This paper explores the effects of Modernization and Globalization paradigms on Quebec Nationalism.

1. The Influence Of Modernization & Globalization On
Quebec Nationalism
By
Todd Julie
For
Professor Sanjay Jeram
POL438
June 23, 2012
1

2. Q: How have the successive developments, modernization and globalization,
informed Francophone nationalism in the post-WWII period?
2

3. I argue that modernization and later globalization built up and broke down successive
institutions that encouraged the transformation of elite Francophone classes, who then
proceeded to further shape and be shaped by those same institutions. More specifically, I
will argue that modernization and globalization paradigms: 1) shaped the elite
Francophone class, who moved, generally speaking, from religion to politics to business
as they moved from one paradigm to the next. 2) Shaped the societal institutions (both
Québécois and Canadian) that shaped this elite. The leapfrog dynamic between
institutional and political forces best allows us to understand the larger transformation of
Quebec nationalism. In historical view: Modernization first creates an educated elite,
within existing Catholic educational institutions, then prompts them to craft new secular
institutions (the welfare state), partner with others (labour unions) and create a modern
Québécois identity in order to fight against traditional barriers to their advancement.
These “Quiet Revolution” political institutions create new elites who, encountering the
limitations of modernization, craft new economic institutions in step with globalization,
breaking their bonds even further.
In order to speak about modernization, globalization or elites, we must first define our
terms. For our purposes we understand Modernization as a state-centric mode and theory
of development that harnesses social, political and economic forces to this singular foci.
In the post-WWII period this has meant the development by each state of its own
industrial base, Keynesian economics and the welfare state. Unlike modernization,
globalization is an internationally focused mode and theory of development that tends to
place limitations on state governments to ensure common and open terms of trade
3

4. between countries. This has generally entailed the de-industrialization of rich countries
and the curtailment of the previous welfare state. In practice, both processes have been at
work throughout the post-war period. They have been separated here for the sake of
clarity. A case can be made for doing so because while they overlap in practice, they
have been somewhat more separate as successively dominant theoretical paradigms for
elite action. Our definition of elites is kept necessarily broad, in order to draw out larger,
generalized transformations of Quebec nationalism. By elites, we mean only those in the
educated classes prominent enough to influence the direction of Quebec nationalism.
Modernization created both a new middle class of industrial workers and a new
professional class in Quebec1. McRoberts explains, "the conversion of Quebec
nationalism to the goals of modernity was due to a multitude of changes in French
Quebec society . . . Urbanization, industrialization, the emergence of mass media, and in
particular, the rise of new social classes"2. Industrialization took place early in the
twentieth century in Quebec and the eventual institutional modernization of the Quiet
Revolution owes itself to this material change in the forces of production. While these
new classes had been raised and educated within the old traditional structures of the
church, the church alone could not provide modern employment opportunities for such
vast numbers of educated professionals. It also lost control of the labour movement as
the unions grew and moved their discourse to the secularized left3. Both these modern
classes, workers and elites, could see a common enemy in the Anglophone business
1
Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” in Nations And
Nationalism, 16 (3), 2010: 432
2
McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1997) 32
3
Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432
4

5. community. The province’s wealthy Anglophone minority exclusively occupied the top
positions in Quebec’s big businesses.
Elite political influence and events played a crucial a role in the timing of the transition
from traditionalist to modern Quebec nationalism. French-Canadian nationalism has its
roots in traditional, ethno-cultural institutions. From the Quebec Act of 1775 (and
before) up until the Quiet Revolution, the pillars of Francophone identity were the Roman
Catholic Church, the Civil Code, the Seigniorial system of land holding and the French
language. However, all that time a more modern liberal conception of the nation existed
and tried repeatedly to take power. The Constitution Act of 1791 gave representative
assemblies to both Upper and Lower Canada and led to struggles for control of the house
between Anglo leaders and an emerging Francophone Petit Bourgeoisie in league with
the majority agrarian population of Lower Canada4. McRoberts describes how these
struggles eventually led to a nationalist movement and in 1837, armed insurrection. The
defeat of this rebellion led to the merging of the Canadas and a surprising cooperation
between French and English Canadians5. Throughout confederation Quebec struggled
with the rest of Canada over the meaning of Canadian federalism. In the twentieth
century the long hold on power of Premiere Maurice Duplessis's conservative Union
Nationale (1936-1959, with a brief liberal interval during WWII) with its base in
traditionalist rural Quebec, meant that the Quiet Revolution took place later than it
otherwise might have. Duplessis rode to power on a platform of "faith, language, race"6 -
a perfect example of pre-modern nationalism. However, new forces were emerging in
4
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 5
5
Ibid., 6-9
6
Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432
5

6. Quebec. The political alliance between the Francophone elite and the growing labour
movement finally secured a new conception of nationalism, based on modernization in
Quebec7.
Modernization recommended a particular kind of nationalism and elites would seek to
mold their movement in this image. The earlier Duplessis government, while nationalist
in a certain sense, was not ideologically animated by modernization theory and so, while
it guarded its own political rights, it did not seek to intervene in the social or economic
life of the province8. In 1960, with the election of the Quebec liberal party of Jean
Lesage, the new Francophone elite were in and they quickly began taking control of the
social, economic an political life of the province9. Lesage articulated this new conception
of the role of government perfectly. French Canadians, he said, "feel that in Quebec
there is a government that is able to play an irreplaceable role in the development of their
collective identity, their way of living, their civilization, their values"10. Francophone
nationalism now gave way to Québécois nationalism, a territorially-based concept that
reflected the transfer of the reigns of the nationalist movement from a porous culturally-
based movement that might exist beyond Quebec in other French speaking parts of
Canada, to a political one bound by Quebec provincial jurisdiction. Industrial
modernization, both in fact and as a commitment of the new elites, also required the
continued influx of new immigrants to work in factories. Therefore Quebec nationalism
could no longer be based on ethnicity and became based primarily on language, which
7
Ibid., 432
8
Ibid., 432
9
Beland, D. & Lecours, A., “The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism And Social Policy Reform
In Canada, The United Kingdom and Belgium” in Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38 No.6, 2005: 685
10
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 34
6

7. any new immigrant could learn. This meant the province would place extreme
importance on control of language laws. New immigrants had to be compelled to learn
French or the nationalist project would be undermined. As Kenneth McRoberts says,
"The central place of the Quebec government in the project of a modern francophone
society gave a greatly expanded meaning to the claim that Quebec was not 'a province
like the others"11. Lesage began calling the province L'Etat du Quebec12 and elite
nationalists would soon begin to push for some sort of constitutional protection of their
political gains13.
The nationalist government began to intervene in the Quebec economy, gearing it
towards the nationalist project. Hydro-Quebec was created in 1962 by nationalizing a
number of private electricity companies14. The government began to funnel public funds
into institutions like the “Caisse de Depot et de placement”, which invested money from
“Quebec pension funds, retirement insurance plans and various other public agencies”15
and “la societe generale de financement” to invest heavily in Francophone businesses16.
More than this, these agencies were tasked with modernizing Quebec’s industrial
structures17. Pierre Arbour describes how state intervention accelerated during the first
11
Ibid., 34
12
Ibid,, 34
13
Ibid., 34-35
14
Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism (Montreal: Robert Davies Publishing,
1993) 21
15
Ibid., 20
16
Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan” in Pacific
Affairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001: 215
17
Arbour, Quebec Inc., 21
7

8. term in office of the Parti Québécois 18. The imbalance in pay that had existed between
Anglophones and Francophones within the province was overcome19
Modernization ensured the social democratic character of Québécois nationalism. In
taking over the political, social, economic life in Quebec from more traditional
conservative elements the modernizing liberal elite also tied its new brand of Quebec
nationalism to socially progressive policies20. Denis & Denis have found the rise of
nationalism and labour unions in Quebec to be intimately intertwined21 and the labour
union was itself an institutional product of modernization. Their power is based on mass
production, mass consumption, collective bargaining, Keynesian demand management
and the welfare state22. Cooperation was crucial for Quebec politicians in making their
initial claim to represent the interests of the entire Québécois nation. In 1964 the Quebec
government’s new Labour Code was the envy of workers throughout the rest of Canada23.
In the middle 70's, Quebec unions helped to create the Parti Québécois 24. Denis & Denis
explain, "government initially sought formulas that would enlist the aid of the labour
movement in their national economic efforts, offering in exchange to maintain the goal of
full employment"25. During the Quiet Revolution Francophone elite power was based on
democratically elected governments with the support of labour. However, they were not
18
Ibid,, 27
19
Hamilton, P., “Converging Nationalisms” in nationalism In Ethnic Politics, 10 (2004): 668
20
Beland & Lecours, The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity, 685
21
Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec” in
LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses
de l’Universite de Quebec,1995: 222
22
Ibid., 219
23
Ibid., 220
24
Ibid., 218
25
Ibid., 221
8

9. yet firmly entrenched in business. Had they secured top positions in business before
government, one wonders whether the result would still have been a social democratic
nationalist movement.
Modernization also created a much stronger conflict between French and English Canada
in two important ways. Firstly, as McRoberts explains, "the older French-Canadian
nationalism had been largely focused on private, church-based institutions. Thus the
nation could be advanced in ways that did not impinge at all on the Canadian political
order"26. The commitment of both groups of elites to modernization theories of
development, meant that both pursued modern state building projects along the same
political, social and economic lines simultaneously27. Of course, each had in mind a
different state that reflected their own power base. Secondly, each side thought of the
issue in a slightly different context. The Canadian state defined itself in opposition to
increasing post-war American encroachment28. Since Quebec and Canada both defined
themselves in opposition to possible assimilation into a larger whole, both felt unity was
required at lower levels in the face of the larger threat. As a result, Quebec and the
federal government did not negotiate the question of Quebec nationalism with exclusive
reference to one another but also in reference to their own specific concerns.
Politicians at both the nationalist and federal level also brought their own specific
understandings of modernization and nationalism to the table. The Pearson government
had flirted with a more asymmetrical, dualist approach to Quebec's demands. It enacted a
26
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 38
27
Ibid., 38
28
Ibid., 37
9

10. "contracting out formula" that allowed the Quebec government to take control of a series
of social program policies that were the preserve of the federal government elsewhere in
the country29. Intellectuals in Quebec and English Canada pushed the idea of an English-
Canadian nationalism that would have then allowed for cooperation with French-
Canadian nationalism in a dualistic state30. However, these pleas were rejected with the
election of Pierre Trudeau. Prime Minister Trudeau continuously equated Quebec
nationalism with its traditional, ethnicity-based roots and would not credit any notion of
modern, liberally based nationalism. For him modernization was based on individualism
and was explicitly non-national31. Trudeau sought to re-orient Francophone loyalties
toward the Canadian state and away from the province of Quebec. His language
legislation, establishing bilingualism within the federal government and across the
country was emblematic of this32. Trudeau’s limited conception of the role he would
allow the Quebec government would lead to nationalist elite conversion to the goal of
secession33.
Not only did Modernization encourage different reference points for each party, it also
framed the competition in a particular way. As long as the competition was political, the
existing Canadian state possessed the obvious advantage of being an actual state. Within
the Modernization framework, there was no greater authority. Quebec politicians could
make league with the labour movement and ordinary French Canadians but there was no
29
Ibid., 42
30
Ibid., 54
31
Ibid., 59
32
Ibid., 65, 79
33
McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And Racial Studies, Vol.2, No.3,
1979: 313
10

11. higher institution above the state they could appeal to. The federal government thus
controlled the game. During the 1980 referendum the feds threatened hard financial
bargaining and potential financial ruin in the case of Quebec secession34. They could also
reach down to disrupt Quebec unity. Trudeau's multiculturalism policy was certainly
viewed in this light. Granting minority group rights threatened to turn Quebec
nationalism into just one of many minority group concerns in Canada35. This problem
would plague Quebec nationalists who wanted secession from Canada. After defeat in
the 1995 secessionist referendum, Jacques Parizeau stated the referendum had failed due
to “money and the ethnic vote”36. Despite the offensive way Parizeau framed his
statement it was largely true. The vote had been extremely close and the immigrant vote
had decided the issue37. The Prime Minister could also play provinces against one
another. During the 1982 constitutional debate, Trudeau was able to detach the Quebec
premiere Rene Levesque from a provincial premier’s coalition and get an agreement
signed without Quebec’s ratification38. With this act, Trudeau locked in his specific
understanding of modernization with the protection of individual rights over group rights.
Globalization gave a wholly different cast to the nationalist struggle of elites by offering
the appeal to the higher institutions that had been lacking under the modernization
paradigm. While the Quiet revolution had been conceived of along modernization theory
lines, it had been frustrated in its more state-centric, constitutional aims. The FTA,
34
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 157
35
Kymlicka, W., “Citizenship, Communities And Identity In Canada” in Bickerton, J. & Gagnon, A.G.
(ed.) Canadian Politics, Toronto: University Of Toronto Press Inc., 2009: 26
36
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 232
37
Ibid., 230
38
Ibid., 165
11

12. NAFTA and the WTO seemed to limit the federal government’s powers of intervention
and offer financial security to Quebec in the case of a successful sovereignty referendum.
The Belanger-Campeau report (a 1991 report by the Quebec National Assembly on the
politics and constitutional future of Quebec39) even thought the FTA might increase the
chances for sovereignty40. Further, provincial subsidies used to create "Quebec Inc.",
were not immediately challenged by the FTA. Drover and Leung relate how “regulations
on tariffs, subsidies and countervail applied initially only to the federal government”41.
However elites understood that eventually the Quebec government would be restrained to
some extent, along with the federal government. It began to “give greater weight to
private companies” and “placed increasing reliance on cooperative funds rather than
direct state support”42. Another transfer of power now occurred, from the Quiet
revolution era political elite, to the new business elite of Quebec Inc.
Globalization offered a new way towards sovereignty that harmonized with the
ascendancy of newly emergent Francophone business leaders in Quebec. During the first
years of the Quiet revolution most elites took jobs within the provincial state and public
sector43. In the late 1960's, government jobs had begun to dry up, leading to calls to make
French the language of business in Quebec44. In the late 1970's the Francophone business
class, created by the 1974 Bill 22 language legislation, came to maturity. Though both
groups, political and business, continued to mutually support one another, the new
39
LaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. & Weinroth, M.)
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995) 151
40
Drover & Leung, Taiwan & Quebec, 214
41
Ibid., 216
42
Ibid., 216
43
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 99
44
Ibid., 99-100
12

13. business branch of the elite began to outgrow their provincial boundaries and look for a
way to expand into foreign markets. Writing in 1995, Andre Turcotte asserted "the
support of a large portion of Quebec's political and business classes for continental
integration is a reflection of their views on the new maturity of the Francophone
segments within those classes and the need for structural changes that would allow those
groups to reach their objectives"45.
Calls for privatization of state (Quebec)-owned businesses began to be heard, as earlier
American perceptions of public subsidization of Quebec companies became a barrier to
further export growth. Globalization produced in elites a re-focusing away from the
welfare state, towards an almost exclusive focus on economics. A year after the FTA was
signed, a business roundtable chaired by Thomas Courchene provided a perfect
understanding of the difference between the economic model pursued under
Globalization and its essential difference in regards to the earlier modernization program.
"Most economics-based competition models”, it was said, are “not trying to artificially
define markets, they're looking at natural markets and making decisions on that basis"46.
“Artificially” defining national markets had been the aim of government under
modernization. Under globalization, the state-centric focus of Quebec and federal elites
would weaken significantly. This would urge a break with the elite’s former coalition
partners, the labour unions.
45
Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA” in LaChapelle,
G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses de
l’Universite de Quebec,1995: 242
46
Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy & Universal Banking,
Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989: 35
13

14. Whereas state-centric Modernization theory had encouraged a broad based nationalist
movement, with strong cooperation between elites and the labour unions, globalization
would largely remove elite interest in union support. The Close identification of the
nationalist Quebec government with globalization, represented by the Free Trade
Agreements, would now lead it to abandon the labour unions, who had been important
partners during the Quiet Revolution47. The Parti Québécois who had been created with
the support of the unions now turned their back on their socially progressive policies to
focus more exclusively on the economy. This re-orientation led not only to the
temporary loss of union support but also to a series of resignations within the party
itself48. Interestingly labour would return to “critical support”49 of the PQ, only insofar as
they returned to an officially sovereigntist position50. Increasingly the unions, who had
been so instrumental in the Quiet Revolution would find neither elite party, the PQ or
Quebec liberals had any interest in negotiating for their support51. Along with labour
unions, a significant portion of the Quebec electorate did not support the FTA and an
even larger share of the electorate didn't support NAFTA52. Hamilton asserts the Quebec
“public” is generally supportive of free trade53. But his statistics, while showing a higher
level of support than in the rest of Canada, indicate an evenly divided public at best54 and
he admits in his footnotes that removing elite opinion from this statistical free trade
47
Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 218
48
Ibid., 218
49
Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 218
50
Ibid., 218
51
Ibid., 235 The authors write that neither the PQ of the Parti liberale now “agrees to bargain for the unions
support in return for signifigant concessions”
52
Turcotte, Uneasy Allies, 251
53
Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 666
54
Ibid., 667
14

15. support leaves one with opposition levels similar to those in the rest of the country55.
This difference of opinion represents a fracturing of the social contract within Quebec.
nationalism.
At this point it is necessary to offer one important aside to our general line of argument.
While globalization has created tension between the Québécois elite and the public on
whom they initially based their authority, the earlier, strong identification of Quebec
nationalism with social democracy and the welfare state, has made these institutions
harder to dislodge. An example of this is Laczko’s finding that social democratic
institutions are more popular in Quebec than elsewhere in North America. Even as the
PQ government cut healthcare services in the 1990’s they attempted to portray these cuts
as “more gentle and caring than those carried out in neighboring Ontario or Alberta”56.
Popular support for programs associated with the Quiet revolution may put them in a
slightly more defendable position. Nonetheless, the downward trend in labour’s position
is unmistakable.
Quebec Politicians had begun re-structuring nationalism around the new Globalization
paradigm even before the signing of the FTA. The election of the Parti Québécois led to
a mass exodus of Anglo-businesses from Quebec and this had an arguably positive effect
for elite Quebec nationalism. It concentrated Quebec politicians on reinforcing
Francophone ownership of Quebec businesses. To this end, Quebec became a leader in
55
Ibid., 683 “20. It is among the nationalist elite that one finds greatest support for continentalism. One
study indicates that mass level data show similar levels of public opposition to free trade in Quebec as
found in the rest of Canada”
56
Laczko, L., “Nationalism And Welfare State Attitudes” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2,
2005
15

16. financial de-regulation in order to create huge concentrations of financial capital that
could then invest heavily in Francophone businesses. Many important Quebec
companies became essentially "take over proof"57 because they were largely owned by
these mammoth-sized Francophone financial interests. The financial elite took over from
government the task of meeting regularly to decide industrial policy for the province58.
Interestingly enough, after the unsuccessful 1995 referendum (and a year after the signing
of the North American Free Trade Agreement), Lucien Bouchard proclaimed that
Quebecers were tired of referendums and wanted the province to focus on getting its
finances in order59. This sentiment was not shared by the unions (mentioned earlier) who
maintained support for the Parti Québécois only to the extent that they officially
continued to support sovereignty for Quebec, as well as “citizens groups and other social
forces . . . The PQ’s referendum success had been partly based on strong appeals to this
clientele”60. But for the nationalist elite, Globalization, initially justified in aid of
sovereignty, had made sovereignty less important.
In fact, interest in sovereignty had declined on both sides of the Anglo-French divide
among the business classes. In his article Semantics and Sovereignty, Michael Keating
documents the shifting loyalties of elites across this divide:
The issues of free trade and market integration are also tied up with class and
sectoral issues and do not just hinge on the nationalist question. . . . There is no
one position shared by political leaders and public opinion, but there does
appear to be an electoral market for the new, emerging post-sovereigntist
57
Courchene, Quebec Inc., 11
58
Ibid., 45
59
McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 232-233
60
Ibid., 232
16

17. discourse, which has the potential to bridge the gap between nationalist and
non-nationalist forces in both cases61
In this statement and in other places throughout Keating’s article, we see that Free Trade
did not have the support of the working class section of the Parti Québécois any more
than the agreement had the support of unions in English Canada62. Here Quebec elites
were in agreement with business elites in English Canada (and America), over and above
the wishes of their lower income nationalist supporters. The switch in the federal
government, from Liberals to Conservatives, re-oriented government policy towards
Quebec63. With the election of business candidate Brian Mulroney, the federal will
towards building a unitary state in Canada had evaporated. Participating in a Canadian
government-business roundtable, Torrance J. Wylie commented in 1989, "The 'spirit' of
Meech Lake . . . Changes the political environment in Canada and puts the provinces in a
very important position vis-a-vis constitutional development, and social and economic
policy"64. The Meech Lake accords had been seen by Quebec elites as a way to lock in
the successful de-regulatory reforms mentioned above. When that failed, free trade
became another way of doing so65. The neutral Netherlands’ Journal Of Business Ethics
amusingly characterized support for the later NAFTA agreement in Quebec as “a case of
a joint government-business coalition against popular desires”66.
61
Keating, M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-Sovereignty Stance? Evidence
From Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2, 2005: 266
62
Ibid., 264-265
63
Courchene, Quebec Under Free Trade, 27
64
Ibid., 27
65
Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 667-668
66
Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness & Directions” in Journal
Of Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, No.16, 1997: 631
17

18. As we have seen Modernization and Globalization favoured very different institutions.
Elite Quebec nationalism used these institutions for its own ends. Paradoxically
however, its ends and its identity were altered in turn by these different paradigms.
Modernization, entailing the coordination of social, political and economic policy pushed
elites towards the goal of an independent Quebec nation-state. In pursuing this end they
would partner themselves with ordinary Québécois in the labour movement and build a
large welfare state. Having achieved so much and yet failed in their quest for
sovereignty, they would try a different tact in turning to Globalization. This new
paradigm would alter the basis of their power and lead them to forsake their old
institutional partnership with the unions for free trade agreements that promised to limit
federal government intervention and increase their new business power. This cynical
reading of elite Quebec nationalism is perhaps balanced somewhat by the fact that labour
and the welfare states identification, in the early modernization period, has at least made
these institutions stronger in Quebec than in Anglophone North America, though their
relative decline under globalization is the same in Quebec as elsewhere. In examining
the interrelation between these phenomenon; elitism, nationalism, modernization and
Globalization, we gain a deeper understanding of the true nature of each. For that reason,
exploration of this topic should be of interest to Anglophones, Francophones and anyone
else interested in real progressive reforms.
18

19. Bibliography:
Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism, Montreal: Robert
Davies Publishing, 1993
Beland,D. & Lecours, A., The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism & Social
Policy Reform In Canada, The United Kingdom & Belgium in Comparative Plitical
Studies Vol. 38 No.6
Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy &
Universal Banking, Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989
Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In
Quebec” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In
North America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995
Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan”
in Pacific Affairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001
Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” in
Nations And Nationalism, 16 (3), 2010
Keating,M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-Sovereignty
Stance? Evidence From Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies
LaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. &
Weinroth, M.), Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995
McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And Racial
Studies, Vol.2, No.3, 1979
McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle For National Unity, Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1997
Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness &
Directions” in Journal Of Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
No.16, 1997
Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA”
in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North
America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995
19

20. 20