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1. Deterrence in Nuclear Age

2. Table 1 The Purposes of Force
Type Purpose Mode Targets Characterist
ics
Defensive 1. Fend Peaceful and 1.Military; Dissuasion value;
off Physical Defensive Acts can
2. Industrial look aggressive;
attack
First strikes for
2. Reduce defense
damage
of an
attack
Deterrent 1. Prevent Peaceful 1.Civilian Threats of
adversary from retaliation made
2. Industrial without being
initiating an 3. Military carried out; second
action strike preparation
can be seen as
first strike
preparation.
Compellent Get adversary Peaceful and All Three Easy to recognize
to stop doing Physical but hard to
achieve;
something or competent actions
start doing can be justified on
something defensive grounds
Swaggering Enhance Peaceful None It can be
prestige threatening;
Difficult to describe
because of
instrumental and
irrational nature

3. Nukes are Unique because:
• Scale of their destructive capability;
• The superiority they render to offensive over
defensive forces an postures;
• The uncertainty they create in judging both the
power and actions of other governments, thus
making rational calculations extremely difficult;
• Their unlimited range which depreciates the
effectiveness of geographic barriers;
• The high speed of their delivery, which eliminates any
meaningful attempt to permit a time for reaction to
their deployment and consequently also creates a
virtual certainty of retaliation by the target state in
the event of attack.
• MAD creates stability in the relations among nuclear
powers.

4. Deterrence Evaluation
• Deterrence is not simply a matter of announcing a
commitment and backing it with threats – the
commitment must be validated by its relationship to
an appropriate national interest.
• Deterrence is highly context- dependent – as the
deterrence situation changes, so does the calculus of
the commitment/threat calculation
• Since deterrence is context dependent it is often
difficult to design a strategy that will deter all options
available to the dissatisfied power.
• Deterrence fails in stages rather than all at once
• Deterrence is a time buying strategy and as such it is
only one instrument of foreign policy and not a
substitute for a creative approach that also relies on
other means.

5. Impact of nuclear Revolution
• Art and Waltz:
“…the immense and sudden destructive
power of nuclear-tipped missiles has
shifted the emphasis of strategic
planners from victory and defense to
deterrence…the distinction between
victory and defense, on the one hand,
and deterrence, on the other, has been
sharpened; and the emphasis shifted
from the first to the second.”
Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds. The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy
(Boston: Little Brown and company, 1971), p. 4

6. What is nuclearization?
• Acquiring Weapon Grade fissile material
• Developing nuclear devices
• Conducting cold tests for the designs
• Acquiring delivery systems
• Conducting successful nuclear tests
• Verifying weapon designs through a series of critical
tests. Sub-critical tests can be simulated on
computers
• Weaponization
• Deployment
• Targetting Posture

7. Steps to Produce and deploy
Nuclear Weapons
Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons materials
•Mining of uranium-bearing ore
•Milling to extract uranium concentrate in the form of “yellow cake” (u308) or
other uranates
•Chemical processing to convert yellowcake into useful compounds (such
as U02, UF 6,UF4, UCI4)
Uranium-235 based weapons:
•Enrichment of uranium to high levels of uranium-235(most often carried out
uranium hexafluroide, UF6, or other Uranium compounds)
•Conversion of enriched uranium product to uranium metal
Plutonium-based weapons:
•Uranium fuel fabrication in the form of metal or oxide (using alloys,
ceramics, zircalloy or aluminum cladding, etc)
•Reactor construction and operation (typically requiring a graphite or heavy-
moderator, unless enriched uranium fuel were available)
•Reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium product
•Conversion of plutonium product to plutonium metal

8. Steps to Produce and deploy
Nuclear Weapons
Weapon fabrication (plutonium or uranium weapons)
•Design and fabrication of fissile core
•Design and fabrication of nonnuclear components
(chemical explosives, detonator, fuze, neutron initiator,
reflector etc)
•Weapon Assembly
Weapon Testing and Deployment
•Physics tests (hydrodynamic, hydronuclear, or nuclear)
•Development of delivery system and integration with
warhead
•Weapon transport and storage
•Possible development of doctrine and training for use
Source: Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear
Proliferation (Chicago, 1984), p. 175

9. What is Deterrence
• The term deterrence with French roots means
“to frighten from”. Simply put it means
“dissuasion by means of threat.”
• Even though the concept is as old as the human
civilization itself, as an explicit justified and
guided by theory, the most developed form of
deterrence originates in the special case of the
international relations of the nuclear era.
• In the context of the nuclear age, the idea was
first articulated by Bernard Brodie in 1946 in his
famous statement: “Thus far the chief purpose
of our military establishment has been to win
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to
avert them.”

10. What is Deterrence
• Alexander George defines deterrence as
“an effort by one actor to persuade an
opponent not to take action of some kind
against his interests by the convincing
the opponent that the costs and risks of
doing so will outweigh what he hopes to
gain thereby.” In its emphasis on threat,
deterrence is often distinguished from
more general forms of persuasion,
including those based on the offer of
rewards. It is the threat of punishment
which is the defining characteristics of
deterrence.

11. Deterrence Effect
• Deterrence Effect = Estimated Capability Estimated
Intent.

12. What does deterrence mean?
• To deter means to dissuade
• Deterrence is a strategy of prevention
• It has three components:
• A)Capability
• B)The intention to employ it
• C)The ability to communicate both capability and
resolve

13. Deterrence Defined
• “Deterrence consists essentially of an effort by
one actor to persuade an opponent not to take
action of some kind against his interests by
convincing the opponent that the costs and risks
of doing so will outweigh what he hopes to gain
thereby.”
• Steps in Deterrence process:
• Weigh interests at stake
• Convey commitment to defend those interests
• Back commitment by threats to respond if the
opponent acts.
• Make such threats appear credible and sufficient
in the eyes of the opponent

14. How is it different from defense
• Defense is the ability to defend oneself against an act
of aggression.
• Deterrence is the ability to persuade the adversary
from committing act of aggression.
• Defense follows the failure of deterrence
• Deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation with
force to inflict unacceptable damage

15. Deterrence and compellence
• Deterrence focus is on “refrain”
• Compellence focus is on “changing course”
• Compellence is much harder to achieve than
deterrence.

16. Underlying Assumptions of
Deterrence Theory
• 1. Decisions by both the defender and
the challenger will be based on
rational calculations of probable costs
and gains, accurate evaluations of the
situation and careful assessment of
relative capabilities;
• 2. A high level of threat, such as that
posed by the nuclear weapons,
inhibits rather than provokes
aggressive behavior.

17. Underlying assumptions
of deterrence theory
• 3. The value hierarchies of both the defender and the
challenger are similar, at least to the point that each
places the avoidance of large-scale violence at or
near top;
• 4. Both sides have similar frames of reference so that
signals of resolve and reassurance are perceived and
interpreted accurately;

18. Underlying assumptions of
deterrence theory
• 5. Decisions are not sensitive to such extraneous
considerations as domestic political pressures;
• 6. Both sides maintain tight centralized control over
decisions that might involve or provoke the use of
strategic weapons. Deterrence thus presupposes
rational and predictable decision processes.

19. Key assumptions of
Nuclear Deterrence
• Rationality
• No objective is worth dying
• Cost/benefit calculus
• Mutual vulnerability – MAD
• Deterrence is a process spread over many
stages.
• Perceptions are the key
• Credibility is fundamental for effective
functioning of deterrence

20. Escalation
• One strategy used to try to compel compliance by
another state is escalation – a series of negative
sanctions of increasing severity applied in order to
induce another actor to take some action.

21. The Dynamics of Escalation
Old Dynamics
• Prolonged conventional phase or massive surprise attack.
• Sequential elevation of alert status.
• Reciprocal signaling through forces posturing.
• Crisis management (standing down).
• Restoration of intra-war deterrence through deliberate
limitations on retaliation, pausing on steps of traditional
escalation ladder.
New Dynamics
Little or no warning.
Small, limited strikes, with political/symbolic objectives rather than strategic military objectives.
Unlikely demonstrative use.

22. Implications, continued
• Deterrence under current conditions
must necessarily be "idiosyncratic."
• We should be prepared to dynamically
"raise" or "lower" the nuclear
threshold, depending on
circumstances.
• In a crisis with a regional nuclear-
armed power, it may be necessary to
demonstratively "lower" the nuclear
threshold, especially if convincing
advanced conventional options are
limited, unavailable, or likely to be
ineffective.

23. Features of South Asian
nuclearization
• 1. Incremental growth and long-gestation period
• 2. Delivery systems developed before actual
weaponisation took place
• 3. External support and help was critical, to varying
degrees, for South Asia’s nuclear breakout
• 4. Failure of coercive pressure to effect nuclear
reversal

24. Features of nuclearization
• 5. Raging debate about stability/instability dynamic
• 6. Are nuclear weapons a source of stability
• 7. System wide and unit level effects of nuclear
weapons converge in South Asia.
• 8. Nascent nuclear doctrines and evolving nuclear
postures
• 9. MND, NUTS and MAD are in contention with each
other with no clear winner

25. Future of deterrence
• Nuclear deterrence will be based on virtual arsenals -
a responsive nuclear infrastructure consisting of
functioning nuclear laboratories and some capacity to
produce nuclear weapons.
• For virtual deterrence to replace existing ready
arsenals, agreement on following five key questions
will be necessary

26. Virtual nuclear deterrence
• 1. What are the key elements of a responsive
nuclear infrastructure, that is, one with a
capacity for limited and timely reconstitution of
a deterrent, and how might that be phased out
over time?
• 2. What activities, facilities or weapon-related
items should be limited or prohibited?
• 3. What can be done to assure early and reliable
warning of a breakout attempt to develop
nuclear weapons?
• 4. Can effective and plausible enforcement
measures be devised and put in place?
• 5. How closely could a civil nuclear programme
resemble a responsive nuclear infrastructure in
the case of states that had not previously built
nuclear weapons?

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