Pace, N. “Cash Transfers and Women’s Economic Inclusion Experimental evidence from Zambia.” CSAE Conference 2022, Economic Development in Africa. March 17, 2022.

1. Cash Transfers and Women’s
Economic Inclusion
Experimental evidence from Zambia
Silvio Daidone1, N. Pace1,2, N. Sitko1, F. Viberti3
1Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
2University of Teramo, Italy
3 World Food Programme
Pacific Development Conference
March 5, 2022

2. Background
• Economic inclusion concept (OECD, 2011)
• Economic growth and poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2018)
• The “psychology of scarcity” (Handa et al., 2014; Banerjee et al.,
2011)
• Gender gap (UN Women, 2018; FAO et al., 2018)
• Cash transfers (CTs) as a trigger for changes:
a. economic choices, especially in rural areas (Todd et al., 2010;
Boone et al., 2013; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Daidone et al,
2019)
b. intertemporal discount rates (Handa et al., 2020)

3. Research objectives
• Does an unconditional CT to women foster their
economic inclusion?
a. Productive capacity
b. Financial inclusion
c. Decision-making
d. Psychological assets
• Are CT impacts on productive outcomes influenced by
improvements in recipients’ psychological assets?
(unpacking direct and indirect effects)
Time preferences elicited via non-incentivized
lotteries - “Money Earlier or Later” model
(Cohen et al., 2020; Freeman et al., 2016)
Future expectations based on responses to
the question “Do you think your life will be
better in one/three/five years?”

4. Research objectives
• Does an unconditional CT to women foster their
economic inclusion?
a. Productive capacity
b. Financial inclusion
c. Social power
d. Psychological assets
• Are CT impacts on productive outcomes influenced by
improvements in recipients’ psychological assets?
(unpacking direct and indirect effects)
Time preferences elicited via non-incentivized
lotteries - “Money Earlier or Later” model
(Cohen et al., 2020; Freeman et al., 2016)
Future expectations based on responses to
the question “Do you think your life will be
better in one/three/five years?”
Starting non-farm enterprises and
assets accumulation
Women’s savings ability
decision-making power over personal
and household economic choices

5. Research objectives
• Does an unconditional CT to women foster their
economic inclusion?
a. Productive capacity
b. Financial inclusion
c. Social power
d. Psychological assets
• Are CT impacts on productive outcomes influenced by
improvements in recipients’ psychological assets?
(unpacking direct and indirect effects)
⤷ Time preferences elicited via non-incentivized lotteries - “Money Earlier
or Later” model (Cohen et al., 2020; Freeman et al., 2016)
⤷ Future expectations based on responses to the question “Do you think
your life will be better in one/three/five years?”

6. The Zambia Child Grant (CG) model of the Social Cash
Transfer (SCT) programme
• Embedded within the 5th National Strategic Development
Plan (GoZ, 2006)
• SCT initially piloted in various districts targeting labor-
constrained households.
• SCT scaled-up between 2010-2014, targeting subdivided in:
a. the Child Grant (CG) model
b. the Multiple Category Transfer Grant (MCTG)
• CG rolled out in three districts (Kalabo, Shangombo, Kaputa)
• Bimonthly flat transfer: 55/60 ZMW per month (11/12 USD) ≈
27% monthly per capita expenditure

7. Data
• RCT design with data collected during the lean season
(Sept./Dec.) in 2010 and 2013
• 2,515 households from 90 Community Welfare Assistance
Committees (CWAC) randomly assigned to immediate or delayed
participation
• Three-stage randomization:
I. 30 CWAC per district
II. 28 households per CWAC
III. Treatment assignment
• Sample selection. Dropped households:
a. Male is the main respondent (47 hhlds)
b. Main female respondent changed between baseline & follow-up
(138 hhlds)
c. Attritors (though no differential/overall attrition)
• Total sample for the analysis: 4,382 households

8. Direct impact of the CG on women’s economic inclusion
•
• Y={productive capacity, financial inclusion, social power}
• X={main respondent/hhld characteristics, shocks
experienced, district fixed effects}

9. Mediated impact of the CG on women’s economic
inclusion (WEI)
• Mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Imai et al., 2010;
2011)
• Sequential ignorability assumptions:
• When both holds, direct & mediated effects are estimated:
2 = direct effect of the CG on WEI
1 = effect of the CG on the mediator (psychological assets)
1 * 3 = indirect mediated impacts

10. Baseline balance – household characteristics
C T Diff
respondent age 29.5 29.9 0.36
completed primary ed. (main resp) 0.27 0.31 0.05
respondent married/cohabiting 0.71 0.74 0.03
# males in the hh 2.71 2.67 -0.03
# females in the hh 2.9 3.05 .16*
hh members <=5 yrs old 1.9 1.88 -0.02
hh members >=6 & <=12 yrs old 1.25 1.26 0.01
hh members >=13 & <=17 yrs old 0.44 0.5 0.07
members in hh >=15 & <=59 years old 1.94 2 0.06
members in hh >=60 years old 0.06 0.08 0.01
hh tot. consumption exp. (weekly), ZMK 44.27 48.14 3.87
% food insecure 0.53 0.48 -0.05
access to improved toilet facility 0.05 0.04 -0.01
appropriate roof 0.05 0.04 -0.02
brick walls 0.31 0.31 0
clean drinking water source 0.21 0.22 0.01
hh affected by…
drought 0.05 0.05 0
flood 0.07 0.03 -0.04
member illness 0.06 0.07 0.01
death of bread earner 0.01 0.01 0
Living in…
Kalabo district 0.33 0.33 0
Kaputa district 0.33 0.33 0
Shangombo district 0.33 0.33 0
Observations 1097 1094
Sample evenly distributed
across three districts
Only 1 variable showing
statistically significant
differences
Young uneducated main
respondent, caring for
approx. 3 children
Considerable material
hardship!!!

11. Baseline balance – outcomes* and mediators
C T Diff
Currently saving (yes=1) 0.15 0.18 0.02
Amount saved last month 19.65 17.13 -2.52
Decision-making (yes=1):
own earnings 0.57 0.54 -0.03
partner’s earnings 0.52 0.47 -0.05
major hh purchases 0.6 0.58 -0.02
daily purchases 0.65 0.64 -0.01
Decision-making index 0.59 0.57 -0.02
Observations 1097 1094
C T Diff
never propense to wait 0.23 0.18 -0.04
Switch at KW200 0.16 0.14 -0.02
Switch at KW300 0.34 0.41 0.06
Switch at KW400 0.12 0.12 0
Switch at KW600 0.09 0.09 0.01
Switch at KW800 0.04 0.02 -0.01
no better life expect. 0.32 0.29 -0.03
better life expect. in 1 yr 0.53 0.52 -0.01
better life expect. in 3 yrs 0.55 0.56 0.01
better life expect. in 5 yrs 0.62 0.63 0.01
Observations 1097 1094
Unsurprisingly low savings rate
More than half main respondents involved in
various decision-making dimensions
20.5% never willing to wait
31% with pessimistic expectations wrt future
*non-farm enterprises data available at follow-up only

12. Direct impacts: CG highly successful at fostering rural
women’s non-farm productive capacity
NFE (all) Female-led NFE NFE asset value
(female-led)
NFE profit
(female-led)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
T 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.114** 0.118*** 14.79** 15.03*** 43.40** 43.35**
(0.046) (0.038) (0.0378) (0.032) (4.562) (4.358) (16.07) (13.79)
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191
R2 0.031 0.105 0.016 0.075 0.007 0.026 0.015 0.075
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results robust to non-linear estimation methods

13. Direct impacts: CG positively affected women’s savings
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results robust to non-linear and double difference estimation methods
Currently Saving Q.ty saved (last month)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
T 0.248*** 0.248*** 54.96*** 52.29***
(0.0334) (0.0323) (12.84) (11.15)
N 2191 2191 2190 2190
R2 0.068 0.090 0.013 0.055

14. Direct impacts: nothing found on women’s decision-
making power
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results robust to non-linear and double difference estimation methods
Own Earnings Partner Earnings Major hh purchases Daily hh
purchases
Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
T -0.0278 -0.0191 0.0433 0.0429 -0.00895 -0.00130 0.00589 0.00942 0.00715 0.0112
(0.0293) (0.0284) (0.0376) (0.0356) (0.0318) (0.0251) (0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0197) (0.0193)
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191
R2 0.001 0.038 0.002 0.050 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.026

15. Direct impacts: transfer not sufficient to significantly alter
women’s time preferences
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results robust to non-linear and double difference estimation methods
Impatient KW 200 KW 800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (11) (12)
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
T -0.048 -0.0486+ 0.010 0.007 0.000 -0.002
(0.029) (0.0266) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191
R2
0.004 0.049 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.015
Results for KW
300-400-600
not shown,
though
qualitatively
similar

16. Direct impacts: improved future expectations about life
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results robust to non-linear and double difference estimation methods
Pessimist 1 Year 3 years 5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
T -0.0874*** -0.0869*** 0.102** 0.0997** 0.0679* 0.0688** 0.0949*** 0.0942***
(0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0338) (0.0320) (0.0262) (0.0237) (0.0211) (0.0198)
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191 2191
R2 0.025 0.044 0.013 0.031 0.007 0.035 0.020 0.041

17. Very small contribution of future expectations in mediating
impacts on productive capacity (≈5% of total impact)
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis.
Unadjusted models do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as,
information on the household’s head (age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics
of the household (n. of male and female members, n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet,
wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty, shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-
earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pessimist fem_NFE
(0/1)
asset_fNFE
(ZKW)
Save (0/1) qty.save
(ZKW)
T -0.0869*** 0.111*** 14.79** 0.235*** 49.22***
(0.0175) (0.0323) (4.548) (0.0327) (10.94)
pessimist -0.0799* -2.826 -0.156*** -35.35***
(0.0340) (7.951) (0.0345) (6.688)
Direct Impact 0.111*** 14.79** 0.235*** 49.22***
Mediated Impact .006** .245 .013*** 3.07***
Total Impact .117*** 15.03*** .248*** 52.28***
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2190
R2 0.044 0.077 0.027 0.098 0.056

18. Small contribution of time preferences in mediating
impacts on productive capacity (≈2.5% of total impact)
Linear weighted estimations models with robust standard errors clustered at CWAC level in parenthesis. Unadjusted models
do not include control variables, while Adjusted models include control variables such as, information on the household’s head
(age, completed primary education, married), demographic characteristics of the household (n. of male and female members,
n. of members per age group), housing conditions (toilet, wall, roof, water), household consumption and self-assessed poverty,
shocks (drought, flood, illness, bread-earner death), district of residence.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
impatient fem_NFE
(0/1)
asset_fNFE
(ZKW)
Save
(0/1)
qty.save
(ZKW)
T -0.0486+ 0.114*** 14.59*** 0.247*** 51.17***
(0.0266) (0.0315) (4.192) (0.0322) (10.91)
impatient -0.0625* -9.084* -0.0181 -23.18**
(0.0294) (4.412) (0.0385) (8.148)
Direct Impact 0.114*** 14.59*** 0.247*** 51.17***
Mediated Impact .003+ .44+ 0.00 1.12**
Total Impact 0.117*** 15.03*** 0.248*** 52.29***
N 2191 2191 2191 2191 2190
R2 0.049 0.077 0.028 0.090 0.056

19. Conclusions and policy implications
1) Strong evidence of direct impacts of CG on the productive
capacity, financial inclusion and future expectations
2) No impact on women’s decision-making
3) Weak evidence of indirect and mutually reinforcing
relationship between changes in psychological assets and
improvements in the productive capacity and financial
inclusion of beneficiaries
• Limitations of cash transfers to foster economic inclusion for
rural women.
• Integrating cash transfers with complementary programmes to
address social and cultural barriers that limit women’s decision-
making power

20. Many thanks !!!
For more info & comments:
Silvio.Daidone@fao.org
Our work:
https://www.fao.org/social-protection/en/
https://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/
https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/