This document summarizes a presentation given by Sandra Carrillo Hoyos about her research on extractive industries, revenue allocation, and local development in Peru. Specifically:
1) Peru is a top global producer of various metals and minerals, but macroeconomic growth from extractives has not always translated to inclusive local prosperity.
2) Carrillo Hoyos' research examines how revenue transfers to local governments have impacted conditions for a "local resource curse" through case studies of Espinar and Huari provinces.
3) Preliminary findings show revenues have had mixed effects, with some reductions in poverty and increases in infrastructure but ongoing issues like unemployment, inequality, and lack of economic diversification. Weak institutional capacity
How Extractive Industry Revenues Impact Local Development in Peru
1. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, REVENUE ALLOCATION AND LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY IN PERU
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
RGS-IBG ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
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London, September 2nd, 2016
2. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
1° copper
3° molybdenum
7° silver
9° nickel
11° coal
3° silver
3° copper
3° tin
3° zinc
4° lead
4° molybdenum
6° gold
3° iron
5° tin
7° nickel
12° oil
CHILE BRAZIL PERU COLOMBIA
Resource abundance
Policies oriented to the
extractive sector
Boom of commodity
prices 2000-2008
Performance of
operations
Has allowed these
countries to become
the top producers in
the world
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3. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
1° copper
3° molybdenum
7° silver
12% of GDP
49% of exports
9° nickel
11° coal
2.4% of GDP
Non/metallic
minerals: 24.4%
of GDP
3° silver
3° copper
3° tin
3° zinc
4° lead
4° molybdenum
6° gold
12% of GDP
57% of exports
3° iron
5° tin
7° nickel
12° oil
Mining, 4% of
GDP
Oil, 13% OF GDP
Oil and oil
products, 9% of
exports
Metal products
7% of exports
CHILE BRAZIL PERU COLOMBIA
Resource abundance
Policies oriented to the
extractive sector
Boom of commodity
prices 2000-2008
Performance of
operations
Has allowed these
countries to become
the top producers in
the world
*Data from World Bank and USGS.
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4. RESOURCE CURSE PHENOMENOM IN THE REGION?
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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EVOLUTION OF POVERTY AND EXTREM POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA
1980-2015 (IN PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION)
GINI COEFICIENT IN LATIN AMERICA 2002-2014
Source: ECLAC, 2016
5. RESOURCE CURSE – APPLIED TO THE LOCAL LEVEL
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Community of Caimanes against Los Pelambres Company
Vélez and Landázuri Municipalities against coal mining
Chile, Coquimbo
Colombia, SantanderPerú,Arequipa
Islay Province against Tia Maria Project – Southern Corporation
Bolivia
Indigenous groups claiming against North Energy Company
Brazil, Pará
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6. APPROACHING A LOCAL RESOURCE CURSE PHENOMENOM
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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Dissatisfaction
with the low
impact on local
development
Disappointment about
revenue allocation
Concerns about
environmental
impact on resources
necessary for
subsistence
Low credibility on
environmental regulation
efficacy
Lack of participatory
mechanisms and
communication efforts
Ineffective actions to
achieve social license to
operate
Low capacity to
address social
conflicts
COMMON
DRIVERS OF
CONFLICT
7. THE CASE OF PERU: WHY THE MACROECONOMIC SUCCESS
HAS NOT NECESSARILY DERIVED IN INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY?
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Peruvian dichotomy
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8. MY RESEARCH
To what extent the allocation of extractive revenues has determined conditions for the applicability of
the local resource curse hypothesis in Peru?
Specific questions:
1. How are manifested the channels of local resource curse?
2. Has the public investment resulted from extractive revenues contributed to beating the local resource curse?
3. Which factors may be inducing a better / worse use of funds transfered to local governments?
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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9. APPARENT SUCCESS AT THE MARCO LEVEL
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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Source: EY Peru
10. THOUGH, IS REVENUE DISTRIBUTION CREATING LOCAL
DEVELOPMET?
10%
25%
40%
25%
DISTRIBUTION OF CANON
Distrital Municipalities where resources
are exploited
Provincial Municipality and Distrital
Municipalities within the Province where
resources are exploited
Rest of Provincial Municipalities and
District Municipalities in the Department
where resources are exploited
80% for Regional Government and 20%
for Public Universities
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CanonrevenuesinUS$milliondollars
Years
CANON REVENUES
Mining Gas Petroleum
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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11. CORRELATION BETWEEN POVERTYVARIATION AND REVENUETRANSFERS PER
CAPITA (IN US$ DOLLARS) IN PERUVIAN PROVINCES FROM 2009TO 2013
-50.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
0.0 2000.0 4000.0 6000.0 8000.0 10000.0 12000.0 14000.0 16000.0 18000.0
Variationofmonetatypoverty
Transfer por revenues - per capita (in US$ dollars)
MONETARY POVERTYVS TRANSFER OF REVENUES
2009 - 2013
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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12. CORRELATION BETWEEN HDIVARIATION AND REVENUE TRANSFERS PER
CAPITA (IN US$ DOLLARS) IN PERUVIAN PROVINCES FROM 2009 TO 2013
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.0 2000.0 4000.0 6000.0 8000.0 10000.0 12000.0 14000.0 16000.0 18000.0
HDIvariation2009-2013
Transfer por revenues from 2009 to 2013 - per capita in US$ dollars
HUMAN DEVELOPMENTVS TRANSFER OF REVENUES
2009-2013
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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13. METHODOLOGY:
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH + COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
Channels of local resource
curse
Monetary poverty
Human development
Income inequality
Economic diversification
Socio-environmental
conflict
Corruption
Contribution of public
investment resulted from
revenues
Transfer of revenues
Spending of revenues
Categories of public
investment
Relation between
investment and needs
Impact of public
investment
Factors inducing the allocation
of funds
Institutional background
Institutional capacity
Transparency mechanisms
Civil society engagement
Role of national and
subnational institutions
Overlapping of roles with
extractive companies
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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14. SELECTED CASES: ESPINAR AND HUARI
69,146 people
Antappacay, copper operation
by Glencore Xstrata
63,057 people
Antamina, polymetallic
operation by BHP Billiton
(33.75%), Glencore Xstrata
(33.75%),Teck (22.5%) and
Mitsubishi (10%)5
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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15. MAIN FINDINGS: SYMPTOMS OF LOCAL RESOURCE CURSE
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Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Monetary poverty
Reduced but not gradually
Human development
Unmet social services
Inequality
Skills and economic activities
employment dependancy on mining
activities (skilled and unskilled labour)
Low economic diversification
Most population are involved in
traditional agriculture and livestock
activities.
Environmental impacts
Lack of trust on oficial
information Socio-environmental
conflicts social
mobilization will depend on
environmental awareness
Short term
aspirations might
hinder potential
activities
Employment
volatility
Potential for
tourisms
underdeveloped
Cost of living
16. MAIN FINDINGS: IMPACT FROM PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROJECTS
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Espinar
Huari
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200
0.0300
0.0400
0.0500
0.0600
0.0700
0.0800
0.0900
0.1000
0.0 2000.0 4000.0 6000.0 8000.0 10000.0 12000.0
HumanDevelopmentIndex2007-2012
Accumulated trasnfers from 2004 - 2012
HDI Index variationVS transfers per capita
Espinar
Huari
Province average
-40.0%
-35.0%
-30.0%
-25.0%
-20.0%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
0.0 1000.0 2000.0 3000.0 4000.0 5000.0 6000.0 7000.0
Povertyvariation
Transfers per capita (US$ Dolars)
Poverty variationVS transfers per capita
2009-2013
17. MAIN FINDINGS: IMPACT FROM PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROJECTS
6%
1%
1%
11%
1%
2%
0.2%
16%
7%
8%
11%
2%
5%
11%
9%
8%
2%
6%
6%
12%
8%
0.3%
8%
22%
2%
4%
9%
2%
1%
7%
9%
3%
SECURITY
TRADING
TOURISM
AGRICULTURE
FISHING
ENERGY
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
SANITATION
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HEALTH
CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
SOCIAL PROTECTION
CATEGORIES OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROJECTS
Provincial Municipality of Espinar District Municipality of San Marcos
17
Majority of projects
implemented had less
than US$ 50 000 of
budget
Remain oriented to
the provision or
maintenance of
infrastructure
Increase of budget and
pressing to spend it
have not favored an
effective investment
General negative
perception around
derived impacts:
education and water
Development plan and
participatory budget
process do not
account for spending
Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
18. MAIN FINDINGS: DRIVERS OF REVENUE ALLOCATION
Lack of previous
preparation
Lack of strategic planning
and management
Staff skills and academic
background
Background and
institutional capacity
Mistrust with authorities
and justice system
Perception of more
revenues= more
corruption
Corruption
Very low level of
information concerning
revenue allocation
Obstacles for accessing
and using information
Weak capacities for
accountability
Transparency and
stakeholder
engagement
Need for orientation and
guidelines from national
institutions
Confusion around duties
performed by public and
private institutions
Public and private role
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Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
19. CONCLUSIONS
This research has contributed to the literature by corroborating that a high level of revenue transfers to local
governments without prior preparation and capacity building could be considered as a driver of local resource
curse.
This situation may be aggravated when the impact from public investment is not officially evaluated and there is a
lack of citizen accountability.
Those factors are likely to incentivize corruption and constraint development opportunities.
From this exploratory research, a further assessment is required around the impacts derived from public
investment projects and major drivers of local development performance did not addressed in this paper.
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Sandra Carrillo Hoyos, MSc Environment and Development Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)