My seminar paper on Think Tanks as a Source of Disruptive Innovation in Large Corporations tries to propose a viable solution to the problem many large organizations nowadays have: robust, inflexible structures, processes and cultures in which the creation and development of disruptive innovations is almost impossible. My solution: outsourced, creative, clandestine think tanks or labs that are focusing solely on disruptive innovation outside of the core business of the organization. How can this be a viable solution? Google X might be a popular and successful example. Read my paper to know why!

1. Google X
Think Tanks as a Source of
Disruptive Innovation in Large
Corporations
February 27th, 2015
Thomas Klaffke | Matrikel-Nr.: 4835459 | E-mail: thomas.klaffke@gmail.com
Modul: Innovationsforschung und -management | Univ.-Prof. Dr. Carsten Dreher
Masterstudiengang Zukunftsforschung

2. Table of Contents
List of Figures 3
1. Introduction 4
2. Barriers to Disruptive Innovation 6
2.1. Defining Disruptive Innovation 6
2.2. What Hampers Disruptive Innovation 8
3. Corporate Think Tanks 11
4. Google X 13
4.1. Google’s Innovation Strategy 13
4.2. Innovation at Google X 16
4.3. Model for Large Corporations? 20
5. Conclusion 23
Bibliography 25
Eidesstattliche Erklärung 29
I

3. List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Attributes of Google’s corporate culture 14
II

4. 1. Introduction
The world is changing - and so is business! Globalization and the dissemination of
information and telecommunication technologies have led to an increasingly complex and
accelerating world in which change is the only constant. In order to keep up with the
disruptive potentials of emerging technologies and the emergence of new startups, large
corporations nowadays are challenged to continuously adapt to the changes in their market
environment. The most prominent example of a constantly adapting and succeeding1
corporation might be Stora Enso. The roots of this Finnish-Swedish pulp and paper
manufacturer - one of the largest in the world - reach way back into the Middle Ages, with
a granting concession for its foundation that dates from 1288, making it, as some claim, the
oldest existing corporation in the world. Stora, as it was formerly known, adapted to a2
great amount of social and technological changes, surviving „the Middle Ages, the
Reformation, the wars of the 1600s, the Industrial Revolution, and the two world wars of
the twentieth century.“ Throughout its over 700 years in business, Stora „[…] shifted from
copper to forest exploitation, iron smelting, hydropower, and eventually paper, wood pulp,
and chemicals.“3
As marvelous and inspiring Stora Enso’s history is, it obviously doesn’t resemble the fate
of the ordinary, modern-day company. The transformational shifts during the last decades
seem to be much different to what we have seen in the centuries before. From 1920 to
today, the average lifespan of a company listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index of
leading US companies has decreased by 52 years, from 67 to 15 years. As a consequence,4
even longstanding, previously uncontested management and market principles are
questioned, as they seem to be unable to provide relevant guidelines for today’s
corporations. Ever since renown economist Michael E. Porter began the discussion about
competitive advantages, competition-based strategies have been the dominant focus - from
see Tidd, Joe et al. (2005), Managing Innovation - Integrating Technological, Market and Organizational1
Change. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. Ed. 3. pp. 39-50
see Gittleson, Kim (2012), Can a company live forever? BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/2
business-16611040 [24.02.15]
see de Geus, Arie (1997), The Living Company. Harvard Business Review. March-April 1997. p. 533
see Gittleson (2012), Can a company live forever?4
!4

5. choosing a good market position (cost leadership, differentiation or focus) to
benchmarking the competition. More recent papers in strategy and innovation5
management, however, propose a parting of these old-fashioned strategies in virtue of new
market factors - as renowned business thinker Gary Hamel puts it: „[…] in a discontinuous
world, strategy innovation is the key to wealth creation.“ These new endeavors are6
ultimately advising companies to avoid fierce competition and to venture into new
uncontested markets and value networks. In his bestseller „The Innovator’s Dilemma:7
when new technologies cause great firms to fail“, esteemed Harvard professor Clayton M.
Christensen points out that even well-managed, innovative companies fail to stay atop their
industries when confronted with what he coined disruptive technology.8
One way of withstanding the disruptive forces of this changing business world, is to spur
and implement disruption oneself. However, as Christensen demonstrates in his book, there
is no challenge more difficult for a successful market leader facing disruption than to
disrupt itself before a startup or a competitor does it. In order to be able to develop and9
implement disruption itself, an organization first and foremost has to overcome its barriers
to innovation. This includes cultural, structural and managerial aspects that more often than
not lead to innovation happening outside, by new and quickly found startups, rather than
within the company. The question that arises is how a large corporation with all those
ingrained structures and values might still be able to stimulate disruptive innovation?
One strategy that has been around for many decades but seems to come evermore into
popularity, is the establishment of so called corporate think tanks: semi-independent
research and development departments, specifically formed to identify, analyze, develop,
and implement disruptive innovations. Being one of the current top innovative companies10
see Porter, Michael E. (1985), Competitive Advantage - Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance.5
New York: The Free Press.
see Hamel, Gary (1998), Strategy Innovation and the Quest for Value. Sloan Management Review. Winter6
1998. Vol. 39, No. 2. pp. 7-14
see ibid.; Christensen, Clayton M. (2003), The Innovator’s Dilemma. New York: HarperBusiness Essentials.7
ed. 1 and McGrath, Rita G. (2013), The End of Competitive Advantage. Harvard Business Review Press.
see Christensen (2003), The Innovator’s Dilemma. p. xviii8
see Christensen (2003), The Innovator’s Dilemma. pp. 257-2619
see Poguntke, Sven (2014), Corporate Think Tanks - Zukunftsgerichtete Denkfabriken, Innovation Labs,10
Kreativforen & Co. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. pp. 19-36
!5

6. in the world, Google has been researching and developing disruptive innovations at its11
own corporate think tank called Google X. With ongoing mega-projects stretching from
driverless cars to cancer-searching nanoparticles, Google X has become a decent amount of
media coverage since its official launch in 2010. The secretive lab at the edge of the
Google campus is specifically designed to find science-fiction sounding solutions to
humanity’s big problems while increasing Google’s impact in industries outside of
Google’s core business or even creating completely new ones.12
This seminar paper is examining the potential of corporate think tanks as a source of
disruptive innovation in large corporations. In the first chapter, a clear definition of the
term disruptive innovation as well as factors and mechanisms hampering disruptive
innovations in large corporations are outlined and analyzed. The second chapter gives an
overview of the types, structures and goals of corporate think tanks, including some
examples. The third and last chapter takes an extensive look at Google X. A brief outline of
Google’s general innovation strategy is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the
structures, processes and principles of Google X. Finally, the lab’s potential as a model for
large corporations is examined.
2. Barriers to Disruptive Innovation
In order to get an idea on why large corporations have severe difficulties spurring
disruptive innovations within their organizations and networks, let us first define what
disruptive innovation precisely means, and furthermore explore the factors and
mechanisms that specifically hamper the development of disruptive innovations within
large corporations.
2.1. Defining Disruptive Innovation
It wasn’t before Clayton M. Christensen wrote his famous book „The Innovator’s
Dilemma“ in 1997 that the terms disruptive technology and disruptive innovation became
see Lidsky, David (2014), The Breathtaking Breadth of Google - Most Innovative Companies 2014. Fast11
Company. February 12, 2014. http://www.fastcompany.com/3026059/most-innovative-companies-2014/the-
breathtaking-breadth-of-google [25.02.15]
see Gertner, Jon (2014), The Truth about Google X: An Exclusive Look Behind the Secretive Lab’s Closed12
Doors. Fast Company. April 14, 2014. http://www.fastcompany.com/3028156/united-states-of-innovation/
the-google-x-factor [25.02.15]
!6

7. popular in the business world and academia. Although concepts and definitions similar to
Christensen’s have always been around in the academic circles of strategy and innovation
management, it is Christensen and the insights gathered from his analysis of company
failure in the disk drive industry that has shed the most light on the phenomena. In his
book, and in various academic papers he has written, Christensen reveals that even well-
managed, very innovative companies can fail due to the emergence of disruptive
technologies. On the basis of his extensive research, Christensen makes the renowned13
case for differentiating between sustaining and disruptive technologies. Hereby,
Christensen uses a broad definition of technology that encompasses marketing, investment,
and managerial, in addition to engineering and manufacturing processes. He describes
technology as „[…] the processes by which an organization transforms labor, capital,
materials, and information into products and services of greater value“ and calls innovation
„[…] a change in one of these technologies.“ He than concurs that, while a sustaining14
technology can be either incremental or radical in character, sustaining technologies do not
create new markets or value networks like disruptive technologies do. Sustaining
technologies rather „[…] improve the performance of established products, along the
dimensions of performance that mainstream customers […] have historically valued.“15
Disruptive technologies however, bring a completely different and novel value proposition
to a market. They introduce, among others, simplicity, convenience, accessibility, and
affordability in markets where high costs and complication are the status quo. A16
disruptive innovation therefore can be defined as a technological change, resulting in a
product and/or service that creates new markets and value networks, eventually displacing
old technologies. A prominent example of a disruptive innovation is the personal computer.
As a simpler, smaller, much more convenient and affordable product, the personal
computer displaced the old mainframes and minicomputers in the 1980s. Many of the
previously successful and viable companies that were manufacturing mainframes and
minicomputers did not make the transition to personal computers which was commenced
see Christensen (2003), The Innovator’s Dilemma. pp. xvi-xx13
ibid. p. xvi14
ibid. p. xviii15
ibid.16
!7

8. by some of todays top brands (e.g. Apple). Christensen’s breakthrough insights reveal17
that companies competing in a contested head-to-head market and focusing on higher
margins through sustaining innovations always loose to companies implementing
disruptive technologies and creating new value networks.
A concept by INSEAD Business School professors W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne
called Blue Ocean Strategy comes to a similar understanding and might also be of
relevance to the analysis in this paper, especially regarding the applicability of the
corporate think tank model to large corporations [see Chapter 4.2]. Kim and Mauborgne
argue that accelerated technological advances and globalization have substantially
improved industrial productivity and information gain, while profit margins, niche markets,
and monopolies dwindled. The rising imperative for companies, they conclude, is to let go
of companies’ traditional focus on competition-based strategies and to create blue oceans,
i.e. uncontested and untapped markets with opportunities for highly profitable growth, by
expanding existing industry boundaries. Kim and Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean Strategy is18
based on value innovation which is defined - similarly to Christensen’s disruptive
innovation concept - as creating a leap in value for one’s customers and company, thereby
opening up new untapped market space. Likewise Christensen’s work, the Blue Ocean19
Strategy puts the emphasis on needs of new, potential customers instead of catering to and
focusing on retaining and expanding existing ones.20
2.2. What Hampers Disruptive Innovation
„It seems that the very factors that lead to a firm’s success can also play a
significant role in its demise. The leadership, vision, strategic focus, valued competencies,
structures, policies, rewards, and corporate culture that were all so critical in building the
ibid. p. xiif17
Kim, W. Chan and Mauborgne, Renee (2005), Blue Ocean Strategy - How to Create Uncontested Market18
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. pp. 4f, 8
ibid. p.1219
ibid. pp. 100ff20
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9. company’s growth and competitive advantage during one period can become its Achilles
heel as technological and market conditions change over time.“21
While the previous chapter defined and outlined arguments for disruptive innovation, this
chapter deals with the barriers to disruptive innovation within organizations. A look at the
literature reveals various kinds of models and studies regarding general hurdles to
innovation. This chapter however tries to focus specifically on inhibitors of disruptive
innovation. Christensen’s research of company failure in light of disruption, and several22
other studies on the topic, expose the prevailing mechanisms hampering disruptive
innovation. Although being somewhat interconnected, these mechanisms can be clustered23
into managerial, cultural, and organizational barriers.
The literature analysis leads to three main managerial barriers: the failure to recognize
the strategic importance of disruptive innovations, the dominant focus on existing business
models, products, and customer needs, and the neglect to capture disruptive ideas of
employees. Various examples of company failure due to disruption show that many
corporations still lack a fundamental awareness of the imperative of disruptive innovation.
In spite of new management theories by Christensen and others, many companies keep on
sticking to the competition-based strategy principles of the older days. These companies
tend to focus too much on their existing business models and customer needs. They are
therefore more occupied with sustaining their current way of doing things, improving
existing designs and technologies, than with incorporating new ideas. Thus, innovative
concepts by employees are discouraged or left behind and technology-innovation remains
path-dependent and foreseeable. The company ultimately becomes hostage to its own
Paap, Jay and Katz, Ralph (2004) Predicting the „Unpredictable“ - Anticipating Disruptive Innovation.21
Research-Technology Management. Vol. 74, No. 5. Washington: Industrial Research Institute. pp. 13f
see Loewe, Pierre and Dominiquini, Jennifer (2006) "Overcoming the barriers to effective innovation",22
Strategy & Leadership, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 24f
see Christensen (2003), The Innovator’s Dilemma. pp. 33-68 and Assink, Marnix (2006), Inhibitors of23
Disruptive Innovation Capability: A Conceptual Model. European Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 9,
No. 2. pp. 215-233 and Anonymous (2006), Becoming part of the new innovation paradigm. Strategic
Direction. Vol. 22, No. 4. pp. 30-32 and Thomond, Pete et al. (2003), Disruptive Innovation: Removing the
Innovator’s Dilemma. Harrogate: British Academy of Management Conference and Paap and Katz (2004)
Predicting the „Unpredictable“ - Anticipating Disruptive Innovation. pp. 13-23
!9

10. success. This is what Christensen calls the innovator’s dilemma or what Paap and Katz call
dualism.24
Besides management, a corporate culture can pose great obstacles to developing
disruptive innovations. Over the years, companies develop their own, unique culture
including specific artifacts, shared basic assumptions, and values. Sometimes these25
aspects are deeply ingrained into the corporate culture, to the extent that the company and
its individuals become unable to unlearn and to overcome old logic and mental models.
This also prevents the advent of new, innovative, break-the-rules ideas which disruptive
innovation needs. In contingent, fast-moving and uncertain environments, rigid and often
tacit business routines and mindsets become major stumbling blocks for transformational
change. Such cultures tend to hold on fiercely to their organization-wide beliefs, in
particular when previous successes have underlined the company’s long-existing values
and philosophies, leading to innovation-obstructing complacency.26
Finally, there are various organizational barriers regarding disruptive innovation.
Hierarchical structures and excessive bureaucracy, often seen in large corporations, lead to
slow-moving processes, risk-averse climates, and a decline in creativity. In order to
implement transformational change or to push disruptive ideas through, employees of such
companies often have to struggle with long lists of rules, standardized procedures, and
infighting. Many companies lack a mandatory infrastructure for researching, developing
and marketing disruptive innovations. Thus, innovative employees are left with the options
to either bootleg, create their own venture or to eventually forget about their ideas.27
A corporation set to overcome the before mentioned barriers has to come up with, and
implement new ways of strategy and innovation management. One of the solutions, as
proposed in this seminar paper, might be the establishment of a corporate think tank. Its
see ibid.24
see Schein, Edgar H. (1999), The Corporate Culture Survival Guide: Sense and Nonsense About Cultural25
Change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. pp. 15-58
see Marnix (2006), Inhibitors of Disruptive Innovation Capability: A Conceptual Model. pp. 219-224 and26
Paap and Katz (2004), Predicting the „Unpredictable“ - Anticipating Disruptive Innovation. p. 14
see Marnix (2006), Inhibitors of Disruptive Innovation Capability: A Conceptual Model. pp. 226f27
!10

11. characteristics and therefore its potential to break barriers to disruptive innovation are
examined in the following chapters.
3. Corporate Think Tanks
Academic articles and books about think tanks within corporations are almost non existent.
The concept itself has its roots in the second world war, its name originating from the bug-
proof rooms („tanks“) in which experts held important discussions about military strategy.
The term think tank later became common when referring to organizations offering
military or political advice. It wasn’t until recent years that this specific term has become28
increasingly popular among businesses. Sven Poguntke in his book „Corporate Think
Tanks“, defines them as
„forums, task forces or divisions in which interdisciplinary teams of employees
and/or external individuals (e.g. experts, partners, customers) deal with future-oriented
issues. Corporate think tanks are intended to contribute to the decision-making of
executives and to the realization of business goals by conducting analyses, identifying
growth areas, formulating strategies or yielding innovations.“29
Poguntke differentiates between three types of corporate think tanks: analyzing think
tanks, creative think tanks and a combination of both. While analyzing think tanks solely
focus on assessing trends and developments in the company’s business environment to
identify growth areas and new markets, creative think tanks develop specific solutions and
innovations. Furthermore, corporate think tanks can either be established as a permanent,30
separate organizational division, as a temporary task force within a corporation, or as an
external consulting service offered by specific agencies. The expression corporate think31
tank can therefore be seen as an attempt to create a generic term. Idea labs, creative labs,
see Poguntke, Sven (2014), Corporate Think Tanks. p. 928
ibid. p.13. translated from German: „Corporate Think Tanks sind Foren, Projektgruppen oder29
Unternehmensbereiche, in denen sich interdisziplinäre Teams aus Mitarbeitern und/oder Externen (z. B.
Experten, Kooperationspartner, Kunden) mit zukunftsorientierten Fragestellungen beschäftigen. Corporate
Think Tanks sollen einen Beitrag zur Entscheidungsfindung von Führungskräften sowie zur Erreichung von
Unternehmenszielen leisten, z. B. durch die Durchführung von Analysen, die Identifikation von
Wachstumsfeldern, die Konzeption von Strategien oder das Hervorbringen von Innovationen.“
see ibid. pp.13f30
see ibid. pp.15f31
!11

12. innovation labs, skunkworks, and other terms classify as synonymous or subordinate items,
according to Poguntke.32
One of the historically most prominent examples of corporate think tanks are Xerox PARC
(Palo Alto Research Center) and Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Programs,
better known as Skunk Works. Xerox PARC is the legendary Palo Alto based think tank of
U.S. photocopier manufacturer Xerox Corporation. Established in 1970, the division was
meant to gather top scientists and engineers to develop the products of the future. Former
employees describe the atmosphere at Xerox PARC as being energetic, young and full of
individual freedom. Thus, it sparked disruptive innovations like the laser printer, ethernet
and the first personal computer with a graphic interface. However, executives at the
company didn’t fully understand the visions the innovators had, eventually leading to the
fall of Xerox and to the advent of new successful companies like Apple Computers.33
The history of Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works division goes back even further. When
during the second world war, Nazi-Germany’s then high-tech jets appeared over Europe,
the U.S. needed an appropriate reaction which led to the creation of Lockheed Martin’s
secretive R&D lab. In the following decades, engineers at Skunk Works created all kinds of
breakthrough military spy planes and fighter jets. Today, Skunk Works still is a source of34
disruptive innovations in many areas. Just recently, Lockheed Martin unveiled a project
aimed at revolutionizing the energy industry by developing a compact nuclear fusion
reactor. The concept that lies behind Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works is very similar to35
what Pogunkte calls corporate think tanks and has over the years become an often-used
term for clandestine company projects. A skunkworks project usually refers to a small team
separated from the ongoing business of an organization with complete autonomy,
see ibid. p. 1432
see Stillich, Sven (2008), Die wahren PC-Erfinder - Weltherrschaft verschlafen. Spiegel Online. October33
29, 2008. http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/die-wahren-pc-erfinder-a-947989.html [25.02.15]
see Garrison, Peter (2010), Head Skunk. Air&Space Magazine. Smithsonian. March 2010. http://34
www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/head-skunk-5960121/?all [25.02.15]
see Norris, Guy (2014), Skunk Works Reveals Compact Fusion Reactor Details. Aviation Week & Space35
Technology. October 15, 2014. http://aviationweek.com/technology/skunk-works-reveals-compact-fusion-
reactor-details [25.02.15]
!12

13. responsibility, freedom for creativity, and control over resources. Both examples illustrate36
the potential of corporate think tanks and their unique characteristics.
4. Google X
In reference to above-outlined definition of corporate think tanks, Google X can be
classified as a combination of a skunkworks project and a permanent, separate, and rather
creative than analyzing corporate think tank. The main idea behind Google X dates to
around 2009, when Google’s founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page hit on the idea of
creating a management position - a Director of the Other - with the purpose to examine
and oversee innovation ideas far from Google’s core businesses. In 2010, This idea evolved
into what is now known as Google X. In the beginning, Google engineer and former
Stanford professor Sebastian Thrun, who led Google X’s driverless car project, ran the
secretive corporate think tank together with Google’s founder Sergey Brin. Later, Thrun
was eventually succeeded by Eric „Astro“ Teller, a scientist, engineer, and serial-
entrepreneur. Google X has since become a hotbed for science-fiction sounding projects
and breakthrough innovations. Its current, known-of projects span from developing above
mentioned driverless cars to internet-providing balloons, augmented reality glasses, kite-
like wind turbines, smart contact lenses, and cancer-detecting nanoparticles. What is
common about all of Google X’s projects is that all of them defy logic and are
uncomfortably ambitious and disruptive.37
4.1. Google’s Innovation Strategy
„It seems as if no company, executive, or institution truly understands how to
survive and prosper in the internet age. Except Google.“38
Before examining the innovation mechanisms at Google X, a quick overview of how
Google works and how its management model supports the development of innovations is
see Rich, Ben R. (1988), The Skunk Works Management Style - It’s no Secret. Vital Speeches Of The Day.36
November 15, 1988. Vol. 55, No. 3. pp. 87-93
see Gertner, Jon (2014), The Truth about Google X. Fast Company and Miller, Claire C. and Bilton, Nick37
(2011), Google’s Lab of Wildest Dreams. The New York Times. November 13, 2011. http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/technology/at-google-x-a-top-secret-lab-dreaming-up-the-future.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [25.02.15] and Stone, Brad (2013), Inside Google’s Secret Lab. Bloomberg Business.
May 22, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-05-22/inside-googles-secret-lab [25.02.15]
Jarvis, Jeff (2009), What Would Google Do? New York: HarperCollins. Ed. 1. p. 338
!13

14. essential. From the very beginning, founders Brin and Page outlined Google’s vision, its
values and its main goals, as they did not want to build „just“ another company based on
conventional thinking. Their intention was to build a dynamic organization in which
constant improvement, change, and transformation was expected and in which an
environment and culture exist, where smart, committed, and creative individuals that are
eager to innovate can expand their abilities to the fullest. Thus, continuous innovation is
since its beginnings deeply ingrained into Google’s DNA.
Much of the company’s unique management model and innovation strategy can be
explained by its corporate culture, which represents the core and the roots of many
decisions made at the Google campus. On the basis of a one-year study of Google’s39
innovation model, Annika Steiber, together with the Chalmers University of Technology,
clustered the company’s culture into four main categories: focus, ambition, cooperation
& collaboration, as well as ethic (see Figure 1.1.).40
Figure 1.1: Attributes of Google’s culture41
see Steiber, Annika (2014), The Google Model - Managing Continuous Innovation in a Rapidly Changing39
World. Cham: Springer. Management for Professionals. pp. 39, 42f
see ibid. pp. 48ff40
ibid. p. 4941
!14

15. Without going too much into detail, Steiber describes that Google’s culture is driven by a
clear focus on the specific mission of organizing the world’s information coupled with an
emphasis on the individual, by giving each employee enough latitude to pursue his or her
own projects. Another important characteristic of Google’s culture is the highly ambitious
attitude. Google sets challenging goals and persuades every employee to think big.
Therefore, radical and disruptive innovations are more common than incremental
improvements and „me too products“. An emphasis is put on creating great solutions and
benefits for people, while „the issue of how Google will earn money on the innovation is
postponed until later stages.“ In this context, Steiber also mentions the creative42
environment that Google provides to its employees. Google’s offices are designed similar
to university campuses, leading to an unconstrained work atmosphere to foster
collaboration and creativity. At Google, self-organization and taking initiatives are valued
highly. Google employees describe their coworkers as being incredibly smart but at the
same time very humble. This, coupled with open spaces and offices as well as lots of
transparency and frequent collaboration events, provides an environment in which even
high level executives are available to answer questions or to do a chitchat. The last aspect
Steiber mentions is Google’s unique ethics. Here, Google’s famous guidelines „Don’t be
evil“ and „Do good for society“ play a major role. Early on, Google’s founders Brin and
Page stated that Google’s goal was to make the world a better place. The company’s
employees are expected to strive towards this goal and to adhere to, and embody Google’s
ethical guidelines. Those same ethics also play a major role at Google X, as outlined43
below (see Chapter 4.2).
Besides Google’s distinctive culture, the company’s characteristic structure is another
important driver for its success. Google finds itself in a constant process of balancing
chaos and order: to foster creativity and self-initiative, an organization needs a
decentralized and a flat structure - to make profits and succeed in business, a company
needs rules, a top-down management approach, and order. Google is able to blend these
ibid. p.5242
ibid. pp. 48ff43
!15

16. two roles in a unique way. On the one hand, Google is strongly striving for self-organizing
systems and tries to avoid as much hierarchy and bureaucracy as possible, on the other
hand, the company sticks to clear objectives, goals and prioritization given by the top
management, and is very much driven by its founders curiosity and ideas. This is also44
where Google X comes in. As described above, it was an idea Google’s founders Brin and
Page had developed early on: to have a small part of Google focusing on innovation ideas
far from the company’s core business. Eric Schmidt, former CEO and present executive
chairman of Google, described this concept by calling it the 70-20-10 formula. In 2005, he
stated that, from a management perspective, „‚we spend 70 percent of our time on core
search and ads. We spend 20 percent on adjacent businesses, ones related to the core
businesses in some interesting way. […] And then 10 percent of our time should be on
things that are truly new.‘“45
This formula assures that Google is keeping its core businesses successfully running, but
also provides enough time for thinking about radical and disruptive innovations. Google X
seems to be a specific unit for developing such „things that are truly new“. The factors that
enable Google X to research and develop the truly new are examined in the following
chapter, by looking at three categories, similarly to the Chapters above: Google X’s
organizational integration, its culture and its processes.
4.2. Innovation at Google X
As mentioned above, Google X is a separate, secretive and creative corporate think tank of
Google Inc. Its mission is to develop longterm, futuristic and disruptive products and
services that are outside of the company’s core business. The idea is to have a R&D
department that takes on projects that nobody else is doing. Small companies usually don’t
have the resources for such projects, the government often states that it is too risky, long-
term, and big companies are mainly afraid of loosing their shareholders or current
customers. Ultimately, Google X strives to develop other huge businesses that could
augment Google’s core search division.46
ibid. pp. 68ff44
Batelle, John (2005), The 70 Percent Solution. Business 2.0 Magazine. Vol. 5, No. 11. December 1, 2005.45
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2005/12/01/8364616/index.htm [25.02.15]
see Gertner (2014), The Truth about Google X. Fast Company.46
!16

17. To do just that, Google’s top management made sure that the department is established as a
separate unit with independent resources. Google X is - alike its organizational integration -
mainly located at the edge of Google’s main campus and is about 250 employees strong.
The research and development at Google X is usually done independent from any
involvement by teams and departments from the main Google units. In Google X’s early47
days, even most of the company’s main employees didn’t know the lab exist. It is only48
when projects reach a certain maturity that these are send to the core company for further
development and implementation. This happened recently for example with Google Brain
(now called Neural Network Project), a machine learning project which was first
undertaken by a Google X team and is now part of Google’s core departments. This49
example illustrates the uniqueness of Google X and its role as a corporate think tank,
which obviously conducts completely different projects to what other Google R&D
departments do. Its extraordinary concept even goes against what most large corporations
do, regarding far-off-research and risky long-term projects. These days, large corporations
rather establish incubators and corporate ventures to fund startups, or buy rights to ideas
and patents from university research or government labs than researching and developing it
by themselves. While Google is doing that too, Google X strives to be a think tank of
curious, smart, diverse, and creative employees which comes up with its own out-of-the-
box ideas. Fast Company’s Jon Gertner, one of the first journalists who was granted access
to the clandestine lab, sums up three criteria that these ideas share:
„all must address a problem that affects millions—or better yet, billions—of
people. All must utilize a radical solution that has at least a component that resembles
science fiction. And all must tap technologies that are now (or very nearly) obtainable.“50
Google X’s head, Astro Teller and Rich DeVaul, head of the Rapid Evaluation Team at
Google X, emphasize that none of the projects they are taking on should be incremental.
Teller calls the lab’s projects moonshots and the concept behind it moonshot or 10x
see ibid.47
see Miller and Bilton (2011), Google’s Lab of Wildest Dreams. The New York Times.48
see Dougherty, Conor (2015), Hoping Google’s Lab is a Rainmaker. The New York Times. February 15,49
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/business/google-aims-for-sky-but-investors-start-to-clamor-for-
profits.html [25.02.15]
Gertner (2014), The Truth about Google X. Fast Company.50
!17

18. thinking. The idea behind moonshots is to develop a perspective shift: by taking on far
riskier and bigger problems, a team has to think in completely different ways than by just
improving things incrementally or even radically. Teller and DeVaul believe that it is often
times even easier to come up with solutions when you have a ten times bigger problem to
solve. An example of moonshot thinking would be Google X’s Project Loon. The51
audacious idea behind Project Loon is to connect the last few billion people to the internet.
To make such an idea a reality, one has to think in much crazier and distinct ways than one
who, for instance, simply wanted to improve network bandwidth and coverage in a specific
region. The encouragement to think crazy led to the concept of a global network of high-
altitude balloons orbiting the earth and providing internet service to people in remote and
rural regions. Google X is currently still conducting experiments with its balloons.
However, various telco companies have expressed interest to partner with Google to
further implement the project.52
The moonshot mentality and the encouragement to be creative and think crazy has other
benefits, too. For one, it lures smart and creative people from all over the world who want
to come and work for Google X, and secondly, it gives an intangible incentive to go to
work and to do your best, as there is a difference between coming to work to create the
next smartphone, and coming to work to make the first robot car, to fight cancer, or to
connect the poor to the internet. Moreover, it takes the pressure to form a business plan or53
to think about how to make profits, consequently leading to more creativity and risk-
taking. Thus, Google X’s mission and its projects’ nature themselves already drive the
formation of its highly innovative culture, and at the same time emphasize the focus on
disruptive innovations. The lab seeks out people with diverse backgrounds, and unique
CV’s who are keen on building something. As mentioned above, crazy, bold and science
fiction-sounding ideas are welcomed. Employees report that working on things like
teleportation, levitation or space elevators have even been talked about. The employees at
Google X are constantly pushed to take on risky ideas, to create breakthroughs and to stay
see ibid.51
see Levy, Steven (2014), Google’s Balloon Internet Experiment, One Year Later. Wired. June 16, 2014.52
http://www.wired.com/2014/06/google-balloons-year-later/ [25.02.15]
cf. Google for Work (2013), Moonshot Thinking from Astro Teller. Google for Work YouTube Channel.53
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cA_8IO3vbFs&spfreload=10 [25.02.15]
!18

19. positive if failure occurs. This is accomplished by establishing a culture in which failure is
rewarded - e.g. Google X’s head, Astro Teller, is said to give employees hugs if they admit
mistakes or if their project failed. As a result, a „cult of failure“ is established and
employees tend to take on higher risks, think more creative, and are less daunted when
things go wrong. In addition, people don’t hang on too long to a doomed idea, but rather
fail fast and start working on the next thing.54
Another distinctive feature of Google X is how it is conducting its innovation process.
Unfortunately, as Google X is a somewhat secretive lab, there aren’t that many sources that
describe the specific processes going on at the think tank. However, several journalists,
especially aforementioned Fast Company’s Jon Gertner, have been able to get a look at
some of the ways Google X is approaching and developing new ideas. While ideas for55
new projects come from various people inside Google X as well as from the outside - either
from the core company, its founders or acquaintances in academia - all ideas usually
undergo a rapid evaluation process at first. The lab has its own team of about half a dozen
diverse inventors and engineers to do just that: vetting hundreds of ideas by trying anything
possible to making them fall apart. This occurs by using rapid prototyping in a quick and
dirty approach. If several ideas might lead to solving a problem or parts of it, Google X’s so
called Rapid Evaluation Team quickly tries to implement those ideas by building cheap and
scrappy prototypes and testing them out. This ensures that a large amount of ideas can
actually be tested, and that the technologies used, are ones that are already available. Later,
the best ideas are further explored and questions concerning the scale of the problem, the
impact of the proposed solution, and the technological risks are discussed. If an idea still
holds, a more advanced prototype is built, an official project is commenced and a team is
assembled. It is only then, that the project is made public and that project managers begin
looking at specific business plans.56
see Gertner (2014), The Truth about Google X. Fast Company and Stone, Brad (2013), Inside Google’s54
Secret Lab. Bloomberg Business. p. 4 and Grossman, David (2014), Secret Google lab ‚rewards staff for
failure’. BBC News. January 24, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25880738 [25.02.15]
see Gertner (2014), The Truth about Google X. Fast Company55
ibid.56
!19

20. 4.3. Model for Large Corporations?
„Imagine if General Motors invested in drought-resistant crops, or Disney decided
to build small nuclear power plants, or Microsoft got into the algae business. That is the
kind of boundary crashing that has become commonplace at Google.“57
After examining the innovation model of Google’s secret lab for disruptive innovations, the
question arises, wether this model could be applied to other large corporations? This
question is even more interesting as Google isn’t the usual company. Google is considered
one of the top innovative companies in the world; its current market capitalization is at a58
whopping $364 billion; in 2014, it has accumulated $66 billion, with a year on year59
growth of 19 %; and it is expected to have more than $100 billion in cash and cash-like60
securities by the end of 2016. Thus, how applicable and how desirable is the Google X61
model to other large corporations that might not be in such an advantageous situation?
First of all, Google X isn’t just a playground for experimenting with audacious ideas. And
it isn’t as far away from accumulating profits for its parent company as many would think.
Unfortunately, due to its clandestine character, there isn’t any information on how much
money Google pours into Google X. However, its aforementioned sprung out machine
learning project, Google Brain, alone is said to produce a value that is comparable to
Google X’s total costs. In addition, Google is already in talks with telco companies62
regarding its Project Loon. Thus, telco companies could soon be able to lease Google’s
balloons when needed, generating revenue for Google and leading to substantially more
Gunther, Marc (2015), Self-driving cars and elevators to space: what will come of Google’s bold57
‚moonshots’. The Guardian. February 19, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/feb/
19/google-x-glass-nest-makani-driverless-cars-bold-bets-tech [25.02.15]
see Jaruzelski, Barry et al. (2013), The 2013 Global Innovation 1000 Study - Navigating the Digital Future.58
Booz & Company. http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_2013-Global-Innovation-1000-
Study-Navigating-the-Digital-Future_Media-Report.pdf [25.02.15] and Lidsky (2014), The Breathtaking
Breadth of Google - Most Innovative Companies 2014.
see Anonymous (2015), Google Inc. (GOOG) - NasdaqGS. Yahoo! Finance. http://finance.yahoo.com/q?59
s=GOOG [25.02.15]
see Google (2015), Google Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2014 Results. Google Investor60
Relations. January 29, 2014. https://investor.google.com/earnings/2014/Q4_google_earnings.html [25.02.15]
see Barr, Alistair (2014), Google’s Expected $100 Billion Cash Pile Prompts Call for Dividend. Wall Street61
Journal, November 1, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/11/01/googles-expected-100-billion-cash-pile-
prompts-call-for-dividend/ [25.02.15]
see Dougherty, Conor (2015), Hoping Google’s Lab is a Rainmaker. The New York Times.62
!20

21. internet users who might use Google services. Moreover, as Google X has only been63
founded five years ago, most of the lab’s projects are still in the development stage and
have therefore not yet yielded any revenues. One could nonetheless presume that once
mature and successfully implemented, projects like self-driving cars, smart contact lenses
and drone delivery could eventually yield massive profits. Hence, while Google’s large pile
of cash and its continuous growth certainly play an important role in the way Google, its
top executives, and its shareholders handle risks, it would be false to assume that only a
company in such an advantageous situation as Google were able to establish such a lab. As
illustrated above (in Chapter 4 and 4.1), the establishment of Google X is more likely due
to Sergey Brin and Larry Page’s desire to attack huge problems and to create disruptive
technologies as well as to Google’s longterm business strategy, than just to the playfulness
of a wealthy company.
There are however setbacks and negative stories, too. Recently, Google X’s first
commercially available product, Google Glass, was scrapped. Two and a half years after
the augmented reality glasses were unveiled and after many criticism and concerns from
the public and privacy groups, the production of the $1,500 glasses was stopped. Even
though the future potential of such glasses is projected to be very high, critics argue that
the consumer good came out just too early. Furthermore, most of Google X’s currently64
known-of projects aren’t as originally developed as Google X markets them or as they are
talked of in the media. The idea behind Project Loon for example wasn’t one that
originated at Google X or even Google. Already in 2008, a company called Space Data
Corp. was experimenting with internet-providing balloons. Back then, Google even
considered partnering with or buying the company. Recently, another project which deals65
with a potential disruptive innovation called Engineered Architecture has come under
scrutiny. Architect Eli Attia who began developing the concept in 1996 continued working
on it at Google X, shortly after the lab was founded. However, after one year, Google X
see Levy, Steven (2014), Google’s Balloon Internet Experiment, One Year Later. Wired.63
see Metz, Rachel (2014), Google Glass is Dead; Long Live Smart Glasses. MIT Technology Review.64
November 26, 2014. http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/532691/google-glass-is-dead-long-
live-smart-glasses/ [25.02.15]
see Sharma, Amol (2008), Floating a New Idea For Going Wireless, Parachute Included. The Wall Street65
Journal, February 20, 2008. http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120347353988378955 [25.02.15]
!21

22. scrapped the project and created an independent business out of it, while Attia was
apparently no longer needed. Later, Attia accused Google X of stealing his idea, and in
2014, a lawsuit against Google was filed. These two examples show that not everything66
about Google X is exciting and blemishless.
Nonetheless, regarding the increasing imperative to create new markets Christensen and
others talk about as well as the barriers to innovation, both discussed in Chapter 2, the
establishing of a Google X-like corporate think tank seems highly attractive for large
corporation. As mentioned above, Christensen as well as Kim and Mauborgne argue that
large corporations, to a certain extent, have to let go of competition-based management
strategies and their increased focus on customer needs and sustaining innovations. They
believe that it is absolutely essential for companies to invest sufficient resources creating
and opening up new untapped market spaces by developing disruptive innovations. A
corporate think tank, such as Google X, can be set up as a unit which is exactly designed to
do just that (see Chapter 3 and 4.2). The model of Google X, if realized in a
commensurable way, has the potential to solve two problems: it can evade barriers to
innovation and it can provide a space specifically for risky, longterm innovation projects,
that are far from the company’s core business. Old, ingrained routines, company values,
mindsets, and beliefs can thereby be circumvent. Moreover, hierarchies and bureaucracy
which might play a substantial role in the core departments of a company, do not play any
role in an outsourced division, established especially with the aim to foster creativeness ,
collaboration and crazy thinking. By having a separate division, the core departments can
furthermore increase their focus on the daily business and don’t have to bother themselves
with questions about new market opportunities and the company’s future. Lastly, as Google
X shows us, developing breakthrough innovations at a special department as opposed to
merely buying and taking over startups can boost the company’s attractiveness to the
outside world as well as to its existing employees.
What remains however, are the managerial barriers. If executives don’t understand the
need to look ahead, the need to venture into untapped markets. And if they don’t recognize
see Brandom, Russell (2015), The moonshot that missed. Did Google X steal this famous architect’s life’s66
work? The Verge, February 17, 2015. http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/17/8048779/google-x-eli-attia-
lawsuit-flux-architecture [25.02.15]
!22

23. the creative potential their employees have, then all of the above mentioned barriers won’t
be overcome. Hence, while the model of Google X might be a perfect fit for large
corporations in order to vanquish cultural and organizational barriers as well as to deal
with the innovator’s dilemma, it predominantly depends upon the top management in these
companies if efforts to build a unit for disruptive innovations are actually realized. This
might even be a bigger problem for companies that haven’t been founded on the values and
visions the founders of Google early on emphasized - among others the aforementioned
constant transformation, self-organization, and the 70-20-10 formula.
5. Conclusion
This paper examined the issue of developing disruptive innovations in large corporations,
and whether this would be possible by establishing a Google X-like corporate think tank.
At first, a brief analysis of the term disruptive innovation and its underlying concepts
illustrated the dilemma many organizations are facing: fostering disruptive innovation
versus focusing on core business processes and values. A look at barriers to disruptive
innovation further outlined this dilemma by describing various kinds of managerial,
cultural, and organizational barriers that inhibit companies from creating disruptive
innovations. Afterwards, the concept of corporate think tanks was briefly clarified.
Looking at the concept’s origin, synonymous ideas, and two examples, this paper came to
the conclusion that, despite having a long and aspiring history, corporate think tanks are
nonetheless rather uncommon, and sparsely implemented and analyzed. Chapter 4 then
dealt with Google’s secretive think tank Google X. A quick illustration of Google’s general
innovation strategy gave an idea how the search giant is managing its innovation efforts
through an unique corporate culture, management approach and structure. Thereafter, an
extensive analysis of Google X depicted and clustered various aspects of the lab’s known-
of structures and practices, revealing its innovation-propelling characteristics. Finally, the
question wether a corporate think tank in the model of Google X would be applicable and
desirable to other large corporations was examined. The chapter concluded that, while the
establishment of such a think tank could be very much attractive to a large organization, it
is ultimately in the hands of the leading management and their acknowledgement of the
!23

24. imperative to develop disruptive innovations that determines the building and the success
of a corporate think tank.
While making a strong case for corporate think tanks such as Google X, this seminar paper
however only partly answers its initially posed question. The latter is the case, because
Google X’s secret nature results in only a small amount of information about its
mechanisms. Furthermore, the lab’s young existence in comparison to its longterm projects
makes a thorough analysis of its success rather difficult. Regarding corporate think tanks
and synonymous concepts (e.g. skunkworks), the literature, in general, lacks adequate and
deeper analyses. Here, a further look at other examples of corporate think tanks as well as
analyses of their profit-making potentials would be interesting.
It seems however that the rapid pace of technological progress and the surge in quickly-
established startups is increasingly fueling the debate about business and market disruption
as well as discussions about new management concepts for disruptive innovation. What is67
going to be interesting, is the various ways businesses will choose to transform and the
new dominant management paradigms that will emerge. Consequently, the question
companies have to ask themselves these days is which transformation and which
innovation concept is the one that is most suitable to their market environment specifically,
and to the future business world in general.
see Wessel, Maxwell and Christensen, Clayton M. (2012), Surviving Disruption. Harvard Business67
Review. Vol. 90, No. 12. December 2012. pp. 56-64 and Hamel, Gary (2009), Moon Shots for Management.
Harvard Business Review. Vol. 87, No. 2. February 2009. pp. 91ff
!24

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29. Eidesstattliche Erklärung
Ich versichere: Ich habe die Seminararbeit selbstständig verfasst. Andere als die
angegebenen Hilfsmittel und Quellen habe ich nicht benutzt. Des Weiteren hat die Arbeit
keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen.
Berlin, den ________________ Unterschrift __________________
!29