2. The Future of Life Science Research? “ Every major technology - metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy - has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?” Matthew Meselson Professor of Molecular Biology Harvard University
5. What research should be done, under what conditions, and how should it be communicated?
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7. Capabilities & Threats: “ Returning to influenza as an illustrative example, advances in technology have led to the possibility that, even if a new lethal influenza A virus does not emerge in nature within the near future, one could be artificially generated through reverse genetic engineering…”
10. See J. van Aken and I. Hunger. 2009. ‘Biosecurity policies at international lifescience journals’ Biosecurity and Bioterrorism ASM journals - Reviewers and editor asked to identify paper “describes misuse of microbial systems or the information derived therefrom” (6/year) - All CDC ‘Select agent’ papers (10/week) Step 1 : Editor-in-Chief and ASM Publication Board talk Step 2 : ASM Publication Board meeting (1/year) Nature Publishing Group - Nature internal guidelines related to Fink Report and CDC Select Agent List Step 1 : Papers reviewed by a Biosecurity Panel to determine if security review is warranted. Step 2 : Review for security issues by experts (15 in 2005 and 2006)
17. A Typology for ‘Codes of Conduct’ Prescribing or proscribing certain acts ‘ Code of practice’ Enforceable codes Provide guidelines, raise awareness & debate; foster moral agents ‘ Code of conduct’ Educational/ Advisory codes Alert; Set realistic or idealistic standards ‘ Code of ethics’ Aspirational codes Main Aims Designation Type
18. A Typology for ‘Codes of Conduct’ Prescribing or proscribing certain acts ‘ Code of practice’ Enforceable codes Provide guidelines, raise awareness & debate; foster moral agents ‘ Code of conduct’ Educational/ Advisory codes Alert; Set realistic or idealistic standards ‘ Code of ethics’ Aspirational codes Main Aims Designation Type
19. Prospects for Codes * Clarifying individual and collective responsibilities * Critique of ethics as ‘rule following’ * Limits to inculcating moral behavior Ethical/Philosophical Question: Could S&T codes ‘work’? * Raise awareness * Foster norms * Re-interpret actions * Increase public trust * Establish base standards; esp. in new areas * Yes, if enforcement mechanisms * Effectiveness poorly understood * Rarely consulted or known * Often conflicting principles * Abstract guides need supplementing * As PR tools, maybe… Applied Ethics Question: Do S&T codes ‘work’?
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21. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons. It effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons and is a key element in the international community’s efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
28. Reframing Utility by Shifting the Question From: Applied Ethics Question: Do S&T codes ‘work’? Ethical/Philosophical Question: Could S&T codes ‘work’? To: Pragmatic Question: Do ‘S&T codes’ provide a common focus that helps: reduce uncertainties, build shared agendas, define common framings, support networks, etc.?
29. Assessments of codes as contingent and situational Does ‘codes talk’ provide the interpretative resources to move the conversation on? Keeping up the Tension:
30. Codes at the UK Foreign Office 2003 - Seminar to discuss ‘ utility, scope, promulgation, implementation, reactions, enforcement and next steps.’ 2004 - Meeting wherein agreed ‘further work on codes should build on existing systems, but that an overall statement of core principles could be developed as a guide for such continuing work.’ 2005 - Meeting to discuss Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention meetings 2006 - Meeting where decided ‘The imperative was to keep the issue alive and under discussion. It was encouraging to know that the general consensus was that, if embedded in existing systems and both feasible and proportionate, codes of conduct had a utility.’ 2008 - Meeting considering ‘lessons from history; current activities in academia and industry; government initiatives; international aspects; and lessons from [chemistry] on educational aspects that might be relevant for the BTWC’.
31. Shamanism: ‘relies on corrosive scepticism […] in which scepticism and belief actively cannibalize one another so that continuous injections of recruits […] are required. They are required, so it would seem, to test and therewith brace the mix by serving not as raw material of doubt positioned to terminate as believers, nor yet as cynical manipulators, but as exposer vehicles for confession for the next revelation of the secret contained in the trick that is both art and technique and thus real and really made up.’ Scepticism, Belief, and Knowledge: Magic as Deferral - Michael Taussig ‘Viscerality, Faith, & Skepticism: Another Theory of Magic’