PROJECT REPORT - SUPER GROUP

UNIVERSITY
OF
WESTERN
AUSTRALIA
FRANCE, MILLAU VIADUCT BRIDGE
A PROJECT CASE STUDY REPORT: PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
PROJECT TEAM:
SHOBHIT SHEKHAR, CO-ORDINATOR, 21777517
DEVYN JACKAMARRA, MEMBER, 20761794
HARSH HASMUKHBHAI PATEL, MEMBER, 21804443
KHADIJA BEGUM, MEMBER, 21822517
XIAOFAN WU, MEMBER, 21795592
ERIC TANG, MEMBER, 21929169
ZIYING ZHANG, MEMBER, 20933753
UNIT CO-ORDINATOR: DR. COSIMO FAIELLO, PROJECT
MANAGEMENT, UWA
PROJECT COMPANY: VIADUCT DE MILLAU, FRANCE
PROJECT MANAGER: CHRISTIAN LEYRITT
CHIEF ARCHITECTS: MICHEL VIRLOGEUX & LORD
NORMAN FOSTER

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE MILLAU VIADUC (VIADUC DE MILLAU) .......................................... 1
SECTION A: CASE STUDY WRITING....................................................................................................... 2
1 THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT THE PROJECT: ................................................................................ 2
2 INTRODUCTION:............................................................................................................................. 2
2.1 Estimated Pathways.................................................................................................................. 3
2.1.1 The Great Western ................................................................................................................ 3
2.1.2 Near RN9 ............................................................................................................................. 3
2.1.3 The Great Eastern ................................................................................................................. 3
2.1.4 Intermediate (Mediante), west of Millau ................................................................................ 4
2.1.5 The Choice Of Technical Design ........................................................................................... 4
3 STAKEHOLDERS:.................................................................................................................................. 5
3.1 The local authorities ................................................................................................................. 5
3.2 The conceding authority ........................................................................................................... 5
3.3 Eiffage ..................................................................................................................................... 5
3.4 The Arrondissement Interdépartemental des Ouvrages d’Art (AIOA) ....................................... 5
3.5 The Compagnie du viaduc de Millau ........................................................................................ 5
3.5.1 Eiffage Construction.................................................................................................................. 6
3.5.2 Eiffel Construction.................................................................................................................... 6
PROJECT TIME FRAME ..................................................................................................................... 6
SECTION B CASE STUDY ANALYSIS.................................................................................................... 9
1. CONCEPTUALIZATION/INITIATION ........................................................................................... 9
2. PLANNING..................................................................................................................................... 11
3. EXECUTION .................................................................................................................................. 13
4. FINALIZATION ............................................................................................................................. 14
SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CASE.............................................................................. 16

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONCEPTULAIZATION...................................................................... 16
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PLANNING........................................................................................... 17
RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXECUTION ........................................................................................ 19
RECOMMENDATIONS TO FINALIZATION ................................................................................... 20
CONCLUSION AND ATTRIBUTES TO SUCCESS.................................................................................. 22
SUMMARY................................................................................................................................................ 22
APPENDIX................................................................................................................................................. 23
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ANALYSIS........................................................................................ 23
RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................... 23
COST MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................. 24
HUMAN RESORCE MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 25
GANTT CHART ......................................................................................................................... 27
GROUP MEETINGS........................................................................................................................... 31
PROJECT WORK ALLOCATION GUIDE SUPER GROUP ...................................................... 32
REFERENCES:................................................................................................................................... 37

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE MILLAU VIADUC (VIADUC DE MILLAU)
The Millar Viaduct (French: Viaduc de Millau) is the world’s tallest cable-stayed bridge that hangs
over the river Tarn near Millau in southern France. Conceived and designed by French structural
engineer Michel Virloguex & British architect Sir Norman Foster who had seen a vision to give it an
iconic view in the world. It has the mast’s summit at 343 m above the base structure. Also, it’s the
12th highest bridge in the world having 270 meters drop from the bridge road to the valley below.
The 2460 meters long bridge is a spectacular architectural and design feat. It’s also one the most
glamorous bridges that ever exist in planet.
Figure 1: http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/millau-viaduct-france-tallest-bridge-in.html)
The construction of Millau Viaduct Bridge required one of the most state of art techniques used in
the field of Civil Engineering. Until then no construction site had ever combined, in one single place,
such a mixture of technology climbing framework, specifically surface coats, high performance
concrete and the innovative materials that were all instrumental in the success of this extraordinary
construction. The bridge was opened in 16 December 2004 to close the “missing link” on the A75
autoroute connecting Paris in the north to Perpignan in the south. Millau Viaduct was the result of 17
years of ideas, proposals and designs that resulted in reducing 37 miles off the former route through
the region. But instead of choosing a mundane design that simply did the job, the French went big!

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SECTION A: CASE STUDY WRITING
1 THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT THE PROJECT:
Due to the problems of traffic on the way from Paris to Spain, along the path through the Tarn valley
near the town of Millau, leading to congestion in the summer from holiday traffic, construction of
the bridge to span the valley was required. To start with, arrangements were examined and by
October of 1991, the decision was made to build the high crossing of Tarn River by a structure of
around 2.5 km. An alternate motivation might have been the promotion of the economic
development and tourism locally by improving access to the area. It was also intended to mitigate
the local problems in the town of MILLAU.
2 INTRODUCTION:
The Millau Viaduct is a part of the A75 motorway, a 2.46 km tolled bridge across the Tarn River
valley in southern France. It commenced in 2004 and is also the world’s longest cable-stayed span.
The project was the first pike program to benefit from two government policies, requiring 1% of the
project budget to be allocated to regional economic development and making motorway drivers to
stop at nearby villages. The viaduct has turned into a visitor fascination in its own right, and the
modern improvement in the zone has benefited from the 1% policy. The Viaduct is a multiple cable-
stayed span bridge, based on the honour winning configuration by Norman Foster & Partners and
Segelerg-EEG-SERF, which itself derives from an initial concept by French engineer Michel
Virlogeux. Throughout 1993–1994 the legislature consulted with 7 designers and 8 structural
architects. During 1995–1996, a second meaning contemplate was made by five associated architect
groups and structural engineers. In January 1995, the administration announced a revelation for open
investment with request configuration methodologies for a rivalry.

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2.1 ESTIMATED PATHWAYS:
Figure 2 Source: Omega Centre, Millau Route
2.1.1 The Great Western (grand Ouest) (black route)
It was longer than the eastern option by 12 km (7.5 mi), following the Cernon valley. Technically
easier (requiring four viaducts), this result might have been judged to bring opposite effects on the
environment, in particular on the picturesque villages of Peyre and Saint-Georges-de-Luzençon. It
might have been more exorbitant over the first option, and served those district seriously.
2.1.2 Near RN9 (proche de la RN9) (red route)
It would have served the town of Millau well, but presented technical challenges would have had a
strong impact on existing or planned structures.
2.1.3 The Great Eastern (grand Est) (yellow route)
The construction of the route, which is passing east of Millau and crossing the valleys of
the Tarn and Dourbie on two very high and long bridges (spans of .8 km and 1 km or 2,600 ft and
3,300 ft), was recognized as a major concern. This alternative might have permitted access to Millau
only from the Larzac plateau, using the long and tortuous descent from La Cavalerie. Although this
option was shorter and better suited to through traffic, it did not ultimately serve the necessities of
Millau and its area.

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2.1.4 Intermediate (Mediante), west of Millau (blue route)
It might have been underpinned via nearby opinion, yet all the introduced geological difficulties,
notably on the address for crossing those valley of the tarn. Master examination inferred that these
obstacles were not insurgence. The fourth option was opted by ministerial decree on 28 June 1989. It
encompassed two possibilities:
(1) The helter-skelter solution, envisaging a 2500 m (8200 ft) viaduct more than 200 m (660ft)
above the river;
(2) The low solution plunging under the valley and crossing the river on a 200 m (660 ft) bridge
then a viaduct of 2300 m (7500 ft) extended by a tunnel on the Larzac side.
After in-depth development investigations by the service of state funded works, those low results
might have been surrendered or it might need intersected water table, required a negative effect on
the town.
After the choice of the helter-skelter viaduct, five groups from claiming designers and researchers
worked on a technical solution. The concept and design for the bridge was devised by French
designer Michel Virlogeux. He acted with the Dutch building firm ARCADIS, answerable for the
structural building of the span.
The "high solution" obliged the construction of a 2,500 m (8,200 ft) long viaduct. From 1991 to
1993, the structures division of Sétra, directed by Michel Virlogeux, conveyed preliminary
investigations and examined the feasibility of a single structure spanning the valley. Taking into
account technical, structural and fiscal issues, the Administration of Roads opened the question for
competition among structural designers and engineers to widen the search for practical plans. By
July of 1993, 17 structural designers and 38 architects applied as candidates for the preliminary
studies. With the help of a multidisciplinary authority, the Administration of Roads chose eight
structural engineers for a technical study and seven architects for the architectural study.
2.1.5 THE CHOICE OF TECHNICAL DESIGN
Simultaneously, a school of international experts representing a wide range of expertise (technical,
architectural and landscape), chaired by Jean-François Coste, was established to elucidate the
choices that had to be made. In February 1995, on the foundation of proposals of the architects and
structural engineers, and with backing of the class of experts, five general designs were finalised.
Those rivals might have been relaunched: five combinations from claiming designers and structural
engineers, drawn from the best hopefuls of the primary phase, were formed; each was to conduct in-

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depth investigations of one of the general designs. On 15 July 1996, Bernard Pons, minister of
Public Works, announced the decision of the jury, which was constituted of elected artists and
experts and chaired by Christian Leyrit, the director of highways. The solution of a cable-stayed
bridge, presented by the structural engineering group Sogelerg, Europe Etudes Gecti and Serf and
the architect Foster+Partner was declared the best.
Nitty gritty investigations were carried out by the successful consortium, steered by the highways
authority until mid-1998. Following wind tunnel tests, the shape of the road deck was altered and
detailed corrections were made to the design of the pylons. When the details were eventually
finalised, the whole design was affirmed to late 1998.
3 STAKEHOLDERS:
3.1 The local authorities
The community of Millau and the Millau – Grands Causses grouping for communes would regularly
include in an extent of this sort in perspective of the scale of the nearby effects of the future viaduct.
3.2 The conceding authority
The State (Ministry of Infrastructure) is the yielding power. The Ministry opened the concession of
the viaduct to competition and awarded it to the Eiffage group which is therefore both the structure’s
builder and concessionary. The group has therefore set up specific structures to perform all the tasks
that are necessary in order to construct and then operate the viaduct.
3.3 Eiffage
It is the third largest group in France in the field of construction, civil building and development
related benefits. It is right now in fifth position in Europe. It has a staff of 41,000 in France and the
rest of the world and in the financial year 2000 had an ex-VAT turnover of 6.25 billion Euros.
3.4 The Arrondissement Interdépartemental des Ouvrages d’Art (AIOA)
It has been given responsibility by the yielding power to direct observing. The AIOA reports to the
Infrastructure Directorate of the Aveyron département which is also the construction manager for the
works on the A75 motorway on both sides of the viaduct.
3.5 The Compagnie du viaduc de Millau
This company is a subsidiary of Eiffage and is the structure’s concessionary for a 75 year period.
This share of the organization might have been uncommonly set up to the motivation and draws on
the experience of the Eiffage concessions branch. This company is the project owner, and has the
authority for the entire funding of the project and its subsequent management. It conducts

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transactions with the other parties involved with the viaduct (Central Government, local authorities,
etc.). The Compagnie du Viaduct de Millau has allocated the works to two large subsidiaries of the
Eiffage group: Eiffage construction will be responsible for concrete construction and Eiffel for metal
construction.
3.5.1 Eiffage Construction
(It had a turnover of 3.40 billion Euros in the year 2000, with a total of 17,000 employees including
2,800 designers and executives) will take part throughout the construction process, from land-use
planning to maintenance of the structure, not forgetting promotion of the viaduct and general
contracting. Eiffage development will be available on the whole those areas of France through its
system for 160 territorial subsidiaries. The company also has a major presence in Belgium and
performs large-scale works elsewhere in Europe (Copenhagen Metro, Poznan by-pass, PontVentoux
dam in Italy, etc.), in Asia and Africa. In the case of the Millau viaduct, its subsidiary Eiffage TP,
which is one of the largest French civil engineering and earthworks companies, will have the
responsibilities for all the concrete structures.
3.5.2 Eiffel Construction
It is a French pioneer in metal construction with a turnover of 122 million Euros in 2000 and a staff
of 700. Eiffel has a strong influence in France with four factories, three in the East of France
(Lauterbourg, Metz and Nancy) and one at Fos-sur-Mer, as well as corporate offices in Valenciennes
and Le Havre. It also has offices in the U.K. (London) and Germany (Hanover). Eiffel is at the
leading edge of innovation for buildings, bridges, engineering structures, boilers, mechanical
engineering, water gates, and for the oil industry (offshore platforms). It realizes half of its turnover
outside France.
PROJECT TIME FRAME
Time Frame Project Approach Occasion Details
1987 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of estimated pathways –
studies from the CETE d”Aix en
Province
1988-1990 Feasibility studies/Research Conducting primary viable research
1988 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of an expert committee
within the road authority.
1989 Feasibility studies/Research Establishment of AIOA: inter-
disciplinary administration for

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structures like bridges. The AIOA
is liable for conducting all the
processes on A75
Head of the AIOA : G. GILLET
1988-1989 Feasibility studies/Research Choosing A75 route from four
possibilities.
28 June 1989 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of the median option
which crosses Millau. The choice
fits with the environmental
constraints and development
ambitions.
1990-1991 Feasibility studies/Research Selection of the routes which
crosses the Tarn valley, from ‘high’
and ‘low’.
29 October 1991 Feasibility studies/Research Top authority decision to pass the
Tarn via the high route because it is
the cheapest and the shortest and it
considers all safety requirements.
1992 Feasibility studies/Research SETRA examines different past
projects to get the idea that how
viaduct can be crossed.
1993/1994 Project design and
conception
International committee formed to
advise the road director with
formation of 7 architects and 8
engineering consultancies.
1993 Project design and
conception
Call for refining and improvement
of the design
12 July 1993 Project design and
conception
The top authority approves the
design which consists a structure of
2.4 km long and .2 km high
conception
Choice of the project and organizing
a competition to select the project.
1994-1995 Project design and
conception
Final studies of the project with all
the architects and design engineers.
conception
Selection of the preferred project
design : team Norman Foster-
Segelerg
The cable-stayed bridge won the
challenge because it was more
efficient.
1998 Procurement Change of governance and
introduction of BFOT.
1999/2000 Procurement Organizing an international tender
of BFOT type where the contractor
is bound by conditions in terms of
time and financial aspects.
23 November 1999 Public enquiry The first inter ministry decree is
amended in order to conform the

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concession conditions and allow the
toll system.
March 2001 Procurement EIFFAGE won the bid for the
delivery of the Millau Viaduct.
30 May 2001 Procurement Signature of the concession contract.
8 October 2001 Procurement The council of the state approves the
project via MINISTRY decree
Procurement Decision to build the viaduct with
metal rather than concrete.
10 October 2001 Project delivery/Construction Beginning of the construction phase.
20 February 2002 Control of construction Establishment of the expert
committee of ACDC by Jean
Francois Coste.
14 December 2004 Project
delivery/Construction
Inauguration of the Millau viaduct
and beginning of the operation
phases after couple of days.

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SECTION B CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
KEY MANAGEMENT STAGES
1. CONCEPTUALIZATION/INITIATION:
• The initial study of the France Millau Viaduct started in 1987. Contemporary to the Normandy
Bridge which is also a cable stayed hanging bridge, which was also conceived and designed by
same design engineer, and was planned to be made. The conception which Viaduct drew upon
the experience, combined with 10 years of studies with the administration. It is commemorating
that initially, Millau Viaduct was treated as an A75b infrastructure, authorized under NRA
(National Road Administration).
• As the project started to grow, NRA in charge of developing had gone through internal
amendments. In 1989-1990 the head of road directory, “Jean Berthier” actually decided the
actual route of the Viaduct.
• “Christian Leyrit” succeeded him and supervised complete delivery of Millau Viaduct Project
from conception till opening. He was replaced by Patrick Gandil for operation phases. As
compared to other decisions, Christian Leyrit held the responsibility for selecting design of
Millau Viaduct through international competition having several group of engineers, architects
and representatives of governments. Also, such design had an important inflection point in
designing of bridges in France, particularly when comparing to the Normandy Bridge. It was
uncommon to subject expertise of SETRA and external opinions and experts.
• The Millau Viaduct represents for the first time that design in a project would depend upon a
competition, a decision which was later justified when the wonder was made.
• After the SETRA and Roads Directorate defined five “best options” for the future of the Millau
Viaduct and invited 5 integrated engineer and architect teams for competing by expatiating each
choice. The 5 options came through a “brainstorming” process organized within SETRA and
calling of international experts. The competition began in 1995 and started the selection of the
British architect Sir Norman Foster in 1996.
• It was extracted from cable-stayed solution which was originally suggested by Michel Virlogeux,
who had also designed the bridge of Normandy while working with SETRA.

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• However, the design that came up didn’t prescribe the method of construction, i.e. whether to
build the bridge in steel or concrete. Since either of the solutions was possible but the challenge
was to get it the best one. It was suggested to use concrete, not steel, but later when project
entered the realization stage it was “steel” which became the solution since it was the crucial to
avoid construction delays and preoccupancy which was not isolated from Millau Viaduct’s key
enabling method.
Also, the decision was to entrust the private sectors for financing and delivering the project.
(Source: Compiled by author)
PROBLEMS FACED
(Source: Contrat de concession)
• The problem was to decide the way to cross
the Tarn Valley for which choice between the
high and low solutions was an vital concern as
no proper design was present
Problem 1
• Apart from indisputable proofs of the positive
effects of Viaduct on local economic
development some of them deplore
insufficient leadership from the state level
Problem 2
• There was lack of public funds available for
the existing missing link in A75 for which 2
million francs was required. Management
was in awe to get the funds as public funding
was not enough and expenses couldn’t be
borne by them. It was the question of hour.
Problem 3

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2. PLANNING:
PROBLEM FACED:
The major problem of traffic congestion on the route from Paris to Spain (A75-A71) passing through
the Tarn valley near the town of Millau had been recognised, however, the very first challenge was
what single structure could be the solution, something that could both act as an access to Millau and
a crossing of the Tarn River
DESCRIPTION:
Whatever the solution was, this would prove to be an enormously challenging task, as the valley is
roughly 2.5km across, end to end and nearly 300m deep. The technical services involved were firstly
faced with the decision of whether or not they were to build a high structure, which crossed over the
entire valley or a lower option, one that sloped down and across the valley and river. After much
consideration and reasoning the higher option, being a bridge, was seen to be more suitable and
beneficial to become the crossing of the valley. Now that the crossing had been decided to be a
bridge, several types of bridges had to be analysed and sorted so that a suitable styles could be
narrowed down and eventually one was to be selected. Many designs were considered but only a
group of five types of bridges were seen to be suitable for such a large task. On July, 1996, from the
five suitable types of bridges the solution of a cable-stayed bridge designed by the architects Fosters
& partners was declared to be the best and is what we see today in the Millau Viaduct.
Of course, with any type of bridge, there are the inherent positives and negatives. Cable-stayed
bridges are great for longer spanning needs and have come a long way in their design over recent
years. In fact cable-stayed bridges are now highly recommended alongside suspension bridges for
long spans between 700m and 1500m. Also, cable-stayed bridges are known to look highly elegant
which is a huge positive, as this is a main factor in the decision making process of the bridge design.
No one likes an eye sore running through a beautiful country side. For example, the longest cable-
stayed bridge at the time, before the Millau, was the Tatara Bridge in Japan (figure 2) which looks
very impressive and captivating

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PROBLEM FACED:
Although, as previously stated there are drawbacks. As seen previously with the Tacoma bridge
disaster, swaying caused by the wind can be very dangerous and wind-induced vibration of stay
cables is very common with cable-stayed bridges, so both were taken into heavy consideration
during the designing process
DESCRIPTION:
Once the bridge type had been decided and the design was finalized, costs were able to be calculated
and they came to roughly a staggering EUR 400m. Initially, the costs were planned to be covered by
the state but due to the lack of public funding available to cover the cost of the Millau Viaduct this
was not possible and other sources had to be establish in order to for the whole plan to go ahead.
(Omega Centre).
Figure 3: http://www.pieway.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tatara-Bridge-%E2%80%93Japan.jpg

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3. EXECUTION:
PROBLEM FACED:
CONTROLLING
A challenge in this project was the problem of how to correctly and safely place the decking onto the
pillars. The bridge decking would be built and then pushed onto the pillars, however this presented a
few problems. How does one push a concrete slab in the order of tonnes across the several pillars of
the bridge? As the decking is pushed over gaps between pillars, how would bending be controlled?
And what would control the process?
DESCRIPTION:
Pushing the bridge decking across the spans of pillars required the use of many high pressure
hydraulic systems that lift and then push it along. Each pillar has one of these launching systems and
together they lift and push the 2.46km decking. Each of these launching systems consists of a
hydraulic lifting cylinder and either two or four skates that each consist of two horizontal hydraulic
cylinders. The hydraulic lifting cylinder has a lifting capacity of 250 tonnes while the horizontal
hydraulic cylinders have a pushing capacity of 60 tonnes each. The process of pushing the decking
along the piers is to lift with the lifting cylinder, the horizontal cylinders retract and then push the
decking along the skates.
As the hydraulic system pushed the deck horizontally, the mass of the decking would cause it to
bend downwards between gaps of the pillars. To counteract this problem, a nose recovery system is
used to counteract the bending. This system consists of four hydraulic cylinders and is built at the
end of the deck. As the nose of the deck approaches a pillar or support tower, the nose recovery
system is activated to pull the nose up to the correct level. Once at the correct level the decking can
then continue to be pushed onto the next pillar without any collisions.
MONITORING
To support the bridge decking, pillars are used, but the spans between pillars can be as great as
342m, causing bending and strain on the decking.

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DESCRIPTION:
To counteract this, temporary support towers between pillars help support and control bending of the
deck between the gaps. The support towers closest to the abutments are only 12 to 20 meters high
and thus are raised using cranes. The five remaining support towers are between 87.5m and 163.7
meters high and consequently will require hydraulic stage lifting to be built.
To control the process of lifting and pushing the decking, all the hydraulic cylinders and pressure
lines contain position and pressure transducers that send all the information to the control panel. The
control panel displays position and load information to operators allowing them to monitor the
process. If any of the loads or positions exceeds safe limits, operators can quickly stop the process.
Oil level and temperature sensors also allow the operators to stop the process in case of oil pressure
drops caused by leaks or any other malfunctions. The PLC system takes information from the control
panel and operates the hydraulic cylinders according to a program. The system is programmed to
restrict load difference between hydraulic cylinders to a maximum of 5% and allow for a maximum
difference in height of 3mm. All of these safety measures combine to reduce the risk of any damage
or danger to workers and also to ensure damage to surrounding environment is limited.
4. FINALIZATION:
The project was completed on 14 December 2014 when the inauguration ceremony was held on the
day. The on time completion of the project is attributed to:
The selection of constructing material (integration of concrete and steel) and design;
• The construction method;
• Integration of research and studies;
The state and the administration also facilitated the project to be delivered on time, the AUOA who
provide the access roads for the construction site at the earliest stage.·

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PROBLEMS FACED:
• Under the BFOT-PPP type of procurement the funding of the project relies on the users of
the viaduct. This type of funding is regarded to be an innovative form of funding and
financing, the revenues are generated from toll collection or subsidies (doesn’t cost taxpayers
anything). The aim of the viaduct is to offer the best level of service and relieving Millau's
bottleneck.
• The toll barriers of lanes were extended to 18 in 2005 and more recruitment of employments
adapts the flows since the realistic level of traffic was superior to the forecast where
originally was 14 lanes. In 2005 there are twenty percent more vehicles than anticipated, and
in 2008 even more vehicles crossed the viaduct including heavy goods traffic.
• Other than the toll activities, the viaduct also add more services: security, maintenance,
communication. Where the communication service generates revenue through massive
tourism each year.
To conclude, the key element that lead to the success of Millau Viaduct are following:
Perfection of planning: the initial design of the Viaduct by four experts P.Godin, M.Rat, M.Panet,
and M.Virlogeux was challenged by public, design competition lead to the involvement of
international experts and the British architect Sir Norman Foster that improved the process.
TYPE OF PROCUREMENT:
BFOT-PPP type of Procurement dominated by strong governance and risk management. The
construction: the technical choices, to construct in steel instead of concrete which was less time
consuming, allow the piers and the deck to be built simultaneously, and fabricate the pieces in
factory that reduces delays, provide workers a safer working environment.

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SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CASE
1. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONCEPTULAIZATION:
THE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GEOLOGICAL ENGINEERS.
As faced with the problem to choose one option between the two, they must have communicated
with the architects and geographical designers in order to get a good insight about the region thereby
helping them with the design procedures. Furthermore they must have gathered all of the
information about the challenges which are going to be faced and acted accordingly.
THE STATE AUTHORITY NEEDS TO BE CO-OPERATIVE.
Due to the construction of Millau Viaduct, the localities will benefit economically. This project is
also going to improve the relationships among the local communities. Considering these benefits, the
State authority must have taken active interest to guide the project in a lucid manner and provide the
management team all the necessary means. In addition to that the local people must have also
convinced the State government about the same.
COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL ASPECT.
Funding is the most important part of any project as it can defer the original design due to lack of
funds and render it insufficient. In this case the senior management team must have previously
analysed the funding requirements and the capability of the people to fund the project. Accordingly
they must have invited the private sectors to provide the funding thereby balancing the overall
budget. Being one of the marvelous project the team must have asked for assistance from the central
government to provide necessary funding.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO PLANNING:
• In order to solve the problem of traffic congestion, a structure that could cross the Tarn
valley had to be thought of. The technical services in charge, came up with the idea to invite
five teams consisting of both engineers and architects and have them compete by sharing and
elaborating on their ideas through brainstorming processes. Although all of the solutions by
the company were highly successful, there still are other options that could have been used in
order to get the same result or maybe even better one. Instead of creating a competitive
brainstorming atmosphere, the technical services could have also set up a focus group. An
advantage of this would be instead of competing, the experts could have collaborated, which
in turn could save time, money and create more viable ideas.
• The resulting ideas from the brainstorming processes were separated into two types of
infrastructure, a high or a low option. The high solution, being a 2,500 m viaduct more than
200 m above the river. The low solution, descending into the valley and crossing the river on
a 200 m bridge, then a viaduct of 2300 m extended by a tunnel. Both options were analysed
by the Centre for Technical Equipment Studies and initially the lower option seemed more
suitable. However, due to safety, economic and geotechnical limitations, the high option was
chosen. The deciding factors were all very important ones and seem to be based on specific
stakeholders like the local government and executive management. Nevertheless,
consultation with the local people, another stakeholder could have been included as well, as
they are the people who have to live there and most likely will be the most frequent users of
the crossing.
• Because of the high altitude of the would be bridge and surrounding geography, the wind had
to be carefully studied and accounted for in order to prevent any damage or destruction of the
viaduct. The wind dynamics in the area, were studied through records from meteorology
stations so that the directional patterns of the wind and mechanisms such as steady and gust
forces were identified. This allowed for the engineers to create appropriate models of the
bridge and predict it’s responses to the wind during different scenarios using wind tunnel
technology. As a risk management tool, an expert in wind and structure issues was appointed
this job, because this is such a huge risk for the project, more tools and techniques could have
been used as a part of the risk management process to ensure long lasting success and safety
of the structure.
• The large costs of this project were initially planned to be covered by public funding,
however this proved impossible, as it was far too expensive. In 1998 the Minister of

Page | 18
Transport and Equipment made the decision to procure the bridge under a concession scheme
in order to avoid postponing delivery by delay of construction. This concession scheme
transferred the responsibility of the project to the private sector. The main source of funding
the Millau Viaduct is through toll payments made by users, trucks and other motorists. The
change of source of funding could have been avoided if the project cost estimation was done
prior to the planning for cost management however this wasn’t the case. The source of
funding was decided before the cost of the entire project was calculated, this is why funding
was shifted to private funding, as there was not enough money in the private sector. This
could have been a cause of the internal finance protocols, which if so, should be changed.
Figure 4: http://millau.e-monsite.com/pages/1-1-le-choix-de-l-ouvrage.html

Page | 19
RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXECUTION:
Recommendations on how to select a qualified sub-contractor to perform the technical activities and
to supply the technical components.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONITORING
• Given the foreseeable difficulties in building such an elegant giant, there were many aspects
to be considered regarding the selection of a highly qualified sub-contractor to perform the
engineering of hydraulics for this project. Since it’s known to the engineering world that
hydraulic engineering is relied on practical experience more than creativity, the requirements
covered not only the manufacture of the hydraulic parts, but also the similar experiences of
provision of hydraulic solutions as well as the delivery of the hydraulic parts where
experiences could insure the feasibility and quality of the project, and on-time delivery
makes everything stick to the Gantt Chart.
• The chosen sub-contractor was Enerpac, a global market leader in high pressure hydraulic
tools, controlled force products and solutions for precise positioning of heavy loads (Enerpac,
2015). When we take a glance at the introduction of this company, we would not be
wondering any more why this company was the one to take charge in performing some of the
most important actions in this project. Obviously, Enerpac had done some quite similar jobs
successfully in their previous projects such as Lifting and Installing the Deck Sections of the
Golden Horn Metro Bridge in Istanbul, Turkey (Enerpac, 2015) and the University Bridge in
Bydgoszcz, Poland (Enerpac, 2015), etc. In those projects, Enerpac utilized the methods
which were almost the same as those that were applied in this project, and showed strong
control and impressive experience in solving problems in decking process of building bridges
by advanced hydraulic technologies.

Page | 20
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTROLLING:
On the other hand, the hydraulic system in this project was designed and built by Enerpac's
Construction Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain (Enerpac, 2015). Even though it is quite
common nowadays to perform international cooperation in engineering field, an accurate delivery of
the hydraulic components would still be one of the major concern regarding the completion of the
project. Using an amount of imported equipment could easily lead to the possibility of logistic delay
due to long distance transportation and various unforeseeable factors, and for most situation in
project a slight delay may cause unexpected cost overruns, variations, and other escalating issues. To
avoid such potential risks, a recommendation could be given to adopt local supplier to perform the
manufacture of the hydraulic parts according to the original solution provided by Enerpac.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO FINALIZATION:
Environmental footprint
Due to the scale of the project, the carbon footprint was inevitably high, but it was thought that
because the viaduct has established a new route that is about 67km shorter therefore the lesser,
carbon emissions from automobiles could offset the carbon footprint from construction of the
viaduct. The recommendation to this issue is that the construction company Eiffage should be
responsible for the reforestation of Tarn Valley. Corresponding measures could be in place for
recuperation and treatment of rain water and road residual to minimize environmental impacts.
Suicidal event
Millau Viaduct is so far one of the tallest bridge in the world. Regarding to its altitude and elegance.
It possibly become a choice of suicidal site. It is recorder that in 2005, a man abandoned his car on
the bridge, climbed over and jumped from the Viaduct, a sad tragedy. Although it might not be easy
to change one’s mind from suicide, however from this event it can be seen that more protective
guards should be put in place to prevent such events. For example, the side rail can be redesigned so
that no one is able to climb over it. Furthermore, security could be employed so that they can watch
out for such things, which would then give a much better chance to prevent anything like that
happening again.

Page | 21
Increase maintenance of the Viaduct
Since opening, the volume of the passing vehicles is increasing every year and the level of traffic is
greatly superior to the forecasted expectations. It is necessary to increase the maintenance frequency
to ensure the highest safety level and also maintain its longevity. The Viaduct has become one of the
most recognised tourism sites in France, therefore safety is the most important issue that should be
emphasized.

Page | 22
CONCLUSION AND ATTRIBUTES TO SUCCESS:
The Millau Viaduct Bridge, is considered as a first missing piece of A75 (Clermont Ferrand-
Montpellier). Recalling the FNTP’s conference in October 2003 chaired by the Director of the Road
Directorate Patrice Parise, Jean Francois Coste, Pascal Lechanteur and Marc Legrand outline
The main factors of success as decisions related to:
(Source: Viaduc de Millau, Revue Travaux n*216, Fevier 2005)
SUMMARY:
Taking the whole project process in account, the success of the Millau Viaduct is manifested in:
(Source: allendemontral.wordpress.com/le-monument-2)
The technical choices, in
particular the decision to
build the bridge in steel
The people who
contributed to the
different phases of the
Viaduct
The procurement decisions
and concession
The initial planning and
route.
1
• The “Planning”: From the case study of the initial route to the choice of the
project, The design of the Millau Viaduct consists of the original design proposal
of the administration (SETRA) conceived by Michel Virlogeux. However, expert
and public scrutiny challenged this initial project leading to the involvcement of
the British architect. Sir Norman Foster and international expertise and
competencies. As a result, the project improved over the process.
2
• The “Construction”: The Millau Viaduct does not constitute a technological
innovation in itself but is characterized by a genuine and innovative application
of existing techniques. The decisions to build the deck in steel is part of this
process and helped in reducing delays, and delivering the project on time and
providing good safety conditions for workers on site.
3
• The “Procurement”; The success of the BFOT process relies on sound project
governance and treatment of risks. The Millau Viaduct is a case of cooperation
& coordination between actors at varous stages of the project. The procurement
stage drew greatly upon the previous conception stage led by the
administration.

Page | 23
APPENDIX:
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ANALYSIS
RISK MANAGEMENT:
Potential risks always concern the stakeholders for a big project. In this particular project where
most of them mainly spanned the aspects as follows:
Limited Budget - The shortage of public funds disabled the French State to perform such
construction independently. Another qualified funder should be involved in this project.
Technical Solution – As the highest cable-stay bridge with a maximum of 342m distance between
the piers, special technology was needed for tackling many detailed technical issues in this project.
These issues were what method to adopt to place the decking onto the piers, how to deal with the
long distance between the piers, etc.
Environmental Issues – Noise, visual disturbance and other environmental aspects must be
considered and controlled along the construction.
Due to the consideration of the risks above, a decision was made that this project was to be
performed with a scheme called concession/BFOT. This means the bid winner, Eiffage, could also
get a contract of 75 year operating of the bridge at the same time. In such methodology, the planner
of the project successfully transferred the project risks (or to be described as responsibilities) to the
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
LIMITED BUDGET TECHNICAL
SOLUTION
ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES
CONCEPT
PLANNING
EXECUTION
FINALIZATION

Page | 24
private funder, Eiffage, exchanging with an operating contract which interested Eiffage naturally
with future profits. In other words, the risks were reallocated.
Even though this methodology is widely used nowadays in the world, it is not deniable that such a
way of risk-sharing is also a risk to the project itself. Since no regulations or clear definitions were
set up for such practice, there would be some unexpected issues and troubles such as negative
economic effects, etc. Detailed working specifications were highly demand to be with the contract
between the risk sharers.
However, this methodology proved itself to be a successful example in this project. The accurate
description and definition of the risk sharing in the contract which was correctly proportional to the
profits led this project to an effective accomplishment without any frustration.
1. COST MANAGEMENT
Millau Viaduct had achieved enormous success with its cost management in regard to it being
on schedule and within budget completion, regardless of some minor incidents caused by
extreme weather condition. The building company Eiffage had overcome such complexity of
the work and beat its schedule completion time by one month. They finished the whole project
in just 36 months after putting down the first stone of the bridge, all due to the effective
management of the project. Key success of the project was the significant amount of time spent
ensuring that the end result was a structural solution that "didn't detract from an area highly
prized for its natural beauty." [Lynn, (2005)]
The project’s final expenditure is $470 million, nearly half of the original bid price. This is
indicative of Eiffage’s effective project planning on cost management. "Eiffage's bidding team was
under strict instruction to eliminate all important uncertainties and ensure the bid price would be
accurate ... trawling through every engineering detail raised Eiffage's engineering cost to nearly $4
million." [Reina, (2004)]. The company had done extensive analysis at the initial bidding stage,
ensure every subtle engineering detail to be analyzed as accurate as possible, therefore minimize risk
due to uncertainties. The company also had a contingency budget to risk management in place in
case of uncertainty. The project’s concessionaire procurement type of ‘build - operate - transfer’ also
facilitate its performance on cost management, and incentive the company to effectively manage its
time therefore start earning revenue from collection of tolls.
Source: [Lynn, (2005)], [Reina, (2004)]

Page | 25
2. HUMAN RESORCE MANAGEMENT
Human Resource Strategies:
• The Millau Viaduct bridge required 10 years of research and 4 years of implementation to be
completed. The project required the long research time due to the violent winds in the area,
the deep valley and the difficult crossing. These difficult conditions presented many
challenges that required several different approaches to be investigated. In this time, many
engineers, architects, lawyers, local authorities and Government and local representatives.
• To accomplish this project and its challenges, during 1991 and 1993, preliminary and
feasibility studies were carried out. The studies conducted by the team of engineers at CETE
Mediterranean included deciding between the “high” and “low” solutions. On the 29th
October 1991, advice from the Director of Roads, Jean Berthier led to the Ministry deciding
to use the “high” solution due to economic and safety reasons and also lower environmental
impact. By September 1993, this “high” solution was deemed to be feasible.
• In November 1994, 5 teams were formed, each from SETEC, Jean Muller International,
SEEE Sofresid, Sogelerg & EEG & Serf and Secoa. These teams received complete
specifications on October 1995 and were to submit their proposals on April 23rd 1996. The
DDE’s technical committee evaluated these proposals based on constructability, required
studies before commencement and project estimates.
• The decision was made to use the multiple cable stayed span design by Government and state
representatives, local officials, engineers and Director of Roads on the 12th
of July 1996.
Several studies were initiated using engineers and architects to examine the designs technical
issues, resistance and response to high winds.
• In December 1999, tenders were called for and 4 candidates had applied by the cutoff date.
The tenders were analysed technically, financially and legally. Once the decision of which
tender to use was made, the contract was written. The contract said that Eiffage would take
concession of the structure for 75 operating years for funding 100% of the site works and the
European Bank of Investments would loan 50 million euros to Eiffage.
• As it can be seen, the project required many human resources from a wide range of fields and
specialties to complete. They not only include engineers and architects but also lawyers, local
authorities, Government and local representatives and banks.

Page | 26
(Sources:http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf
http://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/products/view?id=71016http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdfhttp://www.openpm.co.uk/OpenPM/Shared/APM/Cases/Mill
au%20Viaduct%20Case%20Study.pdf)

Page | 31
Group Meetings
Meeting 1:
Date: 7 August, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM
Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum
Chair-person: Shobhit Shekhar
Minutes: Everyone was assigned to find an appropriate project proposal with sufficient scope and
write a page of summery about respective proposal.
Meeting 2:
Date: 11 August, 2015 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM
Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum
Chair-person: Devyn Jackamarra
Minutes: Five project proposals were shared to discuss about their scope, availability of resources,
feasibility, strong and weak aspects and finally one was decided to be the probable group project and
submitted to Dr. Cosimo Faiello for approval.
Meeting 3:
Attendees: Shobhit Shekhar, Harsh Patel, Devyn Jackamarra, Vincent Wu, Khadija Begum, Eric
Tang, Rachel Zhang
Chair-person: Harsh Patel
Minutes: The project that was decided initially to be carried out was discarded because of not getting
spontaneous response from the company representative regarding project details and another
proposal (Millau Viaduct) was submitted by Harsh and also an email was sent to Professor Faiello
for his consent.
Meeting 4:
Date: 21 August, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM
Tang, Rachel Zhang
Chair-person: Khadija Begum
Minutes: All of the project members came up with their analysis about the project and shared their
views about the project scope, management of time, budget, risk factors and impacts on the
environment and respective society.

Page | 32
Meeting 5:
Tang, Rachel Zhang
Chair-person: Vincent Wu
Minutes: A preliminary plan was made about approaching to report writing. Work allocation was
done. The whole team was divided into three sub groups to write different sections.
Meeting 6:
Date: 1 September, 2015 (Tuesday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM
Tang, Rachel Zhang
Chair-person: Eric Tang
Minutes: Each sub-group discussed their sections. A little misunderstanding took place due to having
different perspectives of different members about how the report should be but later it was resolved
through further discussion.
Meeting 7:
Date: 4 September, 2015 (Friday) Venue: Clough Student Centre, ECM
Tang, Rachel Zhang
Chair-person: Rachel Zhang
Minutes: Everyone had their sections almost thoroughly analysed and roughly written. The final
compilation and editing part began.
PROJECT WORK ALLOCATION GUIDE SUPER GROUP
PROJECT REPORT STARTING DATE : 27-AUG-2015
PROJECT REPORT EXPECTED COMPLETION DUE DATE: 05-SEP-2015
PROJECT REPORT REVISION : 06-SEP-2015 & 07-SEP-2015
ACTUAL DATE OF COMPLETION OF REPORT : 06-SEP-2015
Section A: Case study writing
Name Work Allocated Current Status

Page | 33
Shobhit Executive summary COMPLETED on 2/9/2015
Harsh Overview and complete
description of project
resources
COMPLETED on 2/9/2015
Note – SECTION A COMPLETED
Section B: Case study analysis
IT IS AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION (A) ON FIVE MANAGEMENT STAGES: 1.
CONCEPTUALIZATION
2. PLANNING 3. EXECUTION (INCLUDING MONITORING AND CONTROLLING) 4.
FINALIZATION
Name Work allocated Due date CURRENT
STATUS
Devyn Planning part – Write
about the planning
part i.e the planning
of design, bridge
design proposals, etc.
Also, write about
problems and analysis
of it (all should be
under 600 words)
2/9/2015 COMPLETED ON
2/9/2015
Khadija Planning part- Write
the recommendations
of the problems in
Planning phase
(design of bridge) by
getting the info from
Devyn. (Please work
in collaboration with
Devyn)
2/9/2015 COMPLETED on
2/9/2015 (Same as
Devyn)
Vincent Execution part
(Controlling) - Write
about technologies
involved in designing
of bridge, like
hydraulics used,
launching of bridge,
etc. Please write in
not more than 600
words.
2/9/2015
Eric Execution part
(Monitoring)- Write
about the problems
2/9/2015 (Same as
Vincent)

Page | 34
and challenges faced
in using technologies,
their analysis
etc.(Please work in
collaboration with
Vincent and get the
info)
Rachel Finalization- Write
about the finalization
and completion of
project like how it
came to end, how they
finalized,
PROBLEMS in
finalization and the
day of opening of
bridge (please write in
not more than 600
words)
2/9/2015
Shobhit Conceptualization
part- Writing all
concept used,
different concepts in
proposals, challenges
and All problems
relating to it. (Wrote
in 700 words)
2/9/2015
Harsh Conceptualization
recommendations and
review
2/9/2015
SECTION C: CASE STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
Name Work Allocated Due date Current Status
Devyn Write the
recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015
Khadija Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015 (Same as
Devyn)
Vincent W Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
4/9/2015

Page | 35
which u did in
section B
Eric Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015 (Same as
Vincent)
Rachel Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015 Completed on
4/9/2015
Shobhit Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015 (Same as
Harsh)
Harsh Write the
Recommendations of
your planning part
which u did in
section B
4/9/2015
SECTION C CONCLUSION
Name Work Allocated Due date Current status
Vincent Analysis of project by
Risk Management
5/9/2015
Eric Analysis of project by
Human Resource
5/9/2015
Rachel Analysis of project by
Cost Management
5/9/2015
Name Work Allocated Due Date Current Status
Shobhit Conclusion Logical
summary
5/9/2015
Harsh Table of content,
references and
appendices
5/9/2015
SECTION D GROUP MEETINGS (TOTAL GROUP MEETINGS PLANNED =7)
Devyn Group Meetings
(Agenda) and write
about starting 4
5/9/2015

Page | 36
group meetings
Khadija Group Meetings
(Agenda) and write
about last 4 group
meetings
5/9/2015
COMPILATION OF REPORT AND REVISION
Shobhit Compilation and
revision
6/9/2015
Harsh Compilation and
revision
6/9/2015
Devyn Final Compilation
and revision
6/9/2015

Page | 37
REFERENCES:
Figure 1 http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/millau-viaduct-france-tallest-bridge-in.html
Figure 2 Omega Centre, Millau Route
Figure 3 http://www.pieway.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tatara-Bridge-
%E2%80%93Japan.jpg
Figure 4 http://millau.e-monsite.com/pages/1-1-le-choix-de-l-ouvrage.html
Ministère de l‟Equipement (2004)
http://www.environnement.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/millau_cle148b14.pdf (17/02/2010)
CEVM (Compagnie Eiffage du Viaduc de Millau)
Historique d’un projet né en 1987. Quelques étapes significatives d’un grand viaduc à Millau.
Unpublished document.
Omega Centre, 2007, France Millau Profile. [ONLINE] Available at:
http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdf. [03 September References: 15]
(Enerpac, 2015)
Viaduc de Millau, Revue Travaux n*216, Fevier 2005
(allendemontral.wordpress.com/le-monument-2) http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-
content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf )
(Lynn, (2005)), LYNN, J., 2005. World's Tallest Suspension Bridge Opens in South France - on
Schedule, within Budget [online]
(Reina, (2004)) Available from: a REINA, P., 2004. Multispan, Cable-Stayed crossing is High-Level
Landmark. Engineering News-Record, 252 (11). Pp. 24-29
http://www.wctrs.leeds.ac.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/abstracts/lisbon/general/03398.pdf
http://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/products/view?id=71016
http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/FRANCE_MILLAU_PROFILE.pdf
http://www.openpm.co.uk/OpenPM/Shared/APM/Cases/Millau%20Viaduct%20Case%20Study.pdf)

Page | 38
GENG5505 Major Group Project – Marking Guide (Semester 1, 2015)
Group Name: SUPER GROUP
Project name: FRANCE, MILLAU VIADUCT BRIDGE
Tutorial class attended: FRIDAY, 1 PM
Student Name SHOBHIT SHEKHAR Student ID 21777517
Student Name DEVYN JACKAMARRA Student ID 20761794
Student Name HARSH HASMUKHBHAI PATEL Student ID 21804443
Student Name KHADIJA BEGUM Student ID 21822517
Student Name XIAOFAN WU Student ID 21795592
Student Name ERIC TANG Student ID 21929169
Student Name ZIYING ZHANG Student ID 20933753
CONTENT ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Marking Very
Poor
Fair Good Excellent
Executive Summary (Maximum 1 page)
Clarity & conciseness 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
Executive Summary – Total /5
Section A: Case study writing (Approx. 1,500 words)
Clarity & conciseness of project background 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Quality & relevance of research material (i.e.facts) 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Total Section A /20
Section B: Case Study Analysis (Approx. 2,500 words)
Introduction (clarity of purpose & conciseness) 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
Use & relevance of theories & frameworks 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Depth of analysis, clear & logical argument 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Total Section B /25
Section C: Recommendations to the case (Approx. 2,000words)
Use & relevance of theories & frameworks 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Relevance & justification of recommendations 0-2.5 3 3.5 4 5 6 7.5
Insight & synthesis, clear & logical argument 0-2.5 3 3.5 4 5 6 7.5
Total Section C /25
Conclusion (Maximum 1 page)
Logical summary 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
Conclusion - Total /5
Table of contents (compulsory), references & appendices
Appropriate table of contents, appendices & references 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
Table of contents, references & appendices – Total /5
Group meetings (agenda & minutes)
Relevance & consistency of issues & outcome 0 4 5 6 7 8 10
Clarity & conciseness 0-1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
Group meetings (agenda & minutes) - Total /15
TOTAL GROUP MARK /100 %
Additional comments (if required):

PROJECT REPORT - SUPER GROUP

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