2. 2
The Ukraine Conflict as a Catalyst of a Major Change
Thesis 1: The conflict over Ukraine has induced a major change for the worse in world politics
and has left Ukraine in shambles. On the one hand, Russia has destabilized the European
political order; on the other hand, the EU has evidently committed a significant foreign policy
blunder with its policy towards Ukraine.1
In the context of the Ukraine crisis, the dominant
narrative in world politics has changed. In addition, the conflict raised significant questions
about the nature and future of the EU role in world politics.
The Ukraine conflict induced a remarkable change in the discussions on the state of the
world order. Prior to the conflict, analysts and policy makers talked about and practiced
“humanitarian interventions,” discussed “democratic peace,” and developed the
“Responsibility to Protect Doctrine” (R2P)—that is, the international community should
support a state unable to guarantee human rights and in extreme cases even intervene
militarily. A clear final goal dominated the discourse on world security: Global Governance.
With the Ukraine conflict, this has changed. Nowadays the dominating headlines read:
geopolitics and even Cold War II. The main reason behind this change is Russia’s and the
West`s response to the domestic upheavals and political transformation in Ukraine.
The conflict left Ukraine in shambles and the relationship of the West with Russia is currently
deliberately blocked:
Regardless of the ceasefire of September 2015, people are still dying from military
operations in Ukraine—more than nine thousands (civilians, pro-Russian separatists,
and soldiers)2
to date—and war crimes are committed by the rebels but also by
forces fighting for Kyiv. Russia and Ukraine accuse each other of not complying with
the provisions of the ceasefire agreement.
Crimea is no longer part of Ukraine but of Russia—Ukraine and the West call it
annexation and a grave violation of international law. For Putin’s Russia, however,
the absorption of Crimea is about the protection of Russian people and an expression
of the free will of Crimea’s population.
Russian troops are still present in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine. An
extension of the insurrection to other regions with populations leaning towards
Russia is still imaginable.
1
A word of precaution: this does not imply that alternative policy routes of the EU would have avoided all
aspects of the situations we are in now. What I do believe, however, is that we would be better off without
these blunders I am going to elaborate.
2
See the Guardian, 9 December 2015 (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/09/ukraine-conflict-9000-dead-
says-un, accessed 7 April 2016).
3. 3
The EU (and the US) established a sanction regime (provisions against individuals and
trade restrictions) which is still in force. Russia responded with similar measures.3
The EU blames Russia for this disaster. Indeed, Russian domestic and foreign policy is on a
dangerous track. Domestically, the democratic culture is in retreat. In foreign affairs, Russia
has tried to confront the West with an offensive policy—or, from Moscow`s point of view, to
bring Western expansionism to a standstill—and declares its willingness to protect Russian
people outside Russian territory (according to Russian officials, the figure is 30 million).4
It is difficult to answer the question of how much of the offensive turn in Russian foreign
policy is due to Western policy, especially NATO’s expansion.5
The discussion on the
question of whether Russia is rejecting the idea of “Europeanization,” and turning way from
European norms, however, has been around since at least the middle of the first decade of
this century.6
The point here is, nevertheless, a more narrow one: namely, that EU policy
towards Ukraine has opened up a window of opportunity for Putin to take possession of
Crimea and to provoke and support a bloody contest in Ukraine’s east. In this specific cause,
Putin`s actions did not come as a surprise because his policy has come to a dead end.
Russia’s traditional methods of influence no longer had an effect. There were only two
alternatives: either accepting defeat or applying different methods of influence.
In Brussels, Putin’s moves hit unprepared institutions. Consequently, there were no plans at
all for how to respond to Russia’s offensive approach. Regardless of the fact that the major
contentious issue, the EU–Ukrainian association agreement, has come into force7
and, by
3
For a detailed account, see www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Maerkte/Dossiers/russland-
sanktionen,t=2-sanktionen-russlands-gegenueber-der-europaeischen-union,did=1256378.html.
4
See “Moscow Says 30 Million Russians Live Abroad,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, March 8, 2006
(www.rferl.org/content/article/1066475.html, accessed April 9, 2016).
5
Former US defense secretary William Perry, e.g., has recently stressed that the current level of hostility in EU-
Russian relations was caused in part by Washington’s treatment of Moscow’s security concerns (see the
Guardian, 9 March 2016 (www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/russian-hostility-to-west-partly-caused-
by-west, accessed, April 7, 2016).
6
See Hannes Adomeit and Anders Aslund (eds.): Russia versus the United States and Europe—or “Strategic
Triangle”? Developments in Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy, Western Responses, and Prospects of Policy
Coordination, SWP, Berlin, October 2005.
7
The negative turnout of an advisory referendum in the Netherlands on the association agreement (turnout 32
percent, “no” 61 percent), raises questions about the future fate of the treaty. The Dutch Prime Minister
promised to stop ratifying the deal (see The Telegraph: Dutch leader promises to stop ratifying EU-Ukraine deal
after resounding ‘no’ vote, KyivPost, April 7, 2016 (www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/the-
telegraph-dutch-leader-promises-to-stop-ratifying-eu-ukraine-deal-after-resounding-no-vote-411540.html,
accessed, April 7, 2016).
4. 4
this, the EU has reached its major policy goal, there is much evidence for the argument that
self-criticism is necessary. However, the political circles of Brussels are not yet ready for this
kind of critical evaluation.
The Ukrainian nightmare also raises questions about the “nature” of the EU as an
international actor. Traditional notions of “civilian power” no longer appear appropriate. A
number of political figureheads attempt to use the crisis, for example, as a pretext for
developing the EU even into a traditional type of international actor by calling, for instance,
for a “European Army.”
The EU’s Eastern Policy and the Evolution of Events—Integration Rivalry
Thesis 2: Ukraine was the object of a power rivalry between the EU and Russia in which each
side wanted to extent its influence on Ukraine. The EU was well aware of this rivalry. That is
why those in charge rushed towards the signing of the association agreement with Ukraine
and disregarded Russia`s policy. The problem: this policy was based on the assumption that
Putin would apply only methods used in the past. Possible countermoves by Russia based on
a different set of instruments were not taken into account.
Until 2013, Ukraine struggled primarily with Russia. The issues were Ukraine’s debts to
Russia, subsequent reactions by Moscow, and the reproach by Russia that Ukraine sold
Russian gas illegally to the West. Partly in the shadow of these conflicts, the EU executed a
policy of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU in the framework of its Eastern Partnership Policy
with an association agreement as its main part. The agreement is far-reaching and
characterized as “a pioneering document.” Officially, “It is the first agreement based on
political association between the EU and any of the Eastern Partnership countries, and is
unprecedented in its breadth (number of areas covered) and depth (detail of commitments
and timelines).”8
8
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/association_agreement/index_en.htm. Details are
enumerated in short on the same EU webpage as follows : “The Agreement focuses on support to core reforms,
economic recovery and growth, and governance and sector cooperation in areas such as energy, transport and
environment protection, industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer
protection, education, youth, and cultural cooperation. The Agreement also puts a strong emphasis on values
and principles: democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, good
governance, a market economy and sustainable development. There will be enhanced cooperation in foreign
and security policy and energy. It includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which goes
further than classic free trade areas, as it will both open up markets but also address competitiveness issues
and the steps needed to meet EU standards and trade on EU markets. The Agreement will also highlight Justice,
Freedom & Security issues which also include provisions on mobility.”
5. 5
However, with “two competing blueprints for the future of Ukraine—one from the EU and
one from Russia—an outright competition was only a matter of time.”9
The conflict
extended into an EU–Russian conflict only in November 2013, when the Ukrainian President
of that time, Victor Yanukovych decided not to sign the prepared association agreement
with the EU. Until this point, Putin was confident that Russia disposed about enough arm-
twisting power to avoid the worst. Russia offered a better deal from Yanukovych’s point of
view. In December, Russia even announced its intention to buy 15 billion Dollars worth of
Ukrainian government bonds and to reduce the price charged for gas. The EU, on the other
side, rebuffed Ukraine’s request for € 20 billion but offered a far-reaching association
agreement. This made it very clear that Russia and the EU competed seriously for the future
orientation of Ukraine.10
Neither the EU nor Russia foresaw the subsequent events:
Extensive and persistent protests began on Kyiv’s Independence Square in favor of
leaning towards the EU.
Security forces intervened.
The demonstrations reached a dramatic and sorrowful climax in February 2014, when
snipers killed 88 humans (including police officers). Who the killers were has still not
been cleared up.
For Russia, these protests represented an unwelcome challenge. On the EU’s side, the
dominant interpretation was indeed positive, very much welcomed and supported: these
folks believe in the EU and democracy! There was not much thinking about similar
interpretations of the so-called Arab Spring, when many thought that the Arab world was
about to become like Western Europe - dreams are but shadows.
9
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine. The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order, Cambridge,
MA/London, 2015, p. 76.
10
See ibid., p. 77f.
6. 6
Arab Spring – Ukrainian Spring?
Up to that time, EU policy towards Ukraine was led by the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (at that time Catherine Ashton) and the President of the European
Council (at that time Herman van Rompuy). When the crisis arose, however, a significant
change of the major actors occurred. The “European figureheads” disappeared from the
scene and national players took the initiative. Obviously, they mistrusted the actors in
Brussels.
This core group of nations also dominated the later negotiations with Russia on a ceasefire
agreement (predominantly, Germany and France took the lead). The German and Polish
foreign ministers brokered an agreement between President Yanukovych and the opposition
in the streets. The Russian ambassador also took part. Nevertheless, the agreement was
untenable. The protesters rushed and burned government buildings and the parliament. The
president escaped to Russia, and there was a vote in the parliament to unseat the president.
The vote did not abide by constitutional regulations. Nevertheless, a transitional government
seized power. In February 2014, the Ukrainians voted for a new parliament and Arseniy
Yatsenyuk, the favorite of the United States, became prime minister.
By this development, Russia lost a major, although not very reliable, cooperative partner and
was forced to change policy. The traditional methods did not work any longer. Putin’s
options were either losing this battle or changing the methods of influencing the situation.
Given the high priority Ukraine had in Russia’s policy, he had almost no choice—he had to
apply different power instruments.
This change came as a surprise for the EU and EU diplomats still held the opinion that it was
unforeseeable: Russia started to take over Crimea. Gunmen occupied government buildings
and armed forces barracks in Crimea. Events evolved very quickly, with a referendum held
7. 7
on March 16, and 96.6 % voted for becoming part of Russia, though this referendum was not
at all up to Western standards. Nevertheless, the assumption that the majority of Crimea’s
population were in favor of this move is realistic.
The West responded with the EU and the US starting to apply sanctions against Russia and
those deemed responsible for the “coup” in Crimea. The conflict proliferated, and in April
2014, a rebellion started in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine, leading to serious
battles with Ukrainian forces. Russia was obviously part of the contest. Together with an
intensive media campaign, Russia started a modern type of armed conflict: hybrid warfare.
No end to the clashes is in sight:
Two cease-fires in September 2014 and February 2015,11
brokered by the leaders of
Germany, France, and Russia, do not hold.12
The West intensifies its sanction regime.13
The EU’s request to Russia: back to square one—the territorial integrity of Ukraine
should be reinstated (including Eastern Ukraine and Crimea).
Russia accuses the West for having supported an illegal coup d’etat in Kiev and
declares that Crimea is now part of Russia and will remain so.
11
The points in short: 1. Immediate and full bilateral cease-fire. 2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both
sides. 3. Effective monitoring and verification regime for the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons to be
carried out by the OSCE. 4. From day one of the withdrawal begin a dialogue on the holding of local elections in
line with the Ukrainian law on temporary self-rule for parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. There will also be a
dialogue on those areas' political future. 5. Pardon and amnesty by banning any prosecution of figures involved
in the Donetsk and Luhansk conflict. 6. Release of all hostages and other illegally detained people. 7.
Unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to the needy, internationally supervised. 8. Restoration of full social
and economic links with affected areas. 9. Full Ukrainian government control will be restored over the state
border, throughout the conflict zone. 10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons and mercenaries
from Ukrainian territory. 11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with adoption of a new constitution by the end
of 2015 (Ukraine ceasefire: New Minsk agreement—key points, 12 February 2015, accessed, 7 April 2016,
shortened).
12
The UN reports a significant increase in ceasefire violations during February 2016 compared to the previous
month, as well as a corresponding increase in civilian casualties: 10 people were killed and 21 (including two
children) were injured.” (Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #43, 1–29 February 2016
(reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-situation-report-43-1-29-february-2016, accessed April 7,
2016).
13
See the EU’s restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine
(www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/, accessed, April 7, 2016)
8. 8
Regardless of the many talks and phone calls, especially between the German
chancellor and Putin, Moscow does not move one inch.
No military or political solution is in sight.
As far as Western Ukraine and the government in Kiev is concerned, the EU won the battle:
On May 25, 2015, a presidential election took place, bringing into power the oligarch Petro
Poroshenko, supported by the former world champion boxer Vitali Klitschko, who was
originally backed by Germany and who withdrew after Poroshenko forwarded his
application.14
However, from a strategic perspective, EU policy resulted in a “blunder.” Three dimensions
of this policy failure are outstanding: a lack of attention to the domestic cleavages of
Ukraine, a lack of sense for Realpolitik, and a thoughtless look at the possible consequences
if Ukraine falls into the EU’s responsibility.
Ukraine’s Domestic Situation
Thesis 3: In its policy to force Ukraine to take sides, the EU has not analyzed carefully enough
the societal, economic, and political divisions in Ukraine and their likely consequences.
From the outset, Ukraine was a big country fraught with problems and, even more
important, set up rather separate identities about the basic orientation of its policy.
Before the crisis occurred, roughly three “identities” could be identified15
—Crimea, Eastern
Ukraine, and Western Ukraine:16
In Crimea, separatist ideas were widespread from the beginning. Alignment with
Russia was always a subject of discussion. In a 2001 poll, 60 percent declared
themselves as Russians, 24 percent as Ukrainians, and 11 percent as Tartars.
14
The German chancellor and the group of conservative parties in the European parliament aimed for quite a
while to bring forward the former champion as a candidate (see Der Spiegel online, 8 December 2013;
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-merkel-will-klitschko-zum-praesidenten-aufbauen-a-937853.html;
accessed on April 1, 2016)
15
Indeed, this is a very rough orientation only. There is reason to argue that Ukraine as a state is not only
supported by people speaking Ukrainian but also by Russian-speaking citizens. Ukraine’s “identity” is a complex
mixture and cannot be divided up into clear lines (see the vivid and well-informed article by Anna Veronika
Wendland, Hilflos im Dunkeln. “Experten” in der Ukraine-Krise: eine Polemik, in: Osteuropa, Heft 9. 2014, pp.
13–33) The point here, however, is that these kinds of “differentiations“ served as leverage for Russia’s
offensive policy.
16
For the following points, see Winfried Schneider-Deters, pp. 56–60.
9. 9
Russia always supported Russian-minded groups on the peninsula: the DUMA had
declared already in 1991 that the handing over of Crimea to Ukraine was “illegal,”
and DUMA members openly advertised the unification of Crimea with Russia.
In 2010, President Yanukovych gained more than 70% of the votes in the South and
East. His promise was to repair the relationship with Russia.
A poll in 2011 also indicated these divergent orientations:17
In the East, 45.2 percent were in favor of Russia’s customs union, and 24.4 favored an
association with the EU;
In the South, 50.7 percent supported a customs union with Russia, and 23.5 for
becoming a member of the EU;
In Western Ukraine: 76.9 percent took a pro-EU stand.
Ukraine’s government in Kiev was never able to reconcile the three “identities” or
“orientations.” Permanent withering between leaning towards Russia and the EU was a
lasting feature of Ukraine’s policy. Yanukovych’s maneuvering between neutrality and
eastern or western orientation in 2013/14 came about as consequence of this domestic
situation. It was, however, understood by the EU as an incomprehensible “wavering” and
not as a product of the domestic situation of Ukraine. The EU forced the Ukrainian president
to take sides and to reject Russia`s offers.
It was nothing more than a power game, not only with Ukraine but also with Russia:
On February 25, 2013, the President of the European Commission made it clear: “It’s
necessary to say clearly that it’s impossible to simultaneously be a member of the
Customs Union and have a deep free trade area with the European Union.”18
In September 2013, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and President Putin
asked the EU to include Russia in the negotiations, but the EU had no interest.19
Obviously, the idea was to confront Russia with accomplished facts.
Beginning in July 2014, Russians joined the negotiations to discuss many issues with the
European Commission, but only the technical ones. This was too late to have an impact on
17
See Peter W. Schulze, Zwischeneuropa als Wirtschaftspartner der EU oder als dauerhafte Krisenregion:
Ukraine, Belarus und Russland, Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik Wien, Sozialwissenschaftliche
Schriftenreihe, Wien, September 2012, p. 10.
18
www.modernukraine.eu/barroso-rules-out-simultaneous-customs-union-membership-and-fta-with-eu/
19
See Thomas Vogel, Überforderung und Desinteresse, p. 61.
10. 10
the situation. The EU never analyzed Ukraine’s situation carefully. The break-up of the
country by this kind of forced choice was a very real possibility; it is not only the result of the
diabolical strongman in Russia.
The EU–Russian rivalry left Ukraine behind in disorder and even chaos. If there will not
happened some kind of revolution in Russia, Ukraine will be a partner of the EU, which has
lost with Eastern Ukraine a major economic asset and with Crimea a region which gives
Ukraine ready and safe access to the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and Caucasia, as well as a
secure southern border. The political system is still in bad shape and the readiness to move
towards the fulfillment of the ceasefire agreement is very low. Access to Russia and the
Eurasian market will likely be lowered. In addition, the security situation is still precarious.
According to an OSCE report in January 2016, “More than 1,800 explosions were observed
by the SMM across the Donetsk region in the last week with ceasefire violations
concentrated around Donetsk airport, south-west of Donetsk city, north-east of Donetsk city
(Horlivka, Zaitseve and Svitlodarsk), and north-east of Mariupol (Kominternove and
Oktiabr).”20
With regard to peace on Ukraine’s soil, there is no real progress in sight: “The Minsk
agreements are currently the principal instrument for achieving a lasting settlement in the
occupied regions of eastern Ukraine. Moscow and Kyiv, however, are showing little
enthusiasm for implementing the associated package of measures.”21
The outlook of the European Parliamentary Research Service portrays Ukraine’s thorny
situation political situation for 2016 as follows:
While Kyiv is under continued pressure to fulfil the February 2015 Minsk II ceasefire
agreement, the interruption of electricity supply to Crimea—occupied by Russia since
March 2014—has added fuel to bilateral tensions over the peninsula, which could
intensify in 2016. Ukraine's default on its US$3 billion debt to Russia, and Moscow's
response will further strain bilateral ties. The growing fragility of the pro-European
government coalition could increase the likelihood of early parliamentary elections and
impede the on-going reform process. At the same time, the national security situation—
precarious overall as it is—could be further undermined by cyber-attacks.22
20
OSCE, Status Report as of 24 February 2016.
21
Susan Stewart, SWP Comment, Berlin, March 2016.
22
Naja Bentzen, Ukraine: What to watch for in 2016, EPRS. European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016
(www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)577960; accessed April 10,
2016).
11. 11
It very much looks as if today the assessment in the Security Sector Horizon-Scanning 2015 is
still accurate: “… economic reform never really transpired, political reform was only partial,
no one fully learned the lessons of democracy and thus, while everyone is in favour of
reform, no one really knows how to go about it.“23
No Sense of “Realpolitik”
Thesis 4: The EU designed its policy towards Ukraine in competition with Russia. However, it
did not take possible countermeasures by Moscow into account. These countermeasures did
not come as a surprise.
There were warnings about possible military actions already in 2008 after Russia’s attack on
Georgia. For example, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said, “Russia might try to
make advances in Crimea after the success of its military operations in Georgia in August.” In
Poland, there was “the belief that Ukraine is next.”24 In addition, a number of analysts
emphasized before the harsh conflict surfaced that the potential membership of states
participating in the Eastern partnership program of the EU “will alter the tectonics of the
post-Soviet area—massive reactions by Russia will follow.”25 Indeed, Russia’s interest could
easily be identified in official strategy documents, emphasizing, for example, the
predominant status of Russia within the members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) with a growing emphasis for Russia on Ukraine. Already in “Russia’s ‘Medium-
Term Strategy’ (2000–2010) for the development of relations with the EU” one could, for
instance, read that Russia aimed at “consolidating and developing integration processes in
the CIS” and that the EU’s enlargement has an “ambivalent impact” on EU–Russia
cooperation. The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept of February 2013 indicated
Ukraine “as a priority partner within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)” and
“the protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing
abroad." Finally, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on December 23, 2013, that the final
pieces are in place for the 2015 launch of the economic union with Belarus and Kazakhstan
and that he hoped that it could be joined by Ukraine.26
The modern type of warfare, on which Putin’s actions were based, were also not surprising;
the method of hybrid operations has been discussed in Western policy and military circles
23
Laura Clary and Peter Daccick-Adams, Cranfield University, Security Sector Horizon-Scanning 2015. Ukraine.
24
Wikileak from 2008. Poland warns about Russia invading Ukraine
(www.liveleak.com/view?i=65e_1409756438).
25
Barbara Lippert, EU-Erweiterung. Vorschläge für die außenpolitische Flankierung einer Beitrittswpause, SWP-
Studie, Berlin, März 2011, p. 28 (own translation).
26
See www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/eeu.htm, accessed 3 April 2016.
12. 12
since 200227 and were certainly known in military circles in Brussels as well as national
capitals.
EU diplomats and parliamentarians disregarded these very clear warning signs. Even more,
they accelerated the process and put pressure on the Ukrainian president to choose sides. In
other words, they did not realize that Russia and Europe played different games: the EU
Parcheesi (ludo), Putin chess.
CHECK! I THOUGHT WE WERE PLAYING
PARCHEESI (ludo)?!
Replace President Obama
By the President of the
European Commission,
José Manuel Barroso
Brussels argues that Russia had not protested a long time against the agreement. However,
this is a misleading argument:
27
See Joel Andersson and Thierry Tary, Hybrid: what’s in a name? European Union Institute for Security
Studies, October 2015.
13. 13
Russia started to know only in July 2013 about the depth of the envisaged
association, including not only the adaptation of EU standards in the economic field
but a very close political relationship to include security and defense policy
coordination.28
When Russia started to criticize the depth of the association and President
Yanukovych asked in November 2013 to include the Russians in the negotiations,29
the EU showed no interest; there was, indeed, strong support for the Maidan
protests and the unseating of the president.
The Kremlin also proposed that negotiations should happen between the EU and the
Eurasian Union, but Barroso said that Kiev had to choose either Brussels or
Moscow.30
The representative for foreign affairs, Lady Ashton, and van Rompuy, president of the
European Council, wasted no time in getting the agreement signed. The prime
minister of the interim government, Arsenij Jazenjuk, signed the political part on
March 21, 2014, and the economic part was signed on June 27, 2014, by the new
president, Petro Poroshenko.
A report for the British House of Lords of February 2015 sums up EU policy as follows:
“An element of ‘sleep-walking’ was evident in the run-up to the crisis in Ukraine, and
important analytical mistakes were made in the EU. Officials in Brussels as well as Member
States’ embassies all participate in the EU foreign policy process, but all seem to have missed
the warning signs.”
Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt used stronger wording: the EU Commission got too big
for its britches (megalomaniacal).31
28
See the statement by Mr. Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and Editor in
Chief of Russia in Global Affairs as quoted in: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine,
European Union Committee—Sixth Report, printed 10 February 2015, point 178
(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/11508.htm).
29
See Yanukovych says Putin and he concluded that Ukrainian-Russian-EU consultations are needed, in:
interfax-Ukraine, 27 November 2013 (en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/177134.html, accessed April 8, 2016).
EU “refines its thinking” on its Ukraine-Russia relations, 27 November 2013 (updated 28 November 2013,
accessed on 8 April 2016).
30
See Summit of Failure: How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine, in: Spiegel Online International, November 24,
2014 (www.spiegel.de/international/europe/war-in-ukraine-a-result-of-misunderstandings-between-europe-
and-russia-a-1004706.html, accessed April 9, 2016).
14. 14
A (Too?) Heavy Burden
Thesis 5: EU`s policy to sign an association agreement with the Ukraine and provide the
country a clear perspective of membership, adds a staggeringly heavy burden on the EU’s
already overloaded political agenda. It will probably hurt both the EU and Ukraine.
The EU’s old approach, at least on paper, was that there is no relationship between the EU’s
Eastern Policy and membership. However, the goals and methods equaled the preparation
for membership. The EU parliament always held a positive view and the Commission
followed later. The European Commissioner for Enlargement stated in Kiev already on
February 7, 2013, that there was now a link between EU’s Eastern Policy and membership.32
Today, EU`s policy almost unconditionally supports the government in Kiev. The EU and Kyiv
share now something like a community of fate, and it looks as if the EU is inextricably linked
with the future of Ukraine.
This adds another major problem to the EU’s huge list of problems. A rough outline of the
EU’s many and heavy burdens is as follows:
Enlargement:
At the beginning of 2015, Croatia became a member, a country that in 2014 was the
“worst economic performer …, along with bailed-out Greece and Cyprus, and there is
little sign so far of local start-ups or foreign investors generating viable businesses
beyond tourism.”33
Accession talks have started with Serbia, and Germany supports membership of all
states in the Balkans. This is a crisis-prone region.
Turkey took the “refugee deal” with the EU as a lever to speed up membership
negotiations, bringing closer to the EU a country that ranked 69th in the Democracy
Ranking 2015 (among 113 countries, for 2013–2014 data) and has, indeed, certainly
moved down the rank in recent months.34
31
Helmut Schmidt wirft EU Größenwahn vor, in: Zeit Online (www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-
05/helmut-schmidt-ukraine-eu-weltkrieg, accessed March 24, 2016).
32
See democracyranking.org/wordpress/rank/democracy-ranking-2015.
33
Igor Ilic and Zoran Radosavljevic, Croatia’s economy sends troubling message to neighbouring EU wannabes,
Reuters; May 4, 2014 (www.reuters.com/article/croatia-economy-eu-idUSL6N0N827Z20140504).
34
See David F. J. Campbell, Paul Pölzbauer, Thorsten D. Barth, and Georg Pölzbauer, December 15, 2015
(democracyranking.org/ranking/2015/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2015_A4.pdf, accessed April
9, 2016).
15. 15
The EU’s economic situation:
In 2014, youth unemployment exceeded 50 percent in Spain as well as in Greece. In
Croatia and Italy, the figures are above 40 percent. General unemployment has
reached 24 percent in Greece and 20.4 percent in Spain (as of February 2016).35
The Euro crisis has not yet come to an end. Greece is still in trouble.
This creates major tensions among the various countries and regions of the EU.
The “domestic” political situation:
A massive influx of refugees puts European solidarity under stress: from the Balkans,
Africa, Syria, and Iraq.
Critical views on the Euro are shared by 73 percent in Sweden, 70 percent in the UK,
48 percent in Poland, 36 percent in Hungary, and 35 percent in Greece.36
Der Spiegel depicted a cover with the title “How Europeans Look at Germany—
German Übermacht” over a picture, in the background, of officers of the German
Wehrmacht. This raises the question of whether the idea of taming German power
by European integration is as effective as former days.
The recent negative referendum in the Netherlands on the association agreement
feeds doubts not so much about the association, but about European integration in
general.
The referendum in the UK on June 23 of this year favoring UK`s leave of the EU
(BREXIT), puts another question mark on the future of the EU.
35
See ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Table_1_Youth_unemployment,_2014Q4_(%25).png.
36
Eurobarometer, end of 2014.
16. 16
Europe grows … and grows … and grows
There are many signs that European integration stands at a crossroads. European elites still
go ahead with the traditional way of further integration, whereas the opposition against
further centralization grows.37 Adding Ukraine to this list of major challenges places another
heavy burden on the EU’s already serious list of problems. There are no signs that one of
these problems will disappear in the near future.
It is a matter of urgency that the EU tackle the problems with Ukraine and Russia in order to
remedy at least one major challenge from the long list of challenges. The seriousness of the
situation first asks, however, for approaches that might be able to explain why the EU ended
up in this predicament.
Explanatory Approaches
The question of why the European Union pursued this precarious policy is indeed a complex
one. One reason: regardless of the fact that Member States formally have the decisive voice
in the process, in practice there are many actors involved and there is no explicit hierarchy
between the actors, but rather a complex web of mutual dependencies and influences.
37
See Bernhard Pieper and Peter Schmidt, Weniger ist mehr—die EU in der Sackgasse eines zentralistiscchen
Integrationsverständnisses, in: Wirtschaftsdienst. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, March 2106, pp. 185–192.
17. 17
These actors do not share the same priorities and differ in their perspectives. All this adds up
to a non-transparent system of responsibilities.
No single theory is able to create a full understanding of EU policy. I assume, however, that
four approaches are able to illuminate EU policy towards Ukraine: path dependency,
organizational interests, the concept of the EU as a civilian power, and the concept of using
enlargement as a lever to build up a European superpower.
Path dependency
The path dependency approach simply proclaims that major decisions in the past will affect
the possible outcomes of a sequence of events happening later. It is possible to change
course; however, each step has a tendency to keep an actor on the previously chosen track.
Accordingly, the decision taken in Copenhagen 1993 that each European country can
become a member of the EU —if certain conditions are met and the EU is fit for inviting the
new member—has set a course towards further enlargements. After the enlargements of
May 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, with Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007), the EU started the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which targeted the countries at the edges of the EU (Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt,
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). The modernizing power of the
EU should bring these countries, by a policy of conditionality and socialization, closer to EU
standards. A different path of development was not taken into consideration despite the fact
that membership was—on paper—not an explicit goal.38
However, as Annegret Bendiek and Timothy Röhrig wrote in March 2007: “The ENP has a
tendency to replicate enlargement policy in the sense of a path dependent European
policy.”39
The similar course was followed—in an even more rigorous way—by the Eastern
Partnership (EaP) policy launched in Prague in 2009.40
Aside from Ukraine, the Republic of
Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, and the Republic of
Moldova were partners in this program. The policy instruments remained the same. All
these instruments point to the direction of membership, despite many member countries
38
See Annegret Bendiek and Timothy Röhrig, Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik – “Der Tragödie erster
Teil.” Aus europäischen und amerikanischen Fachzeitschriften,. 2. Halbjahr 2006 / 1. Halbjahr 2007, p. 2.
39
Die ENP neigt dazu, die Logiken der Erweiterungspolitik im Sinne einer pfadabhängigen Entwicklung
europäischer Politik zu replizieren.” (Annegret Bendiek and Timothy Röhrig, Die Europäische
Nachbarschaftspolitik – “Der Tradödie erster Teil,” SWP-Zeitschriftenschau, März 2007, S. 6).
40
See EU cooperation of a successful Eastern Partnership, European Commission, European Union 2012
(https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/easdtern_partnership_flyer_final_en.pdf).
18. 18
having been keen to avoid any clear statement in this regard. The Commission, however,
soon uttered a straightforward view.
The former Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, made it clear in May 2014. From his
perspective, the accession of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova has to be the long-term goal.41
The second part of Štefan Füle’s statement on Ukraine’s membership perspective is an
indication that enlargement is linked with another major interest of the Commission: the
further integration of the Union. He proclaims that the deepening of European integration is
to prepare the Union for the membership of these countries. This policy approach is in line
with a long-term tradition of European integration policy: “deepening and widening.” The
Commission has always aimed at the deepening of the EU by presumed challenges and by
the assumption that further integration is a process that grows naturally.42
Path dependency therefore looks like a good approach to understanding the policy of the EU
towards the Eastern countries, including Ukraine—however, only up to a certain point.
Ukraine is not Poland or the Baltic states, where the orientation towards the EU and
membership was uncontested and Russia showed no fundamental opposition against this
step. In Ukraine’s case, Russia had clearly declared the membership of Ukraine in the
Eurasian Economic Union to be a major policy goal. By this, the EU policy of association
occurred in a highly precarious political environment, which greatly limits the explanatory
power of the path dependency approach. In this case, there was ample reason not to rely on
the traditional course of action, but to discuss—and possibly implement—a change of
course, or at least prepare for Russian countermoves. Why did this not happen?
Organizational interests
Although Member States have in general been very keen to avoid a clear membership
perspective for Ukraine, the Commission was the front-runner and very straightforward in
this regard. And indeed, the deepening of the EU in the context of enlargement increases
the political standing of the Commission and represents a basis for acquiring more financial
and personal resources. This policy is in line with the Commission’s organizational interests.
The Commission, however, does not stand alone but acts in a complex institutional
41
See his interview in Die Welt, May 30, 2014 (www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article128540032/Ukraine-
Moldau-und-Georgien-sollen-in-die-EU.html, accessed March 26, 2016).
42
See Beate Kohler-Koch, Thomas Conzelmann, and Michèle Knodt, Europäische Integration—Europäisches
Regieren. Polis. Politikwissenschaft. 3204-7-01-S 1, Hagen 2001, p. 278.
19. 19
environment, which leads to institutional disagreements about responsibilities and
competition among the various actors:43
The Commission is responsible for the Eastern Partnership Program, but also for
enlargement in general (with a single Commissioner).
The policy towards Russia, however, falls into the responsibility of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (and, indeed, at
the same time, Member States follow in part their own policy towards Russia).
The Directorate-General for Trade of the Commission handles almost independently
the negotiations about Free Trade Zones (without the inclusion of the European
External Action Service, or EEAS) which represent a vitally important part of the
association agreement with Ukraine.
The basic negotiation approaches are indeed part of discussion rounds in which
Council working groups, the EEAS, the Commission, and the Member States attempt
to coordinate their views. However, with regard to trade, the Commission has the
overall control in the talks with partner countries, while the EEAS holds this power
for the political part. Because of this, both institutions enjoy an important knowledge
and action edge in comparison to the other actors, especially the Member States.
Member States don’t share a common interest with regard to the policy towards
Eastern Europe. Southern states are not as attentive as, for example, Poland,
concerning Ukraine. With the exception of certain proposals by the Visegrad Group
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) and the so-called Weimar Triangle
(Germany, France, Poland), the EU policy towards the East was a matter of
coordination among the Commission, the EEAS, and the Council. Member States
played a rather passive role.44
The only major step was taken by a group of Member
States which had an interest in not being too clear about Ukraine’s membership in
the EU. Germany, France, and the Netherlands urged the EU to not even designate
43
For the following points, see Thomas Vogel, Überforderung und Desinteresse. Die EU, die Nachbarschaft und
die Ukraine, in: Osteuropa, September/Oktober 2014, p. 53.
44
This became, e.g., obvious at the beginning of 2013. The European Parliament executed intense
parliamentary diplomacy. “Through these efforts, the EU was able to obtain the release of three political
prisoners in Ukraine, ease the prison conditions of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, and push the Ukrainian
government to adopt a series of electoral and criminal laws that were a precondition for signing an AA.” The
EU’s Invisible Diplomacy: The European Parliament’s External Action in the Lead-Up to Ukraine Crisis. Lorinc
Redei (Lecturer, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin) Iulian Romanyshyn (Ph.D. Candidate,
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca).
20. 20
Ukraine as a “European state” in the association agreement in order to avoid as far as
possible any closeness to a definite membership perspective.45
Against this background, the fact that the EU avoided putting the association policy towards
Ukraine in a strategic context, including reflections on possible countermoves, has an
additional explanation. A major factor was the organizational interest of the institutions
representing the EU in the first place: the Commission, the President of the Council, and the
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They
acted in a political context characterized by a rather reactive, even passive, policy by the
Member States. Subsequently, there was no special place where a strategic analysis of
Ukraine’s domestic position, its crucial relationship with Russia, Russia’s interests, and
strategic options were seriously discussed. In other words, there was no overall, strategic
leadership to address the major questions concerning EU policy towards Ukraine thoroughly
and in good time. These questions went missing in the EU’s complex political machinery.
One, two, three, four … one, two, three, four …
European Integration
45
Ibid., p. 60.
21. 21
Civilian power export
The EU largely reflects the list of “civilian aims”46
associated with the concept of a civilian or
normative power. As Michael Meimeth and Jrostaw Jańczak argue: “From the perspective of
the ‘civilian power’ discourse, both the enlargement process as well as the Partnership
Initiative were and still are all about transferring and diffusing the EU’s internal values and
norms to the states of Central and Eastern Europe allowing a post-national order to replace
the logic of power politics that governed this part of Europe until the end of the Cold War.”47
In this framework, the EU’s association policy with Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine,
represents a peaceful concept to induce positive change in Ukraine, without any negative
impact on the relationship with Russia. Traditional power politics, or thinking in geopolitical
terms, including the use of the military as a political instrument, is not part of this kind of
foreign policy thinking. This thinking transfers the EU’s domestic political experience and
norms to the external world. Even more: because of its unique and innovative internal
political and institutional structure, “the EU has no other choice but to project these
principles and norms in its external relations.”48
Indeed, this underlying “philosophy” was an important factor in the shaping of EU policy
towards Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular. Nevertheless, again the question emerges
of why the EU was not able or willing to change course—at the latest, after the Vilnius
summit in November 2013. From the EU’s perspective, this summit should have decided on
far-reaching association with several Eastern neighbors in order to pull them closer to the
EU. The “historical moment,” however, turned out to be at most only a moderate success.
Belarus and Azerbaijan were not inclined to succumb to the tone of sirens of the EU’s soft
power and President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine refused to sign the deal.
It is instructive that the Vilnius summit brought about very limited results, and an EU
diplomat told an EU observer, "We don't know how to do geopolitics….It's a clash of two
worlds. Ukrainian politicians are completely different to us: They know the West only
through visits to five star hotels.” In addition, he added, “the EU underestimated not only
46
These are the following: Constraining the use of force through cooperation and collective security
arrangements; strengthening the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration and partial transfer
of sovereignty; promoting democracy and human rights within and between states (in accordance with
Harnisch and Maull 2001, as quoted by Michael Meimeth and Jarostaw Jańczak, Highway to hell? European
Union’s Eastern Policy from a Civilian power perspective, CIFE not de recherche no. 17, June 2015, p. 2).
47
Michael Meimeth and Jrostaw Jańczak, ibid., p. 2.
48
Michael Meimeth and Jarostaw Jańczak, ibid., p. 1.
22. 22
Putin; it equally underestimated Yanukovych, who has played Brussels against Moscow to
get ‘money, money, money.’”49
It became obvious that Ukraine evolved into a center of
power politics. The question of why the EU did not change course needs additional
interpretation.
Superpower by enlargement?
The civilian power concept is not without controversy. Since the very beginning of European
integration, the goal of a “federal Europe”—just another word for “European superpower”—
has played a role in the debates on Europe. In recent years, especially representatives of the
Commission and other Brussels-based actors now and again brought the superpower vision
into the debate. For Margret Thatcher, enlargement was an instrument to weaken the
central institutions in Brussels. The former President of the Commission, Romano Prodi,
disclosed the opposite function of Eastern enlargement. For him Eastern enlargement was
supposed to be part of a strategy to “create a superpower on the European continent that
stands equal to the United States.” 50
In this concept, enlargement is not only a strategy to let the EU grow, to export norms, and
to serve organizational interests, but serves as a lever to create a “European superpower” at
the same time. Against this background, it makes sense that the Commission, the High
Representative, and the President of the Council did not change course after Vilnius, but
hastened towards the signing of the association agreement with Ukraine. It is in line with
this thinking that European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, referring to the
confrontation with Russia over Ukraine, called for a European army.51
It is revealing that this
kind of thinking neglects the widely shared approach prior to the Eastern Partnership
program that Eastern enlargement should happen with an overarching agreement with
Russia.52
To summarize: path dependency and the civilian power concept can well serve as an
explanatory “leitmotivs” for EU policy towards Ukraine up to the point where it became
evident that Russia opposed this move and was in a situation to either lose the battle or
change the “methods of influencing.” At this point, the explanatory scheme has to be
enlarged by the complexity of the EU’s organizational structure in this field and the resulting
49
See https://euobserver.com/foreign/122218, accessed on March 31, 2016.
50
Former Commission President Romano Prodi, as quoted by the Economist of 24 April 2003.
51
See “Jean-Claude Juncker calls for EU army,” in: the Guardian, 8 March 2015
(www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-
miltary, accessed April 9, 2016).
52
See Schneider-Deters, Die Ukraine, p. 625.
23. 23
lack of “strategic leadership.” In addition, the strategy by European institutions of using
enlargement as a lever for further integration reinforced this policy—with the goal being a
European superpower.
Is There a Way Out?
At this point, it looks reasonable to start from the following assumptions:
The fighting in the Donbass will continue.
The EU (and the US) demand that Putin give up Crimea and respect the territorial
integrity of Ukraine as laid down in the Russian–Ukraine treaty of friendship from
1997. This is an approach which will not come true in the foreseeable future.53
The ceasefire agreement foresees a change in Ukraine’s constitution to provide a
special, more independent stand for the Donbass region. However, the
implementation is unlikely due to mutual reproaches of both sides.
With regard to the Donbass region, there is much speculation about Moscow’s
interests and goals. However, it is hard to believe that Putin and the “rebels” will
surrender unconditionally. At the same time, a military victory of the Ukrainian forces
is unlikely.
If this is a reasonable description of the situation, all negotiations have come to a deadlock
and the cease-fire will not function. The consequence: Western policy has ended up in a
stalemate.
In addition, indeed, there is a lot of time pressure:
People continue to die in Eastern Ukraine.
The European Bank for Reconstruction assesses the economic situation of Ukraine as
follows: “The economy has contracted deeply and remains very fragile”54
and the war
is a great hindrance to further reform and economic recovery.
The country does not get some peace domestically: eight people who were close to
former President Yanukovych died in early 2015—some just shot down.55
53
In addition, the question arises, whether a large part of Crimea’s population will accept it.
54
Transition Report 2015–16, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2015.tr-
ebrd.com/en/countries/#!ukraine, accessed April 8, 2016).
55
See Ukraine ally of ex-President Yanukovych found dead, BBC News, 15 April 2015
(www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32329512, accessed, 9 April 2016).
24. 24
On the Russian side, the sanctions may well contribute to a further economic and
political decline and, what is often forgotten, to a reorientation eastwards (to China).
The EU is, to use another cartoon, locked in a maze—and the place closes soon.
How to break the ice? Is there an option which provides at least some chance to avoid the
building up of a new wall in Europe?
The major option supported by analysts favoring realist approaches—neutrality—has gone.56
This would require abandoning the association agreement with Ukraine and would represent
a major defeat for the EU, which is not likely to be accepted. The other option is to watch for
cooperation mechanisms in the field of trade between the two economic regions: the EU
and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard have reasoned,
“the EEU is precisely the sort of project that Brussels might have invented itself. It is the only
institution capable of reducing Moscow’s reliance on military pressure and nationalist
56
See John J. Mearsheimer, Why Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault, in: Foreign Affairs, September/October
2014.
25. 25
rhetoric.”57
This, however, is for the foreseeable future hardly feasible as long as Crimea is
not reunited with Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine has become a stable region under Kiev’s rule
again. Nevertheless, it may well represent a long-term project. President Juncker’s proposal
to build a European army in response to Russia’s actions has no potential to influence
Ukraine’s situation. On the contrary, because the conflict over Ukraine occurs in a Realpolitik
context, such a move would block political solutions and aggravate European–Russian
competition.
The remaining option is painful for the EU and will therefore not be offered by institutions in
Brussels. Their position is embedded in concrete because of their political philosophy (in part
civilian power, in part the idea to further the evolution of the EU into a superpower by
enlargement), but also because of organizational interests. One or another Member State
has to take the lead. This proposal may carry the potential for a peaceful Ukraine and some
improvement in the EU–Russian relationship. As Egbert Jahn argues, if Russia does not go
back to a consensus-based conflict management, the Ukraine needs a K. Adenauer, who
preferred to have the bigger part of Germany firmly integrated in the ‘West’ over—at this
time—an illusionary restoration of the territorial integrity in the borders of 2013.58
Along these lines, my brief proposal for the EU is the following:
Tacitly accept that Crimea is no longer part of Ukraine.
Ask the Ukrainian government to give up its policy of reclaiming Crimea.
Request that the government in Kyiv to change the constitution and undertake a
constitutional reform allowing provinces to leave in an orderly, regulated manner by
a supervised referendum.59
Promote the idea that the Eastern provinces should hold such a referendum under
international supervision (OSCE).
57
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, Europe’s Shattered Dream of Order. How Putin Is Disrupting the Atlantic
Alliance, in: Foreign Affairs, 3/2015, p. 57.
58
Egbert Jahn, Die Zuspitzung der Integrationskonkurrenz zwischen Brüssel und Moskau um die Ukraine,
Frankfurter Montags-Vorlesungen, 4. Mai 2015, p. 27 (my own translation).
59
The current attempt to reform the Ukrainian constitution is blocked by opposing ideas on the question of
decentralization. Moscow wants a solution where regions have some veto over national policy, which quite
likely means the end of Ukraine’s orientation towards the West. Poroshenko tabled a proposal which entails a
modest decentralization of powers to the “oblasts” only. This proposal, however, did not find the necessary
two-thirds backing. See Timothy Ash: Ukraine’s constitutional reform conundrum, KyivPost, January 25, 2016
(www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/timothy-ash-ukraines-constitutional-reform-conundrum-
406630.html, accessed April 7, 2016).
26. 26
Accept the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as a positive feature of the European
order and not a competitive framework.
Indeed, such a policy would require major sacrifices on the side of the EU and Ukraine.
However, it would be difficult for the “rebels” not to accept this offer, and Putin would
be forced on the defensive.
If this policy translates into practice and a referendum does take place, its outcome is
uncertain. However, I think a detachment of the Eastern region from Ukraine would
probably be a better solution for the country than a marginal victory for Kyiv.
