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Digital Identity
      Rob Richards
   September 17, 2008

http://xri.net/=rob.richards
What is a Digital Identity?


• Digital representation of claims about an entity
  – Domain name
  – email address
  – username
  – I-name
• Claims can be made by or about the entity
• No built-in assumption of trust




                                2
Who Am I?

=rob.richards                     jbobhick
                                  Jimbob Hick
                                  ab3544...@nyms.net
Rob Richards                      Caribou, Maine
<personal email>
<address>
<telephone>             rob@mashery.com
                        Rob Richards
                        Sr. Software Architect

    http://rrichards.pip.verisignlabs.com/



                         3
What's the Problem?


• Username/Password juggling
• Information is being stored
   – Concerns over privacy issues
   – Security concerns / Identity Theft
• User has no idea who/what is using their information
• Continual re-invention of authentication mechanisms
• Granting access to personal data to another party


  *** Sep 17th 2008 ***
  http://www.enews20.com/
  news_Norwegian_tax_authority_mistakenly_leaks_sensitive_data_11597.html



                                      4
7 Laws of Identity


• User Control and Consent
• Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use
• Justifiable Parties
• Directed Identity
• Pluralism of Operators and Technologies
• Human Integration
• Consistent Experience Across Contexts


  Kim Cameron, quot;Laws of Identityquot;, http://www.identityblog.com/?page_id=354




                                   5
Identity Context Examples


• Browsing: self-asserted identity for exploring the Web
  (giving away no real data)‫‏‬
• Personal: self-asserted identity for sites with which I want an ongoing
  private relationship (including my name and a long-term e-mail address)‫‏‬
• Community: a public identity for collaborating with others
• Professional: a public identity for collaborating issued by my employer
• Credit card: an identity issued by my financial institution
• Citizen: an identity issued by my government


Kim Cameron, quot;Laws of Identityquot;, http://www.identityblog.com/?page_id=354



                                  6
OpenID and Information Cards


• Allow for Single Sign On
• Decentralized
  – No one entity in control
  – User has choice and freedom
• User-Centric
  – User is in control of data
  – User aware of information exchange
• Possible reduction in amount of personal information a remote site
  would need to store
• Potential to increase the Web experience while maintaining User
  privacy



                                   7
Common Terminology


• Subject
   – Entity referenced by identity
• Digital Identity
   – Set of claims made by one digital subject about itself or another
• Relying Party (RP)
   – Site requesting identity
• Identity Provider (IdP) / OpenID Provider (OP)
   – Service that provides or maintains identity information




                                      8
OpenID


• URL based
   – http://rrichards.pip.verisignlabs.com/
   – =rob.richards (http://xri.net/=rob.richards)‫‏‬
• Not Machine Dependent
• Based on Simplicity
   – HTTP/S
   – URLs
• PHP Libraries (There are More . . .)‫‏‬
   – PHP OpenID library (http://www.openidenabled.com/php-openid/)‫‏‬
   – Zend (http://framework.zend.com/manual/en/zend.openid.html)
   – OpenID for PHP (http://www.openidforphp.org/)




                                       9
OpenID Interaction
                           Based on OpenID 1.1

                                              Relying Party locates
User Submits ID
                                              Identity Provider (IP)‫‏‬




                     Relying Party                               Relying Party
                  Redirects User to IP                      Establishes Association




            User Authenticates                            IP Redirects back
                Against IP                                 to Relying Party




                                                           Relying Party
                                                        Evaluates Response


                                         10
OpenID Validation Example
12
OpenID Verification




       13
User Trust Consent




       14
OpenID validated




      15
OpenID 2.0

• Extension Support
  – namespaced extensions
• Attribute Exchange Extension
  – Extensible attribute support
  – Identity Provider can be asked to store certain attributes
• HTTP POST Support
  – No longer limited to URL length
  – Larger Requests and Responses
• Directed Identity
  – URL can identity Identity Provider
  – Identity Provider determines what ID to send to Relying Party
• Official i-name Support


                                   16
OpenID: Potential Issues


• Phishing / Pharming
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) / Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
  – Feature to trust sites and not require login
  – Attacker could access sites unbeknownst to user
• DNS Poisoning
• Web Page Defacement
• Realm Spoofing
  – Open Redirect Servers
  – XSS exploited
• ID recycling
• Your provider knows every site you use your id on


                                     17
Information Cards: Identities


      Identities represented as cards in a wallet
– Self Asserted
– Managed (Third Party provided)‫‏‬




                                18
Information Cards: Selectors

      CardSpace != Information Cards
Information Cards are not Microsoft specific




                  19
Information Cards


• Identifier is unique amongst parties
  – Distinct digital key for each realm
• Protections again Phishing
  – Visual indicators of previous interactions
  – x509 certificate checking
• Complex Technologies
  – SAML
  – WS-Security / WS-Policy / WS-Trust
  – x509




                                     20
Information Cards: Making Claims




              21
Information Cards Interaction




                      Source: David Chappell
                      quot;Introducing Windows CardSpacequot;
                      April 2006




            22
Information Card
Validation Example



        23
Information Card Login




         24
Site Information




     25
Select or Create Card




        26
Preview Information To Be Sent




             27
Information Card Validated




          28
InfoCard Selector Initiation


<form id=quot;infocardquot; method=quot;postquot; action=quot;serendipity_admin.phpquot;>
  <center>
    <img src=quot;/infocard/infocard.pngquot; onClick=quot;infocard.submit()quot;/>
  </center>

  <OBJECT type=quot;application/x-informationCardquot; name=quot;xmlTokenquot;>
   <PARAM Name=quot;tokenTypequot; Value=quot;urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertionquot;>
    <PARAM Name=quot;requiredClaimsquot;
    Value=quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/givenname
    http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/surname
 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/privatepersonalidentifier
    http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddressquot; />
  </OBJECT>

</form>


                                   29
InfoCard: PHP Code

 http://www.cdatazone.org/index.php?/pages/source.html

• My own code
  – xmlseclibs.php
     • XMLDSig / XMLENC
  – infocard-lib.php
     • Decrypts submitted XML Token
     • Verifies Signed SAML Token
     • Parses Assertions
• Zend_Infocard
  – http://framework.zend.com/manual/en/zend.infocard.html
  – Included with 1.5 release




                                      30
Submitted Token

<enc:EncryptedData xmlns:enc=quot;...xmlenc#quot; Type=quot;...xmlenc#Elementquot;>
  <enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmlenc#aes256-cbcquot; />
  <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds=quot;http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#quot;>
    <enc:EncryptedKey>
      <enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1pquot;>
        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmldsig#sha1quot; />
      </enc:EncryptionMethod>
      <ds:KeyInfo>
        <wsse:SecurityTokenReference xmlns:wsse=quot;...ssecurity-secext-1.0.xsdquot;>
          <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType=quot;. . .#ThumbprintSHA1quot;
               EncodingType=quot;. . .#Base64Binaryquot;>7SSj. . .</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
        </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
      </ds:KeyInfo>
      <enc:CipherData> . . .</enc:CipherData>
    </enc:EncryptedKey>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
  <enc:CipherData>. . .</enc:CipherData>
</enc:EncryptedData>
                                    31
Decrypted Self-Asserted Card

<saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;emailaddressquot;
  AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./identity/claimsquot;>
    <saml:AttributeValue>rrichards@php.net</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>

<saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;givennamequot;
  AttributeNamespace=quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claimsquot;>
    <saml:AttributeValue>Rob</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>

<saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;surnamequot;
  AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./identity/claimsquot;>
    <saml:AttributeValue>Richards</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>

<saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;privatepersonalidentifierquot; AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./
identity/claimsquot;>
    <saml:AttributeValue>mzhu+UCL. . .</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
                                     32
Information Cards: Into The Future




              33
Information Card Issues


• Still in infancy
   – Few number of selectors
   – Differing functionality between selectors
   – Small numbers in production
• CardStore not easily transportable
• Third party applications required for non Windows systems
• Third party applications/plugins required
• More difficult to implement than most Identity technologies




                                     34
Digital Identity: What Are You Using It For?


• Identity for public or private use?
• Is it a part of a reputation?
• How valuable is the data to be protected?
• What are the individual privacy concerns?
• Consequences if a users identity is compromised?




                        35
OAuth
OAuth




API Authorization Delegation




           37
OAuth: The Problem




       38
OAuth: The Problem


Stop Asking For My User Credentials!




               39
OAuth: What Is It?

   Allows a User to grant access to private resources to
another entity without giving away the keys to the Kingdom
                            Master Key




                                 User




       Service Provider                     Consumer


                            40
OAuth


• OAuth Is Not OpenID
  – Shares common technologies
  – Workflow Appears similar
• Consumer needs to be known to Service Provider
• Token Based
  – Tokens identify the consumer
  – Tokens identify the combination of user and consumer
  – Tokens can be given a lifespan
  – Tokens can be revoked




                                     41
OAuth Security


• Requests are signed
  – Plaintext
  – HMAC-SHA1
  – RSA-SHA1
• Tokens are passed
  – No sharing of username/password
  – Tokens can be revoked
• Requests pass timestamps
  – Provides validity timeframe
  – Can help prevent replay attacks
• Nonce can be used
  – prevent replay attacks


                                      42
OAuth: Access Protected Resource




       http://api.getsatisfaction.com/me



     AccessDeniedError

              43
OAuth: Consumer Registration


• Consumer provides information to Service Provider
  – Name
  – URL
  – Description
• Consumer receives unique identifier (Consumer Key)
• Information for Signature is shared
  – Shared secrect (Consumer Secret)
  – Consumer Public Key for use in RSA-SHA1 verification
• Request and Access token endpoints made known




                                   44
OAuth: Consumer Registration




            45
OAuth: Consumer Registration




            46
OAuth: Get Request Token


http://getsatisfaction.com/api/request_token?

oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29

&oauth_nonce=15865e53dbe0c4d4f13d9c2296c49fd8ba7384

&oauth_signature=kwwh%2BMO21uExLTAn25jFwLhZfys%3D

&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1

&oauth_timestamp=1221478575

&oauth_version=1.0
                           47
OAuth: Get Request Token (SP Response)


oauth_token=2147xxxxvz0i

&oauth_token_secret=xuxxtmxxxxxxx60bbn8worxxxxxxxcr1




                           48
OAuth: User Authorization


http://getsatisfaction.com/api/authorize?

oauth_token=pspiu7gw5faq

&oauth_callback=http%3A%2F%2Fcdatazone.org
%2Fexample%2Ftest.php




                            49
OAuth: User Authorization




          50
OAuth: User Authorization (SP Redirect)


http://www.cdatazone.org/example/test.php?

oauth_token=pspiu7gw5faq




                           51
OAuth: Get Access Token

http://getsatisfaction.com/api/access_token?

oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29

&oauth_nonce=be2ca738ccd024a9524d4eb090c1375b9953

&oauth_signature=2jSjj%2BjqlrxEbvbrxy0HboHrhr0%3D

&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1

&oauth_timestamp=1221480066

&oauth_token=pspiu7gw5faq

&oauth_version=1.0
                           52
OAuth: Get Access Token (SP Response)

oauth_token=s8xxxjxixxxu

&oauth_token_secret=powxhxxxxxxxw9m457xxxxxxxjom2o




                           53
OAuth: Access Protected Resource

http://api.getsatisfaction.com/me?

oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29

&oauth_nonce=33cc986c57ee57689665ef331058cacacda6ab

&oauth_signature=cWVX7QHX9FedI29fGiw99msSPfA%3D

&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1

&oauth_timestamp=1221480525

&oauth_token=s8xxxjxixxxu

&oauth_version=1.0
                            54
OAuth: Access Protected Resource




              55
Questions?




    Digital Identity

      Rob Richards

http://xri.net/=rob.richards
   www.cdatazone.org

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Digital Identity

  • 1. Digital Identity Rob Richards September 17, 2008 http://xri.net/=rob.richards
  • 2. What is a Digital Identity? • Digital representation of claims about an entity – Domain name – email address – username – I-name • Claims can be made by or about the entity • No built-in assumption of trust 2
  • 3. Who Am I? =rob.richards jbobhick Jimbob Hick ab3544...@nyms.net Rob Richards Caribou, Maine <personal email> <address> <telephone> rob@mashery.com Rob Richards Sr. Software Architect http://rrichards.pip.verisignlabs.com/ 3
  • 4. What's the Problem? • Username/Password juggling • Information is being stored – Concerns over privacy issues – Security concerns / Identity Theft • User has no idea who/what is using their information • Continual re-invention of authentication mechanisms • Granting access to personal data to another party *** Sep 17th 2008 *** http://www.enews20.com/ news_Norwegian_tax_authority_mistakenly_leaks_sensitive_data_11597.html 4
  • 5. 7 Laws of Identity • User Control and Consent • Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use • Justifiable Parties • Directed Identity • Pluralism of Operators and Technologies • Human Integration • Consistent Experience Across Contexts Kim Cameron, quot;Laws of Identityquot;, http://www.identityblog.com/?page_id=354 5
  • 6. Identity Context Examples • Browsing: self-asserted identity for exploring the Web (giving away no real data)‫‏‬ • Personal: self-asserted identity for sites with which I want an ongoing private relationship (including my name and a long-term e-mail address)‫‏‬ • Community: a public identity for collaborating with others • Professional: a public identity for collaborating issued by my employer • Credit card: an identity issued by my financial institution • Citizen: an identity issued by my government Kim Cameron, quot;Laws of Identityquot;, http://www.identityblog.com/?page_id=354 6
  • 7. OpenID and Information Cards • Allow for Single Sign On • Decentralized – No one entity in control – User has choice and freedom • User-Centric – User is in control of data – User aware of information exchange • Possible reduction in amount of personal information a remote site would need to store • Potential to increase the Web experience while maintaining User privacy 7
  • 8. Common Terminology • Subject – Entity referenced by identity • Digital Identity – Set of claims made by one digital subject about itself or another • Relying Party (RP) – Site requesting identity • Identity Provider (IdP) / OpenID Provider (OP) – Service that provides or maintains identity information 8
  • 9. OpenID • URL based – http://rrichards.pip.verisignlabs.com/ – =rob.richards (http://xri.net/=rob.richards)‫‏‬ • Not Machine Dependent • Based on Simplicity – HTTP/S – URLs • PHP Libraries (There are More . . .)‫‏‬ – PHP OpenID library (http://www.openidenabled.com/php-openid/)‫‏‬ – Zend (http://framework.zend.com/manual/en/zend.openid.html) – OpenID for PHP (http://www.openidforphp.org/) 9
  • 10. OpenID Interaction Based on OpenID 1.1 Relying Party locates User Submits ID Identity Provider (IP)‫‏‬ Relying Party Relying Party Redirects User to IP Establishes Association User Authenticates IP Redirects back Against IP to Relying Party Relying Party Evaluates Response 10
  • 12. 12
  • 16. OpenID 2.0 • Extension Support – namespaced extensions • Attribute Exchange Extension – Extensible attribute support – Identity Provider can be asked to store certain attributes • HTTP POST Support – No longer limited to URL length – Larger Requests and Responses • Directed Identity – URL can identity Identity Provider – Identity Provider determines what ID to send to Relying Party • Official i-name Support 16
  • 17. OpenID: Potential Issues • Phishing / Pharming • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) / Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) – Feature to trust sites and not require login – Attacker could access sites unbeknownst to user • DNS Poisoning • Web Page Defacement • Realm Spoofing – Open Redirect Servers – XSS exploited • ID recycling • Your provider knows every site you use your id on 17
  • 18. Information Cards: Identities Identities represented as cards in a wallet – Self Asserted – Managed (Third Party provided)‫‏‬ 18
  • 19. Information Cards: Selectors CardSpace != Information Cards Information Cards are not Microsoft specific 19
  • 20. Information Cards • Identifier is unique amongst parties – Distinct digital key for each realm • Protections again Phishing – Visual indicators of previous interactions – x509 certificate checking • Complex Technologies – SAML – WS-Security / WS-Policy / WS-Trust – x509 20
  • 22. Information Cards Interaction Source: David Chappell quot;Introducing Windows CardSpacequot; April 2006 22
  • 26. Select or Create Card 26
  • 29. InfoCard Selector Initiation <form id=quot;infocardquot; method=quot;postquot; action=quot;serendipity_admin.phpquot;> <center> <img src=quot;/infocard/infocard.pngquot; onClick=quot;infocard.submit()quot;/> </center> <OBJECT type=quot;application/x-informationCardquot; name=quot;xmlTokenquot;> <PARAM Name=quot;tokenTypequot; Value=quot;urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertionquot;> <PARAM Name=quot;requiredClaimsquot; Value=quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/givenname http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/surname http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/privatepersonalidentifier http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddressquot; /> </OBJECT> </form> 29
  • 30. InfoCard: PHP Code http://www.cdatazone.org/index.php?/pages/source.html • My own code – xmlseclibs.php • XMLDSig / XMLENC – infocard-lib.php • Decrypts submitted XML Token • Verifies Signed SAML Token • Parses Assertions • Zend_Infocard – http://framework.zend.com/manual/en/zend.infocard.html – Included with 1.5 release 30
  • 31. Submitted Token <enc:EncryptedData xmlns:enc=quot;...xmlenc#quot; Type=quot;...xmlenc#Elementquot;> <enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmlenc#aes256-cbcquot; /> <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds=quot;http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#quot;> <enc:EncryptedKey> <enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1pquot;> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=quot;...xmldsig#sha1quot; /> </enc:EncryptionMethod> <ds:KeyInfo> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference xmlns:wsse=quot;...ssecurity-secext-1.0.xsdquot;> <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType=quot;. . .#ThumbprintSHA1quot; EncodingType=quot;. . .#Base64Binaryquot;>7SSj. . .</wsse:KeyIdentifier> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </ds:KeyInfo> <enc:CipherData> . . .</enc:CipherData> </enc:EncryptedKey> </ds:KeyInfo> <enc:CipherData>. . .</enc:CipherData> </enc:EncryptedData> 31
  • 32. Decrypted Self-Asserted Card <saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;emailaddressquot; AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./identity/claimsquot;> <saml:AttributeValue>rrichards@php.net</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> <saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;givennamequot; AttributeNamespace=quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claimsquot;> <saml:AttributeValue>Rob</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> <saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;surnamequot; AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./identity/claimsquot;> <saml:AttributeValue>Richards</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> <saml:Attribute AttributeName=quot;privatepersonalidentifierquot; AttributeNamespace=quot;. . ./ identity/claimsquot;> <saml:AttributeValue>mzhu+UCL. . .</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> 32
  • 33. Information Cards: Into The Future 33
  • 34. Information Card Issues • Still in infancy – Few number of selectors – Differing functionality between selectors – Small numbers in production • CardStore not easily transportable • Third party applications required for non Windows systems • Third party applications/plugins required • More difficult to implement than most Identity technologies 34
  • 35. Digital Identity: What Are You Using It For? • Identity for public or private use? • Is it a part of a reputation? • How valuable is the data to be protected? • What are the individual privacy concerns? • Consequences if a users identity is compromised? 35
  • 36. OAuth
  • 39. OAuth: The Problem Stop Asking For My User Credentials! 39
  • 40. OAuth: What Is It? Allows a User to grant access to private resources to another entity without giving away the keys to the Kingdom Master Key User Service Provider Consumer 40
  • 41. OAuth • OAuth Is Not OpenID – Shares common technologies – Workflow Appears similar • Consumer needs to be known to Service Provider • Token Based – Tokens identify the consumer – Tokens identify the combination of user and consumer – Tokens can be given a lifespan – Tokens can be revoked 41
  • 42. OAuth Security • Requests are signed – Plaintext – HMAC-SHA1 – RSA-SHA1 • Tokens are passed – No sharing of username/password – Tokens can be revoked • Requests pass timestamps – Provides validity timeframe – Can help prevent replay attacks • Nonce can be used – prevent replay attacks 42
  • 43. OAuth: Access Protected Resource http://api.getsatisfaction.com/me AccessDeniedError 43
  • 44. OAuth: Consumer Registration • Consumer provides information to Service Provider – Name – URL – Description • Consumer receives unique identifier (Consumer Key) • Information for Signature is shared – Shared secrect (Consumer Secret) – Consumer Public Key for use in RSA-SHA1 verification • Request and Access token endpoints made known 44
  • 47. OAuth: Get Request Token http://getsatisfaction.com/api/request_token? oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29 &oauth_nonce=15865e53dbe0c4d4f13d9c2296c49fd8ba7384 &oauth_signature=kwwh%2BMO21uExLTAn25jFwLhZfys%3D &oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1 &oauth_timestamp=1221478575 &oauth_version=1.0 47
  • 48. OAuth: Get Request Token (SP Response) oauth_token=2147xxxxvz0i &oauth_token_secret=xuxxtmxxxxxxx60bbn8worxxxxxxxcr1 48
  • 51. OAuth: User Authorization (SP Redirect) http://www.cdatazone.org/example/test.php? oauth_token=pspiu7gw5faq 51
  • 52. OAuth: Get Access Token http://getsatisfaction.com/api/access_token? oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29 &oauth_nonce=be2ca738ccd024a9524d4eb090c1375b9953 &oauth_signature=2jSjj%2BjqlrxEbvbrxy0HboHrhr0%3D &oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1 &oauth_timestamp=1221480066 &oauth_token=pspiu7gw5faq &oauth_version=1.0 52
  • 53. OAuth: Get Access Token (SP Response) oauth_token=s8xxxjxixxxu &oauth_token_secret=powxhxxxxxxxw9m457xxxxxxxjom2o 53
  • 54. OAuth: Access Protected Resource http://api.getsatisfaction.com/me? oauth_consumer_key=qw0xx50kxx29 &oauth_nonce=33cc986c57ee57689665ef331058cacacda6ab &oauth_signature=cWVX7QHX9FedI29fGiw99msSPfA%3D &oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1 &oauth_timestamp=1221480525 &oauth_token=s8xxxjxixxxu &oauth_version=1.0 54
  • 55. OAuth: Access Protected Resource 55
  • 56. Questions? Digital Identity Rob Richards http://xri.net/=rob.richards www.cdatazone.org