Working Paper

Research Line
Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods
Social Mechanisms for Preventing and
Controlling Violence: Voices from Two
Neighborhoods in Abuja
Princess Hamman-Obels
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers
No. 12
ViolenceResearchandDevelopmentProject|Papers

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 12
International Center for Violence Research – ICVR
A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary
Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG
Universität Bielefeld
Universitätsstraße 25
33615 Bielefeld
Germany
Project Webpage
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html
Contact
icvr@uni-bielefeld.de
The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating
research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center
for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence
Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are
welcome and should be addressed to the author(s).
Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the
International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on
Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University.
If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence
Research please send an e-mail to: icvr@uni-bielefeld.de
The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the
author(s).

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 12 1
Acknowledgements
The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary
results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social
science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of
the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence
research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop
scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.
For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)
entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin
City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic
University of Peru in Lima.
The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:
“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent
and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against
Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at
aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,
violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and
vigilantism.
This chapter documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Violent and
Non-Violent Neighborhoods”. Within the context of the Global South, research on violence
mainly focuses on issues related to violent countries, national histories, periods, and policies,
as well as institutions and phenomena such as police, military, youth gangs, militias, drug
economies, and violent religious groups. The research mainly approaches violence from a
national perspective, but also broadens the scope to include larger entities, such as
continents and sub-continents. The aim of the research on “Violent and Non-Violent
Neighborhoods” is to identify local social mechanisms for a) direct control and prevention of
violence and b) factors in the social context which enable or restrict the success of both
community-based and national measures designed to achieve control and prevention of
violence.
Bielefeld, June 2015
Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann

Research Line
Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods
Social Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Violence: Voices from Two
Neighborhoods in Abuja
Princess Hamman-Obels
Abstract
In this study I examine how social mechanisms work in the context of violence and crime
prevention and control in Abuja, using a micro-sociological approach. I wanted to enhance
understanding of local social mechanisms for direct violence control and prevention as well
as social context factors that enable or disable the success of measures for violence control
and prevention. I did this by comparing the everyday life of urban dwellers in Dutse Apo, a
marginalized non-violent neighborhood and Durumi II, a marginalized violent neighborhood in
Abuja based on primary source materials and field research that involved observations,
interviews and a Focus Group discussion. The comparison between these two
neighborhoods, which have similar socio-economic characteristics but different outcomes in
terms of violence and crime, shows the importance of social institutions. My findings indicate
that social institutions, such as social control and social capital in terms of neighborhood
local leadership, socio-political interactions, ethnic association, belonging and community,
are important mechanisms that influence (outbreaks of) violence as well as crime prevention
and control.

“Our metropolitan regions are the scene of many contrasts,
of complex lives being lived in intricate social and physical surroundings”
(Mark Gottdiener 1994: 3).
1. Introduction
Urban centers as the nucleus of political, social and economic processes are the meeting
point for peoples from diverse backgrounds. They are often the sites of intense social
struggles for power and control of scarce resources. In recent years, urban violence1
has
been on the increase globally, including minor crimes, gang wars and terror attacks by
extremists; at the same time urban violence has become a major development issue
worldwide. The issue of urban violence has become even more pressing with increased
urbanization in the last decade. In other words, urban violence is associated with changing
urban lifestyles and designs2
related to meeting the challenges presented by the processes
of urbanization. Some cities, especially those in Asia, Latin America and Africa, are
struggling with high levels of violence that have become a critical threat to urban dwellers.
Violence undermines the foundations of the economic and social development of the entire
population (Moser 2004, World Bank 2011). In some cases, certain cities and their
neighborhoods are convulsed by endemic violence and in many cases the scale of urban
violence can even eclipse open warfare (Muggah 2012).
Urban violence is experienced by rich and poor, young and old, men and women, but the
urban poor and marginalized people experience it most acutely. This raises the question:
how is it possible to control and/or prevent violence and crime in marginalized urban
centers? However, as proposed by Koonings and Kruijt (2007), violence and/or the fear of
violence cannot be assessed in isolation, so it’s necessary to study these phenomena in their
broader sociological and anthropological context as well as from the point of view of how
they are perceived. This perspective forms the core premise of this research. This is because
it’s understood that this approach can add nuance to the multi-dimensionality of insecurity,
violence and fear as well as the multiple aspects of social reality (Koonings and Kruijt 2007).
1
Violence is understood as a complex phenomenon involving major ambiguity between destruction and
creation of order (Imbusch 2003 p.13) and the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others, including
psychological hurt and material deprivation (Moser 2004).
2
For example, alternative security provisions such as gated neighborhoods and guarded apartment complexes.

The literature reveals a number of factors that cause urban violence. Albert (1994) identified
various causes of urban violence in Africa, which include high population growth rates with
associated unemployment; poor wages; poor living conditions; urban culture shocks; and
poor quality of urban management that manifests itself in current crises in healthcare,
transportation, housing and employment. In Nigeria, urban violence has been attributed to
the loss of traditional structures that used to keep people together (Aderinto, 1994 cited in
Oruwari and Owei 2006). On the other hand, it can also be explained by continuing political
uncertainty, a lack of progressive management of the economy, leading to inflation, as well
as the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few who are in positions of public authority.
These create a melting pot for violent outcomes due to a sense of hopeless desperation
among the masses (Oruwei and Owei 2006). Examples of this include the insurgency by
Boko Haram3
in the North-East, ethno-religious conflicts, and clashes between farmers and
Fulani herdsmen.
Furthermore, in Nigeria, most studies of urbanization, violence, societal decay and lack of
cohesion, have been about traditional mega-cities such as Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Port
Harcourt and not Abuja, , which is a relative newcomer (e.g. Albert 1994; Fourchard 2008;
Aluko 2010; Akinwale 2012). Abuja was chosen for this study because it’s relatively
understudied and most studies done on Abuja have focused on housing needs and issues
related to demolition (COHRE and SERAC 20084
; Jibril and Garba 2012; Ade and Afolabi
2013; LeVan and Olubole 2014)). There are hardly any studies that focus on residents’
experiences of violence or the strategies they adopt to deal with violence. Also Abuja is the
federal capital, situated in the center of the country and planned to give a sense of belonging
to all Nigerians. It has land for expansion in contrast to the previous federal capital, Lagos.
However, although Abuja has been praised for its infrastructure and social services, such as
clean streets and relatively stable electricity supply, many Nigerians experience the city as a
place with slums, discrimination, exclusion and marginalization (LeVan and Olubowale
2014). Abuja thus calls for more scholarly engagement.
In this study I examine how social mechanisms work in the context of violence and crime
in Abuja. With its focus on this relatively understudied city, which also happens to be one of
the fastest growing cities in the world (e.g. Adeyemi 2011; Myers2011), this study can
contribute to the body of knowledge on urbanization, violence, conflict, and in particular
urban governance and administration. The qualitative approach taken in this research is in
contrast to the dominant quantitative and large surveys studies that are common (e.g. Hove
3
A socio-religious (Islamic) insurgent group with its stronghold in the North-East of Nigeria that has been
responsible for a series of bombings of government organizations, the UN Building, as well as other acts of
terror, including kidnapping schoolchildren.
4
COHRE: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions; SERAC: Social and Economic Rights Action Centre.

et al. 2013). The focus on neighborhoods5
is also different from country-wide studies. Using a
micro-sociological perspective, this study provides a micro-analysis of experiences,
perceptions, and preventive mechanisms related to violence and crime in urban centers. The
expectation here is that a micro-sociological perspective will bring to light social mechanisms
of crime control and prevention that do not only depend on national policies and history but
also on everyday experiences of people. This will contribute to enriching public policy and
administration. The comparison between these two neighborhoods with similar socio-
economic characteristics but different outcomes in terms of violence and crime also shows
the importance of social institutions. This study thus contributes to the understanding of
social institutions.
I explore how urban dwellers use local social mechanisms to control and prevent violence
in urban neighborhoods. Specifically, this study focused on the violence control and
prevention mechanisms adopted in the everyday life of urban dwellers in Dutse Apo, a
marginalized non-violent neighborhood and Durumi II, a marginalized violent neighborhood in
Abuja through the use of primary source materials and field research that involved thirty
semi-structured interviews with thirty residents of the neighborhoods, two local government
officials and three security experts, as well as a Focus Group discussion with six young
residents. The central question posed was: how do local social mechanisms support or
mitigate violence control and prevention in the Dutse Apo and Durumi neighborhoods of
Abuja?
2. Research Context: Abuja from the Beginning6
Abuja (also known as the Federal Capital City (FCC)) is situated in the Federal Capital
Territory (FCT) of Nigeria. It is the seat of the Federal Government and home to most of the
country’s institutions, including the Central Bank, and the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation. Abuja is also the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African
States and the regional headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
In socio-political discourses, the city symbolizes national pride and unity (LeVan and
Olubowale 2014).
In June 1977, the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) commissioned the US-
based IPA Group, to prepare a draft Master Plan for the new Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
5
Neighborhoods are understood here as both physical and social spaces that incorporate places and people,
are flexible and cannot be seen in isolation, as their characteristics are shaped by their relationship to other
places (see Lupton 2003).
6
See http://www.fcda.gov.ng/; Interview with an FCDA Official, June 9, 2014.

The Master Plan envisaged Abuja being built in the Northern quadrant of the FCT, which
functioned as a cordon sanitarium and as an agricultural hinterland. The city was to be built
in four phases, the first commenced in 1979 and to provide space for 230,000 inhabitants
across 4,000 hectares of land. The capital was scaled to have over a population of 1, 600,
000 and expandable at its sides to 3, 200, 000 with a “Central Area” as the city center. The
later was structured in terms of rectilinear super blocks that would have two wings at its sides
that can enclose a total of eight essentially self-contained “development sector,” as the
Master Plan states, with between 120, 000 and 190, 000 inhabitants each. The FCT is
divided into six area councils namely: Abaji, Abuja Municipal, Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kuje and
Kwali; (FCDA website (www.fcda.ng.gov).
Abuja was a sparsely populated area, which was one of the reasons for the choice of the
site. But the conception of the Federal Capital and subsequently the Master Plan was based
on the promise that all the approximately 500,000 inhabitants within the entire 8,000 square
kilometers would be resettled outside of the territory. Consequently, the University of Ibadan
Consultancy Services was commissioned to undertake an ecological survey to ascertain the
exact number of people to be settled outside the territory and also to determine the amount
to be paid to the affected inhabitants as compensation by the Federal Government. This
policy of total evacuation however, changed in 1978 based on the argument that the funds
required as compensation entitlement at over N1.8 billion was exorbitant. As a result, the
resettlement scheme in the FCT is in two categories namely:
1. Original inhabitants7
who opted to be moved out of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
2. Original inhabitants who have remained and will be resettled within the FCT, but
outside the Federal Capital City (FCC) whenever their places of abode are affected by
development projects.
Urbanization and the Political Economy of Abuja
Abuja, unlike Lagos and Kano, is a relatively new city with a fraction of the population of
these other cities which are located at the extreme South and North of the country. Although
the FCT was created in 1976, development activities did not start until early 1980 and the
seat of the Federal Government shifted from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 under the administration
of General Ibrahim B. Babangida. A key demographic characteristic of the FCT is that over
60% of its populace live in the rural areas across the six area councils, with particular
concentrations in the satellite towns/areas.
However, Abuja, the most developed of the councils, contains a mix of neighborhoods,
suburbs, satellites towns, vacant spaces, industrial parks, shopping malls, and recreational
7
The Gbaygis (also called Gwaris) are an ethnic group.

areas—all of which are interconnected and bridged by communication and transport
networks including highways and telecommunications. Abuja is planned to accommodate an
ultimate population of a little above three million people when fully developed (Ibrahim and
Garba 2012).
With a projected population of 5 million – driven by conflict migration and economic
migration – Abuja is the seat of power and control of resources in Nigeria. The economy of
Abuja is driven primarily by government contracts and the real-estate market. Housing is very
expensive and only within the reach of the upper class and wealthy. Access to land is also
very exclusive. Government interventions e.g. mass housing schemes have still not
addressed the problem, as only the rich have access to such housing because of the very
high prices and virtually unattainable mortgage conditions. In essence, the “commoditization
of the urban space” (see Kramer 2012) has resulted in socio-spatial exclusion and
marginalization.
Crime and Violence in Abuja
Abuja is one of the relatively safest places to live, work and raise children in Nigeria (Police
Report 2009, p. 92). In 2009, the FCT command recorded a total of 649 criminal cases (ibid).
Even though crime is increasing and becoming more sophisticated (Police Report 2009).
Common criminal activities include armed robbery, car-jacking, rape, murder and kidnap-for-
ransom. There is also a history of ethnic and religious conflict that is generally motivated by
competition about access to resources, and often exacerbated by political manipulation
(Nigeria Police Force Annual Report (NPF) 2009, p.2). Two years down the line, a crime
victimization survey carried out across the country by the CLEEN8
Foundation reported that
51% of respondents in the FCT said that they were victims of crime in 2011 (Alemika 2013).
This reflects a rise in violence and crime as the city expands, particularly due to a growing
population as a result of migration from neighboring states and the interior of the country.
Across the country, more criminal victimization was recorded in 2011, compared to 2010,
for all categories of crimes (Alemika 2013). According to this survey, the most common forms
of criminal victimization were property crimes, both violent and non-violent, while the most
common crimes suffered by the household members of interviewees were theft of mobile
phone handsets, theft of money, domestic violence, physical assaults, burglary and robbery
(ibid). There is also the problem of Boko Haram attacks in the city that have led to a large
8
An NGO working in areas of public safety, security and accessible justice.

death toll and to some extent the normalization of other forms of violence. In the words of an
interviewee “anything less than Boko Haram bombing is not violence; it’s normal”9
State Policing of the Urban Space in Nigeria
Nigeria has a National Police Force (NPF), having abolished the Native Authority and local
government systems of police in the late 1960s. However, relationships between the public
and the police have historically been characterized by mutual distrust 10
. One way of
explaining the State’s response to rising violence and crime in urban centers in Nigeria is
through the NPF’s response mechanisms, which are linked to the ongoing transformation
within the NPF. So what is the State’s response to tackling crime and violence in urban
areas?
The Nigerian Police is currently being overhauled as part of ongoing reform and
transformation from a “colonial policing system to a democratic structure where the police
work primarily for the public interest and not in the interests of the ruling party or any
influential group” (NPF Annual Report 2009, p.4). This is based on its understanding that, as
one of the key players in the criminal justice system, it plays a critical role in creating an
enabling environment for socio-economic development of the country (ibid p.3). This reform
agenda focuses on five major areas: logistics, equipment and infrastructure; capacity building
(training and rehabilitation/upgrade of training facilities); Community Policing (CP); Police
Image and the Welfare of Police Personnel (p.7). However, the focus of the study is on
community policing – policing from the bottom up. The communities are given the opportunity
to determine their policing needs and this influences the NPF response in the community11
.
The introduction of community policing as the philosophy to guide all working practices is a
major strategy aimed at achieving police reform agenda, especially in ensuring a move from
reactive to more proactive policing (NPF 2009). At the neighborhood level, there is a
neighborhood policing strategic policy as well as geographic area policing and what is known
as ‘high visibility’ area policing12
.
This is also in recognition of the principle of democratic policing, as citizens are now
involved in community crime issues affecting their quality of life (NPF 2009 p.8). Community
policing is expected to be a key element in a wider, multi-partners Nigeria Community Safety
Strategy (NCSS). In furtherance of this, pilot Community Safety Partnerships (CSP) were
introduced in a number of police divisions in a few states across the country including the
FCT-Abuja. The CSPs are multifaceted multi-agency partnerships where the Police are the
9
Interview with a young entrepreneur on May 29, 2014.
10
To emphasis this point, it’s worth noting that 98% of the respondents indicated a strong distrust of the police.
11
Interview with a police expert in Abuja, June 30, 2014.
12
Ibid.

main partners. The CSP has representation from Local Government Councils, the Police, the
specific/target community and many other key agencies (NPF p.14). For instance, in a target
community, various groups such as CSO, NGO, unions, State government, market women,
and transport workers come together and form a CSP. The CSP’s main responsible is to
identify the policing priorities of the community. This has proven helpful to the NPF as they
found that in a number of instances, the needs of communities are at variance with what the
NPF envisaged. In some communities, their priority may be combating armed robbery, while
in others, it could be road traffic accidents (Gwagwalada, FCT), or drug abuse among young
people13
.
3. Research Methodology
This is a qualitative study research, using primarily data from 14 weeks of field work. A
qualitative field research approach was adopted because one is better able to add nuance to
attitudes and behavior which are best understood within their natural social setting that would
be not otherwise be apparent using other methods (Barbie 2007). Also this approach focuses
on speaking for and with those who are on the margins (Denzin and Lincoln 2011), i.e. the
interviewees for this study.
Data was generated from semi-structured interviews and direct observations of the
interviewees and their social contexts. Interviews provided verbal data, while direct
observation allowed for noting subtle communications and other events that might not
otherwise be anticipated or measured (Barbie 2007:289). Similarly, based on a micro-
sociological perspective, data was analyzed to privilege the voices of residents in two
marginalized neighborhoods of Abuja. I consider their views alongside those of the city urban
development authority and the police, so as to analyze these urban dwellers’ lived
experiences in terms of mechanisms adopted for preventing and controlling violence and
crime in their space/territory as well as situate their experience at the macro of national and
international discourse and debates about issues of urbanization processes, development
and security.
Research Site and Rationale for the Cases
This research was conducted in Durumi II and Dutse Apo neighborhoods of the FCC. The
main ethnic communities, who are also the earliest inhabitants of the FCT, are the Gbagyis
13
Interview with a Police Expert, Abuja, June 30, 2014.

(Gwaris) and they are divided into six chiefdoms14
: Garki, Jiwa, Zuba, Bwari, Gwagwalada
and Abaji Chiefdoms15
.
The two neighborhoods, which are in Abuja Municipality Area Council (AMAC), are
situated in Phase II of the development plan of the FCC (see the above map). Abuja is
divided into districts and the districts are grouped into development phases, namely: Phase
1, Phase 2, Phase 3 and Phase 4. Most districts in Phase 1 are fully developed with
infrastructure and social services. Dutse Apo Village and Durumi II neighborhoods are
located in Phase 2 but without the infrastructure and facilities that the districts enjoy
especially the surrounding housing estates. They have similar histories as settlements of
Gbaygis/Gwaris, the original inhabitants of the area before the establishment of the Federal
Capital Territory (FCT). Both neighborhoods fall under category II of the resettlement scheme
discussed under the previous section.
Their main source of livelihood before the appropriation of the territory as the FCT was
farming16
. These neighborhoods are neither planned nor do they have a clear layout. While
most of the houses are built with blocks, since this brings in more rent, one can still find a
number built with traditional mud. Both neighborhoods have a junior public school, which
provides basic education for students for the first nine years of schooling. However, Dutse
also has a nomadic junior school as well as a rundown and dilapidated primary healthcare
center. There is no pipe-borne water; residents rely on local water vendors called “Mai-ruwa.”
These vendors usually fetch the water from a central water point powered by borehole. There
are two such boreholes in Dutse, provided by the Rotary Club. It is worth noting that Durumi
is less than a kilometer away from the National Assembly (NASS) Quarters.
The justification for selecting the two neighborhoods for the study is because of the
presence of poor socio-economic conditions (high levels of poverty, inequality, etc.),
communal (sense of community, presence of religious institutions, school), and security
indicators (police presence, private security presence), all factors that are relevant to the
study. Also they were selected based on general perception of the prevalence of violence in
Durumi II, and otherwise in Dutse Apo. However, the traditional indicators used to determine
the level and pattern of criminality and violence in country are based on official crime
statistics produced by the justice system (police, prisons and the courts). This would ideally
have been an appropriate tool for categorizing the neighborhoods but crime statistics were
not used because they were not accessible (unavailable).
This is easily understood given the view of Alemika (2013 p.2) that in Nigeria, the police
and other law enforcement agencies including the intelligence and judicial agencies neglect
14
The socio-political organization of communities with centralization of power and authority which is exercised
by a single person (the Mai-anguwa) over the community.
15
Interview with an FCDA Official, June 9, 2014.
16
Interview with Dutse Apo and Durumi II Local Chiefs (Mai-angwa) March 15 and 30, 2014, respectively.

the collection, analysis and utilization of crime, disorder and victimization data, which would
be essential input to their planning, operations and administrations. Secondly, in this context,
crime statistics may not give a clear picture when these are available because of inaccurate
figures: ‘dark’ figures (unreported crimes), ‘grey’ figures (reported but unrecorded crimes)
and manipulation of records to satisfy political and, or institutional interests as when reported
increase or decrease may be advantageous to the regime in power or to a particular criminal
justice agency, especially the police force (Alemika 2013, p.3).
Sampling Methods
The neighborhoods were selected on the basis of narratives of prevalence of violence in
Durumi II and less so in Dutse. Many of the interviewees were reached with the help of an
insider who facilitated our meetings with the local chiefs, and a number of respondents for
the interviews particularly the gatekeepers who initially sought to deny access. In a way the
facilitator became a collaborator in the same sense William F. Whyte experienced “Doc” in
Street Corner Society (Whyte 1993:301), as she was with us during 85% of the interviews
that were conducted. Interviewees were selected based on categories such as ethnicity, age,
gender, position in the neighborhood (key informants, gatekeepers), and location of resident
to ensure that the different areas of the neighborhood are covered. The interviewees
selected to represent the various zones/areas/segments of the neighborhoods as partitioned
by dwelling. For instance, Dutse is segmented into three areas “up, middle and back.”
Similarly, Durumi is segmented into three areas “new site, market (the center) and the
back”17
.
A total of 30 interviews with 35 people were conducted in a period of 14 weeks .The
interviewees’ ages range from 15 years to over 70 years and were from diverse socio-
economic, educational and occupational backgrounds. The variables of age, ethnicity,
religion and gender were important for selection of the sample. The sample for the study is
small, due to the qualitative nature of the method of research. However, this small sample
size is more than compensated for by its inherent capacity for deep and rich data collection
(see Barbie 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2011). It is expected that these cases will throw more
light on the type of citizen-driven mechanisms (approaches) for combating violence and
crime in the way they organize controlling and, where possible, preventing violence within
their neighborhoods. An interview was also conducted with staff of the FCDA, Resettlement
and Compensation Department and a police expert, as well as some informal general chats
with staff at a security institution.
17
Initial field interviews.

Data Collection
In order to answer the research questions and achieve the stated objectives, this research
included qualitative data from several sources such as key informants, cultural and religious
gate keepers and methods such as direct/participants observations, informal conversations
and formalized interviews with members of the field as well as the 2009 Police Annual Report
and other literature relevant to this study. Triangulation of the data was also used as a
strategy for improving the quality of the research by extending the approach to the issue
under study, using different data collected by various qualitative methods (Flick 2009). Also,
this approach was adopted to further ground the knowledge obtained with qualitative
methods to systematically extend and complete the possibilities of knowledge production
(ibid).
Due to the nature of the research question and the type of information solicited, semi-
structured interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and direct observations were
employed as the main methods of data collection (see detailed list of interviewees in
Appendix I). Some interviews were conducted with key informants and gatekeepers of the
neighborhoods while others cut across gender, ethnicity, age and relative social status. For
residents of the neighborhoods, interviews were conducted in the residential and business
premises of the interviewees, while the interviews with government official and police expert
took place in their offices. The interviews period ranged from 30 minutes to 1. 5 hours. There
was also an FGD with a group of six young people, three females and three males between
ages 15 -23years from Dutse Apo Village outside the neighborhood. The FGD was to provide
“unexpected insights” and “elaborated accounts” that are unlikely to arise in the context of
individual interviews (Wilkinson 2004:181-2). FGD also provided for possibility of
triangulation of data collection.
4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Neighborhood, Urban Violence,
Social Disorganization and Social Capital
Beginning with the Chicago School, several theories have emerged since the early twentieth
century to explain variations in urban disorder and violence within and between cities and
neighborhoods, though mostly rooted in the Western European and North American
experience (see Parks and Burgess 1921; Wirth 1938; Harvey 1973; Lefebvre 1774; Castells
1977; Sanders 2003 among others). However, as argued by Muggah (2010), the explanatory
power of these constructs and their assumptions are being tested by contemporary trends
such as rapid urbanization, globalization and the interconnectedness of cities and slums in

lower- and medium-income settings across Africa, Asia and Latin America. For this paper,
Social Disorganization theory and social capital theories were found to be relevant and useful
in explaining and understanding the findings from this study.
Social Disorganization Theory
According to May and Perry, over the last century there have been rich and diverse
contributions to urban studies with evolving studies from the Chicago School with their focus
on urban ecology, to the ‘radicalism’ of New Urban Sociology emphasizing neo-Weberian
and neo-Marxist approaches (May and Perry 2005,p. 343). The theory of social
disorganization, which focuses on the relationship between neighborhood structure, social
control and crime emanates from two of the pioneers of the Chicago School, Clifford Shaw
and Henry Mackay’s (1942) work on juvenile delinquency in urban areas. In their study of
crime in Chicago, Shaw and McKay found that crime was not evenly distributed across the
city but that high delinquency rates persisted in certain neighborhoods for long periods
despite changes in the racial and ethnic composition of these communities (Kubrin and
Weitzer 2003). They discovered a strong pattern to crime in which rates of crime diminished
as one moved away from the inner city (Tripplett et al. 2003).
Their research centered on observed cultural heterogeneity and the constant population
movements in the “zone of transition” (Bottom 2007, p.531). The zone of transition is
characterized by economic deprivation, physical deterioration, population mobility, and
population heterogeneity containing both social-structural weaknesses that according to
Shaw and Mackay influenced juvenile delinquency through a process of “social
disorganization” (Bottom 2007). “Social disorganization refers to the inability of a community
to achieve common goals and solve chronic problems.” (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003, p.374)
The theory suggests that poverty, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and weak social
networks decrease a neighborhood’s capacity to control the behavior of people in public, and
hence increase the likelihood of crime (ibid).
However, in the last three decades, social disorganization theory underwent substantial
theoretical and empirical development (Triplett et al. 2003) and the literature has grown
tremendously (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Current model of the theory is based on a systemic
model of control which emphasizes the role of social networks as precursor for neighborhood
social controls18
(Triplett et al. 2003). This new model also incorporates and clearly specifies
the relationship between both intra-neighborhood and extra-neighborhood factors (Bursik
and Grasmick 1993). This systemic reformulation assumes that the degree to which
18
See the works of Sampson and Grooves 1987; Bursik, 1988; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampson et al.,
1997.

neighborhoods informally control crime is a function of the structure of the networks that
integrate residents into the primary and secondary groups of the community, and those that
link the whole neighborhood to the broader social, economic and political institutions of the
city (Bursik 1999, p. 85).
The new systemic model spells out how these networks mediate the effect of
neighborhood structural characteristics on rates of crime by carefully specifying the
relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics, social networks and
neighborhood rates of crime (ibid). In these systemic models, “social networks are seen as
critical to social control for they are the mechanism through which individuals in a
neighborhood come to know each other, establish common values and carry out informal
social control” (Triplett et al. 2003, p.440). Similarly, recent work has recognized that social
networks are critical in the distribution of and access to social capital and social support
(Bursik 1999) as well as the inclusion of considerations of control at private, parochial and
public levels (Triplett et al. 2003).
Sun et al. (2004, p.1) elaborate this point further, using the Sampson and Grooves test of
a model of social disorganization which draws on the initial work by Shaw and Mackey
(1942). According to Sampson and Grooves (1989 cited in Sun et al. 2004), the disruption of
local organizations (i.e., social disorganization), is characterized by weak local friendship
networks, low levels of organizational participation, and unsupervised teenage groups. The
model predicts that social disorganization limits the capacity of neighborhoods to regulate
and control behavior, which contributes to higher rates of crime and delinquency (Sun et al.
2004).
Social Capital Theory
A related concept is the notion of social capital. Social capital is a popular currency in the
social sciences as a tool in explaining social bond and connectedness (Putnam, 1993a and
b; Portes, 1998 and 2000; Lin et al, 2001; Small, 2004; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). In
development discourse, social capital is the “missing link” in poverty alleviation and the
“essential glue” that binds people together (Wong 2007). However, in economics, it’s seen as
social capital, because it arises from a nonmarket interaction of agents that nevertheless has
economic effects which are not internalized in the decision calculus of each agent by the
prices faced in markets (Collier 2002).
According to Lin et al. (2001, p. vii), the attraction of the notion of social capital is twofold.
First, it’s due an ability to capture the essence of many sociological concepts such as social
support, social integration and social cohesion. Secondly, it shares commonalities with other
forms of capital (notably human capital) in its focus on a payoff or utility. Similarly, Portes

(1998, p.2) argues that heuristic power of social capital come from two sources, namely: the
concept focuses attention on the positive consequences of sociability while putting aside its
less attractive features. Furthermore, it places those positive consequences in the framework
of a broader discussion of capital and calls attention to how such nonmonetary forms can be
important sources of power and influence, like the size of one’s stock holdings or bank
account (Portes 1998, p.2).
A review of literature reveals varied definitions of social capital based on relationships
between actors, the structure of these relations, internal and external types of linkages
among actors as well as the dimensions of these linkages and relations. For instance,
Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2002a/b, defined social capital as the institutions and networks
of relationships between people, and the associated norms and values. While for Field
(2008), social capital is a way of defining the intangible resources of community, shared
values and trust upon which it draws in daily life. These definitions are more complementary
than contradictory (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2002a). Social capital has developed along
three dimensions, namely: its scope (or unit of observation), its forms (or manifestations),
and the channels through which it affects development (ibid). However, there are three
dominant perspectives on social capital that are based on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu
(1980, 1985), James Coleman (1988), and Robert Putnam (1993, 2000).
Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248; 1980 cited in
Portes 1998). For Coleman (1998), social capital is framed at the neighborhood level and is
defined by its function. It constitutes a particular kind of resource available to an actor, in
which the actor has control over certain resources and interests in certain resources and
events (p.S98). Social capital involves a variety of entities consisting of some aspect of social
structures, while at the same time facilitating certain actions within the structure (ibid). Unlike
other capital, social capital is inherent in the structure of relationships between actors and
among actors (ibid). Coleman argues that social capital is less tangible, as it exists in the
relationships. In other words, it comes about through change in the relationships among
those who facilitate action (p.S101).
In the third instance is Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital as networks of civic
engagement and the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens
will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit. Putnam's concept of social capital has three
components: moral obligations and norms, social values (especially trust) and social
networks (especially voluntary associations). Putnam's thesis is that networks of civic
engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity. So for example, “I’ll do this for
you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else will return the

favor.”(Putnam 1993, p. 3 ) Furthermore, according to him, social capital can be very dense,
interlaced, interconnected, and multiplex. It can also be very thin, almost invisible forms of
social capital such as the nodding acquaintance you have with the person you occasionally
see at the supermarket, while waiting in line (Putnam n.d.).
5. Research Findings: The Dynamics of Social Mechanisms for Prevention and
Control of Violence and Crime
Dutse Apo Village
Dutse Apo Village, a neighborhood in Dutse District is situated off the second ring road of
Abuja. Although a multi-ethnic neighborhood representing the multi-ethnic outlook of the city,
it’s dominated by the Gbaygis, the original inhabitants, who hold the primary leadership
responsibility for the neighborhood. The local economy is driven by retail and petty trading.
Common occupations therein include tailors, hair makers, DJ/Music CDs sellers, and
commercial bike riders (Okada riders). These occupations are common to the young people.
There is a central mosque where all Muslims congregate. The mosque also serves as
sleeping abode for many young local water vendors and Okada riders. There is no police
post in Dutse, civic and criminal cases have to be taken to Apo (another neighborhood)
station. Also of note is that a number of the people reside in this neighborhood as a result of
demolition of their homes in nearby Apo, while for others it’s the proximity to the city center,
thus reduced cost of transportation. Finally there is a traditional chief whose authority is very
visible and respected.
Durumi II
Durumi II is one of the four neighborhoods in Durumi District, other neighborhoods are
Durumi I, III and IV. Like Dutse Apo, Durumi II is a multi-ethnic neighborhood characterized
by poor socio-economic conditions. The main attraction of the neighborhood is its proximity
to the city center and easy transport network by tricycle “keke.” It also has relatively stable
electricity supply. The neighborhood is also home to a thriving local brewery industry as well
as beer market which drives the local economy. This is supported by petty trading and
vocational occupations such as tailoring, barbing, hair-dressing and music CD shops. The
neighborhood has a police post which according to the local chief was upgraded to a district
station in January 2014 (this was not evidence from the physical outlook of the post as at the

time of the fieldwork). There are five Muslim praying grounds. Finally, the local chief authority
is relatively less apparent and respected.
Table 1: Some Identified Differences between Dutse Apo and Durumi II
S/N Dutse Apo Durumi II
1 The roads are bad and not drivable The road is fairly drivable
2 Less organized layout More organized layout
3 No police post There is a police post
4 Close to the main city Closer to the main city
5 The Chief’s power and authority is visible in
interviewees’ frequent reference to him
making him very involved
Chief is not visible and apparently
less involved
6 The Chief is old and not literate The Chief is young and literate
7 It is surrounded by housing estates Not surrounded by estates but
regular residences
8 Most houses make use of pit toilets and
dumpsites
There are toilets and bathrooms in
most houses
9 There are different drinking bars Presence of traditional brewery
industry and retail distribution
market for it
10 The neighborhood atmosphere has warmth
and welcome
The neighborhood atmosphere is
frenzy and strange
11 Existence of a central mosque Various Islamic prayer spaces
12 Two public schools One public school
13 Strong social ties in neighborhood Weak social ties in neighborhood
Source: Author’s Research, 2014
Leadership Structure
In Dutse Apo, there are two major leadership structures supported by two others. The first
and overall structure is formed by the Gbaygis. Here the local chieftain (Mai-anguwa) who
has been chief for over 20 years holds sway. He is aided by his cabinet, other title holders
such as the chief farmer, youth leader and a secretary19
. This was corroborated by other
interviewees, who indicated that the Mai-anguwa, Gbaygi youth leader and the Gbaygis as
the most influential and powerful people and group in the neighborhood. As one of the young
respondents puts it “Mai -anguwa is in charge of everything20
. Another Mai-anguwa, any
problem you take it to him, he will find a solution.”21
Similarly, in the Dutse, there are various ethnic groups beside the Gbaygis. Each of these
groups has its own association whence members interact socio-politically. The second level
19
Interview with a Dutse Mai-anguwa-Neighborhood Chief, March 15, 2014.
20
Dutse Youth FGD, Andrew, March 23, 2014.
21
Duste Youth FGD, Melisa, March 23, 2014.

of leadership is embedded in ethnic associations. These associations include the Igbo, Tiv,
Southern Kaduna ethnic associations. Each association has a leadership structure headed
by a chairperson (usually a man). These chairpersons represent their groups at the regularly
scheduled meetings with the local chief. According to a number of respondents, the Igbo
association has stronger internal bonds and cooperation than any other ethnic association.
Also found in Dutse is a third level of leadership in the form of a combined association of all
ethnic groups, referred to as the “non-indigenes association.” This is headed by an elected
chairperson (presently a man). Another level derives from the youth structure. There is a
youth leader, a member of the Gbaygi ethnic group who controls the affairs of the youth in
the neighborhood. He advises the Mai-anguwa on youth issues. For one of the respondents,
the youth leader’s influence and importance is only second to the local chief. According to
him, the youth leader is elected by the Gbagyis to represent them against anything that might
come up, he represents them, internally and externally. The chief and the youth leader are
the most influential people you can meet if there’s anything disturbing you if you have any
need, you can meet them, converse with them they’re the most influential people22
.
In contrast to Dutse Apo, there seem to be crises of leadership in Durumi II. There is only
one major level of leadership structure, the Mai-anguwa and his cabinet, and this not so
effective. Another level identified by a member of cabinet consists of the “leader Gbagyi
student association, Ayenaje association, and women group23
. According to him, the Gbagyi
student association try to give awareness to the youth to enable them make right decisions.
The women association started about 4 years ago, they cooperate among themselves on
issues”24
. The local chief, who became Mai-anguwa in 2010, expresses helplessness in
tackling social ills of the community. In response to the question of security, the chief stated
that he is helpless in control and prevention of violence and crime in his community. In his
words: “we don’t have security, because there was a time I formed a vigilante group (that’s
two years ago). But the problem was, they decided not to continue with the job because my
hand is not enough I have never been big in the sense that I can be paying them…. still up till
now, the robbers, the criminals are disturbing this Durumi community and there is nothing we
can do, what do we do?” Similarly, he complained thus “when I schedule a meeting (I don’t
know if it would be possible for you to witness it yourself) they never pay attention. Only
sometimes they pay attention and then I can tender my own agenda”25
.
Interviewees in Durumi II neighborhood expressed similar views on the ineffectiveness of the
traditional leadership institution. As stated by an interviewee “this chief, will not care about
insecurity all he knows, is bring money for me. He goes round collecting money, like this
22
Interview with DJ/Barber, Dutse, March 1, 2014.
23
Interview with Durumi Cabinet member/Church elder, May 5, 2014.
24
Ibid.
25
Interview with Durumi Mai-anguwa-Neighborhood chief.

market every month we pay N1000, they will come and collect, they give to him, security
money they still give him part of security money all he knows is money”26
. In another’s
opinion, unlike “residents of Durumi I are secured their chief doesn’t allow, doesn’t even
welcome any nonsense but this our Durumi II we having a lot of challenges in terms of
house, in terms of light, in terms of all this security, all this bad guys I haven’t seen anything
where they said the chief here have done”27
.
It is apparent that the nature and quality of leadership in the two communities make
significant difference. In Dutse Apo, there is a nest of leaders and associations. These
associations and their leaders provide guide and code of conduct to the citizens. The
interviews clearly identify that structure of leadership and authority. The fact that the youth
leader is an elective position is probably an incentive for the person to function well.
Specifically, the Mai-anguwa (Community Head), is well respected and his authority is well
recognized. In contrast, Durumi, according to the respondents, is besieged by insecurity
despite the presence of a police post, which is lacking in Dutse and traditional leaders.
Leadership and associational life are thin in Durumi. The leaders didn’t command any
respect. It looks like corruption or corrupt leadership is one of the reasons for lack of
effectiveness in Durumi. In other words, lack of trust is embedded in the community.
Socio-ethnic Networks and Socio-political Interactions
Society is often characterized by networks of both formal and informal interpersonal
communication and exchange (Putnam 1993). Some of these networks are horizontal,
bringing together agents of equivalent status and power while others are vertical linking
unequal agents in asymmetric relationships of hierarchy and dependence (ibid). Networks of
civic engagement, such as various neighborhood ethnic associations and regular socio-
political interactions between the Gbaygis and other ethnic groups in Dutse Apo, represent
intense horizontal interaction on one level especially in ethnic group setting and vertical
relation to interaction with the chief, who has the final authority in the neighborhood. The
study found that trust and mutual cooperation from ethnic associations is high in Dutse Apo,
the non-violent neighborhood and low in Durumi II, the relatively more violent neighborhood.
Furthermore, in Dutse Apo, while most of the social interactions take place outside these
associations, the social-political interactions take place within these associations especially
decision making and information flow. For instance information about the neighborhood
including social rules and decisions on security, etc. are passed from the local chief via the
leadership of the various ethnic groups. This is understandable given that meetings on
26
Interview with a female tailor, May 29, 2014.
27
Interview with Christy, March 22, 2014.

different issues of the neighborhoods are held between the chief, his cabinet, the leaders of
the ethnic groups and some religious leaders. However, these associations are also
gendered. Women hold their own meetings separate from the men. This observation was
confirmed by an interviewee who was also the woman leader of one of the ethnic
associations.
In Durumi II, one interviewee expressed nostalgia in missing this ethnic association life
which was a key part of her life in her resident prior to moving to Durumi II: “when I lived in
Area 1, we have Ibo meetings where we have discussions using the Igbo language….you
know that we Ibos, we know how to do weddings and child dedication very well. But here in
Durumi II, nothing like Ibo meeting, everybody goes his/her own way and does his/her own
thing”28
. Others showed low level of interest in getting involved in these types of association:
“we mind our businesses; sometimes like in my compound nobody has time for his/her
neighbor. In the morning everybody will go to his/her working place and come back in the
evening to sleep” 29
. A number of the interviewees from Durumi expressed feeling of
alienation (isolate) and weak ties to the neighborhood. As one of the interviewees stated,
“You are on your own”30
. In a way, this shows that social ties established through close
interactions and ethnic associational life could be “disorganized” by new forms of interaction
that favored transient social relationships over deeper social ties. These new relationships
were temporary and ephemeral, hence the feeling of alienation.
The critical issue to note is that, these ethnic based associations constitute a center of
security mechanism in the neighborhood. For instance, in Dutse, besides the welfare of
members discussed and actions taken at the collective level to meet members’ needs,
security information is disseminated through these associations. The leaders hold regular
meetings on security with the Mai-anguwa as well as extraordinary meetings where there is
urgent information to be passed. It is also through these associations that social services are
provided. For example, the contributions for the procurement of the electricity facilities
(cables and transformers) for the neighborhood are facilitated via these associations.
Another source of collective action from high social capital is the Parents – Teachers
Association (PTA) of the government school31
. What Putnam (n.d.) refers to as “highly formal
social capital.” To enhance the educational prospects of the youth, the PTA improvises by
appointing National Certificate Examination (NCE) graduate holders to bridge the gap in the
deficit of teachers.32
Other neighborhood meetings which feed into the stock of social capital
and encourage cohesion include meetings on PHCN (Power Holding Company of Nigeria)
28
Interview with Mama, Durumi II, May 31, 2014.
29
Interview with a female tailor, Durumi II, May 29, 2014.
30
Interview with Christy, Durumi II, March 22 , 2014.
31
There are two government schools; the mainstream is the junior school and the other for nomadic education.
32
Interview with a Dutse Local Chief.

which focuses on electricity provision. What comes out strongly from this is that the
associations are resource to the individual members and the neighborhood. To the individual,
it’s a platform for information exchange, welfare provisioning and at the level of the
neighborhood, they facilitate and promote collective action as illustrated by their provision of
electricity service by themselves.
Durumi residents also contributed money for electricity but this was done twice after
accusation of misappropriation of the first contributions by the chief. This actually led to a big
conflict with some residents calling out the chief to account. In turn, the Gbagyis retaliating by
bringing in the FCDA bull dozers to demolish peoples’ properties (interview with Madam
Christy). This has further alienated the non-original settlers in the community. Compared with
Dutse Apo, where there is strong social ties, cohesion and cooperation illustrated by the
results from successful collective actions of the neighborhood at different times in providing
vigilante/watch, social services such as electricity and teachers for the government school.
The presence of social control mechanisms and social capital is important resource for
violence prevention and control. This supports findings from other studies such as indicated
by the literature review in the previous section. However, while social capital cannot predict
individual interest and abilities, it’s a necessary catalyst for social change and development
as it does indicate the ability to mobilize for group activities to keep up social order and to
diffuse information within neighborhoods.
A community’s ability to devise locally-based structures and strategies for preventing
crime is manifest in Dutse Apo. The density of associational life and clearly defined
leadership structure helped to reduce criminality and violence in the community. They do not
rely on formal institution such as police. Comparatively, Durumi II is on a different scale with
little sense of community and associational life. The formal instrument of law and order, the
police, has not succeeded in curbing criminality.
Community and Belongingness
Community and belonging was examined from the perspective of land ownership and tenure
for residents. The principal law guiding land acquisition, resettlement and allocation in
Nigeria is the Land Use Act of 1978. The Act was enacted as a policy of equitable land
redistribution within the country.
However, Nigeria operates a dual land tenure system in a sense, with the federal system
superseding any other form of land ownership regime. The Land use Act 1978 vested all land
in the country on the Federal Government who then allocates land on the basis of a 99-year
lease to those who meets requirement for allocation. However, recognizing that people
occupied these lands before the modern State, there is also a customary land regime. This is

usually managed by Local Government Councils, and recognizes ownership of land prior to
the 1978 Act. Thus in many parts of the country these two systems are in operation.
This is not the case in FCT. Customary Administrative System has gradually been eroded
leaving the FCT Authority as the only authority managing the land system and regime33
. So
while in other regions of the country, these neighborhoods would have been accepted as
ethnic villages because of the development agenda for the FCC, these neighborhoods are
not seen as such but deemed as temporary settlements whose inhabitants would be
relocated to more permanent sites in line with the Master Plan of the FCC. Of note here is
that the only recognized inhabitants with entitlements to resettlement are the Gbaygis. And
usually when government demolition is carried out, Gbaygis’ houses are left intact while all
others are destroyed. This creates housing insecurity for many of the residents of these and
similar neighborhoods. In fact, many of the interviewees identified demolition as a form of
extreme violence.
This therefore, creates a distinct social stratification in terms of land ownership pattern in
the neighborhoods which is a direct reflection of the rules governing land tenure in each
place. For instance, land ownership in Durumi II is predominantly owned by the Gbaygis
(original inhabitants). According to the interviewees, only the lands for churches and the
mosques are owned by non-original inhabitants and all the residential houses are owned by
the Gbaygis, who in turn collect rents from others and this is a source of power. The reverse
was found in Dutse Apo where anybody who could afford to buy land from the original
inhabitants did so and built houses that were not of standard quality. Many of the older
interviewees in this study owned their houses.
Similarly, unlike Dutse, where there are regular neighborhood meetings between the
original inhabitants and other ethnic groups to discuss various issues particularly security,
the meetings in Durumi neighborhood are usually among the original inhabitants, the
landlords who are then expected to convey the outcomes and decisions to their tenants. The
only other group that holds meetings is the traders in the market, the mainstay of the local
economy. According to many interviewees, the market meetings hold once a week and the
major discussion is payment to support local security even though this is not effective as
there are incessant robbery incidents. The traders interviewed openly expressed their lack of
trust in the informal security as they have to make their own individual arrangements which
involves allowing “local water vendors” to sleep in the shops and protect it against robbery.
An interviewee shared the typical response from her landlord when he responded to her
complaint about insecurity, he replied thus “you’re on your own, nobody brought you to
33
This was consolidated and became more operational under Nasir El-Rufai tenure as minister of the FCT.

Abuja, it was your choice to come Abuja so you have to take care of your things, take care of
yourself”34
.
The experiences of non-original inhabitants have made them to have little or no trust or
cooperation with their host. Trust as argued by the proponents of social capital is a key
element in determining capital and cohesiveness and the ability to mobilize collective action
in a community. While findings show some level of mistrust of original inhabitants in both
neighborhoods35
, however, this was stronger in Durumi II. One explanation may be the
general attitude of the Gbaygis to other ethnic groups particularly pertaining to demolition of
houses. There is also the strong belief that the recent demolitions that occurred in Durumi II
was at the instance of the original inhabitants because the settlers had requested for
accountability of funds contributed to secure electricity transformer when the neighborhood
was thrown into darkness for over three months when the old transformer became
malfunctional36
.
Informal Policing of Urban Space
The rise of local mechanism of crime and violence prevention and control, in some climes is
referred to as community watch or informal policing can be traced to the crisis of governance
in sense of weak social control and organization mechanisms. The crises range from the
failure of the law enforcement and judicial system to effectively combat crime and violence.
In this situation, the State is seen as powerless and unable to guarantee security of life and
property for its citizens.
In these neighborhoods the crises of governance undermined judicial and law
enforcement mechanisms, forcing citizens to seek alternative modes of violence and crime
prevention and control. In each of the neighborhoods, violence is perceived to manifest
through a crisis of governance at the State level (police not having the capacity to provide
security). The two neighborhoods have vigilante operations but with different outcomes. In
Dutse Apo, the outcome has been more positive with the reduction of crime rate compared to
Durumi II. In a sense, these different outcomes can be explained from the organization and
management of the vigilante groups.
Dutse Apo has a well-planned neighborhood vigilante system which operates at the various
levels with overall management under the leadership of the Mai-anguwa, supported by the
youth leader. The active neighborhood vigilante group in Dutse Apo is the result of the
34
Interview with Christy, Durumi II.
35
In Dutse, only one of the respondents, a youth of 22 expressed mistrust of the host and this was in the context
of friendship with Gbaygi youths. He implied that the Gbaygis tended to be more loyal in friendship.
36
A number of respondents pointed to this and told the story of how the chief, who was alleged to have used the
funds to purchase a car had to run away from the community because of an angry mob.

collective efforts of residents. Residents pay for the services on a monthly basis. The
success of the Dutse group could also be attributed to the level of trust and legitimacy
conferred on them by the residents. For instance, when asked why use this method of
security provision, the response was: “because the members are within us here we trust
them we elected them to be members, we know their character”37
.
In contrast, for residents of Durumi the only collective vigilante operation covers the
market area alone and this is not as effective as some of the interviewees complained of
theft of their properties necessitating their making personal arrangements to secure their
shops. In this situation an exchange of services of “sleeping quarters for protection” The
shop owners engage the local water vendors “Mai-ruwa” who tend to be homeless to sleep in
their shops at night to guard their property from thieves, “you will see twenty of them in one
shop sleeping just to secure that place for that person”38
. For the residence, the strategy is
similar to what the traders employ in securing their premises: “if you are travelling look for
somebody to stay in your house”39
.
Even the Durumi II local chief admits weakness in the local mechanism deployed:
“Sometimes when we call on this Durumi II police post, we find that there is only one police
man there. When you will inform him about an ongoing robbery, he replies that he cannot
leave the police post as he is alone. So I have made appeals to the District Police Office of
Garki that we need more police officers. It is not a good situation that crime is happening and
when you get to the police station you find out that is it’s only one police officer on duty.
Sometimes it’s only a police woman that would be there. Woman? Police woman although
God has created us differently, why must you allow only one police woman in the outpost
especially at night”40
.
Interviews in the two communities illustrate the differences in terms of trust, a sense of
community, rapport and social capital (see Table 2). In Dutse Apo they feel more secured
partly because the vigilante groups are elected and paid regularly from the contributions of
residents. It is expected that the vigilantes will perform better in their task of informal policing
because of the bond with the rest of the community. On the other hand, in Durumi II, the
vigilantes are ‘strangers’ who have little or no connection with the community. Resorting to
an individual approach such as recruiting water vendors (Mai-ruwa) to provide security has
not helped the situation. The existence of a police post has not helped either. Indeed the
formal presence of a police post is as ineffective as the informal security available in the
community.
37
Interview with a member of cabinet of Dutse who was interpreter at the interview with the Local Chief and from
time to time contributed his views and the Chief who also expressed this view.
38
Interview with Durumi II residents: Christy, Tailor and Mama, March 22, May 29 and 31, 2014 respectively.
39
Interview with Christy, March 22, 2014.
40
Interview with a Durumi II Local Chief (Mai-anguwa).

Table 2: Comparison between the two neighborhoods’ Violence Prevention and
Control Mechanisms
Social Actor Dutse –Apo Village Durumi II Village
Local
government
Absent, only seen when they come for
rents and during elections
Absent, only seen when they come for
rents and during elections
Police Regular patrol
No police outpost or station
Presence of police outpost (upgraded to
station only this year)
Stationed at the peripheral of the
neighborhood
No patrol
Often seen engaged in drinking in the
local drinking joints
only active rare times of raids based on
tip-offs
Local chief Strong actor and play an important role
in control and prevention. Exert strong
social control over the neighborhood.
Highly respected and obeyed
Provides discipline for erring youths.
Relatively weaker and does not exert
social control over the neighborhood.
Not so regarded.
Socio-political
interactions
Regular meetings between the Gbaygis
and other ethnic groups on security and
social services
Meetings among the Gbaygis. Outsiders
present are tenants sent to represent
landlords
neighborhood
mechanisms
Collective mechanism with monthly
payment for services by residents
The local market, which is the central
point of the neighborhood has its own
vigilante group (though it’s ineffective)
Private
mechanisms
Not common, rely on collective
mechanism
On Sundays during services the
churches use security personnel unit
composed from church memberships
Shop owners employ individual private
means to secure shops
Residents do same when they cannot
sleep in their houses (e.g. travels)
Youth groups Present, play major role in organizing
security for the neighborhood
Present but not active in security
provision, only in collecting “levies”
Socio-cultural
institutions
Presence of strong ethnic associations
serve as mechanism for violence
prevention and control
Absent
Religious
institutions
Heavy existence of churches and a
central mosque
Religious leaders participate in
neighborhood meetings on security
Islamic scholar engage in teachings,
preaching against violence, the Mosque
is central point for many homeless
young Muslims engaged in “Okada
41
business.”
Religious leaders do not engage in
meetings Different Muslim prayer points,
no centralized mosque.
NGOs Absent Absent
Source: Author’s Research, 2014.
41
Motor-bike transport providers.

6. Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the dynamics of social mechanisms deployed by urban dwellers to in
controlling and, if possible, prevent violence and crime in their everyday life by comparing the
experiences in a violent and a relatively non-violent neighborhood. The Gbagyis, who are the
original inhabitants of Abuja, dominate these neighborhoods. They are the main landowners
and have also traditionally been the major decision-makers in both neighborhoods. They also
– mainly through the local chieftain – maintain a set of structural rules, norms and values that
govern their neighborhoods (rules that influence what residents do). But, as Putnam has
argued, some places are better governed than others, even when local governments have
identical structures and equivalent legal and financial resources (Putnam 1993).
Putnam’s argument is useful to explain the differences in outcomes related to violence
prevention and control in these neighborhoods. In the narratives recorded in the fieldwork,
regardless of the identity of the interviewees, who ranged from neighborhood leaders to local
youth, there was a clear sense that social control, social ties and trust embedded in social
capital, as well as collective action in terms of local leadership, socio-political interaction
between and among the various ethnic groups, ethnic associations/networks, sense of
community and belonging, presence of neighborhood vigilante groups are all important. In
other words, the capacity to prevent violence is conceptualized in terms of social interactions
that lead to shared trust and a capacity for action (Sabol et al. 2004).
Reflections by respondents in Durumi II are different from those in Dutse Apo. The Durumi
community is riddled with challenges such as insecurity, distrust, alienation and atomization.
The people there lack community-based structures that generate inclusivity and social
capital. The contrast between the Gbyagis who claim land ownership with those who joined
the community later is stark. Non-indigenes are excluded from many community activities.
There is considerable tension between them and the indigenous inhabitants. This lack of
social inclusion and alienation accounts for their inability to establish effective security. In
contrast, people in Dutse Apo have succeeded in reducing crime and criminality, partly
because of the ability of the community to bond together through various associations.
Relations between indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants are more cordial and inclusive
there. Non-indigenes were also incorporated in the community through administrative
structures. Ethnic associations thrived and people were connected to each other through
community-wide administrative arrangements.
What's more, life opportunities vary according to social class, race, gender, ethnicity, age,
and family status, among other factors. In reality these social factors interact with locational,
or spatial, factors such as the clustering of homes according to family income and the diverse
ways people pursue particular lifestyles. They also interact with particular patterns of social

networks and the search for cultural experiences (Gottdiener and Hutchinson 2011, p.2).
One of the critical findings of this research is that socio-ethnic networks in the form of
neighborhood-based ethnic associations foster social cohesion and help to mitigate violence,
thanks to the active participation of these networks in controlling and , where possible,
preventing violence and crime.
It is worth noting that this research can be further enriched by more extensive field work
and possibly a full ethnographic study, which would first generate deeper understanding of
violence perceptions in these neighborhoods, especially in the context of mounting fears and
insecurity due to the Boko Haram insurgency and clashes between farmers and Fulani
herdsmen. Further research would also provide an opportunity to generate data from a larger
sample and a wider group of stakeholders, including security agencies and the multiplicity of
civil society organizations working on urban issues in general and violence and crime in
particular in Nigeria.

References
ADE, M. A. And AFOLABI, Y. D. (2013) Monitoring Urban Sprawl in The Federal Capital
Territory Of Nigeria Using Remote Sensing And GIS Techniques Ethiopian Journal of
Environmental Studies and Management Vol. 6 (1), pp.82-95
AKINWALE, A.A. AND A.A. ADERINTO (2011) Crisis of Governance and Urban Violence in
Nigeria African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies Vol.5 (1 &2), pp. 49-77
ALBERT, O.A. (1994) Violence in metropolitan Kano: A Historical Perspective in OSAGHAE,
E.E. et al. (eds.) (1994) Urban Violence in Africa. Ibadan: IFRA, pp. 111-136
ALEMIKA, E. (2013) Criminal Victimization, Policing and Governance in Nigeria. Lagos,
Abuja and Owerri: CLEEN Foundation
ALUKO O.E. (2010) The Impact of Urbanization on Housing Development: The Lagos
Experience, Nigeria. Ethiopian Journal of Environmental Studies and Management
Vol.3 (3), pp. 64-74
BOTTOMS, A.E. (2007) Place, Space, Crime and Disorder. In: MAGUIRE, M. et al. (2007)
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. 4th
ed. pp.529-574
BOURDIEU, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge –
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
BOURDIEU, P. (1989) Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, Vol 7(1), pp.
14-25.
BURSIK, R.J. JR. (1999) The Informal Control of Crime Through Neighborhood Networks
Sociological Focus Vol. 32(1), pp. 85-97
COHRE and SERAC 2008 The Myth of the Abuja Master Plan: Forced Evictions as Urban
Planning in Abuja, Nigeria. Available from
http://abahlali.org/files/Myth_of_the_Abuja_Master_Plan.pdf (Accessed 20/01/15)
COLEMAN, J.S. (1988) Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of
Sociology 94 (Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic
Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure), pp. S95-S120
DENZIN, N.K. and LINCOLN, Y.K. (2011) Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of
Qualitative Research. In: DENZIN, N.K. and LINCOLN, Y.K. (eds.) (2011) Sage
Handbook of Qualitative Research. 4th
ed. Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, pp.1-20
FLICK, U. (2009) An Introduction to Qualitative Research. 4th
ed. London, Thousand Oaks
and Singapore: Sage
FOREST, R. and KEARNS, A. (2001) Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neigborhood.
Urban Studies, Vol. 38 (12), pp 2125–2143
FOURCHARD, L. (2008) A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western
Nigeria. Africa 78(01), pp. 16-40

FUKUYAMA, F. (1997) Social Capital. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at
Brasenose College, Oxford May 12, 14, and 15, 1997
GOTTDIENER, M. and HUTCHISON, R. (2011) the New Urban Sociology. 4th
ed. Boulder:
Westview Press
GROOTAERT, C. and VAN BASTELAER, T. (eds.) (2002a) Understanding and Measuring
Social Capital: A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners. Washington: the World Bank
GROOTAERT, C. and VAN BASTELAER, T. (eds.) (2002b) the Role of Social Capital in
Development: An Empirical Assessment. Cambridge and New York, Melbourne,
Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo: Cambridge University Press
HORN, A. (2004) Reflections on the Concept and Conceptualisation of the Urban
Neighbourhood in Societies in Transition: The Case of Pretoria (South Africa) Dela 21
pp. 329-340
HOVE, M., NGWERUME, E.T. and MUCHEMWA, C. 2013. The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development. Stability:
International Journal of Security and Development 2(1):7, pp.1-14
IBRAHIM, J.U. (n.d.) Land Administration as a Tool for Good Governance: The AGIS Way
accessed June 19, 2014 from
http://www.academia.edu/5208181/Land_Administration_as_a_Tool_for_Good_Govern
ance_The_AGIS_Way
IBRAHIM, J.U. and GARBA, K.T. (2012) The Challenges of Housing Development and
Needs in Abuja. FIG Working Week 2012: Knowing to Manage the Territory, Protect
the Environment, and Evaluate the Cultural Heritage. Rome, Italy, 6-10 May 2012
IMBUSCH, P. (2003) the Concept of Violence. In: HEITMEYER, W. and HAGAN, J. (eds.)
(2003) International Handbook of Violence Research. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, pp. 13-39
KOONINGS, K. and KRUIJT, D. (2007) Fractured Cities, Second-class Citizenship and
Urban Violence. In: KOONINGS, K. and KRUIJT, D. (eds.) (2007) Fractured Cities
Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America. London and
New York: Zed Books, pp. 7-23
KOONINGS, K. and KRUIJT, D. (eds.) (2009) Megacities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion
and Violence in the Global South. London and New York: Zed Books
KRAMER, R. (2012) “Political Elites, “Broken Windows,” and the Commodification of Urban
Space” Critical Criminology Vol. 20(3), pp 229-248
KUBRIN, C.E. and WEITZER, R. (2003) New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory.
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency Vol. 40(4), pp. 374-402
LUPTON, R. (2003) ‘neighborhood Effects’: Can we Measure them and does it Matter?
CASE Paper 73, pp 1-27

MOSER, C. (2004) Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap. Environment
and Urbanization Brief (10), pp. 1-6
MUGGAH, T. (2012) Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence.
Ottawa: IDRC
MYERS, G. (2011) African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice. London
and New York: Zed Books
NAN, L. (2001) Building a Network Theory of Social Capital. In: NAN, L., COOK, K. and
BURT, R. S. (eds.) (2001) Social Capital: Theory and Research. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter,
NAN, L., COOK, K. and BURT, R. S. (eds.) (2001) Social Capital: Theory and Research.
New York: Aldine de Gruyter
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE (2009) Annual Report of the Nigeria Police Force. Lagos: Nigeria
Police Force Press
ORUWARI, Y. AND OWEI, O. (2006) Youth in Urban Violence in Nigeria: a Case Study of
Urban Gangs from Port Harcourt, Economies of Violence Working Paper 14. California,
Washington DC and Port Harcourt: Institute of International Studies, the United States
Institute of Peace and Niger Delta
OSTROM, E. and AHN, T.K. (2009) The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective
Action. In: SVENDSEN G.T. and SVENDSEN G.L.H. (eds.) (2009) Handbook of Social
Capital: The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics Cheltenham and
Northampton: Edward Elgar, pp17-35.
PALEN, J. J. (1997) Urbanization. In Ronald K. Vogel (ed.) (1997) Handbook of Research on
Urban Politics and Policy in the United States Greenwood Press: Westport-Connecticut
and London, pages 31-41
PIETERSE, E. (2008) City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development. London,
New York and Cape Town: Zed Books and UCT Press
PORTES, A. (1998) Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. Annual
Review of Sociology 24, pp.1-24
PUTNAM, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press
PUTNAM, R.D. (ed.) (2002) Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in
Contemporary Society. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
PUTNAM, R.D. (n.d.) Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences (online). Available
from: www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825848.pdf (Accessed 20/06/14)
SABOL, W.J., COULTON, C.J. and KORBIN, J.E. (2004) Building Community Capacity for
Violence Prevention. Journal of Interpersonal Violence Vol. 19(3) pp. 322-340

SAMPSON R.J. (2009) Disparity and diversity in the contemporary city: Social (dis)order
Revisited. The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 60(1), pp. 1-31
SMALL, M.L. (2004) Villa Victoria: The Transformation of Social Capital in a Boston Barrio.
London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press
SUN, I.Y, TRIPLETT, R. and R.R. GAINEY (2004) Neighborhood Characteristics and Crime:
A Test of Sampson and Groves’ Model of Social Disorganization. Western Criminology
Review 5(1), pp. 1-16
SVENDSEN G.T. and SVENDSEN G.L.H. (eds.) (2009) Handbook of Social Capital: The
Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics. Cheltenham and Northampton:
Edward Elgar
TRIPLETT, R.A., GAINEY, R.R and SUN I.Y. (2003) Institutional Strength, Social Control
and Neighborhood Crime Rates. Theoretical Criminology Vol. 7(4), pp.439–467
WHYTE, W.F. (1993) Appendix. In: Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian
Slum. 4th
ed. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, pp. 279-373
WILKINSON, S. (2004) Focus Group Research. In SILVERMAN, D. (ed.) (2004) Qualitative
Research: Theory, Method and Practice. 2nd
ed. London, Thousand Oaks and New
Delhi: Sage, pp. 177-199
WIRTH, L. (1938) Urbanism as a Way of Life. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44(1),
pp. 1-24.
WOLLEBÆK, D. and SELLE, P. (2003) Participation and Social Capital Formation: Norway
in a Comparative Perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies, 26 (1), pp.67-91
WONG, S. (2007) Exploring ‘Unseen’ Social Capital in Community Participation: Everyday
Lives of Poor Mainland Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong. Amsterdam: ICAS/Amsterdam
University Press
WORLD BANK (2010) Violence in the City: Understanding and Supporting Community
Responses to Urban Violence. Washington DC: World Bank
WORLD BANK (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development.
Washington DC: World Bank
Websites Consulted
AMAC http://www.mdgfctabuja.net/Downloads/AMAC.pdf
FCDA http://www.fcda.gov.ng/
Abuja Geographical Information Systems (AGIS) http://www.abujagis.com/aboutabuja.html

Appendices
Appendix I: Profile of Interviewees
A. Dutse, a Non-Violent Neighborhood
Interviewees Age Gender Occupation Years of
residence
1 Neighborhood Chief (Mai-
anguwa)
70+ Male Farmer 50+ years
2 Cabinet member/ Lazarus 50 Male Civil servant
3 Islamic religious leader 60 Male Imam 20 years
4 Christian leader (also Ibo
ethnic leader)
54 Male Welding &
Fabrication
5 years
5 Tiv Ethnic leader 39 Female Butcher 11 years
6 Tiv Ethnic leader 48 Male Private security 11 years
7 Housewife 28 Female Housewife 2 years
8 Housewife/hairdresser 24 Female Hairdresser 4 years
9 Barber Male Barber 5 years
10 Margaret 26 Female Hairdresser/stude
nt
4 years
11 Business woman 24 Female Snacks and
clothes
4 years
12 Catechist 64 Male Catechist 8 years
13 Ojo 40s Male Police officer 6months
1 Happiness 15 Female Student 2 years
2 Gloria 22 Female Business center
staff42
8 years
3 Andrew 1 22 Male Building
Construction
8 years
4 Ola 20 Male Student/Tiler 4 years
5 Miracle 17 Female Student/Show
Business
8 years
6 Andrew 2 23 Male Building
Construction
5 years
B. Durumi II, Violent Neighborhood
Interviewees Age Gender Occupation Years of
residence
1 Mama 50 Female Petty Trader 4 years
2 Barber 23 Male Barber/Musician 3 years
3 Christy 30 Female Business Woman 4 years
4 Cameraman 26 Male Events Coverage 3-4 years
5 Elder in ECWA Church 35 Male Tailor Born here
6 Teacher 30 Male Teacher 4 years
42
Business centre in the Nigerian context is where photocopies, lamination, printing and related jobs are done.

7 Tailor 44 Male Tailor 14 years
8 Business Man 31 Male Spear-parts dealer 4 years
9 Tailor 20s Female Tailor 4.5 years
10 Pharmacy Attendant Male Attendant 2 years
11 Local Chief 35 Male neighborhood
Head
Lived here most
of his life
12 Hair stylist 20s Male Stylist Works here
C. Other Interviewees
Interviewees Age Gender Work years
1 FCDA 30s Male 8
2 Police expert 30s Male 8
3 Police gatekeeper43
40s Male
4 CSO expert44
Female
Appendix II: Interview Areas
1. Problem Perception
• Risk factors
• Recent acts of violence and crime
• Dangerous and safe places in the neighborhood
2. Fear of Crime and Victimization
• Feeling of safety
• Experience of violence
• neighborhood evaluation in relation to occupation
• Gendered experience
3. Perceived Perpetrators
• Individuals or groups responsible
• Characteristics of perpetrators
4. Neighborhood Activities Related to Crime Prevention and Control
• Individual and/or collective mechanism for crime prevention and control
• Principal agent providing security
• Situations that legitimize violence
5. Historical Change
• General changes in the neighborhood
• Increase or decrease in violence and crime
43
Informal conversation with a District Police Officer (DPO).
44
The two people approached unfortunately became members of the constitutional conference and as such
very busy and so could not keep our appointments.

Working Paper

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

La actualidad más candente (17)

Similar a Working Paper

Similar a Working Paper (20)

Working Paper