Igor Sutyagin: The Opposite of Air Power

Air Defence –
the Opposite Side of Air Power

Chief of the Air Staff RAF
Air Power Conference
London, 18 July 2013

Dr. Igor Sutyagin, Research Fellow,
Russian Studies, RUSI


Note on sources:
The following materials are based upon both the personal experience
of the author, who was formerly an officer of the Soviet Air Defence Troops
(Voyska PVO Strany - National Air Defence), and also specialist Russian
technical publications and websites. For those who are interested in the
more detailed English-language sources, the author would strongly
recommend browsing the highly informative website, Air Power Australia
(http://www.ausairpower.net/ ) some of whose illustrations are used in this
presentation.


The UK Air and Space Doctrine (JDP 0-30) defines Air Power as
«using air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the
course of events». It was the extremely interesting discussion on the Air
Power issues over the previous two days. The new prospects for
exercising air power produced by the new hardware – F-35 «LightningII» for example – have been discussed. But it is critically important to
remember that – as Lt.-Gen. Jones, Commander, USAFE-USAFAFR
perfectly outlined it at this conference – it is more often than not our best
wishes are not enough to make the wishes the reality.
That is correct in regard to Air Power too. That is why it is worth
mentioning the power which opposes Air Power – the Air Defence (AD)
assets which might be met by Air Power practitioners in their prospective
future contingencies.


We don’t fly ourselves –
but we don’t let others fly either
(The unofficial motto of the
Soviet Air Defence Troops)


One need to recognize that the Soviet (and then Russian) National
Air Defence Troops had the good reason to have such the motto – it was
the formidable force. Meanwhile, keeping in mind Russia’s activism on
the arms market with its AD hardware, one need to be prepared that one
day Western air forces and their allies might meet not only Russianoriginated AD hardware but Russian tactics as well. Indeed, Russia
actively exports its own expertise and operational concepts in air
defence along with its armaments. Let us have a look onto all these
three elements of the Russian air defence exports.


1. Target Detection


Unlike the Western states Russia kept developing its low-band radars
since 1930s – and has achieved the impressive results in their improving.
With the modern radar signal shapes and radar return processing algorithms
the modern Russian low-band radars have error box small enough to enable
SAM/AAM with active or IR seeker to be flown near enough to the least
observable target to acquire it and initiate terminal homing. For instance, the
export version of the Track Tall (55Zh6U) low-band radar has the publicly
announced error box of «less than 60 metres» for distance measurement.
(Belorussian producers are more open in disclosing the radar’s capabilities –
unlike their Russian counterparts they openly state that error box is just 25
metres.) At the same time the modern technique used to design lowobservable (LO) aircraft is much less effective against low-band radars than
against the shorter wave-length radars thus making LO aircraft comparatively
easier detectable by low-band radars.
Meanwhile those who tried do know that it is the very difficult business to
‘switch off’ low-band radars: airborne jammers are not impressively effective
against them and anti-radar missiles (due to physics of metre wave-length
emission) tend to plough a narrow ring strip of land around radar instead of
hitting radar itself. It is difficult hence to suppress an air defence system built
around low-band radars.


55Zh6U «Nebo-U» / Tall Track


Potential customers can opt for the cheaper variant if Track Tall is
too expensive and complicated system for them. There are around 500
legacy Spoon Rest D/E (P-18) Russian-produced meter wave-length
radars still operational around the globe.


P-18 / Spoon Rest D/E


And one can have the fundamentally modernized - digitized –
Spoon Rest D/Es for reasonably low price. That will provide customer
the good survivability along with the error box of just 250 metres.
Customers can opt for the Russia-originated budget version…


…or for the more expensive but the more effective Belorussian version
of the radar (P-18T). Interestingly enough it is the NATO member state –
Czech Republic – which markets the digital upgrade to Spoon Rest D/Eseries radars too. Thus NATO aircraft might meet one day a NATOupgraded low-band radars opposing them in a contingency…


P-18T/TRS-2D


Low-band radars contribute into the advanced air defence tactics
using the specialist concept of operations (CONOPS). These are not
only the effective detection mean against LO aircraft – low-band radars
solve some problems with combat use of SAM against such aircraft.
One Russian tactical device is to classify the target as LO aircraft if it is
observed by metre-band radars and not observed by centimetre-band
ones. In such the case the low-band radar is used to guide SAM to the
vicinity of the LO target and SAM themselves are flown in the ‘dog-leg’
pattern to approach the target from the aspects where its cross-section
is higher thus making it easier detectable for the SAM seeker.


Metre-band radars CONOPS

© Carlo Kopp - http://www.ausairpower.net/


Physics of the low-band radars CONOPS is based upon the fact
that emission-absorbing materials used by the modern LO aircraft are
just marginally effective against meter-band emission while the elements
of aircraft are too small to conceal aircraft against the meter wave-length
radar signals. Thus there are effectively ‘bright spots’ making aircraft
visible for low-band radars.


Metre-band radars CONOPS physics



F-35 is highly susceptible to detection by low-band radars (due to its
compact size), unlike larger aircraft such as F-22 and B-2A very low
observable (VLO) aircraft. It would take much longer wave-length –
decametre-band - radars to apply the same ‘bright spots’ technique to
«Raptor» and «Spirit».
And Russia does market decametre-band radars – «Rezonans-NE»
for instance – to build air defences against VLO aircraft. «Rezonans»
has detection range of up to 1 200 kilometres.


«Rezonans-N»


The alternative technique applicable to detection of aircraft of all
classes – from ‘traditional’ to LO and VLO ones – is the use of radioemission intercept paired with triangulation. Every source of radio
emission – like Terrain-Avoidance Radars – might disclose the presence
of aircraft for tactical (with intercept range up to 50 to 60 km) «Vega»
system based upon «Orion» radio-intercept stations…


Intercept of radio emission + Triangulation

«Orion» station

«Vega» system


…or the much longer range (up to 500 km) «Valeriya» intercept stations
which are similar in their capabilities to the Czech-produced «Vera»
radio intercept stations.
The Russian air defence CONOPS dictates that both decametreband radars and radio-emission intercept/triangulation systems are
integrated into the detection/combat engagement component of air
defences.


Intercept of radio emission + Triangulation

«Valeriya»


One more element of the modern Russian air defence CONOPS is
the use of multi-band radar combines like the «Nebo-M» (55Zh6M) one.
The general idea behind the «Nebo-M» design is the fusing of radar
information provided by meter-, decimetre-, and centimetre-band radars
in one fusion van which constitutes the C2 centre of such the radar
combine.


55Zh6M «Nebo-M»

© NIIRT


The metre- and decimetre-band components of «Nebo-M» are
already operational and marketed by Russia (the centimetre-band
component is at the final stage of development now).


55Zh6M «Nebo-M»
© NIIRT

Metre-band component

Decimetre-band component


The «Nebo-M» CONOPS allows the triangulation of LO targets in
case of proper operational location of the combine’s elements – which
adds the valuable tactical device to the multi-band detection/tracking of
targets.


© NIIRT

55Zh6M «Nebo-M»
CONOPS



The same concept of multi-band detection/tracking is applied to the
airborne platforms too. T-50/Firefox Russian 5th generation fighter is
equipped with the dual-band (X- and L-band) radar providing it some
tactical advantage over F-35. Indeed, the latter’s LO features will be
inevitably degraded against T-50’s L-band radar channel as F-35’s
design is mainly optimised against centimetre-band radars.
Thus T-50 might be potentially used as the comparatively effective
detection mean against the NATO LO aircraft.


T-50 / Firefox


T-50’s L-band
radar


Russia is certainly willing to export its other airborne radar
platforms: the mass produced ones like Ka-31 Helix-B radar-picket
helicopters with E-801 radar system…


Ka-31 / Helix-B


…as
well
as
to
resume
by
customer’s
request
the
development/production of its previous airborne radar picket aircraft
projects like Yak-44E and An-71 Madcap aircraft with E-601 «Kvant»
radar system.


Yak-44E


An-71 / Madcap


2. Target Elimination


Russia markets the wide range of air defence systems – S-300 family
systems being the longest-range ones among them. SA-20 (S-300PMU-2
«Favorit») and SA-12/SA-23 (S-300VMD/S-300V4 «Antey-2500») provide
the intercept range up to 200 km against aerodynamic targets. SA-12/SA-23
are optimised for the tactical ballistic missile defence (TBMD) task too
providing the intercept range up to 40 km (altitude up to 30 km) against
ballistic missiles with range up to 3 500 km thus making the well-tested
Russian system ahead of the French SAMP-T. Like SA-12/SA-23 the SA-20
system has the TBMD capability against tactical ballistic missiles too – it can
engage missiles with range of up to 1 000 km.


S-300PMU-2 «Favorit» / SA-20

S-300VMD «Antey-2500» / SA-23


MiG-31 Foxhound is included here not only due its capability to
engage aerodynamic targets with its 200 km-range export-oriented RVVBD Air-to-Air missile (the R-37 version of the same missile operational
with the Russian Air Force has range of 280-320 km). The
Soviet/Russian National Air Defence Troops practised the operational
use of Foxhounds in groups of four in the ‘engage-on-remote’ mode with
one aircraft guiding missiles fired by other aircraft within the group since
the mid-1980s. Aircraft shared the radar/IR-detector data within the
group using datalinks.
As that is not enough the Russian engineers and military make the
research now on the possibility to employ SAM in the ‘engage-onremote’ mode with the use of Foxhounds as the forward-based combat
engagement platforms thus dramatically extending the potential
intercept range and/or reducing the reaction time of Russian-produced
SAM systems against time-sensitive (e.g. low altitude/LO/high speed)
targets.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound

RVV-BD air-to-air missile


Russia might be willing to put on the market up to 150 MiG-31FE
Foxhound aircraft planned for retirement from the Russian Air Force for
the price compared to the price of one new while the much less capable
MiG-29 Fulcrum each.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound
150 potentially on sale

RVV-BD air-to-air missile


It is noteworthy that the export-oriented two-seater FGFA version of
T-50 Firefox 5th generation fighter being developed jointly by Russia and
India will retain all the main features of MiG-31 Foxhound – including
those of the dual-band detection/tracking and of the ‘engage-on-remote’
mode with its potential application to the joint FGFA/SAM operational
employment. Notice the RVV-BD missile in the forward armament
compartment of FGFA.
One should not miss the fact that FGFA is the export-oriented
project with three potential customers in the South America and Asia
already negotiating the acquisition of the aircraft – thus making it the
realistic option that in some future contingencies NATO air forces might
meat in combat with the LO aircraft having some potential advantages
over F-35.


T-50 / FGFA

RVV-BD


One more potent air defence system being marketed by Russia is
S-350 «Vityaz» (50R6). The system is the close equivalent to Patriot
PAC-3 having the comparable TBMD capability while the longer
intercept range (up to 120 km) against aerodynamic targets. (There is no
NATO designator for S-350 yet. S-350 was publicly displayed at the end
of June 2013 at the first time.)

04 July 2013
Thales, Paris

S-350E «Vityaz» (50R6)


S-350 «Vityaz» employs the element of the Russian air defence
CONOPS which calls for dealing with saturation attacks via use of the
mixture of missiles of different types. In order not to waste the potent
(and expensive) longer-range 9M96-2 missiles S-350 employs the
shorter-range (up to 40 to 60 km) 9M96 as the short-range (6 to 10 km)
9M100 SAM to deal with targets which cannot be intercepted on the
longer distance (like PGM).
9M96-2 SAM provide S-350 the capability to engage and intercept
tactical ballistic missiles (range up to 600 km) on the distance up to 30
km (altitude up to 30 km).

04 July 2013
Thales, Paris

S-350E «Vityaz» (50R6)
9M96/9M100

9M96-2

9M96-2
9M96
9M100


The same concept of dealing with saturation attacks is currently
being applied to SA-21/S-400 SAM systems in the Russian possession
– while there are no the fundamental technical obstacles which would
prevent its employment in the export SA-20/S-300PMU-2 systems too.
The Russian S-400 system currently uses the mixture of the 48N62/48N6-3 long-range and the 9M96-2 SAM. All three types of SAM have
the capability to engage ballistic missiles.

04 July 2013
Thales, Paris

48N6-2

S-400 / SA-21

9M96-2


The Ground Troops Air Defence SA-17/«Buk-M2» system also has
the limited TBMD capability (range up to 20-25 km, altitude up to 16-18
km against ballistic target) – while the capability of each SA-17
launcher/tracking/illuminating vehicle to engage 4 aerodynamic targets
simultaneously on the distance of up to 52 km is probably the more
important feature.

04 July 2013
Thales, Paris

© Miroslav Gyurosi

«Buk-M2»
(9K317) / SA-17


SA-15/«Tor-M2» is also the multi-channel of fire system with the
capability to engage 4 targets simultaneously. SA-15 might be tailored to
the customer’s needs being marketed in either mobile (tracked or
wheeled vehicle) or containerised variants with the latter having the
option to be installed on trailer to provide the limited mobility.


«Tor-M2» / SA-15


«Tor-M2KM» / SA-15


Another important Russian air defence operational concept is the
closing the gaps in air defences immediately over SAM systems. The
dome AESA is employed for this purpose by the 42S6 «Morpheus»
short-range (up to 5-10 km range) SAM system undergoing the final
stage of development in Russia now. (There is no NATO designator for
42S6 yet.) The system is already proposed for export.


42S6 «Morfey» («Morpheus»)

© http://militaryrussia.ru


The current Russian Air defence CONOPS calls for the wide use of
passive AD systems – either the comparatively longer-range (up to 12
km) «Bagul’nik» («Sosna» in the export version) with the laser-guided
SAM and the sector optronic acquisition/tracking station…


«Sosna» («Bagul’nik» in the Russian service)


…or the shorter-range (up to 5.2 to 6.5 km) while all-passive SAM
system based upon MANPAD missiles with and the more capable 360degrees «Feniks» («Phoenix») acquisition/tracking optronic station.


ZRK BD-PS - «Feniks»


One more trend in the development of Russian AD systems (and
the Russia-originated ones) is the introduction of the new MANPAD-type
missiles into all legacy AD systems.


ZSU-23-4M4 «Shilka-4M»

ZU-23M1 - «Strelets»


This trend includes the integration of all available AD assets (when
Russians say ‘integrated air defences’ they mean what they say): the
«Shlem» («Helmet») C2 system provides the capability to control up to 9
MANPAD/MANPAD-based modules aiming them into the predicted
engagement points before targets appeared in the MANPAD operators’
field of view and seekers detected the targets. The current Russian
MANPAD modules provide the capability to fire two SAM simultaneously
to complicate the employment of evasion manoeuvres against SAM and
increase the probability of kill.


JDP 0-30 emphasises that the information gathering is one of the
key elements of the Air Power with satellites being one of the most
effective information means – so it should not be surprising that the
Russian air defence concepts pay attention to counteraction with spacebased information gathering systems. A-60 (1LK222) «Sokol-Eshelon»
airborne laser system is the representative example of the Russian
approach to solving the task to isolate the battlefield. One could notice
the laser beam-director in the hump on the top of the aircraft – as well as
the programme’s logo clearly depicting the main operational task of A-60
aircraft.


A-60 «Sokol-Eshelon» (1LK222)


3. Self-defence


The Russian air defence theoreticians and practitioners take very seriously the
experience gained out of the recent armed conflicts – and apply the conclusions
made on the base of the observed trends to the Russian air defence CONOPS
(which is also exported along with Russia-originated air defence systems). It was
concluded that the comparative threat to air defences represented by anti-radar
missiles (ARM) should be reconsidered. Indeed, 65 per cent of air defence systems
(both radars and SAM/AA) were lost in combat during the conflict in Yugoslavia in
1999 due to the use of PGMs with optronic (TV/laser/IR) seekers, not ARMs. That
percentage was even higher during the Second Gulf War. That forced Russian
military and air defence designers to make the far-reaching conclusions influencing
both air defence tactics and the hardware acquisition.
One can see the net result of those conclusions on the following slide depicting
a SA-20/S-300PM battalion. The most telling thing about this slide is that there is no
any SA-20 equipment on it. What is pictured is the inflatable set imitating the main
SA-20 battalion’s characteristics in optic, thermal, and electromagnetic field with the
accuracy within the margin of several per cent (which is the current design order of
the Russian Armed Forces). The same sort of disguising inflatable sets are currently
produced for all Russian main weapons systems and armaments. Sure that might
be the comparatively effective self-defence device complicating the task of
delivering SEAD air strikes.


Active means of AD self-defence are widely employed too. SA-22/
«Pantsir» anti-aircraft gun/missile system is mainly employed in this role.
(Due to its design features SA-22 has very low effectiveness in
defending any object not immediately collocated with SA-22 vehicles.)
Like many other Russian AD systems SA-22 can be tailored to the
customer’s needs being marketed in mobile (based on tracked or
wheeled chassis) or containerised version and with different
acquisition/combat engagement equipment – including the newer
version with the S-band acquisition radar (shown on the picture).


«Pantsir-S1E» (96K6) / SA-22


«Pantsir-S1E» (96K6) / SA-22

S-band


Direct-energy systems traditionally attracted the Soviet/Russian
designers and military attention. Some of them entered the service (in
limited quantity) long ago – like the 1LK14 «Sanguine-1» mobile laser
point-defence system.


The more powerful 74T6 «Omega-2» short-range laser air defence
system (employed RD0600 gas-dynamic laser) has achieved its first
intercept of aerodynamic target as early as in the mid-1980s.


The Soviet Union had the extensive R&D programme on the EMP
and microwave systems too. (Russia currently continues the
programme.) The large «Astrofizika-Omega» vircator-based system
provided over-saturation of p-n bridges within any semiconductor-based
electronic devices (like aircraft radars and missile seekers) thus making
avionics non-operational for the period ranging from several minutes to
several days (depending on the type of electronics). That effect covered
area within the range of up to 15 kilometres from an «AstrofizikaOmega» vehicle making it the potentially useful self-defence mean.


Russian industry offers to produce the radar-type «Ranets-E»
‘electromagnetic gun’ with the same design features as «AstrofizikaOmega». The offer mentions the capability to influence avionics within
the range «up to 20 naval miles» – while specialists estimate the
effective to be closer to 8 to 10 kilometres.


«Ranets-E» mobile microwave protection system


Russian industry has also achieved the impressive successes after
nearly 40 years of the «Atropus» R&D programme in the exotic EMP
devices which might be called ‘EMP grenades’ to distinguish them from
vircator-based EMP systems employed by the USA. (The choice of the
programme’s name is very much telling as «atropus» is the Ancient
Greek word for «inevitability». Like other EMP/microwave systems also
employ the p-n bridges over-saturation effect.)
Some elements of the «Atropus» family are represented on the
slide – these were tested against different types of ground-based and
airborne electronics (blinding of electronics for periods between minutes
and days has been achieved) and proved to be effective against both IRand radar seekers of Air-to-Air missiles as well as radars. (Quite
understandably «Atropus» devices proved to be more effective against
radars and radar seekers than against IR-seekers which were blinded
within the shorter radius – while at the distances sufficient to break the
terminal homing and defend attacked aircraft which was the essence of
the experiments at that stage).


«Atropus»
E-35

E-29
EMP devices able to temporarily blind
IR- and radar seekers
(not the US-style vircators)
E-47


The main difference between Russian «Atropus» devices and the
US vircator-based system used in combat against the Baghdad TV
station is in their sizes (with the comparable combat efficiency). The US
system is included in the case of 2 metric tones-calibre bomb while the
E-29 device of the «Atropus» family is the bottle-sized device blinding
electronics for minutes to days within the radius of 300-400 metres.
Comparative sizes of Russian and US devices are visible on the slide.
The current stage of the Russian CONOPS R&D efforts regarding
the EMP systems is concentrated on the possible employment of
«Atropus»-type devices for defence of ground-based assets against
PGM strikes. In this case «Atropus» devices are to be fired in the pattern
similar to that of IR-decoys being fired to break homing of IR-guided
SAM.


«Atropus»

US combat vircator

E-29

E-35

E-47


4. Operational implications


To illustrate the possible operational implications of the air defence
hardware and tactics described in the previous sections we can make
the highly hypothetical case study.


Needless to say that appearance of just one SA-21/S-400 or S-500
battalion might make the huge difference in the situation.


S-500/AD mode

S-400/SA-21


Meanwhile the existing air defence systems being actively marketed
by Russia now have the potential to complicate exercising the Air Power
too providing the very potent Anti-Access coverage.


Anti-Access


Anti-Access

SA-20

SA-20
SA-20
SA-20

SA-20

SA-20


Integration of airborne AD elements (like MiG-31 Foxhound) into
such the hypothetical Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) might
extend the coverage even more…


…especially in the case if the hypothetical customer arms the
Foxhounds with the KS-172 300 km range AAM currently rejected by
the Russian Air Forces but being proposed by the producer for export.


Anti-Access
KS-172
RVV-BD
SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20
SA-20

SA-20

KS-172


The effectiveness of the air component of the hypothetical IADS
might be increased in the case if the Foxhound’s another design feature
is fully utilised. Foxhounds are designed to be the element of the IADS
serving as the airborne C2 platform to employ (via datalinks) three
Flanker/Fulcrum aircraft per each Foxhound either in the traditional
AWACS mode or in the Soviet-style ‘engage-on-remote’ mode. It is
worth of keeping in mind that Flankers and Fulcrums are also fully
capable to deliver and employ RVV-BD as well as KS-172 AAM.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound
RVV-BD/KS-172 air-to-air missiles

Su-30MK, Su-35 / Flanker

MiG-29SMT/M/M2 / Fulcrum


The Russia-originated shorter-range AD systems might provide the
effective Area Denial coverage too.


Area
Denial


42S6 «Morfey»
«Sosna» (not all
zones shown)

«Sosna»
42S6
«Sosna»
42S6

«Sosna»
«Sosna»
42S6

«Sosna»
42S6

«Sosna»

Area
Denial


SA-15
SA-22
SA-17
S-350
SA-20

SA-22
S-350

S-350

S-350
SA-20
SA-22
SA-17

SA-15

Area
Denial


Thus all the elements currently being marketed by Russian
producers if combined together have the substantial capability to
complicate to the very large extent prospective future attempts to «use
air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of
events» thus opposing the exercising of the Air Power.
It is necessary to recognise then that the modern and prospective
future Air Defence might seriously influence the ability of other
international actors to employ their Air Power to achieve their political
aims. One cannot miss the fact that under such the circumstances the
Air Defence should be seriously considered as another political power
directly opposing the political use of the Air Power – which, after all is
said, is the core essence of Air Power.


A2/AD

Igor Sutyagin: The Opposite of Air Power

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

Más de Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Más de Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (20)

Último

Último (20)

Igor Sutyagin: The Opposite of Air Power