfaced in China as well as in contemporary literature
during this investigation that suggests there is a shift in the country’s growth trend. These new
trends infer China is now attempting to slow its internal economic development. These trends are
being signaled by the emergence of a set of priorities that are focused on enhancing and growing
China’s global external interests, image, competency, and authority as a new world leader.
Moreover, China is rapidly learning from the errors inherent in past reforms. As an example,
China has discovered the adverse effects from imposing its one-child policy. Due to these
discoveries, the government has reassessed and is undertaking a series of reforms to overhaul the
policy due to its negative impacts on China’s continuing economic growth goals. The original
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
policy effectively created an aging problem in the country that is contributing to a substantial
reduction in China’s workforce, production, and manufacturing strengths. These traditional
Chinese laborers and associated work ethics are representative of many of the drivers of the
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Since 1990 foreign investment in mainland China’s
industrial manufacturing complex and pursuit of its domestic markets has been surging.
When the strength of China’s traditional labor force and its work ethics are fully
considered as significant growth factors, it is clear that the government of China will need to
place a considerable effort into dealing with this shrinking and highly productive resource.
Further, departures of the aged population from the workforce continue to impose an ever-
increasing burden to the national economy. This study’s SLR analysts suggest labor resources are
additionally challenged due to China’s lack of a comprehensive social security and pension
system for retirees which are adding to reductions in the productivity of the younger workforce.
Collectively these conditions may become influential factors that drive the country’s priorities
towards increasing national spending for a health care system that serves the entire population in
the near future. Such social programs that are focused on serving this growing aged population
will serve the government’s interests as these programs will free the younger generation (family
members) from commitments to provide care and support of its aging and infirm members. As
China begins to focus on monitoring the effects of these conditions, few government officials
argue against them being social-economic detractors that are undermining the productivity of
younger Chinese workers. These observations were additionally confirmed as extracted from this
study’s in-country surveys and SLR research.
Absent the attention of the government towards providing relief in this area, ever-
increasing internal burdens on young Chinese entering the workforce may serve to additionally
reduce their productivity as they strive to care for the needs of their extended families. In many
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of this author’s interviews and surveys with national Chinese working class these concerns were
expressed as significant. Many argued the government’s one-child policy has resulted in placing
burdens on the family unit that are unprecedented in recent history.
China’s rapidly changing social-economic and workforce demographics are likely already
influencing the country’s leadership and future priorities. The environmental factors this author
explored in this area of interest provide indicators of China’s recent Five Year Plan to shift the
country’s economic focus away from being the manufacturing hub of the world to one of being a
leader in innovative design, research, and development of unique Chinese brands and products.
This shift is significant when placed in the context of the country’s future demand for large
quantities of unskilled laborers. Given the country’s change in direction, the need for such a
large labor force in the future is substantially reduced. This shift in strategy, however, does not
serve to effectively ensure bridging the economic growth gap during China’s manpower transition
from a hard working labor force to one representative of advanced technological research,
development, innovation, and production when assessed within a highly competitive global
economy. This shift represents a transformation from a system driven by a planned economy to
one instead driven by a uniquely Chinese socialistic market economy. Many economic scholars
and historians view China’s present stage of development as one that represents a duality between
an “economic system and economic growth method” (Ruogu, 2008, pp. 424-425).
Rubric for Policy Development: Ethics, Values, and Goals
It is inherent to the nature of policy development and decision making that a wide range of
multidimensional and interdisciplinary factors are considered in the process of designing and
applying an appropriate Inquiring System (IS) (Turoff M. , 2002). Collectively, when applied to
social, political, economic, legal, and technology environmental strategies that support a policy
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development process that may additionally touch on and be influenced by ethnography. By
applying this author’s rubric as a part of the pre and post Delphi Policy process reviewers should
be reminded that both are simply tools for the analysis of relevant issues and not mechanisms for
final policy decisions. They are only used to facilitate the discovery of significant factors,
influencers, and drivers that can be synthesized to provide a simplified structure that is supportive
of identifying a consensus (Turoff M. , 2002). In Rist’s paper on the topic of policy research and
its related decisional processes he offers the following observations.
“Research is but one (and often minor at that) among a number of often contradictory and
competing sources that seek to influence what is an ongoing and constantly evolving
process.” Rist stresses, the term "process" because he chooses to describe policy
decision making as more or less an “unbounded” process, as characterized by actors who
arrive on the scene (often unannounced)… “delimited by clearly defined constraints of
time and location,” purpose, or calculation. Such a description suggests the antithesis of
the conventional understanding of decision making. In the latter, a more traditional
approach to decision making is understood as a discrete event. One that is undertaken by
a defined set of actors that are working in "real time" and moving to a decision that is
based on their analysis of a list of alternatives (Rist, 1983).
Ultimately the objective of this research is to present to the Delphi Policy Subject Matter
Expert (SME) panel a completed assessment and evaluation rubric that will allow each participant
to view a synthesized summation of the findings pertaining to each research question. Moreover,
this study’s findings and recommendations will serve to assist each SME in their ability to quickly
evaluate, assess, and determine an opinion as to a definitive set of priorities and sense of the
future direction of China as pertaining to each category of interest or controlling environmental
factor. The resulting degree of consensus or lack thereof, will allow this author to offer a
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predictive judgment as to the priorities and direction China’s strategies and system of priorities
may take over the next 10 to 15 years.
The following rubric is presented as an interpretive tool to summarize the range of
potential outcomes related to each environmental factor and associated research inquiry as a set of
“predictive elements” (Mitroff & Turoff, 1975).
Figure 7: Rubric Model Conceptual
Rubric Model
Policy Development Conclusions
During the author’s exploration into China’s strategies, policies, and development he
discovered the government’s approach and consideration of social, political, economic, legal,
intercultural, and technology factors are undertaken with a considerable male bias. This bias is
not unique to other eastern cultures this author has studied. In fact, he has found it to be quite
commonplace. As one of this study’s SLR analysts observed, this gender bias makes being a
female in certain areas of China similar to being subject to a death sentence. This bias is
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considerably lesser when compared to many developed countries in the Western Bloc. When
viewed in the context of the Chinese people, the CPC, and their government, all are in agreement
when gender bias is considered as an influencer to the direction of the country’s social, political,
economic, legal, and technology strategies, policies, and development. As such, China’s future
policy development and resulting direction will continue to be heavily influenced by this bias and
its strong sense of nationalism, exceptionalism, and interest in increasing its power, authority, and
presence. Collectively, these are supportive of a set of esoteric or pure strategies that are
designed to lead China to becoming the new global leader.
Pure Strategy’s Role in Policy Development
China’s economic strategies are relatively transparent and reasonably well defined within
its different five year plans and series of documents that provide supporting arguments in favor of
the adoption of these plans. Some of this study’s SLR scholars define strategy as a plan, method,
or series of maneuvers or stratagems that are applied to achieve a specific goal or result.
Strategies are often employed during periods of peace and war by a nation or society by focusing
its total powers and force structure to achieve large-scale, long-range developmental desires and
goals. To ensure the security and victory of a nation in the achievement of its most challenging
goals, it is necessary that its society supports its government with the strength and commitment of
an equally strong public will.
Discovery of these strategies is relatively easy as many of the arguments associated with
the different aspects of each plan are available on the worldwide Internet. These are either
authored by the elite “insiders” within China’s government or by world class subject matter
experts and/or historians that have followed China’s economy for several decades. Most of these
SMEs or Sino-analysts have a common approach to gaining a full understanding of these factors,
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influencers, and drivers of China’s economic priorities, strategies, and resulting policies. Many of
this study’s history, social-geography scholars, and scientists argue that it is essential to become
knowledgeable and understanding of China’s ancient cultural origins, language, icons, and
ideologies before a researcher can break the code pertaining to how China really works (Bol,
2009; Diamond, 2005).
To this extent then, Sino-scholars, academics, and experts investigating various categories
of China’s environmental factors believe researchers must first understand the ideology of
China’s most influential philosophers. Once this is achieved, these scholars argue it is necessary
to fully understand and appreciate the nature and impact that China’s geographic placement plays
in its development and influence within the global community (Bol, 2009). Next, these scholars
and SMEs would argue it is necessary to investigate, appreciate, and understand the role a
country’s natural resources and material requirements play as influencers in the global
community (Diamond, 2005).
Once these pure factors are understood, a researcher can better assess and evaluate the
following:
• China’s social culture, controlling philosophies
• ideological believes and collective internal and external worldviews
• established and tested trade and commerce traditions and customs
• shifting needs
• desires within the global community
Once understood, only then can a researcher begin to be empowered with sufficient
insight and the tools necessary to begin to identify relevant relationships, trends, and the possible
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causations or origins of forces at play in a society or sovereign government that are driving its
desires, priorities, strategies, and ultimately its internal and external policies.
Ultimately, it is the objective of any policy analyst that is focused on assessing the future
direction of a particular society to be able to identify the “pure strategy” of the society being
investigated. By decoding this pure strategy a researcher can pose a hypothetical statement of
how a study subject is playing the game to achieve its primary objectives and long-term goals
(Nash, 1928; Neumann & Morgenstem, 1953). Once deciphered the analyst can better predict
each move a society will make given a variety of situations it is likely to confront.
This research attempts to discover and identify key factors within China’s strategies that
represent its “strategy set” or pure strategies that are associated to the country as it acts to achieve
its internal and external desires. This research attempts then to ultimately identify and assign a
probability to each of the environmental factors as categories directly or indirectly associated with
dependencies to each pure strategy as an influencer in driving China’s future priorities, policies,
and direction.
Strategy Sets and Priorities
China’s set of pure strategies are highly complex and integral to the achievement of a
myriad of national needs and desires. In fact, during the conductance of the initial research the
author discovered and identified a specific set of pure strategies in association with China’s
political, economic, legal, technology and infrastructural policies. Each of these is presented and
explored within this Chapter. The author provides a list that represents a few of the strategies that
are being applied to achieve China’s present national objectives and goals as a strategy set.
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Among the strategies that have been adopted by China that pertain to this area of interest
are the following:
• Monitor internal and external environments so as to adopt a slow and calculated pace of
continuing reforms to ensure the least disruption to the stability, authority, and the power
of the CPC and central government.
• Strengthen China’s internal ideologies in ways that will best achieve the people’s desires,
long-term interests, nationalism, and exceptionalism.
• Increase the country’s unity and focus towards achieving and securing its long-term
national interests as a dominant force and leader within the global community.
• Strengthen the country’s power, authority, and influence towards achieving its national
security goals and the protection of its global trade routes and commerce.
• Transform the country’s image, sense of value, control, and authority by assuming global
leadership in the areas of innovation, change, research, development, and the creation of
intellectual property and patents.
• Utilize this image and authority to gain international acceptance and approval of its
ideologies so as to influence other sovereigns to act on behalf of China’s best interests,
needs, and desires.
• Ensure the CPC and government “adamantly” serve the people and their “working
interest” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).
• Ensure the system of “democratic centralism” promotes trust and supports a “speed and
stability” during the course of reforms and development; a balanced “relationship
between the central…and local governments”; and, the public as “a collective and as
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individuals”. These are to be “coordinated” as a paced process during the achievement
of China’s development and economic goals (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).
• Transform China’s current “planned economy” to one that is driven instead by a uniquely
Chinese “socialistic market economy” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 424-425).
• Promote Confucian ethics, values, and behavior through: education and tradition;
tolerance and assimilation; and, by “advocating frugality” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).
• Utilize the acceptance of China’s ideologies, image, and power as a basis for partnering
with developing and undeveloped countries in beneficial areas of sustainable major
infrastructure, trade, and commerce.
• Utilize global partnering as a significant force for disruptive innovation and change; and,
as an alternative to the Western hegemony.
• Demonstrate a national ideology that encourages any country to select its own
development path and create suitable institutions that support its national needs and
desires to achieve success within the global community.
• Demonstrate China’s core ideologies and development strategies are applicable to all
countries. Specifically emphasize that those countries that believe their institutions,
political ideologies, and forceful strategies that require developing and undeveloped
countries change and adopt their form of governance as the best can be proven to be
ideologically flawed and destructive (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 430-431).
Researcher’s Observations
Background
For decades after the 1949 rise of communism, China has been known for its poverty and
social repression. During this rise China’s has expressed its aggression primarily along the lines
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of its internal national development, manufacturing power, the harvesting of its natural resources,
and its accumulation of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) or trade reserves (Richards, 2012). This
journey has proven to be one that has involved the country’s embrace of a number of significant
transformations, innovative experiments, and disruptive change. Some of these reforms have
proven to be successful over the years, but others have proven to be steps in the wrong direction.
Many of the reforms ultimately proved to be devastating to the country and its people. Many of
these failed reforms were adopted as ideologically associated with Maoist principles. As a result,
a popular saying in China is that Mao’s reforms got it 70 percent right and 30 percent wrong.
Over time the CPC has attempted to correct these errors with more liberal reforms in some areas
and more restrict reforms in others. That said, China and its leadership must be credited with the
ability to recognize their errors in favor of rapidly shifting to policies that correct the country’s
future course and priorities.
More recently, China’s experimentation with innovative changes to Maoist writs and
doctrine are shifting its aggressive passions and national interests in the direction of external
political-economic expansion and a transformation of its internal educational and research
systems so as to empower the country to become a world leader in the development of intellectual
property and technology. This shift is coupled with China’s interests in building and
strengthening its global partnerships; external foreign direct investments; securing natural
resources and minerals; and collecting the best intellectual minds in the world; in short, focusing
the country on what it needs most to ensure its future growth. This transformation is shifting
China’s internal and external policies so as to secure its ability to maintain the lowest possible
manufacturing costs and its access to as much of the world’s inexpensive natural and human
resources as possible. As such, China is entering an era of significant challenges in order to
sustain its future economic growth, power, and authority.
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Challenges
In order for China to successfully implement its national strategies and related policies, it
will need to address challenges on the following levels:
Internal:
• Improve the efficient utilization of its natural resources, and methods of extraction so
as to be more environmentally sensitive;
• Introduce increased reforms pertaining to the distribution of wealth between its four
classes (to include the grey class); and, enforce its trading and investment market
regulations so as to reduce corruption by increasing transparency and trust;
• Approach sweeping changes in ideologies and innovation reforms that will allow the
country to become more align with the Western Bloc, given some of these changes will
include a further liberalization and divergence from China’s rich cultural history,
traditions, and social structure;
• Integrate reforms in the areas of trade, property, and legal writs into the country’s
five year plan that favor increases in entrepreneurism, capitalism, foreign direct
investment, education, research, and development;
• Address the ever-increasing Western Bloc and European cultural influences that are
emerging internally due to cultural, trade, and commerce that are in conflict with
China’s traditions.
External:
• China will need to develop of a worldview that embraces an aggressive pursuit of
natural and human resources outside its borders;
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• Expand the country’s leadership influence in other regions of the world to include the
West and Europe;
• Grow exceptionalism and pursue aggressive financial and monetary systems,
international trade and commerce, debt management, increased capitalism, and
exploitation as a fierce competitor in the global marketplace;
• Focus on self-determination and the desire to assume global leadership through
influence, authority, and control by establishing a new spirit of entrepreneurism,
brand of capitalism, to include intellectual and real property reforms that will serve to
influence and lead Western and European cultures.
As China is confronted with internal and external challenges that pertain to its national
objectives and goals it will need to be centered on sustaining its GDP growth. As such, China
will need to consider the implications of its strategies, policies, and plans on its undeveloped,
developing and developed global stakeholders that are struggling with financial solvency and
economic viability. These stakeholders will need to be provided financial and infrastructural
development investments in order to grow their markets in order to become stronger trade and
commerce partners with China.
In fact, China's decision to continue its economic expansion at the rate of approximately 8
percent per year may need to be downwardly revised if it is to concern itself with having a viable
base of customers and stakeholders in which to continue to build an economy. As recommended
by numerous global economic analysts, scholars, and historians, China may need to seriously
consider adjusting its GDP growth to 3 or 4 percent per year (Beardson, 2013; Madjidi,
International policy experience: China., 2013). This may be necessary for China to continue to
develop and achieve its political and economic goals in the long term. Absent any adjustments to
its current strategies and policies, China is likely to experience significant repercussions in these
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areas as a result of the financial crisis being experienced in the West and Europe and as associated
with the financial stresses many undeveloped, developing, and developed countries are
experiencing.
Today approximately, 60 to 70 percent of America’s financial stability is based on credit
and consumer buying power as directly supported by trade and commerce debt holdings. “Most
of America's buying power is based on credit from China” (CNN, June, 18, 2012). Presently,
China is providing 75 to 85 percent of the credit or monetary supply necessary to support the
financial stability and the purchasing power of the United States. As a result, the U.S. closely
monitors and assesses China’s pure strategy sets and leading indicators.
The consequences of China's actions should the country cease to continue this financial
support (considering a change in economic and/or monetary policy) would impose liquidity,
credit, and debt considerations that would likely result in reducing the GDP of the U.S.. These
changes would likely deepen the financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe. In fact, many of the
economic analysts and historians that were examined in this study’s SLRs argue such a series of
events would increase the degree of financial stress being experienced across the entire global
community. Additionally, these experts argue such a negative shift in China’s policy would, at
the very least, serve to prolong the collective financial recovery of the global community as well
as leave many countries open to deepening social stresses that would result in critically disrupting
their political and governmental stability.
This poses a question. What would keep China from offering a greater level of financial
support to the Western Bloc and Eastern Europe so as to assist recovery? This author argues that
his research indicates China is being confronted with significant internal and external social,
political, economic, legal, intercultural, technology, and infrastructural challenges that represent a
set of substantial transformational problems the country will need to address before it can offer
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any additional assistance to the global community. So to a degree facing these challenges will
limit China’s ability to take a more aggressive stance towards providing the additional support
many in the Western Bloc and Eastern Europe would like. Instead, China needs to carefully
measure and balance its external involvements in favor of successfully managing its internal
affairs. The speed and care in which this transformation is implemented is critical to China
achieving its goals and objectives while at the same time maintaining the critical level of stability
the CPC and the government desires.
In this author's view China's internal and external political-economic policies, technology,
and educational shifts will impose significant challenges to China’s current and future leadership
to include a close examination of their future ethical behavior. China’s environmental factors
will continue to require close monitoring and the degree of responsiveness necessary to accurately
assess and adjust reforms to achieve the country’s goals while maintaining stability.
Moreover, this will require the careful construction of strategies and the implementation of
policies over the next decade. Due to China’s internal and external transformational stresses, the
country is not likely to pursue a policy of significantly increasing its economic and financial
support of the global community short of a few exceptions. These exceptions will be in the areas
where foreign sovereigns are willing to join its new trade and commerce league and its financial
and monetary investment banking systems as members eligible to receive foreign direct
investments in major infrastructure projects. In these countries, China’s Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) with its $100 billion in authorized capital together with the $40 billion
allocated to the Silk Road Fund, when coupled with a “well designed financial framework that
can connect countries along the Belt and Road Initiative to jointly raise funds for infrastructure
construction will strengthen the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) ability to successfully offer
bonds and financial instruments necessary to fill an $8 trillion gap in financing needed to develop
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regional sovereigns between 2014 and 2020” (Bank, 2015; Jia, 2015). Once accomplished, the
ADB will contribute in ways that will best serve China’s political, market, resource, monetary,
credit, and debt balancing interests, to include its other goals.
Policy Summary
China’s internal and external growth goals are transforming communism to a uniquely
Chinese form of capitalism, resource acquisition, commerce, and international trade debt
management. It appears this new form of communism [socialism] is bent on exploiting capitalism
to the point that it gains dominance or defeats all global competitors to include “Mother Russia”
(Roger Le Roy Miller, Benjamin, & North, 2010, p. 194).
Hypotheses
The author’s initial research and supporting evidence offers the following hypotheses for
further examination and testing pertaining to China’s policy priorities and the direction the
country will take over the next 10 to 20 years:
• Hypothesis No. 1: The people of China are accepting the CPC’s priorities to move the
country’s policies further to the right of traditional Maoist writs and doctrine.
• Evidence:
o The CPC priorities are focused on increasing the liberalization of its internal and
external reforms that include the country’s education system, financial and
monetary markets, international trade, and commerce. These reforms will bring
the country into better alignment with the West in certain areas of mutual interest.
Additionally, the policy shifts are designed to gain wider appeal and global
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acceptance of China’s political ideologies, and improve the worldview of its
leader’s ethics, authority, and power.
• Hypothesis No. 2: China has begun to experience signs of a slowed economic
expansion however the CPC has placed new priorities on increasing the country’s
future economic growth and ability to build and sustain higher levels of real GDP
income in the future from its FDIs.
• Evidence:
o The CPCs priorities are focused on internal and external reforms that are designed
to increase its FDI programs in order to strengthen and grow its global economy,
influence, dominance over and access to natural and human resources.
o These FDI reforms are focused on strengthening the members of China’s
international monetary, finance, investment banking, and debt management
initiatives (e.g., BRICS, AIIS, NDB, and the ADB) that have been chartered to
build significant and enduring infrastructure in member countries that have
stakeholder interests. Capital financing of these countries is designed and
structured to be in the form investments with direct returns as oppose to being
Western styled budget and debt financing assistance with trade, commerce, and
governance overtones. In time, China’s FDI initiatives will provide substantially
high economic (GDP) growth with a sustained return on its investments that is
realized through trade and commerce with the stakeholders in these initiatives.
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• Hypothesis No. 3: China’s laws are protective of intellectual property rights however
there is little or no priority for enforcement.
• Evidence:
o The CPCs priorities are focused on continuing all aspects of its highly aggressive
and unique form of capitalism which includes an open, transparent marketplace
with few restrictions.
o These priorities include the transformation of China’s education, research, and IP
development systems. Moreover, these reforms are focused on building an
intellectual property capability that will produce the world’s most advanced
technologies, and patents that will represent uniquely Chinese products.
• Hypothesis No. 4: China’s Internet services are sufficiently secure to conduct
confidential corporate transactions however these are prioritized to remain as shared
communications with the government.
• Evidence:
o The CPCs priority is to ensure all corporate enterprise and related digital
transactions remain structured, operated, and monitored. This priority is in
keeping with the government’s viewpoint that the State is an active partner with
full visibility and the ability to authorize, manipulate, or control all electronic
communications and corporate transactions.
o These policies are widely accepted by the people of China and those enterprise
operators that are accustom to the Asian business culture.
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The CPC and the government will continue to closely monitor these policies as priorities
that are setting the direction of the country. If successfully implemented, these policies will
ensure China and its leader’s ethics serve to increase the country’s nationalism, exceptionalism,
authority, and advancement towards gaining global dominance.
The above hypotheses are subject to the added examination, data collection, analysis,
evaluation, and determination of significance as indicators (predictors) of those priorities that are
related to establishing the future direction of China over the next 10 to 20 years.
These hypotheses and underlying assumptions although supported by this author’s initial
research, in-country surveys, SLRs, narratives, and data remain subject to confirmation and
validation by consensus through the application of the Delphi process.
The next section of this chapter explores this study’s central political research question.
The section includes the presentation and analysis of additional data as a collective body of
evidence supportive of increasing the significance of this study’s initial observations and findings
pertinent to the related hypothesis.
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Political Policy
“The core of the Chinese development mode is institutional suitability, which, in the final
analysis, is not a certain kind of specific mode, but a method, idea, and philosophical idea,
emphasizing that change is eternal.”
Li Ruogu, Chairman,
China Import & Export Bank, 2008,
Institutional Suitability and Economic Development, p.430
Research Question No. 1
Are the Chinese people accepting the CPC’s policy changes that are moving the country
to the right of its traditional Maoist writs and doctrine?
Overview
China is continuing to undergo a considerable degree of change and innovation in an
effort to position itself as a new political leader within the global community.
This interest is supported by the country’s general population, its local and regional
provincial officials, and its central government as a goal that is driven by a strong sense of
exceptionalism (EX1), nationalism (NA), and institutional suitability (IS) [Saldana analysis
coding].
These interests are so strong within China that the CPC and the central government are
given great latitudes in timing, the use of resources, and acceptance of continuing restrictive
social-political reforms in order for the governing elite and officials to get it right. So far, the
People of China have been tolerant and appreciative of the degree of complexity that is
confronting its government in light of its new strategies, associated policies, and goals. However,
this author’s initial research indicates this degree of tolerance is rapidly being played out.
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The series of findings pertaining to the political environment are presented in the
following order: empowerment (EM), stability and security (SS), availability and access (AA),
civil rights (CR1), property ownership (PO1), and right of enjoyment (RE1). All have been
identified as significant in the context of the SPELIT matrix framework and analysis methods
selected for this study. Each of the words, phrases, and/or themes has been coded using
Saldana’s Method of relevant data discovery, incident measurement, and determination of
significance related to reoccurrences. As such, this section provides a summary of the outcomes
derived from the author’s SLRs, in-country surveys, accompanying analysis, and assigned coding.
Current Policy
The current CPC political policies represent a shift in Maoist writs and doctrine towards
the support of a form of socialistic capitalism objectives and goals that are uniquely Chinese
(Ruogu, 2008). This shift in political strategies and policies are focused to right of traditional
Maoism.
As a result, the CPCs political ideologies are moving the country from traditional
communism to one that favors a more contemporary or liberal socialistic society. This shift has
been expressed by the adoption of limited rights and reforms. These include encouraging open
social and political forums; and, town meetings as a means for gauging and assessing popular
consensus, as well as many others that are referenced in this section of the study.
As the CPC shifts its political ideologies, the scholars and analysts reviewed in this study’s
SLRs argue the CPC will need to successfully address transitions in the areas that have been
mapped and analyzed by applying Saldana’s word, phrase, and theme codes as indicated:
• Empowerment (EM) : increased public access to government processes and
empowerment;
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• Stability and Security (SS): increased stability and security of the people and the
government through equalized and improved standards;
• Access and Availability (AA): adopt a shared and more fairly balanced access and
availability to social, political, economic, legal, and technological advancements
and benefits;
• Civil-Rights (CR1): increase working class property rights to include fair and
equal distribution of the nation’s wealth, retirement, and health care benefits;
• Property Ownership (PO1): ensure all classes share a more fair and balanced
ownership in the country’s increased standard of living;
• Right of Enjoyment (RE1): ensure all mainland Chinese are sharing fair and
balanced increases in their level of enjoyment of the country’s achievements such
as increased:
o access to higher education (EU1);
o access to better, more skilled, and higher paying jobs (EB1);
o health care and retirement benefits (EB2);
o Environmental responsibility, management, care, and conservation of
natural resources (ER)
Although many of these reforms appear to be connected to the country’s political
strategies and policies, they all influence or drive the CPC’s economic strategies as well. Deng
Xiaoping stated, “the correct attitude” should be that first, “we should let [the people and foreign
investors] make money” and then second, a belief in China’s ideologies and, “patriotism” will
follow. “We should not require them to love the country first, and make money…second.”
(Ruogu, 2008, p. 415). That said, this author’s investigation into Deng’s strategy of allowing the
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people and foreigners to first accumulate wealth and then become accepting of China’s political
ideologies and system are leading to the emergence of numerous disruptive trends specific to
social, political, and economic fairness and equalities.
Currently, the CPCs policies are creating a substantial middle and upper class with
significant degrees of disparity in the level of empowerment, access, availability, rights,
ownership, and enjoyment. Over time these disparities will force a distinction between classes
that will increase the cultural stresses between the lower classes in the west, northwest, and
central rural regions of the country with the urban regions in the north and southern coastal
areas.
Unless the CPC creates a series of reform policies that successfully address and enforce a
rebalancing of these disparities in ways that are perceived to be fairer and more balanced,
stresses between the classes in these diverse regions will continue to grow. Ultimately, these
stresses will cause significant stability issues between the local, regional, and the national
government to include the CPC if they remain unaddressed (Li, Qiang, & Jie, 2008; Luo & Mary,
2010).
As these differences increase and force even greater separation between classes some of
the constructs that are fundamental to the foundation of Marx, Engels, and Lenin that drove
Russia's social revolution and subsequently influenced China will serve to renew the symptomatic
causes of social unrest and conflict that were causational to China’s original adoption of
communistic ideologies and doctrine. Given the emergence of such a condition, the CPC could
be faced with a degree of instability that would force the party and central government to enact
sweeping reforms in order to reverse its course. Such a reversal would no doubt have significant
implications pertaining to the achievement of many of China’s publicized future internal and
external desires, expectations, and goals.
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ASAP OBSERVATION POINT 40:
OBSERVING THE CULTURAL EXPECTATIONS OF A COUNTRY’S PEOPLE: When designing your ASAP be sure to
include observations of the cultural expectations of the host country and its people. This deeper inquiry should be conducted into
how the country and its people view themselves in the context of their position, power, authority, and dominance within their
geographic region and within the global community. Identifying these worldviews will assist you in understanding the influences,
characteristics, and drivers of their culture and offer insight and perspective when comparing their culture and ideologies to your
own.
The CPCs shifts in strategies and policies as argued by the scholars and analysts reviewed
in this study’s SLRs are validated when compared to the author’s in-country discoveries as
reflected in the data offered by its Chinese respondents. The surveys indicated this group feared a
distinct possibility that once the CPC reaches its goal of overtaking the U.S. GDP (placing China
1st
among the global community) the central government may reverse its present economic and
political strategies and policies. If this concern holds true, the policies that are allowing the
country’s classes to accumulate wealth may be reformed in favor of nationalizing these new
assets so as to capture and redirect them towards better serving the needs and interests of the
central government and the CPC.
In summary, China's political and economic policies are coupled and focused towards a
national agenda. Presently, the CPC’s political strategies are aggressive and appear to some
extent to be centered on addressing the risks associated with the stability of the People’s
Communist Party of China as it pushes to expand its external interests through the application of
capitalist and economic mechanisms.
This author would argue that these shifts in political strategy are focused towards
increasing China’s external influences that are beneficial to the country and its people. However,
should these strategies prove to lose public support or the “willing consent” of the people in the
future, the policies could result in placing the stability of the country at “risk” (Smith, 2013, pp.
35, 53-59).
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Pure Strategy
The current political strategies being applied in support of the CPC’s policies are complex
and address a number of environmental factors in an attempt to influence the future direction of
the country over the next few years.
It is important to note that the CPC continually monitors, assesses, and evaluates the
effectiveness of these policies. In fact, the CPC and central government revise and adjust national
policies regularly on a five year basis and often issues writs to reform those that are ineffective or
not suitable.
The present CPC strategy is to find an acceptable balance between its present internal
focus and one that places emphasis on increased external or outwardly aggressive expansion.
This change in strategy is being expressed in terms of the development of strategies and policies
that support the country’s increasing external objectives, needs, and goals that must be achieved
in order for China to continue its internal development and expansion (at least for now).
This author argues it is critical for China to strike a successful balance between these
internal and external strategies and supporting policies in order for it to continue to meet or
exceed its growth needs, goals, and desires.
Does this mean the global community may be facing the emergence of another
colonial hegemony? Evidence collected to date does not support this assumption. Over its
extensive history, China has never demonstrated a continuing outward expression of imperialism
or the desire to create a global colonial empire. It has, however, been deeply involved from time
to time in global inquiries and experiential learning as a way of seeking self-improvement and
advancement. To this extent at one time in China’s history it maintained the world’s largest
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maritime fleet. However, after a short period of discovery and service to the country this fleet
was retired.
ASAP OBSERVATION POINT 41:
LEARNING THROUGH GLOBAL TRAVELS AND CULTURAL EXPERIENCES: Throughout history many cultures have
journeyed to distance lands to study the cultures, characteristics, and the unique advantages enjoyed by others. Often these
journeys were tasked by the sovereign to seek treasures, commodities, minerals, or inventions that would add value and wealth to
its government. In the case of China, this approach has been used frequently throughout its history as a means of assessing and
comparing its wealth, values, knowledge, and dominance against other sovereigns. Often these experiential learning journeys have
served to introduce disruptive change and innovation into China’s culture, expectations, and goals to include reshaping the
suitability of its governance.
One component of the CPC’s pure strategy-sets is to pursue a significant degree of change
and innovation in an effort to position the country as a new political leader within the global
community. As such, its political policies are coupled to a strategy of expanding the country’s
political strengths to the point that it achieves global dominance through economic means as
measured by GDP and as recognized by international institutes and organizations that monitor
and evaluate index performance.
Another of the CPC’s pure strategy-set components is to address and effectively reduce
social and political stresses due to the rapid degree of innovation, change, and restructuring of
China’s local, provincial, and central governments. This strategy is aimed at reducing regional
tensions between the lower and middle classes so as to better align them with the goals and needs
of the upper (ruling-elite) class. This realignment strategy is ultimately intended to reinforce the
stability of the CPC and the central government. Conditions of unfair and unequal distribution of
social and political liberties and influence between classes have in China’s past history created
significant unrest and revolution that have led to highly disruptive change and innovation.
China’s history of rebellions over social and political injustice is similar to those that have taken
place in Russia. (See Russia’s Red Rebellion.) Moreover, it could be argued that the CPC and the
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central government have excellent memory retention pertaining to the implications of dealing with
highly-disruptive social activism.
Last, this study focuses on an argument that China’s pure political strategies and policies
have greater significance and increased utility when they are best align and applicable to the
greater global community. This pure strategy applies a construct wherein any country that
believes its thinking and institutions are the best and do not need change will inevitably lead to
becoming rigid if not backward. Accordingly, China’s leaders believe that over time any country
that embraces these characteristics will ultimately experience social, political, economic and
leadership failures if not the collapse of their entire system of governance (Ruogu, 2008, pp. 430-
431).
In short, the CPC embraces a pure mixed-strategy that is continually subject to change
and innovation in order for its political objectives and goals to be achieved.
This study’s initial SLRs and in-country survey data provide findings and observations are
supportive of positive outcomes related to many of China’s political strategies and policies. These
can be summarized as mixed-strategy priorities that significantly characterize and influence the
development of policies that are shaping the course of desired events and outcomes that are
driving the direction of the country towards achieving its objectives and goals in ways that are
uniquely Chinese. These pure strategies include China strengthening its long term prospects for
success by adapting to regional diversities and by spreading its risks over an ever-increasing
network of global partners or stakeholders that hold similar ideological, economic, development,
trade and commerce interests (worldviews) that are supported by dominant strategies and inter-
dependency.
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Other scholars and analysts examined in this study’s SLRs argue that by China continuing
the present high-rate of growth, it is rushing towards a negative outcome or a “point of eventual
collapse by design” due to increased complexity and scale (West, 2011).
Mixed-Strategy Priorities
China’s present pure mixed-strategy priorities are highly complex and integral to the
achievement of a myriad of national needs and desires. However, this author has placed limits on
this research by identifying a short list of the country’s pure strategy components that have been
identified in the initial research as relevant. These limitations assist in reducing and simplifying
those components of each mixed-strategy that are associated with each area of interest or
environmental factor that infers significance (Turoff & Linstone, 2002). As such, the study
explores only those mixed-strategies and components that meet this study’s relevancy criteria.
These mixed-strategy components were used to measure and assess the validity of each of the
associated hypothesis. Each of the pure mixed-strategy components that have been determined to
be significant from the SLRs and in-country data analysis supports the following CPC policies
that include:
• Monitoring internal and external environments so as to adopt a slow and calculated pace
of reforms that are suitable to the Chinese people in order to maintain the stability,
security, authority, and power of the CPC and the central government.
• Strengthening China’s nationalism, exceptionalism, and suitable institutional ideologies.
• Increasing China’s long-term internal and external interests so as to achieve a dominant
role within the global community.
• Strengthen its political and social power, authority, and influence so as to achieve the
country’s national goals and leadership dominance within the global community.
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• Building the country’s image and sense of value, ethics, trust, control, and authority with
it stakeholders, partners, and the broader international community.
• Utilize China’s new image and authority to gain international acceptance and approval of
its ideologies so as to induce its stakeholders and partners to act on its behalf.
• Utilize the power of China’s ideologies, image, and value as a global stakeholder with
undeveloped, developing, and developed countries through large-scale infrastructure
programs, beneficial trade, and commerce partnering as a significant force for disruptive
innovation and change as an alternative to Western hegemony.
Issue(s)
China’ path of aggressive expansion has and is continuing to raise the attention and
concerns of many of the developed sovereigns in the global community. These concerns
primarily range in the area of China’s developing interests in: (1) expanding its ideological
alliances and partnerships; (b) the equitable treatment of its people, civil-rights, liberties,
empowerment, and standard of living; (c) the stability of the people and government due to rapid
reforms, policy changes, and innovations; and, (d) the political liberalization of a uniquely
Chinese form of aggressive market capitalism. These are better defined in the following:
1. Expanding ideological alliances and partnerships: China is facing new challenges in its
role as a global leader considering the ever-increasing strength of its international partners as it
succeeds in realigning traditional allies of the West with its ideological strategies and policies in
the areas of political, economic, development, trade, and commerce.
2. Equitable treatment of the people: Mainland Chinese view their life circumstances as
improving under these new policies. This may become an issue as China’s internal and external
successes inspire its people to increase their proportional share in the liberties and social
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empowerment that are commonly coupled with improved living standards. The challenge of these
new policies that are considerably to the right of Mao’s original doctrine will be to control the
redistribution of wealth and empowerment between the classes while maintaining political and
social stability.
3. Stability of the people and government: Continuing reforms or modifications to the
present political policies will need to be developed by the CPC in order to accomplish its goals.
These changes represent additional challenges to the country’s political stability. As such, the
continuing reforms will require careful monitoring during the development of policy,
implementation, enforcement, and measurement of the reforms. Once accomplished, the CPC
will need to ensure effective reevaluations and readjustments to these policies. To successfully
accomplish this, the CPC will need to exercise extreme caution in adopting the appropriate
reforms so as to ensure they are properly synchronized, measured, continuously re-evaluated,
adjusted, and properly paced in order to maintain public suitability, acceptance, and stability.
4. Political liberalization: The present CPC strategies and policies support a form of
decentralized communism (socialism) that exploits market capitalism to the point that it defeats or
gains dominance over its global competitors to include “Mother Russia”. This study’s SLR
scholars and analysts argue that over time this style of liberalized aggressive capitalism will
increase stress among many developed countries. In fact, stresses between China and Russia in
the past have now shifted to impose new challenges that are centered on the West. Presently
China and Russia find if mutually beneficial to hold a common course of interests that are unique
from those held by the Western Bloc.
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Overall, China's political strategies and policies as established by the CPC are aggressive
and set to a timeline that appears to be risking the stability of the government as it presses to
expand its form of market capitalism. This includes opening the country to increased foreign
cultural influences and the integration of their positive characteristics into China’s culture in
unique ways that will either strengthen the country and increase the empowerment of the CPC
through a series of planned reforms so as to ensure China’s desire for exceptionalism and long
term goals are achieved; or, these influences will serve to drive ever-increasing challenges and
disruptive stresses internal to China and external to the country with its developed partners.
High-Value Objective(s) (HVOs)
These issues would appear to shape pure a mixed-strategy set that is focused on
developing policy reforms that emphasize slowing China’s political expansionism in favor of
increasing its international leadership and diplomacy in ways that are less aggressive. Given
these considerations, this study identifies HVOs that provide for increased alignments with the
Western Bloc and Eastern European that will increase mutually dominant dependencies by
applying mixed-strategies that are supportive of embracing established standards, mechanisms of
diplomacy, and the mutual global interests of each.
In addition, the suggested HVOs for China support increasing its level of ethics, trust, and
confidence to include validating its true intensions and commitments to contribute positively to
the Asian region and the broader global community.
Analyses were conducted of this study’s SLRs and HISS data to determine the
significance and or relevance of the HVOs and related VARs. It was determined that “on a high
level, the corpus is focused on China and country-level policy strategies for shifts and changes in
its development along political, economic, social, cultural, legal, technology, and environmental
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verticals.” Further, goals and priorities for China's government were analyzed “across lines of
potential reforms and their implications on the global community, as well as other internal and
external factors. Transformational trends are also analyzed, as well as their bearings on
innovation, ideologies, and resources” (Dimkpa, 2025). Impact on the study’s research and the
suggested approach to experiential learning for international students was also explored and
examined.
Figure 8: Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes (Saldana applied)
Note: Each of the HVOs mapped in the figure above have been assigned estimated utility (EU) or payoff values (EUPs) based on the constructs
Nash’s Equilibrium Theory of gaming. The EUPs assigned to each to the pure strategy components represents the highest and best payoff for each
player group. The game is designed to assist the level of significance in a determination of finding given the significant data and relevance
discovered from conducting Saldana Method of pattern analysis.
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HVO Significance and Determination of Findings
1. A classification performance score of 67 percent was determined from the
analysis. This indicates the DMS experiments and testing validated the code and theme
classifications used by this author to define each HVO. “This proves, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the approach of the author in selecting the said classification is both scientific and
appropriate” (Dimkpa, 2025).
2. A higher score would have indicated a higher degree of binding between the
research focus (research ideas) and the selected classification codes and themes; however, the
calculated score suggests a strong binding exists between the research focus, variance inquiries,
and the codes and themes identified.
After identifying the significance of the words, phrases, and themes discovered by
applying Saldana’s Method of analysis to this study’s SLRs, in-country surveys, narratives, and
data this author argues the following HVOs are sufficiently relevant for additional examination by
applying Nash’s Equilibrium or Gaming Theory:
1. Global Profile (HVO1): Improve trust, ethics, and the integration of diverse
worldviews. Lower global concerns and reactions over implications related to China’s
interests. To accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be
assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {3, 0, -3, -3, 4, -1}
and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {3, 1, 3, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or
estimated utility and -3 equaling the lowest for each player group related to the pure
strategy. See Table 9, Mixed-Stategy Outcome Probabilities: Political, p. 202 (Castro,
2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
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2. Nationalism (HVO2): Increase nationalism and goals that are internally suitable. To
accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned
within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {0, 0, -1, 0, 2, 0} and
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {1, 1, 2, 1, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or
2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
3. Dominance (HVO3): Increase political leadership, power, authority, and global
dominance. To accomplish this an estimated utility or player outcome value must be
assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻3 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {-3, -1, -2, -5, -4,
-3} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻3 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {3, 2, 2, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or
2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
4. Alliances (HVO4): Create political stakeholder alignments supportive of China’s
expansion strategies, agreements, and sovereign partnerships. This includes creating
alliances with countries that are closely associated with the Western Bloc and Western
Europe. [The West views China’s political expansionism as intrusive on these
relationships and disruptive to the policies they have in place.] To accomplish this an
estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned within a given range
(RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻4 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {-3, 0, -5, -3, -3, -3} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻4 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
= {5, 1, 5, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or estimated utility and -5 equaling
the lowest for each player group related to the pure strategy. See Table 9, Mixed-
Stategy Outcome Probabilities: Political, p. 202 (Castro, 2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
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5. Transformation (HVO5): Transform political and economic focus from manufacturing
to one of creating intellectual property, patents, and advanced technology production.
To accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned
within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻5 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {4, 2, -4, -3, -2, -2} and
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻5 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or
2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
6. Exceptionalism (HVO6): Transition educational systems to increase access and focus on
science, research, and the development of advanced discoveries, exceptionalism, and
production. To accomplish this an estimated utility or player outcome value must be
assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻6 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {-1, 0, -3, -3, -2,
4} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻6 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = {4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or
2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).
Classification Performance Score Significance
The HVO analysis, testing, and associated significance determination and findings
indicated a Classification Performance Score (CPS) of (4/6) x 100 = 67 percent (See Appendix
R).
1. The classification performance score of 67 percent (B+) signifies that the experiment
validated the classification used by the author in the definition of the HVOs. This proves, beyond
200

reasonable doubt, that the approach of the author in selecting the said classification is both
scientific and appropriate (Dimkpa, 2025).
2. A higher score would have indicated a higher degree of binding between the research
focus (research ideas) and the selected classifications; however the logical score calculated
suggests strong binding between the research focus and selected classifications (Dimkpa, 2025).
The value ranges of the HVOs allow the EUPs to be assigned proportionally so as to
represent the best outcome of each opposing player. In this case: Player Group One, or the
Western Bloc and Eastern Europe sovereigns; and, Player Group Two, or the Asian Bloc, Middle
and Far East, Africa, Latin America, and the Western European sovereigns.
Given this, a third player group was additionally identified. Player Group Three or other
sovereigns that impose influence on political strategy and policy play. This group consists of
developing and undeveloped sovereigns that are essentially non-committed to any long-term
alliances or agreements with either the East or the West. This group of fence setters is relatively
powerless. Due to this group’s small size and relative influence or dominance as related to their
potential impact on Player Group One and/or Player Group Two; Player Group Three was
marginalized as related to the detailed game play analysis that follows (See Figure 9: Mixed-
Strategy Multidimensional Interpretative, paragraph B. Adaptive Notes (1-4)).
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Mixed-Strategies, Game Play, and Estimated Utility Outcomes (Nash applied)
Table 9: Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities: Political
Factors, Findings, and Implications
Source: Mitroff, 1975; Nash, J., 1928; Spaniel, W., 2015; Turoff, M., 2002.
Adaptation and original data: Huff, P.D., 2015; MS PPT, Graphics chaps-1-5 rev 150829-01.
Determining Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcomes:
Solving for:
1. Any tuple represents a pure strategy that can be selected and expressed as (x,y),(x*,y), (x*,y*), or (x,y*)
which represents an ordered set of structured data consisting of comma-separated values that constitute a
given mixed-strategy that can in turn be utilized in a program or mathematical expression and computed
in an operating system that assists in conducting outcome analysis.
2. The outcome probabilities for any two tuples or mixed-strategies may be different.
3. Total number of tuples generated from this study’s initial data = 36
4. Total number of players considered = 3
5. Total number of players assessed that infer significance to game outcome = 2
6. Number of game players represented in the matrix analysis = 2
7. (X*) or (Y*) indicates the best response (BR) and estimated highest utility or payoff among those outcomes that are
align in the vertical axis of each category or HVOn for either Player Group 1 (X) or Player Group 2 (Y).
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Testing Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities:
Test for two tuple outcomes representing any randomly selected pure mixed-strategy.
Given PG2 and Pjpn or estimated highest or best payoffs:
EUHVO1,1
= EUHVO3,1
EUHVO1,1
(3)
= 𝜎𝜎HVO1,2
(1) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,3
(3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,4
(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,5
(4)+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,6
(4)EUHVO3,1
(3)
= 𝜎𝜎HVO3,2
(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,3
(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,4
(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO
E3,5
(4) + (1 – 𝜎𝜎HVO3,6
(4)
P2pn = Player Group 2 probability for tuple {HVO1, HVO1} EU:
𝜎𝜎 HVO1,1
(3)+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,2
)(1) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,3
)(3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,4
)(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,5
)(4) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO1,6
)(4)
= 𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1
(3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,2
)(2)+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,3
)(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,4
)(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,5
)(4) + (1 – 𝜎𝜎HVO3,6
)(4)3𝜎𝜎 HVO1,1
+ 1 - 1𝜎𝜎HVO1,2
+ 3 - 3𝜎𝜎HVO1,3
+ 5 - 5𝜎𝜎HVO1,4
+ 4 - 4𝜎𝜎HVO1,5
+ 4 - 4𝜎𝜎HVO1,6
= 3𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1
+ 2 - 2𝜎𝜎HVO3,2
+ 2 - 2𝜎𝜎HVO3,3
+ 5 - 5𝜎𝜎HVO3,4
+ 4 - 4𝜎𝜎HVO3,5
+ 4 – 4𝜎𝜎HVO3,6
20𝜎𝜎 HVO1,1
+ 17
= 20𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1
+ 17𝜎𝜎 HVO1,1
= 𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1
= 1/1
∴ The probability of tuple HVO1,1
occurring is equal to tuple HVO 3,1
Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probability Finding:
Resultant Outcome:
• If Player Group 2 engages in a Global Profile strategy move, there is a 1/1 probability that Player Group 2 will also
engage in a Dominance strategy move; with the additional observation that the dominant (HVO3,1) move will be
highly resisted by Player Group 1 representing a mixed-strategy dependency.
Theory Adaptation, Definitions, and Guidance:
A. Table 9, IESDS Codes:
1. Green Outlined Tuples: Identifies the most sensible maximum payoff (Ppn ) strategies for each player. A total of
four have been identified in the analysis table.
2. Blue Outlined Tuples: Identifies dominant strategy moves that are the most favorable for each player but are not
necessarily the most efficient. The objective of these moves is to achieve the highest estimated utility or player
payoff ( Pipn, Pjpn, or Pkpn ) as noted in Nash’s theory. For example: HVO3 and HVO4 are weakly dominated
strategies for player 1, so we can remove them from the analysis.
3. Special Note: Blue outlined tuples should be removed immediately from further play consideration and analysis.
In these cases Player Y’s optimal strategy infers dependency on player X’s choice (e.g., both groups best response
(BR)). This results in the denial or blocking of the opposing player’s ability to achieve their desired strategic goals.
No basis of finding in this study’s initial data validates the assumptions that the dominant strategy tuples represent
the BR or EUP as shown in the table, or that these are strictly dominated strategy moves for each of the player
groups (See M.1.-4.). However, such evidence may be discovered upon further investigation.
4. (*) Asterisks indicate Player Group’s BRs within each tuple in a given category: These are indicated in each pair of
HVO tuples or pure strategies for each Player Group within a vertical HVO category, e.g. for Player Group 2 (PG2)
BRs = {HVO1 = 5*, HVO2 = 4*, HVO3 = 5*, HVO4 = 5*, HVO5 = 4*, and HVO6 = 4*}
5. BR: Best responses are color coded to Player Group1 (PG1) or Player Group 2 (PG2).
6. MBR: Indicates mutual best response for both Player Groups as associated with a given mixed-strategy (See J.1.-6.),
e.g. where PG1 and PG2 MBRs = {HVO1,5 = 4*, 4*; and HVO6,6 = 4*,4*}.
7. ZSG: Indicates zero sum game plays (See P.1.-2.).
8. NE: Indicates conditions that meet the criteria for Nash’s Equilibrium (See I.1.-2.).
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Figure 9:Mixed-Strategy Multidimensional Interpretative: (Plotted Outcomes)
Tuples:
(HVO1 ,HVO5)= Global, Transformation
(HVO5 ,HVO1)= Transformation, Global
(HVO6 ,HVO6)= Exceptionalism, Exceptionalism
n Tuples
= 7 Nonresistive Neutral strategies
+ 4 Low resistive strategies
+ 4 Moderately resistive strategies
+ 18 Highly resistive strategies
= 36
Source: Mitroff, 1975; Nash, J., 1928; Spaniel, W., 2015; Turoff, M., 2002. Adaption and original data by: Huff, P.D., 2015;MS PPT,
Graphics chaps-1-5 rev 150829-01. Also see Carrol, Douglas J., and Wish, Myron, Multidimensional Scaling: Models, Methods, and
Relations to Delphi, or (MDS) as a technique to deal with problems of measuring and predicting human judgment (Carrol, 1979).
Given:
1. Pi,jpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11)
2. P1p0 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p0 = 1 Tuple = 1/1
3. P2p0 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p0 = 0 Tuples = 0/1
4. P1p0 + P2p0 = 1 Tuple outcomes
Given:
1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11)
Given:
1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Dominant-High Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11)
Given:
1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Dominant-High Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11)
Given:
1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11)
204

B. Adaptation Notes:
1. The proposed high-value objectives (HVOs) are examined for significance by applying a modified form of Nash
Equilibrium Theory as a test of each pure strategy.
2. Player Group One = Partners in the Western Bloc; Eastern European; North, Central, and Latin (South) America.
3. Player Group Two = Partners in the Asian Bloc, Middle & Far East, Western European, South Africa, and Latin
America.
4. Player Group Three = International sovereigns without standing partner or stakeholder commitments to either
Player Group One or Player Group Two. As such, PG3 represents (sovereigns) that have split alliances between
PG1 and PG2 with little or low collective global impact due to the scale of their economy, geographic location, or
natural resources. (After assessment and evaluation PG3 was omitted from play.)
C. Player Groups and Other Coding:
1. Player Group One = PG1
2. Player Group Two = PG2
3. Player Group Three = PG3
4. PG1 = X strategies (Coded Blue)
5. PG2 = Y strategies (Coded Red)
6. IESDS = Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies.
7. EU = Estimated utility of a player’s given strategic move.
8. EUP = Estimated utility of a player’s best response (BR) payoff value.
9. Pi = PG1, so that PG1’s maximum payoff = Pip (Nash, 1928)
10. Pj = PG2, so that PG2’s maximum payoff = Pjp (Nash, 1928)
11. Pk = PG3, so that PG3’s maximum payoff = Pkp (Nash, 1928)
D. Estimated Utility (EU) or Player Estimated Utility Payoff (EUP) or Pnp Value Relationships: (Values associated with
each player group’s strategy move; See Table for Minimax move ranges to include paragraph E below.)
1. EU Max. (positive) move = 5
2. EU Indifferent (neutral) move or a pass = 0
3. EU Mini. (negative) blocks the opposing player’s move, neutralizing or defeating the opposing player’s desired
outcome = -5
E. Strategy Coding and Estimated Utility (EU) or Estimated Utility Payoff (EUP) Minimax ranges within the sample space:
1. HVO1 = Global Profile = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3} = Sample space, or range (RNG) possible outcomes.
2. HVO2 = Nationalism = {4, 3, 2, 1 ,0, -1}
3. HVO3 = Dominance = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5}
4. HVO4 = Alliances = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5}
5. HVO5 = Transformation = {4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4}
6. HVO6 = Exceptionalism = {4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3}
F. Extensive Advanced Strategic Form Game (EASFG): Theory and rules as defined that limited this study and the
examination of strategically interdependent organizational behavior:
1. Strategic Interdependence: what one player does effects the outcome of the other player(s).
2. Player Outcomes: The game is not just about winning and losing (although it could be).
3. Finite Players: The game is considered to have a finite number of players that have been identified as Player
Groups. In this case the game involves three such player groups that have been identified as PG1, PG2, and PG3.
However, PG3 is not included in the game for the reasons listed in B.4. PG3s strategic moves do not significantly
affect any probable outcomes related to those made by PG1 or PG2.
4. Finite Strategy Sets: The number of proposed pure strategy-sets is considered finite.
5. Finite Games: Finite games always have at least one equilibrium point (EP).
6. Mixed-Strategy: A mixed-strategy is a probability distribution over two or more pure strategies. This game is a
mixed-strategy game with what are considered to be a finite set of strategies coded as high-value objectives
(HVOs). There are six HVOs defined in the game for analysis and testing.
7. Design: The game design provides a methodology to identify significant factors, influencers, drivers and potential
implications or outcomes that are associated with each player group’s strategy moves and supporting policies.
8. Functionality: The game assists in identifying the logic and strategy of interdependent or situational dependencies
that are extremely complicated and at times require fast decision making. Given the nature of the influencers and
drivers of international strategies and supporting policies, the game can be applied to assist sovereign actors in
determining pure strategy sets that best achieve the highest estimated utility, payoffs, and desired outcomes.
9. Measurement and Analysis: By global sovereigns applying Nash’s theory they have an opportunity to assign
accounting tools to measure, track, assess, and analyze potential global strategies for the purpose of determining an
estimated level of significance or utility related to each move and its potential implications.
10. Interactive Behavior: The applied theory offers policy makers and researchers the ability to draw parallels from
one situation to another within the domain of the interactive behaviors associated with the assumed HVOs (In this
case the HVOs associated between PG1 and PG2 as represented in the table).
205

11. Pure strategy: Under Nash’s Equilibrium (Game Theory) this condition is met when the players do not randomize
between two or more strategy moves. In short, the strategy move of one player is dependent on the move of the
other. This design and assumption is critical to setting the game. In the case of this study the assumptions, EUPs,
and analysis are predicated on this study’s SLRs, narratives, and in-country surveys. All HVO category strategies
are essentially influenced if not driven by what the opposing player does.
12. Non-pure strategies (NPS): These conditions are indicated in the table where a stated value is equal to zero (NPS =
0). The table identifies seven instances of occurrence where this condition is met, e.g. tuples {HVO1,HVO2; HVO2,
HVO1}.
13. Limitations: The applied theory, rules, and game limitations are covered in the following paragraphs: H, I, J, K, L,
M, N, O, P, and Q.
G. Purpose:
1. Determine the most probable strategies with the highest payoffs associated with each player’s moves. In this case
the focus is on PG2 or China as related to identifying the most probable priorities and direction the country will
take in the future.
2. Assess the probabilities associated with the pure and mixed-strategies applied by players and related outcomes.
3. Determine a finding by analyzing potential outcomes from a unique perspective as represented by antagonistic
(negative), indifferent (neutral), or protagonistic (positive) interests which affect an opposing player group or in this
case Player Group (PG1) or the Western Bloc; and, Player Group (PG2) or China’s ability to maximize its EUP by
acting out strategy sets or moves that can minimize/maximize China’s desired outcomes.
4. Analyze a finite number of competitive influencers that may affect player outcomes (See table). The analysis is
designed to identify, assess, and evaluate the desired outcomes of the two controlling players in the game, and to
additionally assess the effect of outside third party (player) interests. These interests can represent critical
influencers to each player’s strategies, leading priorities, and the direction each player will take.
5. The game is integrated into this study’s assessment of the HVOs as related to determining the direction China will
take as it is influenced by its government, people; and, by outsider interests in the global community (See figure
below). By applying Nash’s Theory, this study undertakes an examination of what effect these forces will have in
determining China’s future priorities and its direction over the next ten years.
Figure 10: Nash’s Equilibrium Theory (A Three-Player Game)
Source: Nash, J.F., 1928, A Comparsion of Treatments of A Duoploy Situation, p. 141-
153; adapted by Huff, P.D., 2015 as associated with this study’s analysis of a
noncooperative two player game situationally conditional to Nash’s best-reply analysis
under Von Neumann’s minimax theorem. “As a minimum requirement for a pair of
strategies to be a candidate for the solution of a two-person (player) game, Von
Neumann required that each player’s strategy [move must] represent the best reply to
the other. Such a pair of strategies…called a Nash Equilibria, is basic to noncooperative
game theory” (Nash, 1928, p. x-xi). Nash describes aspects of the above three player
model in his Simple Three-Person Poker Game constructs as applied under the
conditions of a non-cooperative game that utilizies a set of strategy choices that are pure
and/or mixed (Nash, 1928, p. 105-295)
Indifferent Influencers
(Experts/Scholars/Analysts)
II
NIPositive
Influencers
(Controllers/
Leaders)
Negative
Influencers
(Users/
Consumers)
PI
Stability & Analysis:
The game must include the
following player/group
interests/desires as potential
EUPs or outcomes:
PI = Positive influencers
NI = Negative influencers
II = Indifferent influencers
Protagonist
Player Group
(PG1)
Antagonist
Player Group
(PG2)
206

H. Rules, limits, and assumptions:
1. Non-Cooperative Gaming: Player Groups take turns moving as in war, invasion plans, and other competitive
games where the other player group views the moves as potentially threatening or non-cooperative.
2. Cooperative Commitments: The game assumes player group moves are consistent with their member’s strategies or
desires and supported by alliances, commitments, and agreements.
3. Comparative Statics: The game is not designed to identify comparative statics or comparative outcomes before and
after a change in some exogenous parameter or a pure-strategy that has origins outside of the modelled limits.
4. Player Characteristics and Organizational Behavior: The analysis assumes both player groups are very smart,
strategy savvy, and not subject to emotional influences or related errors.
5. Independence: Each player group can accomplish their desired outcomes without the help of the other player group.
6. Symmetry: The game’s decisional matrix constructs HVO tuples or strategy sets that are not symmetrical. The
payoffs for Player Two (PG2) do not represent a mirror image of Player One’s (PG1s) payoffs.
7. Finite Strategies: The strategies listed are considered finite in number. They have all been determined as
significant from this study’s SLRs, narratives (scholars and analysts); and, in-country surveys as the most probable
HVOs.
8. Finite Players: The game identifies a total of three player groups that are coded: PG1 or Pi , PG2 or Pj , and PG3 or
Pk as adapted from Nash’s Non-cooperative Three Player Games (Nash, 1928, p. 286-297).
9. Player Group Three (PG3): This group’s strategy moves are included in game play consideration. However, after
analysis, the group’s payoff values are too small to impose significance in the game’s outcome.
10. Other rules, limits, and assumptions: These are continued as outlined in the following paragraphs: I-Q
I. Nash Equilibrium (NE) modifications, limits, assumptions, and Equilibrium Point (EP):
1. Nash’s Equilibrium (NE): No player has any incentive to change their strategy move in the absence another law.
In short, the move must be completely logical under the circumstances and in accordance with the stated player’s
characteristics (See H. 4.).
2. Inherent Stability: All strategies are assumed to be inherently stable given the following conditions: what one
player does is optimal given what the other is doing is optimal as well; in short, neither player has any regrets
regarding their strategy move.
3. Equilibrium Point (EP): An equilibrium point is defined when each player’s mixed-strategy maximizes his payoff
given the strategies of the other player(s) are held firm and not changed. “Thus each player’s strategy is optimal
against those of the others” (Nash, 1928, p. 287).
J. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE):
1. There must be at least one Nash Equilibrium for all finite games (See F. 5.).
2. Pure versus Mixed-Strategy: There are no equilibria within a pure strategy; however, this is not the case with a
mixed-strategy.
3. Game Play: At least one equilibrium must exist in a mixed-strategy game.
4. Strategy Conditions: A mixed-strategy represents a probability distribution when it involves two or more pure
strategies.
5. Game Play Example: An example of a mixed-strategy and implication analysis is represented by comparing the
tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5}. In this comparison the player or observer is able to identify the significance
of the EUPs associated with PG2s (China’s) moves as it potentially impacts PG1 (the Western Bloc’s) efforts to
minimize PG2s (China’s) attempt to maximally achieve alliances to gain dominance in parallel with other moves
China is making to maximize transformation to gain dominance. As indicated in the table both moves by PG2
(China) may appear to be a zero-sum game. That said, the end-state of the game is viewed by all players as
inherently a non-zero sum game. There are four HVOs with ZSGs as defined in the game’s outcomes (See table).
6. Players may choose randomly among pure strategy options that are in equilibrium. An example of this condition is
again represented in the tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5} which indicates each is the mutual best response
(MBR) for both PG1 and PG2.
7. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium: This condition is met when each player’s strategy set(s) or move(s) represent
the mutual best responses for each.
K. Operation of Game Concept:
1. Inherent Stability: Assumes each group’s membership will align with and commit to supporting the group’s
strategy decisions as each member will benefit better if their individual actions conform to their group.
2. Under these conditions, player group moves may not represent the best utility or profit outcomes for themselves or
the other player group. For example, one player group may choose to move to proceed with an action or directional
achievement that in turn would require the opposing player group to choose to discontinue or stop its action or
directional achievements related to the same HVO so as not to cancel-out or block the move. Nash notes that under
some conditions blocking moves need to operate logically even when the moves do not maximally benefit them.
Absent this logic, the actions or moves of each player in the same direction to achieve a commonly desired outcome
results in a disruptive collision or negative EUP for both. Such illogical moves make the game inherently unstable.
The tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5} may be viewed as examples of inherent instability.
L. Member Deviations Within Player Groups:
1. Individual member deviations within the two player groups have been considered. As such, each of the player
group’s members are assumed to be stable and committed to their respective group’s pure and mixed-strategies.
207

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