How paranoid should you really be about online security safety? Read Security Engineer Geoff Vaughan's advice on security best practices for regular users.

1. Security Best Practices
For Regular Users
Geoffrey Vaughan
@mrvaughan
Security Engineer

2. Whoami
• Geoffrey Vaughan @MrVaughan
• Security Engineer @SecurityInnovation
• Appsec pentesting/advisory at all areas of SDLC
• Former High School/Prison/University Teacher
• Occasionally I’m let out of my basement
• Travelled from Toronto to be here with you today

3. Why This Talk?
• I care about you and your data
• I’m tired of regular users suffering for mistakes made by large
organizations (data breaches) or being caught by the simplest
of phishing scam
• Often small adjustments in user behavior has a large impact on
security / privacy

4. Tldr; If you only read one slide
Giving it all away at the beginning:
1) Use a password manager
2) Keep your devices up to date
3) Use 2-Factor Authentication on all your accounts
4) Free Wi-Fi Comes at a cost – Don’t connect to untrusted networks
5) Lock and encrypt your devices (phones + computers)
For more info I wrote a Guide:
https://web.securityinnovation.com/essential-guide-to-online-security

5. Beyond the Basics: How Paranoid
Should I be?
• Protecting your data and privacy online can take a lot of effort
• Complete anonymity is really hard
• It will always be a trade off between usability and
security/privacy
How Paranoid should I be?
It greatly depends on your personal threat model

6. Threat Model?
Simplified Definition:
Identify and quantify your weaknesses so you can come up with
appropriate defenses.

7. Threat Modelling on Easy Mode
• What assets are you trying to protect?
• What threats are the assets under?
• What is the likelihood of a threat being realized?
• What measures can help mitigate or decrease the risk
associated with the threat?

8. Assets to Protect
• Personal Information - Name, Age, DOB, Spouse, Children, Parents
• Personal Pictures, videos, documents
• Financial Information - Banking, loan, credit
• Your Location - Home address, places you frequent, or where you are right
now
• Social Media accounts and data
• Physical Devices
• Business Assets on your devices
• Personal Communications/Conversations - Emails, Text Messages, Chat
etc, phone calls
• Data about Data – When you called someone, who you text messaged

9. Threats?
• Which of the assets are most important for you to protect?
• How might an attacker target each of those assets?

10. Personal Information
Threats
• Information obtained through
public searchable resources
(Google, phone/address look
up)
• Attacker reads information
leaked by peers (tagged
pictures, connections)
• Social Media post leaks info
Defenses
• Hack yourself – See what’s out
there
• Harden your social media
security/privacy settings
• Use fake names / complete alter
ego online
• Draw a very clear line between
your public and private life.
• Ask friends not to tag you

11. Social Media Settings

12. Personal Pictures, Videos, Documents
Threats
• Malware compromises
mobile/desktop device
• Cloud backup account is
compromised
• ‘Auto post’ feature publishes
content automatically
• Data shared with a friend gets
shared with others
Defenses
• Keep your devices up to date
• Use strong passwords on all
online accounts
• Use multi-factor
authentication wherever
possible
• Be aware of all
security/privacy settings for
the applications you are using

13. https://twofactorauth.org/

14. Financial Information
Threats
• Attacker compromises online banking
account (Guesses PVQ, Weak password,
Compromised email allows password
reset)
• Attacker acquires enough information to
perform credit/loan applications on your
behalf
• Website you used improperly stores your
information and your credit
card/information gets compromised
• You use a malicious POS device and your
credit card gets skimmed
• Paypal (or other) account is compromised
Defenses
• Lie on all PVQ questions
• Strong passwords (password
managers)
• Use multi-factor authentication
• Never give out SIN/SS/Personal
Code unless you are sure that
the request is legitimate
• Big retailers are probably safer
than mom/pop shops as they
likely spend much more on
security*

15. Password Managers
To name a few:
• LastPass
• 1Password
• KeePass
• Built-in to browsers (ex.
Chrome/Safari keychain)
Consider the Features
• Local encrypted database
• Remote ‘cloud’ features
• In browser extensions
• Share passwords across
devices or users

16. Your Location
Threats
• Government/ISP/App developer is able to
ascertain your exact location at a particular
time
• General pubic is able to ascertain your
location
• Social media posts leaks location
• Image data leaks location
• Misconfigured app leaks location
• Content of image leaks location (OSINT)
• Connected to untrusted wireless
• Motivated attacker is able to ascertain your
location
• Compromised mobile device
• Phishing email
• Compromised mobile application/account
Defenses
• Complete burner phone + number,
Tor/VPN user, completely separate
accounts for burner device
• Harden security settings, disable
EXIF image metadata, be careful
of the content of your posts
• Previously mentioned device
defense strategies:
• Keeping devices up to date
• Don’t click untrusted links
• Strong passwords

17. Image Content / Open Source
Intelligence
http://blog.ioactive.com/2014/05/glass-
reflections-in-pictures-osint.html
• Tweeted a picture from a hotel
• Previous tweet said they were
in Miami
• Hacker used hotel room
images on travel websites to
find the hotel based on window
structure and reflections
• Used Google earth to render
similar views and get an
estimation on floor and building
area.

18. Tinder API
http://blog.includesecurity.com/2014/02/ho
w-i-was-able-to-track-location-of-any.html
• In 2014 Tinder API allowed
trilateration of a users exact
location
• Used in conjunction with GPS
spoofing

19. Social Media Accounts and Data
Threats
• Social media account gets
compromised resulting in
information disclosure,
posting on your behalf, or
data loss
Defenses
• Strong Passwords
• 2-Factor Authentication
• Restrict third party app
access
• Review security settings
• Protect your email account
similarly (password resets)
• Avoid Phishing Scams

20. Physical Devices
Threats
• Lost or stolen device results
in all data being
lost/compromised
• Your device is inspected at a
border crossing
• Your device is compromised
while being unattended
Defenses
• Strong device password
• Full disk encryption (usually enabled
by default on mobile devices when
you apply a password)
• Restrict what data you keep on your
device (if concerned)
• Consider implications of online vs.
local backups
• Use and test a “lost my device” app
• Enable remote wipe capabilities
(never a guarantee)

21. Business Assets
• All other threats/defenses apply except now the implications are
more severe
• Greater care needs to be taking with corporate assets
• Consider implications on personal assets if a BYOD policy
allows remote management/monitoring/removal of your data
• Recommend separating business and pleasure or revise your
threat model to consider additional threats

22. Personal
Communications/Conversations
Threats
• Attacker/ISP/App
Provider/Nation State intercepts
communication data in transit
and reads conversation
• Receiver forwards conversation
to third party
• App Provider is compromised
leaking all conversation logs
• Government requests app
provider to turn over data
Defenses
• Gold Star: Signal Messenger
(now with disappearing
messages)
• Decent: Wickr
• Getting Better: Facebook
Messenger, WhatsApp
• Avoid: SMS
• A couple companies that have
proven they have your back:
OpenWhisper (Signal), Apple,
Facebook

23. Data About Data
Threats
• You consider information
about who you are talking to
and when sensitive
information
• Attacker/ISP/App
Provider/Nation
State/Untrusted Wireless is
able to collecting metadata
about your
communication/activity
Defenses
• Anonymity is hard. At this level
even the best get caught
• Burner phones / accounts
• Full Tor/VPN would make it
difficult for organizations to
collect data
• Time delayed messages might
mask some traffic
• Create additional noise in
communications, talk to more
people more often

24. Resources
I wrote a paper:
https://web.securityinnovation.com/essential-guide-to-online-
security

25. Another talk today:
I’m also presenting one other talk today on a completely
unrelated subject:
Catching IMSI Catchers: Hunting the hunter, can you tell if your
phone’s being captured by a rogue cell phone tower/ IMSI
catcher/ Stingray?

26. Thank you
Geoffrey Vaughan
@mrvaughan
@SecurityInnovation