3. Agenda
Civil Construction For New Build
Roger Robinson
CEO (European Hub)
Laing O’Rourke
Planning For New Nuclear Build
Ash Townes
Head of AMEC
Nuclear New Build
10:45 – 11:15
Design Considerations
Richard Coackley
Director of Energy Development, URS
and Chair of The Nuclear Construction
Best Practice Forum
11:15 – 12:00
Coffee Break and exhibition viewing
09:45 – 10:15
10:15 – 10:45
12:00 – 12:30
12:30 – 14:15
3
Manufacturing Super Modules
Networking Lunch
David Williams
Business Development Director
Cammell Laird
24. Planning for new nuclear build
‘The first three years are critical’
Ash Townes
Business Unit Director – New Nuclear Build
Nuclear Generation and Defence
AMEC Clean Energy - Europe
28
Presentation title - edit in the Master slide
AMEC Clean Energy;
A natural partner for
your low carbon future
25. AMEC at a Glance
FTSE 100 company
Revenues
Employees
Working in
Mining
Clean Energy
Nuclear
Renewables/Bioprocess
Power
Transmission & Distribution
29
Market cap c.£3.4 billion
Some £4.2 billion
~30 000
AMEC is one of the world’s
leading engineering, project
management and consultancy
companies
Around 40 countries
Environment & Infrastructure
Water/Municipal
Transportation/Infrastructure
Government Services
Industrial/Commercial
Oil & Gas
Conventional and unconventional
We design, deliver & maintain strategic assets for our customers, offering services which extend
from environmental and front-end engineering design before the start of a project to
decommissioning at the end of an asset’s life
*As at 14 August 2012
26. AMEC Nuclear Pedigree
2010
. . . . 3000 nuclear
professionals . . . .
. . . . a Nuclear New Build
partner for 60yrs . . . .
EDF Partnership
AMEC Slovakia
NMP Sellafield
NCI South Africa
Sellafield
Growth in
Clean-Up
NSS/NCL
Canada
2000
AMEC Romania
& Czech Republic
Bruce CANDA
Tokai 1
Dungeness A - Magnox
Magnox Station
Design & Construction
Including Tokai 1
1960
1990
1980
Sizewell B PWR
1970
AGR Station
Design &
Construction
1955
Heysham 1 AGR
30
Sizewell B
. . a strategic role on every NPS
ever built in the UK . .
. . 19 of the last 20 reactors
licensed in the US.
27. NNB organisational spectrum
Multi-package
Island model
Turnkey
Turnkey +
Owner-operator
Internalised D&B
Smaller number of
EPC-type Contracts
Single EPC
Contract
Operate and/or
own
Transfer of
‘Risk’ to
EPC
support
orgn.
Whatever the approach, the client and the extended supply chain need to be truly intelligent
customers and intelligent deliverers across critical core nuclear skill-sets
31
Presentation title - edit in Header and Footer
28. UK Context (1 of 3)
UK Central Electricity
Generating Board (CEGB)
Owner /
Operator
AMEC*
AE
Level
1
AE
Level
2/3
Safety & Reference
Design/Licenses
NSSS &
Auxiliary
Systems
AMEC* /
Westinghouse
JV
Major Nuclear
Euip.
SGs:
Babcock
Vessel Head:
Framatome
RCS/RCP &
Reactor
Systems:
Westinghouse
Owner’s Construction Unit
(Includes Project Board)
Civils Design
Nuclear Design
Associates
McAlpine TWC
* By National Nuclear Corporation (NNC) subsequently acquired by AMEC
32
Procurement
&
Project
Management
Turbines
Radwaste
GEC Alstom
Davy McKee
Main Civils
J Laing
Sizewell B NPS (1995)
Delivery organisation based on a small number
of main EP / EPC Contracts
29. UK Context (2 of 3)
EDF SA
EDF Genco
Part of EDF Energy
Owner /
Operator
Site Licensee, project manager, Intelligent
Customer, Site Prep/Off site Engineering
EDF DIN (France)
AE
Sofinel
Commercial
BNI Level 2
Engineering
EDF/AMEC
BOP Level 2
Engineering
Technical
surveillance
Suppliers
33
Main Civils
Turbines
Major
Nuclear
Euip.
NSSS
Manufacture
Manufacture
Site prepn:
AREVA
Kier/BAM
Alstom
Main Civils:
Hinkley C NPS (Ongoing)
Bouyges TP / Laing
Delivery organisation based on
O’Rourke
multiple E, P and C Contracts
Marine works:
Presentation title - edit in Header and Footer
Costain
Responsible Designer,
Level 1 Engineering
AREVA
NSSS
Design
30. UK Context (3 of 3)
Site Licensee, project
manager, Intelligent
Customer, Site Prep/Off Horizon
site Engineering
Owner /
Operator
100%
Nuclear
Power
Hitachi
GE
80.01%
19.99%
HGNE
Established
Design s/c
FEED
Commercial
Level 1/2
Engineering
UK Context
Support
Level 1/2
Engineering
Technical
surveillance
EPC
EPC
Option 2
HGNE / EPC
Partner JV
EPC
Option 3
HGNE
EPC
Option 1
HGNE +
EPCm
Partner
NSSS
EPC
Wylfa and Oldbury NPS (Ongoing)
Presentation title 34
Delivery organisation edit in Header and Footer
based on Turnkey EPC
Responsible Designer,
Level 1/2 Engineering
GDA Requesting Party
31. Open Questions
. . . . in determining operating model and support requirements:
•How much knowledge must the owner have and how much can the plant designer be relied
on?
•What information does the public need and when?
•How much work can be done locally?
•What is the best contracting and finance model?
Does “best” mean most certain...
...or lowest construction cost...
...or lowest through-life cost...
...or minimum ‘initial’ client equity?
35
Presentation title - edit in Header and Footer
32. Supporting the NNB project through 3 core skill-sets
IAEA Status Assessment
•
•
•
•
•
National position
Funding and financing
Legislative framework
Regulatory framework
Radiation protection
Licensing &
Regulatory
Support
Project feasibility, risk reduction,
integrated support: pre-licence,
licensing, permits &, Regulatory
relationships
• Electrical grid
• Emergency planning
• Industrial involvement
• Procurement
Programme
Management
Office
Project / Procurement/
Construction
Management & Controls
36
• Nuclear Safety
• Management
• Human Resource Development
• Stakeholder involvement
• Site & supporting facilities
• Security & physical protection
• Safeguards
Engineering &
Safety Case
Nuclear and non-nuclear
engineering, technical
and subject matter
experts
• Environmental protectio
• Nuclear fuel cycle
• Radioactive waste
33. . . . through the whole project lifecycle
Flexibility to service each step of the project lifecycle
1
IAEA Milestone 1:
2
Ready to make a knowledgeable
commitment to a nuclear
programme
IAEA Milestone 2:
Ready to invite bids for
the first nuclear power
plant
3
Licensing &
Regulatory Support
Project feasibility, risk
reduction, integrated
support: pre-licence,
licensing, permits &,
Regulatory relationships
Programme
Management
Office
Project /
Procurement/
Construction
Management &
Controls
37
IAEA Milestone 3:
Ready to commission and operate the
first nuclear power plant
IAEA NG-T-3.10 Intelligent Customer
Engineering &
Safety Case
Nuclear and nonnuclear engineering,
technical and
subject matter
experts
Specify the scope and standard of a product / service
Assess whether the supplied product / service meets
the requirements.
The product / service includes
Nuclear Power Plant
Fuel and fuel cycle
Waste management
Decommissioning provisions
Independent technical support and services
Through-life support from the original supply chain
Operation and Maintenance arrangements
Grid Connection
Associated Development
Security arrangements
Environmental studies and analysis
34. 3 core skill-sets through lifecycle
Flexibility to service each step of the project lifecycle
EPC / implementation
resources
Thick IC
NNB support resources
Thin IC
38
35. Summary
• NNB projects internationally have many different configurations of client, suppliers and
(therefore) differing support requirements
• All NNB stakeholders must have a basic capability and capacity across the three critical core
skill-sets
• NNB Support service organisations must be adaptable; to project procurement strategy, phases
of the project, client thick/thin ‘IC’ role
• IC role needs support to varying degrees during the transients in the project lifecycle; interface
management is a critical focus area
• Flexibility is needed within the NNB support service provider and the commercial arrangements
to optimise delivery of the service
• Its important that local suppliers are embedded into the NNB support infrastructure;
lasting legacy in operations
39
40. Nuclear Delta
What is the “Nuclear Delta”?:
•Nuclear safety culture
•Quality
•Security
44
41. What is the “Nuclear Delta”?:
Nuclear safety culture:
•Understanding
•Behavioural
•Personal commitment
45
42. What is the “Nuclear Delta”?:
Quality:
•Right first time culture
•Demonstrable SQEP
•Robust design audit trail
46
43. What is the “Nuclear Delta”?:
Security:
•Awareness
•Behavioural
•Robust physical and IT systems
47
44. SQEP Assessment & Team Training
SQEP Matrix
•Academic and professional qualifications
•Years experience
•Skills assessment
•Maintained by Technical Manager
• Developed in consultation with client
• Specific SQEP register
• Nuclear and project specific training
48
45. Quality: The Journey to Excellence
• Quality = long term nuclear safety
• Quality must be demonstrable for both
approvals and Confidence
• Understanding the safety case drivers
49
46. Productivity: Nuclear Lessons Learned
Engineering the Future
•Based on recent major nuclear new build
projects
•Identified five areas for analysis
Principal Recommendations
•Focus on pre-placement QA
•Integrated design & construction
programme
•Focus on training throughout team
50
49. Nuclear Design and Approvals Process
From Design to Approvals: Removing Congestion
DESIGNER
CONTRACTOR
CLIENT
UK REGULATOR
Robust Design
Constructability
Operability
Approval
CONSTRUCTION
53
50. Nuclear Design and Approvals Process
A Better Way
INTEGRATED DESIGN,
CONSTRUCTION &
CLIENT TEAM
Robust Design for Construction & Operation
CONSTRUCTION
54
UK REGULATOR
SLC
Approval
51. Safety is Paramount
• The health, safety and welfare of employees,
clients and third parties are of prime importance
• Health and safety systems accredited to OHSAS
18001:1999 Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems
• Systems have to be mature - focus on behavioural
safety
• What am I about to do?
• What could go wrong?
• What could be done to make it safer?
• What have I done to communicate the hazards?
55
53. Security Training, Awareness and Staff Culture
Primary means of preventing breaches of security:
•
Training, awareness, vigilance and culture
•
‘Need to know’ principle
Nuclear staff need security clearance and security induction training which provides:
•
A detailed understanding of the security measures in place
•
A detailed understanding of the individuals own responsibility
•
An overview of the UK’s:
•
Official Secrets Act
•
Anti-Terrorism Act
•
Crime and Securities Act
•
Nuclear security industry regulations
57
55. Confidence: Comprehensive Quality Systems
Quality at the design and detailing stage has a major impact on overall project delivery
quality, having a critical influence in the following areas:
• Ease, speed and cost of construction
• Third party and Regulator approvals
• Regulator confidence
Accreditation should include:
• ISO 9001: Quality standard appropriate to services
• ISO 14001: Environmental management
• ISO 18001: Occupational health and safety
59
62. UKTI Nuclear Conference 27th - 29th January 2014
NDA Integrated Waste Management
Dr Adrian Simper
Head of Integrated Waste Management Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
66. Solid Waste in the NDA Estate - Volumes
HLW
ILW
LLW
VLLW
Total
Volume (m3)
1,020
287,000
1,370,000
3,060,000
4,720,000
Mass (Te)
2,700
300,000
1,620,000
3,080,000
5,000,000
Wastes at 1 April 2010 and estimated for future arisings up to 2120
For comparison – England and Wales in one year (2008):
- 335,000,000 Te household and industrial waste
- 6,600,000 Te hazardous waste
71
67. Waste types – operational &
decommissioning
Waste Type
DSRL/ Sellafield
Magnox
RSRL
Aqueous Liquids
Oils & Solvents
Sludges & Slurries
PCM
-
Ion Exchange Media
Wood, Paper & Cardboard
Plastic & Rubber
Irradiated Fuel Debris
Graphite
Steel
Concrete
72
List is not exhaustive & values are indicative only. Major decommissioning streams are in red.
72. NDA Integrated Waste Management
• Objective: Ensure that wastes are managed in a manner that protects people and the
environment, now and in the future, and in ways that comply with Government policies and
provide value for money:
• Address the whole waste lifecycle
• Risk reduction as a priority
• Centralised and multi-site approaches
• Application of Waste Hierarchy
• Diverse solutions
• Waste management should be integrated
• Seek opportunities to do things better
• Opportunities at classification boundaries
77
73. NDA Mission
“Deliver safe, sustainable and publicly acceptable solutions to the challenge of nuclear clean up
and waste management
This means never compromising on safety or security, taking full account of our social and
environmental responsibilities, always seeking value for money for the taxpayer and actively
engaging with stakeholders.”
78
78. History in UK
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Nuclear sites originated in the 1940/50s
Originally all nuclear sites were GOGOs – under UKAEA and CEGB
Several structural changes especially with BNFL created in 1971 but
still GOGOs
1982 – Radiochemical Centre Ltd (Amersham) privatised later several
changes of ownership including foreign companies: POPO
1995/96 – British Energy created to own operate AGRs & PWR and
privatised: POPO
1995/6 – Magnox Electric Ltd created to operate Magnox stations:
GOGO
2005 – NDA created and owned (on behalf of Government);
Springfields operated by Westinghouse Ltd
2007 – Magnox Stations operation contracted out: GOCO
2009 – EDF buys British Energy: POPO
83
79. Some Concepts
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Owner
Operator
Corporate Body
Nuclear Site Licensee/duty holder
Contractor
Parent Company
Subsidiary Company
Site Licensee Company
Management and Operation Contracts
Parent Company Agreement
Controlling Mind
Intelligent Customer
Intelligent Owner
Memorandum and Articles of Association
Employee
84
80. Related Matters - Corporate Relationships
•
•
•
•
•
Corporate structures can be very complex, e.g.:
– Licensee is a subsidiary of a group parent (EDF)
– Licensee is a subsidiary of a joint venture company (Sellafield Ltd)
Parent Company/Joint Venture Company will expect to to adopt strategic oversight and role
of licensee company; e.g. business planning, monitoring of performance and may take
profits or provide funding
Licensee has to demonstrate that these are not detrimental to safety or licensees legal
duties,e.g.:
– Day-to-day operations
– Ability to shut down plant, stop operations, undertake other essential actions for
safety, without recourse to the parent company
– Having adequate funding and other resources for safe operation, maintenance,
decommissioning, etc
Memorandum and Articles of Association can define these relationships and licence
application needs to reflect them in the Safety Management Prospectus which defines
company structure, management system, staffing etc
Control of change through Licence Conditions
85
81. Related Matters – Core Capability, Intelligent Customer
& Design Authority
•
•
•
•
•
•
Core Capability – knowledge, functional specialism and resources within licensee to maintain control & oversight of
safety
Core Capability:
– Includes technical, operational and managerial aspects
– Covers ‘Intelligent Customer’ & ‘Design Authority’
Intelligent Customer – knows what is required, able to specify it to contractor, can intelligently supervise the work,
and can technically review the work at all stages
Licensee as Intelligent Customer retains overall responsibility for, control and oversight of the nuclear safety,
radiological safety and security of all of its business including work done on its behalf by contractors
Design Authority – function responsible for, and requisite knowledge to maintain the design integrity and overall
basis for safety (safety case) throughout the plant life cycle
Licensee Design Authority may assign detailed specialist knowledge to ‘Responsible Designers’ but must have
sufficient Intelligent Customer capability to undertake its role
86
82. Some Principles (1)
IAEA Fundamental Principle 1;
The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation
responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.
•To install or operate a specified nuclear facility in a defined location you must have a nuclear site
licence (NSL)
•A NSL is only granted to a Corporate Body based on the regulator’s assessment of:
– The capability, organisation and resources of the applicant corporate body
– The nature of the prescribed activities and the relevant safety case
– The nature and location of the site
•NSL is not transferable
•Licensee and user of the site are the same corporate body
87
83. Some Principles (2)
• Licensee has absolute responsibility for compliance with NSL (even if
breach results from contractor or tenant on the site) and for no-fault
financial liability – includes failings related to the design and hence needs
to take ownership of the design
• Need clarity on legal responsibility for safe operation, criminal and
financial responsibilities – avoid dual licensing and joint licensing
• Licensee has to have effective day-to-day control over all activities on the
site
• Licensee has to have effective control of safety related resources
• Owners cannot interfere with the Operators/Licensee responsibilities but
should support them
88
84. Summary
• UK has a history of changing Owner/Operator relationships from GOGO to FPOPO
• With no UK reactor design and a market led nuclear policy we have complex
ownership/operator models
• The UK Nuclear Site Licensing approach provides a means of ensuring prime
responsibilities and addressing changing corporate models and financing including
foreign designs and ownership
• There is a need to address related matters such as Core Capabilities, Intelligent
Customer, Design Authority, etc and other issues such as security responsibilities
89