SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 19
IoT Device Security
What Are IoT Devices?
 An IoT device is simply an electronic
device that is connected to the Internet.
 There are several basic properties that
qualify a device as an “IoT” device:
1. A physical device/object
2. Contains controller(s), sensor(s), and or
actuator(s)
3. Connects to the Internet
 Examples: Amazon Alexa, Samsung
Smart TV, Google Home, NEST Security
Camera
 Generally labeled as “Smart Devices”
“Perfect Storm” for IoT Devices
 Higher availability of internet access
 Connection cost: Decreasing
 More devices  Wi-Fi capabilities/sensors
 Technology cost $$  Decreasing
Trend in IoT Devices
 Number of IoT Devices
has surpassed the
number of humans on
the planet
 Industries:
 Personal/Consumer
 Healthcare
 Automotive
 Manufacturing
 Etc.
Figure 1: Growth in IoT Devices
Home IoT Devices
https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/smart-home-or-building
 Average number of
devices per person:
 8 devices per person
(Cisco VNI 2018)
IoT Communication
IoT Devices
Gateway
Internet
User/Device Controller
Cloud Storage Server
Send Data
Receive Command
Figure 3: IoT Communication
Application
Sector Types of Devices Locations
Smart Grid Energy Generators, Turbines, Windmills,
Batteries, Fuel Cells
Oil Rigs, Derricks, Pipelines, Solar Panels,
Wind Turbines, Electrical Grids
Smart Transportation Vehicles, Lights, Ships, Planes, Tolls, Parking
Meters
Air, Rail, Marine, Consumer Vehicles,
Commercial Vehicles, Navigation
Retail POS Systems, Cash Registers, Vending
Machines, Tags
Cinemas, Shopping Malls, Cafes, Restaurants,
Supermarkets, Distribution Centers, Bars
Healthcare MRI, Implants, CGM, Pacemaker Hospitals, ER, Clinic, Doctor Office, Labs
Consumer/Home Digital Cameras, e-Readers, Dishwashers,
Refrigerators, Game Consoles
Wiring, Network Access, Fire Safety,
HVAC/Climate, Lighting, Entertainment
OWASP – Top 10 IoT Risks and Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability/Risk Description
1. Weak, Guessable, Hardcoded Passwords Using easily brute-forced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials
2. Insecure Network Services Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the
internet, compromise the C.I.A. of information or allow unauthorized remote control
3. Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that
allows compromise of the device or its related components.
4. Lack of Secure Update Mechanism Lack of ability to securely update the device. Examples include lack of firmware validation on device, lack
of secure delivery (plaintext transmission), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms
5. Use of Insecure or Outdated Components Using deprecated or insecure software components/libraries that could allow the device to be
compromised. Includes insecure customization of OS platforms, using third-party software, etc.
6. Insufficient Privacy Protection User’s personal information is stored on the device and is used insecurely or without permission
7. Insecure Data Transfer and Storage Lack of encryption or access control of sensitive data anywhere within the ecosystem, including at rest,
in transit, or during processing
8. Lack of Device Management Lack of security support on devices deployed within production, including asset management, update
management, secure decommissioning, systems monitoring, and response capabilities
9. Insecure Default Settings Devices or systems shipped with insecure default settings or lack the ability to make the system more
secure by restricting operators from modifying configurations
10. Lack of Physical Hardening Lack of physical hardening measures, allowing potential attackers to gain sensitive information that can
help in future remote attacks or take local control of the device
IoT Attack Surfaces
Attack Surface Vulnerability
Ecosystem Access Control • Implicit trust between components
• Enrollment security
• Lost access procedures
Device Memory • Cleartext usernames
• Cleartext passwords
• Third-party credentials
Device Physical Interfaces • User CLI
• Admin CLI
• Privilege escalation
Device Web Interface • SQL Injection
• XSS
• Weak Passwords
Device Firmware • Hardcoded credentials
• Sensitive information disclosure
• Encryption keys
IoT Attack Surfaces (Cont.)
Attack Surface Vulnerability
Device Network Services • Denial of Service
• Buffer Overflow
• Poorly implemented encryption
Administrative Interface • SQL Injection
• Account lockout
• Two-factor authentication
Local Data Storage • Unencrypted data
• Data encrypted with discovered keys
• Lack of data integrity checks
Cloud Web Interface • SQL Injection
• Weak passwords
• Username enumeration
Third-party Backend APIs • Unencrypted PII sent
• Device information leaked
• Location leaked
IoT Attack Surfaces (Cont.)
Attack Surface Vulnerability
Update Mechanism • Update sent without encryption
• Updates not signed
• Missing update mechanism
Mobile Application • Implicitly trusted by device or cloud
• Insecure data storage
• Insecure password recovery mechanism
Vendor Backend APIs • Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application
• Weak access controls
• Weak authentication
Ecosystem
Communication
• Health checks
• Ecosystem Commands
• Pushing updates
Network Traffic • LAN
• LAN to Internet
• Short range
Example: IoT Attack Scenario
Server
Fake Server
Network
Devices
Fake Devices
Eavesdropping
Defensive Security Measures – IoT
Category IoT Security Consideration
Insecure Web Interface • Disallow weak user passwords
• Provide an account lockout mechanism
• Test interface for SQL injection, XSS, CSRF vulns
Insufficient
Authentication/Authorization
• Require strong passwords for authentication
• Implement two-factor authentication
• Force password expiration after a certain date
Insecure Network Services • Ensure all devices operate with minimal ports active
• Ensure devices do not make network ports or services available to internet via
UPnP
• Review required network services for vulnerabilities
Lack of Transport Encryption • Ensure traffic is encrypted between system components
• Ensure SSL/TLS implementations are updated and configured properly
Privacy Concerns • Ensure only minimal amount of PII is collected from consumers
• Ensure only non-sensitive data is analyzed
• Ensure data retention policy is in place
Defensive Security Measures – IoT (Cont.)
Category IoT Security Consideration
Insecure Cloud Interface • Ensure all cloud interfaces are reviewed for vulnerabilities
• Ensure any cloud-based web interface disallows weak passwords
• Ensure all cloud interfaces use transport encryption
Insecure Mobile Interface • Ensure that any mobile application disallows weak passwords
• Ensure that any mobile application has an account lockout mechanism
• Implement two-factor authentication for mobile applications
Insufficient Security
Configurability
• Ensure password security options are made available (e.g. Enabling 20 character passwords or
enabling two-factor authentication)
• Ensure encryption options are made available (e.g. Enabling AES-256)
• Ensure secure logging is available for security events
Insecure Software/Firmware • Ensure all system devices have update capability and can be updated quickly when vulnerabilities are
discovered
• Ensure update files are encrypted and that the files are also transmitted using encryption
Poor Physical Security • Ensure the device is produced with a minimal number of physical external ports (e.g. USB ports)
• Ensure the firmware of Operating System can not be accessed via unintended methods such as
through an unnecessary USB port
• Ensure the product is tamper resistant
Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack
 DDoS Attack in October, 2016  Target: DNS provider Dyn
 DDoS attack was staged and launched from IoT devices using the Mirai
malware
 Mirai was designed for two main purposes:
 Find and infect IoT devices to grow the botnet
 Participate in DDoS attacks based on commands received by remote
Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure
 Mirai operates in three stages:
1. Infect the device
2. Protect itself
3. Launch attack
Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)
 Stage 1: Scan for IoT devices that are accessible over the Internet
 Primarily scans for ports 22, 23, 5747, etc. that are open
 Can be configured to scan for others
 Once connected  brute-forces usernames and passwords to login to
the device
 Use the device to scan networks looking for more IoT devices
Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)
https://www.imperva.com/blog/how-to-identify-a-mirai-style-ddos-attack/
Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)
 Stage 2: Protect itself
 Kill other process running on infected device (SSH, Telnet, HTTP) to prevent
owner from gaining remote access to device while infected
 Note: Rebooting the device can remove the malware, but it can become
infected again
 Stage 3: Launch attack
 Infected device launches different types of attacks
 HTTP floods, SYN floods, etc.  DDoS-based attacks
 **Note: Mirai contained a list of known networks in the U.S. to avoid
attacking  U.S. Postal Service, Department of Defense
Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)
https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-the-infamous-iot-botnet-a-retrospective-analysis/

Más contenido relacionado

Similar a IoT-Device-Security.pptx

IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...
IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...
IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...IRJET Journal
 
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdfonline Marketing
 
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurity
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurityEnterprise mobileapplicationsecurity
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurityVenkat Alagarsamy
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)HITCON GIRLS
 
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkata
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet KolkataSecurity Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkata
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkataamiyadutta
 
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)mike parks
 
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptx
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptxAssign 1_8812814ctm.pptx
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptxpdevang
 
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...Jiunn-Jer Sun
 
IoT Security Challenges and Solutions
IoT Security Challenges and SolutionsIoT Security Challenges and Solutions
IoT Security Challenges and SolutionsIntel® Software
 
Security challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of thingsSecurity challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of thingsMonika Keerthi
 
VMI based malware detection in virtual environment
VMI based malware detection in virtual environmentVMI based malware detection in virtual environment
VMI based malware detection in virtual environmentAyush Gargya
 
Chapter-5.pptx
Chapter-5.pptxChapter-5.pptx
Chapter-5.pptxRenu875977
 
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" Myth
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" MythIoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" Myth
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" MythSecurity Innovation
 
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart Buildings
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart BuildingsCybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart Buildings
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart BuildingsVeridify Security
 
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is Yours
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is YoursBig data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is Yours
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is YoursDilum Bandara
 
Cellular wireless network security
Cellular wireless network securityCellular wireless network security
Cellular wireless network securityAnkit Anand
 
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdf
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdfPresentation about IoT in media and communication.pdf
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdfezzAyman1
 

Similar a IoT-Device-Security.pptx (20)

IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...
IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...
IRJET- Multifactor Authentication in IoT Devices for Ensuring Secure Cloud St...
 
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf
12 IoT Cyber Security Threats to Avoid - CyberHive.pdf
 
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurity
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurityEnterprise mobileapplicationsecurity
Enterprise mobileapplicationsecurity
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
 
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkata
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet KolkataSecurity Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkata
Security Holes and Vulnerabilities in Corporate Network_Pre Null Meet Kolkata
 
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)
 
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptx
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptxAssign 1_8812814ctm.pptx
Assign 1_8812814ctm.pptx
 
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...
Build A Solid Foundation For Industrial Network Security - Cybersecurity Webi...
 
IoT security
IoT securityIoT security
IoT security
 
IoT Security Challenges and Solutions
IoT Security Challenges and SolutionsIoT Security Challenges and Solutions
IoT Security Challenges and Solutions
 
Security challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of thingsSecurity challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of things
 
VMI based malware detection in virtual environment
VMI based malware detection in virtual environmentVMI based malware detection in virtual environment
VMI based malware detection in virtual environment
 
Chapter-5.pptx
Chapter-5.pptxChapter-5.pptx
Chapter-5.pptx
 
Linux Security best Practices with Fedora
Linux Security best Practices with FedoraLinux Security best Practices with Fedora
Linux Security best Practices with Fedora
 
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" Myth
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" MythIoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" Myth
IoT Security: Debunking the "We Aren't THAT Connected" Myth
 
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart Buildings
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart BuildingsCybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart Buildings
Cybersecurity for Building Controls and Smart Buildings
 
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is Yours
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is YoursBig data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is Yours
Big data, Security, or Privacy in IoT: Choice is Yours
 
Security Imeprative for iOS and Android Apps
Security Imeprative for iOS and Android AppsSecurity Imeprative for iOS and Android Apps
Security Imeprative for iOS and Android Apps
 
Cellular wireless network security
Cellular wireless network securityCellular wireless network security
Cellular wireless network security
 
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdf
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdfPresentation about IoT in media and communication.pdf
Presentation about IoT in media and communication.pdf
 

Último

%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein
%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein
%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfonteinmasabamasaba
 
tonesoftg
tonesoftgtonesoftg
tonesoftglanshi9
 
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastArchitecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastPapp Krisztián
 
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech studentsHimanshiGarg82
 
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...WSO2
 
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...Shane Coughlan
 
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benonimasabamasaba
 
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrainmasabamasaba
 
AI & Machine Learning Presentation Template
AI & Machine Learning Presentation TemplateAI & Machine Learning Presentation Template
AI & Machine Learning Presentation TemplatePresentation.STUDIO
 
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...Jittipong Loespradit
 
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfonteinmasabamasaba
 
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK Software
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK SoftwareAnnouncing Codolex 2.0 from GDK Software
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK SoftwareJim McKeeth
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...masabamasaba
 
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the Situation
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the SituationWhat Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the Situation
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the SituationJuha-Pekka Tolvanen
 
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...panagenda
 
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburgmasabamasaba
 
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learn
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learnVTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learn
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learnAmarnathKambale
 
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdf
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdfPayment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdf
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdfkalichargn70th171
 

Último (20)

Abortion Pills In Pretoria ](+27832195400*)[ 🏥 Women's Abortion Clinic In Pre...
Abortion Pills In Pretoria ](+27832195400*)[ 🏥 Women's Abortion Clinic In Pre...Abortion Pills In Pretoria ](+27832195400*)[ 🏥 Women's Abortion Clinic In Pre...
Abortion Pills In Pretoria ](+27832195400*)[ 🏥 Women's Abortion Clinic In Pre...
 
%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein
%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein
%in kaalfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kaalfontein
 
tonesoftg
tonesoftgtonesoftg
tonesoftg
 
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastArchitecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
 
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students
8257 interfacing 2 in microprocessor for btech students
 
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...
WSO2Con2024 - From Code To Cloud: Fast Track Your Cloud Native Journey with C...
 
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdfMicrosoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
 
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...
OpenChain - The Ramifications of ISO/IEC 5230 and ISO/IEC 18974 for Legal Pro...
 
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni
%in Benoni+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Benoni
 
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain
%in Bahrain+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Bahrain
 
AI & Machine Learning Presentation Template
AI & Machine Learning Presentation TemplateAI & Machine Learning Presentation Template
AI & Machine Learning Presentation Template
 
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
 
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein
%in Stilfontein+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Stilfontein
 
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK Software
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK SoftwareAnnouncing Codolex 2.0 from GDK Software
Announcing Codolex 2.0 from GDK Software
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...
%+27788225528 love spells in Atlanta Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Brin...
 
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the Situation
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the SituationWhat Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the Situation
What Goes Wrong with Language Definitions and How to Improve the Situation
 
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...
W01_panagenda_Navigating-the-Future-with-The-Hitchhikers-Guide-to-Notes-and-D...
 
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg
%in Rustenburg+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in Rustenburg
 
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learn
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learnVTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learn
VTU technical seminar 8Th Sem on Scikit-learn
 
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdf
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdfPayment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdf
Payment Gateway Testing Simplified_ A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners.pdf
 

IoT-Device-Security.pptx

  • 2. What Are IoT Devices?  An IoT device is simply an electronic device that is connected to the Internet.  There are several basic properties that qualify a device as an “IoT” device: 1. A physical device/object 2. Contains controller(s), sensor(s), and or actuator(s) 3. Connects to the Internet  Examples: Amazon Alexa, Samsung Smart TV, Google Home, NEST Security Camera  Generally labeled as “Smart Devices”
  • 3. “Perfect Storm” for IoT Devices  Higher availability of internet access  Connection cost: Decreasing  More devices  Wi-Fi capabilities/sensors  Technology cost $$  Decreasing
  • 4. Trend in IoT Devices  Number of IoT Devices has surpassed the number of humans on the planet  Industries:  Personal/Consumer  Healthcare  Automotive  Manufacturing  Etc. Figure 1: Growth in IoT Devices
  • 5. Home IoT Devices https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/smart-home-or-building  Average number of devices per person:  8 devices per person (Cisco VNI 2018)
  • 6. IoT Communication IoT Devices Gateway Internet User/Device Controller Cloud Storage Server Send Data Receive Command Figure 3: IoT Communication
  • 7. Application Sector Types of Devices Locations Smart Grid Energy Generators, Turbines, Windmills, Batteries, Fuel Cells Oil Rigs, Derricks, Pipelines, Solar Panels, Wind Turbines, Electrical Grids Smart Transportation Vehicles, Lights, Ships, Planes, Tolls, Parking Meters Air, Rail, Marine, Consumer Vehicles, Commercial Vehicles, Navigation Retail POS Systems, Cash Registers, Vending Machines, Tags Cinemas, Shopping Malls, Cafes, Restaurants, Supermarkets, Distribution Centers, Bars Healthcare MRI, Implants, CGM, Pacemaker Hospitals, ER, Clinic, Doctor Office, Labs Consumer/Home Digital Cameras, e-Readers, Dishwashers, Refrigerators, Game Consoles Wiring, Network Access, Fire Safety, HVAC/Climate, Lighting, Entertainment
  • 8. OWASP – Top 10 IoT Risks and Vulnerabilities Vulnerability/Risk Description 1. Weak, Guessable, Hardcoded Passwords Using easily brute-forced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials 2. Insecure Network Services Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the internet, compromise the C.I.A. of information or allow unauthorized remote control 3. Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that allows compromise of the device or its related components. 4. Lack of Secure Update Mechanism Lack of ability to securely update the device. Examples include lack of firmware validation on device, lack of secure delivery (plaintext transmission), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms 5. Use of Insecure or Outdated Components Using deprecated or insecure software components/libraries that could allow the device to be compromised. Includes insecure customization of OS platforms, using third-party software, etc. 6. Insufficient Privacy Protection User’s personal information is stored on the device and is used insecurely or without permission 7. Insecure Data Transfer and Storage Lack of encryption or access control of sensitive data anywhere within the ecosystem, including at rest, in transit, or during processing 8. Lack of Device Management Lack of security support on devices deployed within production, including asset management, update management, secure decommissioning, systems monitoring, and response capabilities 9. Insecure Default Settings Devices or systems shipped with insecure default settings or lack the ability to make the system more secure by restricting operators from modifying configurations 10. Lack of Physical Hardening Lack of physical hardening measures, allowing potential attackers to gain sensitive information that can help in future remote attacks or take local control of the device
  • 9. IoT Attack Surfaces Attack Surface Vulnerability Ecosystem Access Control • Implicit trust between components • Enrollment security • Lost access procedures Device Memory • Cleartext usernames • Cleartext passwords • Third-party credentials Device Physical Interfaces • User CLI • Admin CLI • Privilege escalation Device Web Interface • SQL Injection • XSS • Weak Passwords Device Firmware • Hardcoded credentials • Sensitive information disclosure • Encryption keys
  • 10. IoT Attack Surfaces (Cont.) Attack Surface Vulnerability Device Network Services • Denial of Service • Buffer Overflow • Poorly implemented encryption Administrative Interface • SQL Injection • Account lockout • Two-factor authentication Local Data Storage • Unencrypted data • Data encrypted with discovered keys • Lack of data integrity checks Cloud Web Interface • SQL Injection • Weak passwords • Username enumeration Third-party Backend APIs • Unencrypted PII sent • Device information leaked • Location leaked
  • 11. IoT Attack Surfaces (Cont.) Attack Surface Vulnerability Update Mechanism • Update sent without encryption • Updates not signed • Missing update mechanism Mobile Application • Implicitly trusted by device or cloud • Insecure data storage • Insecure password recovery mechanism Vendor Backend APIs • Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application • Weak access controls • Weak authentication Ecosystem Communication • Health checks • Ecosystem Commands • Pushing updates Network Traffic • LAN • LAN to Internet • Short range
  • 12. Example: IoT Attack Scenario Server Fake Server Network Devices Fake Devices Eavesdropping
  • 13. Defensive Security Measures – IoT Category IoT Security Consideration Insecure Web Interface • Disallow weak user passwords • Provide an account lockout mechanism • Test interface for SQL injection, XSS, CSRF vulns Insufficient Authentication/Authorization • Require strong passwords for authentication • Implement two-factor authentication • Force password expiration after a certain date Insecure Network Services • Ensure all devices operate with minimal ports active • Ensure devices do not make network ports or services available to internet via UPnP • Review required network services for vulnerabilities Lack of Transport Encryption • Ensure traffic is encrypted between system components • Ensure SSL/TLS implementations are updated and configured properly Privacy Concerns • Ensure only minimal amount of PII is collected from consumers • Ensure only non-sensitive data is analyzed • Ensure data retention policy is in place
  • 14. Defensive Security Measures – IoT (Cont.) Category IoT Security Consideration Insecure Cloud Interface • Ensure all cloud interfaces are reviewed for vulnerabilities • Ensure any cloud-based web interface disallows weak passwords • Ensure all cloud interfaces use transport encryption Insecure Mobile Interface • Ensure that any mobile application disallows weak passwords • Ensure that any mobile application has an account lockout mechanism • Implement two-factor authentication for mobile applications Insufficient Security Configurability • Ensure password security options are made available (e.g. Enabling 20 character passwords or enabling two-factor authentication) • Ensure encryption options are made available (e.g. Enabling AES-256) • Ensure secure logging is available for security events Insecure Software/Firmware • Ensure all system devices have update capability and can be updated quickly when vulnerabilities are discovered • Ensure update files are encrypted and that the files are also transmitted using encryption Poor Physical Security • Ensure the device is produced with a minimal number of physical external ports (e.g. USB ports) • Ensure the firmware of Operating System can not be accessed via unintended methods such as through an unnecessary USB port • Ensure the product is tamper resistant
  • 15. Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack  DDoS Attack in October, 2016  Target: DNS provider Dyn  DDoS attack was staged and launched from IoT devices using the Mirai malware  Mirai was designed for two main purposes:  Find and infect IoT devices to grow the botnet  Participate in DDoS attacks based on commands received by remote Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure  Mirai operates in three stages: 1. Infect the device 2. Protect itself 3. Launch attack
  • 16. Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)  Stage 1: Scan for IoT devices that are accessible over the Internet  Primarily scans for ports 22, 23, 5747, etc. that are open  Can be configured to scan for others  Once connected  brute-forces usernames and passwords to login to the device  Use the device to scan networks looking for more IoT devices
  • 17. Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.) https://www.imperva.com/blog/how-to-identify-a-mirai-style-ddos-attack/
  • 18. Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.)  Stage 2: Protect itself  Kill other process running on infected device (SSH, Telnet, HTTP) to prevent owner from gaining remote access to device while infected  Note: Rebooting the device can remove the malware, but it can become infected again  Stage 3: Launch attack  Infected device launches different types of attacks  HTTP floods, SYN floods, etc.  DDoS-based attacks  **Note: Mirai contained a list of known networks in the U.S. to avoid attacking  U.S. Postal Service, Department of Defense
  • 19. Case: Dyn Botnet DDoS Attack (Cont.) https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-the-infamous-iot-botnet-a-retrospective-analysis/