Professor Malcolm Chalmers
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RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2015
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Professor Malcolm Chalmers
- 1. A Force for Order? Strategic Purposes of UK Land Power Malcolm Chalmers RUSI 30 June 2015
- 2. UK Grand Strategy Broadly unchanged since the late 1940s. = permanent alliance with US and European democracies. + support for rules-based international order. + UK as internationalist and activist.
- 3. Strategy within an alliance • Alliances = main focus UK military effort. • Taking the initiative can increase UK strategic influence within coalition – as in southern Afghanistan 2006, or Libya 2011. • Leading through independent action can work when we care more than others do – France in Mali, UK in Sierra Leone. • But both involve increased risk exposure.
- 4. UK Military Operations since 1990 – six successes out of ten? • Force for Order = most successful. – Iraq 1991 and 1991-03; Afghanistan 2001-05. • Force for Good = mixed results. – Bosnia x 2, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya. • Force for Change = least successful. – Iraq from 2003; Afghanistan from 2006. Source: Wars in Peace, RUSI Books, 2014.
- 5. 1. Be a Force for Order • Be more cautious about being a ‘Force for Change’ = external-military-led operations to transform foreign societies. BUT STILL KEY ROLE FOR LAND FORCES IN: • Acting to reverse state aggression. • Supporting states to safeguard own security. • Contributing to UN peacekeeping missions.
- 6. 2. Help Build Peace in Wider Middle East • From Sahel to Pakistan = ‘wider Middle East’. • Number and depth of conflicts growing - but reduced confidence in success of intervention. • Local and regional partnerships = key. Opportunities for enduring alliances = limited. • Points to need for persistent defence engagement – but also its limitations + costs.
- 7. The Wider Middle East – does the UK have choices? • Should UK focus where it has particular interests and/or comparative advantage – especially (perhaps) where others are less interested? • If so, where? Oman/Qatar/Bahrain? Anglophone West Africa and/or East Africa? Pakistan? • Do capability questions – equipment, training, logistics, forward engagement – follow? • Leadership implies some ownership of escalation risks. How far can alliances mitigate these risks?
- 8. 3. Deterrence of Russia • Alliance objectives are as a ‘Force for Order’: deterring attack on NATO, preventing further aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. • Russia much weaker in conventional terms than NATO – but compensates through nuclear and sub-conventional. • Danger of a ‘tightening of the knot’ – as in 1914 – that could lead to major power war.
- 9. Deterrence of Russia – the UK contribution • NATO needs ability to reinforce conventional deterrence – land, sea and air – as required. • UK should make significant contribution to NATO Readiness Action Plan, including land capabilities. • UK benefits from working closely with European neighbours – Netherlands, Norway, Denmark. • Doesn’t make sense for UK to put all its military eggs in NATO v Russia basket. • Within wider division of labour, Germany and Poland = more Europe-focused.
- 10. Enhancing the UK’s reputation • The UK needs to overcome perceptions that it has become an over-cautious warrior. • Prudent new commitments might help to reverse this – but where and what? • Clear strategic success will be the key to restoring faith in the military instrument.