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Venafi Enterprise Key and Certificate Management
                    presents.
                 What is Flame?

“One of the most complex threats ever discovered.”
What is Flame?
Flame’s creators used a Microsoft
certificate with an MD5 signature to
create a forged certificate with the
same MD5 signature.

This new forged certificate created
spoofed certificates, and also signed
parts of Flame’s code, making it
appear as if it all came from
Microsoft. This is what gave Flame
dangerous access to inter nal IT
systems.

Once on the network, Flame copies
d o c u m e n t s , re c o rd s k e y s t ro k e s ,
network data and verbal conversations.
Why This Matters
Flame was a specific attack that exploited MD5 certificates,
but the same technique can be used by anyone.
If you have MD5 certificates on your network, you are a
target for any attacker exploiting this flaw in MD5.

Continue to see how this all happened, and what you can
do to remediate it on you network.
“MD5 is no longer acceptable where collision resistance is required
such as digital signatures.”
                           Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms
                                                                                               Turner, S. and L. Chen
The Reason Signatures are Important
     Signatures are made by a “signing algorithm.” Identical inputs get identical signatures:

     And different inputs, even if only slightly different, produce totally different signatures:
As you’d expect, two unique certificates generate two unique signatures...

Unique signatures are how you identify and authenticate different certificates.
But what if your algorithm had a flaw which allowed two certificates to create
                         the same signature?
I’m Looking at the Man in
          the Middle
Flame’s creators forged a certificate that contained the same signature trusted by
                  millions of computers. Let’s see this in action.
A simple scenario of how signatures keep you safe.

1. Client wants to connect, asks for a signed certificate.
2. The Man in the Middle server has an untrusted signature on its certificate. The client chooses not to connect.
3. The client knows it can trust this server because of the signed certificate.
Everything changes when signatures may not be unique.
 1. Client wants to connect, asks for a signed certificate.
 2. The Man in the Middle server has a forged signature and the client accepts the malicious connection. The
    Man in the Middle can now intercept and relay all traffic.
 3. The target server can’t tell the difference and accepts the connection, transmitting data as normal.
A man in the Middle server can:

1.Impersonate a server entirely.
2.Manipulate data as it is transferred.
3.Act as an invisible eavesdropper.
A Signature Problem
How an MD5 Signature is Forged



 In the world of pen and ink, a signature is meant to represent an individual and to give authenticity to whatever
                                                     is signed.
                                    Two unique people, two unique signatures.
How certificate signing should work:
  If you have an authentic certificate, and a spoofed certificate, the different certificates should have different
signatures. In this case, we are using the SHA2 algorithm to make the signature. SHA2 doesn’t have the same
                                             weakness that MD5 has.




                                               Trusted Signature
                                              Untrusted Signature
Two unique certificates, two unique signatures.
       The signature cannot be forged.
What happens when it doesn’t work?
The fatal flaw in the MD5 algorithm is that a spoofed certificate can be manipulated to generate the same MD5
                                                   signature.
Two unique certificates, one shared signature.
        The signature is now forged.

        This is the key vulnerability in
          MD5 exploited by Flame.
“It’s imperative that browsers and CAs
                                stop using MD5”
                                  Marc Stevens, 2008 - Cryptology Group, CWI
The Bad News
450 organizations, a sample of the Global 2000, had their networks
assessed for MD5 certificate vulnerability.




  17.4 % of the certificates found were signed using MD5. Venafi Assessor MD5 Report, June 2012
Think about that number for a minute.

                  17%




        Roughly 17 in 100...




Are susceptible to the same attack
    that made Flame possible.
Hiding on your network.




                      “Shhhhh...”
“The risk-based evaluation your company needs to make right now
is not about your vulnerability to the Flame virus; it is about your
vulnerability to MD5-signed certificates.”
                                          June 27, 2012, Derek Brink, Aberdeen Group
The Good News
    Introducing Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor™
We have developed a special version of Venafi Assessor™ that is targeted specifically to find
           MD5 certificates and vulnerabilities and help you remediate them.
MD5 Certificate Assessor:
Scan and Locate MD5 Certificates
Find the risks so you can eliminate them.

Catch the High-Rick Vulnerabilities
Protect your company security and reputation.

Venafi Assessor is 100% Free
Generate your personalized report at no cost.

Venafi provides cutting edge enterprise key
and certificate management to the world’s
largest corporations and government bodies.
Any key. Any certificate. Anywhere.




 Get Venafi MD5 Assessor
1. Download Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor, and simply enter the IP and port range you want to scan.

2. Let the free tool run a secure, anonymous survey.

3. You will receive an instant report showing you the breakdown of the MD5 certificates on you network.
Assess your MD5 risk fast and
easy.

Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor
runs within its own VM on your
network. Simply specify IP/port
ranges and let Assessor discover
certificates across your network
and generate risk profile reports
for you.
The Venafi MD5 certificate
Assessor Risk Report

Identify areas of risk and
vulnerability with the insights
that Assessor provides:
-Discovery population details
-Certificates by CA
-Ports that respond to SSL or
-STARTTLS handshakes
-Days before certificates expire
-Certificate validity periods
-Certificate key lengths
-Signing algorithms
-Wildcard certificates
-Multiple certificate instances
Prevent outages, breaches &
mitigate risks with Venafi.

Venafi offers the only EKCM
(enterprise key and certificate
management) platform that
is:

-Vendor Neutral
-Independent & universal
-A full lifecycle management
Will Flame burn
 your image?
Alarming Increase in Security Breaches
                                                                              – No Longer a Hypothetical Risk

                                                                            360,000 Customer Accounts Breached
                                                                            Estimated Cost $250 Million

                               Tokens Compromised Replacing All
                               Estimated Cost $100 Million                                    90,000 Military Emails
                                                                                                   Breached (md5)
     ‘Directors Desk’ Attack                                                                  Substantial Cost and
     NSA Investigating                                 Network Breach                          Reputation Damage
     Reputational Damage




Jan 2011   Feb 2011       March 2011      April 2011          May 2011      June 2011         July 2011               May 2012




                               PlayStation Network                                 Fraudulently Issued
                               Breached Estimated                                  Domain Certificates
                               Cost + $1 Billion           Multiple Email
                                                           Breaches            Suspended Operations



           SQL Injection Attack
           Millions of Email Accounts                                                           Flame Malware attacks
           Estimated Cost $4 Billion                                                             computers running the
                                             Fraudulent Issue 7 Domains                             Microsoft Windows
                                             Substantial Reputation Damage                           operating system
                                                                                                  Reputation Damage
                                                                                               © 2011 Venafi Proprietary and Confidential
Don’t make
   Damage control the only
constant in you cyber defense.
Stuxnet infected Chevron
   Gauss
   Flame    Reported: (8-nov)
     Duqu
         miniFlame
          Elvis
          Barbara
          Tiffany
          Fiona
          Sonia
          Sam
          Eve
          Drake
          Charles
          Alex
Let us help today!
  Get the sample report and one-sheet
  on Venafi MDF Certificate AssessorTM

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What is-flame-miniflame

  • 1. Venafi Enterprise Key and Certificate Management presents. What is Flame? “One of the most complex threats ever discovered.”
  • 2. What is Flame? Flame’s creators used a Microsoft certificate with an MD5 signature to create a forged certificate with the same MD5 signature. This new forged certificate created spoofed certificates, and also signed parts of Flame’s code, making it appear as if it all came from Microsoft. This is what gave Flame dangerous access to inter nal IT systems. Once on the network, Flame copies d o c u m e n t s , re c o rd s k e y s t ro k e s , network data and verbal conversations.
  • 3. Why This Matters Flame was a specific attack that exploited MD5 certificates, but the same technique can be used by anyone. If you have MD5 certificates on your network, you are a target for any attacker exploiting this flaw in MD5. Continue to see how this all happened, and what you can do to remediate it on you network.
  • 4. “MD5 is no longer acceptable where collision resistance is required such as digital signatures.” Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms Turner, S. and L. Chen
  • 5. The Reason Signatures are Important Signatures are made by a “signing algorithm.” Identical inputs get identical signatures: And different inputs, even if only slightly different, produce totally different signatures:
  • 6. As you’d expect, two unique certificates generate two unique signatures... Unique signatures are how you identify and authenticate different certificates.
  • 7. But what if your algorithm had a flaw which allowed two certificates to create the same signature?
  • 8. I’m Looking at the Man in the Middle Flame’s creators forged a certificate that contained the same signature trusted by millions of computers. Let’s see this in action.
  • 9. A simple scenario of how signatures keep you safe. 1. Client wants to connect, asks for a signed certificate. 2. The Man in the Middle server has an untrusted signature on its certificate. The client chooses not to connect. 3. The client knows it can trust this server because of the signed certificate.
  • 10. Everything changes when signatures may not be unique. 1. Client wants to connect, asks for a signed certificate. 2. The Man in the Middle server has a forged signature and the client accepts the malicious connection. The Man in the Middle can now intercept and relay all traffic. 3. The target server can’t tell the difference and accepts the connection, transmitting data as normal.
  • 11. A man in the Middle server can: 1.Impersonate a server entirely. 2.Manipulate data as it is transferred. 3.Act as an invisible eavesdropper.
  • 12. A Signature Problem How an MD5 Signature is Forged In the world of pen and ink, a signature is meant to represent an individual and to give authenticity to whatever is signed. Two unique people, two unique signatures.
  • 13. How certificate signing should work: If you have an authentic certificate, and a spoofed certificate, the different certificates should have different signatures. In this case, we are using the SHA2 algorithm to make the signature. SHA2 doesn’t have the same weakness that MD5 has. Trusted Signature Untrusted Signature
  • 14. Two unique certificates, two unique signatures. The signature cannot be forged.
  • 15. What happens when it doesn’t work? The fatal flaw in the MD5 algorithm is that a spoofed certificate can be manipulated to generate the same MD5 signature.
  • 16. Two unique certificates, one shared signature. The signature is now forged. This is the key vulnerability in MD5 exploited by Flame.
  • 17. “It’s imperative that browsers and CAs stop using MD5” Marc Stevens, 2008 - Cryptology Group, CWI
  • 18. The Bad News 450 organizations, a sample of the Global 2000, had their networks assessed for MD5 certificate vulnerability. 17.4 % of the certificates found were signed using MD5. Venafi Assessor MD5 Report, June 2012
  • 19. Think about that number for a minute. 17% Roughly 17 in 100... Are susceptible to the same attack that made Flame possible.
  • 20. Hiding on your network. “Shhhhh...”
  • 21. “The risk-based evaluation your company needs to make right now is not about your vulnerability to the Flame virus; it is about your vulnerability to MD5-signed certificates.” June 27, 2012, Derek Brink, Aberdeen Group
  • 22. The Good News Introducing Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor™ We have developed a special version of Venafi Assessor™ that is targeted specifically to find MD5 certificates and vulnerabilities and help you remediate them.
  • 23. MD5 Certificate Assessor: Scan and Locate MD5 Certificates Find the risks so you can eliminate them. Catch the High-Rick Vulnerabilities Protect your company security and reputation. Venafi Assessor is 100% Free Generate your personalized report at no cost. Venafi provides cutting edge enterprise key and certificate management to the world’s largest corporations and government bodies. Any key. Any certificate. Anywhere. Get Venafi MD5 Assessor
  • 24. 1. Download Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor, and simply enter the IP and port range you want to scan. 2. Let the free tool run a secure, anonymous survey. 3. You will receive an instant report showing you the breakdown of the MD5 certificates on you network.
  • 25. Assess your MD5 risk fast and easy. Venafi MD5 Certificate Assessor runs within its own VM on your network. Simply specify IP/port ranges and let Assessor discover certificates across your network and generate risk profile reports for you.
  • 26. The Venafi MD5 certificate Assessor Risk Report Identify areas of risk and vulnerability with the insights that Assessor provides: -Discovery population details -Certificates by CA -Ports that respond to SSL or -STARTTLS handshakes -Days before certificates expire -Certificate validity periods -Certificate key lengths -Signing algorithms -Wildcard certificates -Multiple certificate instances
  • 27. Prevent outages, breaches & mitigate risks with Venafi. Venafi offers the only EKCM (enterprise key and certificate management) platform that is: -Vendor Neutral -Independent & universal -A full lifecycle management
  • 28. Will Flame burn your image?
  • 29. Alarming Increase in Security Breaches – No Longer a Hypothetical Risk 360,000 Customer Accounts Breached Estimated Cost $250 Million Tokens Compromised Replacing All Estimated Cost $100 Million 90,000 Military Emails Breached (md5) ‘Directors Desk’ Attack Substantial Cost and NSA Investigating Network Breach Reputation Damage Reputational Damage Jan 2011 Feb 2011 March 2011 April 2011 May 2011 June 2011 July 2011 May 2012 PlayStation Network Fraudulently Issued Breached Estimated Domain Certificates Cost + $1 Billion Multiple Email Breaches Suspended Operations SQL Injection Attack Millions of Email Accounts Flame Malware attacks Estimated Cost $4 Billion computers running the Fraudulent Issue 7 Domains Microsoft Windows Substantial Reputation Damage operating system Reputation Damage © 2011 Venafi Proprietary and Confidential
  • 30. Don’t make Damage control the only constant in you cyber defense.
  • 31. Stuxnet infected Chevron Gauss Flame Reported: (8-nov) Duqu miniFlame Elvis Barbara Tiffany Fiona Sonia Sam Eve Drake Charles Alex
  • 32. Let us help today! Get the sample report and one-sheet on Venafi MDF Certificate AssessorTM

Notas del editor

  1. The content is duplicated on this slide. Is there a reason for the duplication?\n
  2. Added title for slide. Added timeline on right.\n
  3. \n
  4. \n
  5. The text at the top repeats the copy in the image. Does our SEO need the copy in addition to the images in the slide deck?\n
  6. Refer to comment on slide 5.\n
  7. Refer to comment on slide 5.\n
  8. \n
  9. Left aligned the steps, applied the numbered list formatting.\n
  10. Left aligned the numbered list, moved the list down, applied the numbered list format.\n
  11. Left aligned the numbered list, moved the list up and centered, applied the numbered list format.\n
  12. Ditto to slide 5 comment.\n
  13. Header copy is duplicated\n
  14. Ditto to comment on slide 5. Made duplicate text larger, bolded, and moved to top of slide.\n
  15. The duplicate text really doesn’t work on this slide.\n
  16. Ditto to comment on slide 5.\n
  17. Updated reference\n
  18. \n
  19. Ditto to comment on slide 5. Would work better if the image were trimmed on the top and bottom and the text recreated.\n
  20. Ditto to comments on slide 5 and 20.\n
  21. \n
  22. Please add the link to request MD5 Assessor: http://www.venafi.com/md5-certificate-assessor/. \n
  23. The duplicate text really doesn’t work here. If we need the text to stay, could we hide it behind the image? Please add the link to request MD5 Assessor: http://www.venafi.com/md5-certificate-assessor/. \n
  24. \n
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  26. Ditto to comment on slide 24.\n
  27. Ditto to comment on slide 24.\n
  28. Ditto to comment on slide 24.\n
  29. \n
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  31. \n
  32. \n
  33. Please add the link to request MD5 Assessor: http://www.venafi.com/md5-certificate-assessor/. \n