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1
Software Security in DevOps:
Synthesizing Practitioners’
Perceptions and Practice
Akond Rahman(aarahman@ncsu.edu), and
Laurie Williams
Department of Computer Science,
North Carolina State University
2
Why Security in DevOps?
• Ensuring quality even when software
deployment is rapid
• Adoption concerns
3
Research Objective
Aid software practitioners in integrating security
and DevOps by summarizing experiences in
utilizing security practices in a DevOps
environment.
4
Background
• DevSecOps is the concept of integrating security principles
through increased collaboration
• We differentiate between ‘activity’, and ‘security practice’.
– A DevOps activity focuses on achieving a small, well-
defined goal that has a tangible output.
– A security practice is a collection of activities that can be
grouped based on existing similarities within those
activities.
5
Our Contributions
• A list of DevOps activities that might have a
positive and negative impact
• A list of security practices and an analysis of
how they are used in DevOps organizations
• An analysis that quantifies the levels of
collaboration
6
Research Questions
• RQ1: Perception. How do software
practitioners perceive the integration of
DevOps and security? What DevOps related
activities contribute to those perceptions?
• RQ2: Security Practices. What security
practices are used by organizations that
integrate security into DevOps?
7
Methodology
66 Internet artifacts66 Internet Artifacts
Nine DevOps
Organizations
8
RQ1: Identified Perceptions
• Positive Perceptions
– Use of automated monitoring
– Use of automated pipeline to deploy software
– Automatic deployment of software
– Automatic testing of software changes
– Delivering software in small increments
9
RQ1: Identified Perceptions
• Negative Perceptions
– Use of immature automated deployment tools
– Use of inappropriate software metrics
– Inadequate monitoring of collaboration
10
RQ2: Identified Automated Activities
• Automation of Code Review
• Automation of Monitoring
• Automation of Software defined Firewall
• Automation of Software Licensing
• Automation of Testing
11
RQ2: Identified Non-Automated
Activities
• Design Review
• Input Validation
• Isolation of Untrusted Inputs
• Performing Compliance Requirements
• Performing Security Configurations
• Performing Security Policies
• Security Requirements Analysis
• Performing Manual Security Tests
• Risk Analysis
• Threat Modeling
12
RQ1: Empirical Findings – Positive
Aspects (Internet Artifacts)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Automated monitoring Automated pipeline Automated deployment Automated testing Delivering software in small
increments
CountofInternetArtifacts
13
RQ1: Empirical Findings – Negative
Aspects (Internet Artifacts)
0
1
2
Use of immature automated deployment
tools
Use of inappropriate software metrics Inadequate monitoring of collaboration
CountofInternetArtifacts
14
RQ2: Empirical Findings – Automation
Practices (Internet Artifacts)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Automation of monitoring Automation of testing Automation of code
review
Automation of software
licensing
Automation of software
defined firewall
CountofInternetArtifacts
15
RQ2: Empirical Findings – Non Automation
Practices (Internet Artifacts)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Security
requirements
analysis
Performing
security
configurations
Performing
security
policies
Performing
manual
security tests
Performing
compliance
requirements
Design review Input
validation
Isolation of
untrusted
inputs
Threat
modeling
Risk analysis
CountofInternetArtifacts
16
RQ1: Empirical Findings – Positive
Aspects (Survey)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Use of automated
monitoring
Use of automated pipeline to
deploy software
Automatic deployment of
software
Automatic testing of
software changes
Delivering software in small
increments
CountofOrganizations
Yes No
17
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Automation of monitoring Automation of testing Automation of code review Automation of software
defined firewall
Automation of software
licensing
CountofOrganizations
Yes No
RQ2: Empirical Findings – Automation
Practices (Survey)
18
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Performing
security
policies
Performing
manual
security tests
Input
validation
Performing
compliance
requirements
Performing
security
configurations
Risk analysis Isolation of
untrusted
inputs
Threat
modeling
Design review Security
requirements
analysis
CountofOrganizations
Yes No
RQ2: Empirical Findings – Non
Automation Practices (Survey)
19
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Dev&Ops Dev&Sec Sec&Ops
CountofOrganizations
Lowest Low Moderate High Highest
RQ2: Empirical Findings –
Collaboration (Survey)
20
Summary
• Answer to RQ1:
– A certain set of DevOps activities are perceived to
be beneficial for system’s security
• Answer to RQ2:
– A certain set of DevOps specific automated and
non-automated activities are used to implement
security
– Moderate to strong collaboration exists between
teams
21
Limitations
• Incomprehensive set of Internet artifacts
• Incomprehensive set of security practices
• Generalizability of empirical findings
• Impact of collaboration on practice usage
22
Conclusion
• Commonly used DevOps activities can be
helpful to a system’s security.
• Security teams actively collaborate with
development and operations teams in
established DevOps organizations.
• Security awareness is prevalent amongst
established DevOps organizations

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Software Security in DevOps: Synthesizing Practitioners’ Perceptions and Practices

  • 1. 1 Software Security in DevOps: Synthesizing Practitioners’ Perceptions and Practice Akond Rahman(aarahman@ncsu.edu), and Laurie Williams Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University
  • 2. 2 Why Security in DevOps? • Ensuring quality even when software deployment is rapid • Adoption concerns
  • 3. 3 Research Objective Aid software practitioners in integrating security and DevOps by summarizing experiences in utilizing security practices in a DevOps environment.
  • 4. 4 Background • DevSecOps is the concept of integrating security principles through increased collaboration • We differentiate between ‘activity’, and ‘security practice’. – A DevOps activity focuses on achieving a small, well- defined goal that has a tangible output. – A security practice is a collection of activities that can be grouped based on existing similarities within those activities.
  • 5. 5 Our Contributions • A list of DevOps activities that might have a positive and negative impact • A list of security practices and an analysis of how they are used in DevOps organizations • An analysis that quantifies the levels of collaboration
  • 6. 6 Research Questions • RQ1: Perception. How do software practitioners perceive the integration of DevOps and security? What DevOps related activities contribute to those perceptions? • RQ2: Security Practices. What security practices are used by organizations that integrate security into DevOps?
  • 7. 7 Methodology 66 Internet artifacts66 Internet Artifacts Nine DevOps Organizations
  • 8. 8 RQ1: Identified Perceptions • Positive Perceptions – Use of automated monitoring – Use of automated pipeline to deploy software – Automatic deployment of software – Automatic testing of software changes – Delivering software in small increments
  • 9. 9 RQ1: Identified Perceptions • Negative Perceptions – Use of immature automated deployment tools – Use of inappropriate software metrics – Inadequate monitoring of collaboration
  • 10. 10 RQ2: Identified Automated Activities • Automation of Code Review • Automation of Monitoring • Automation of Software defined Firewall • Automation of Software Licensing • Automation of Testing
  • 11. 11 RQ2: Identified Non-Automated Activities • Design Review • Input Validation • Isolation of Untrusted Inputs • Performing Compliance Requirements • Performing Security Configurations • Performing Security Policies • Security Requirements Analysis • Performing Manual Security Tests • Risk Analysis • Threat Modeling
  • 12. 12 RQ1: Empirical Findings – Positive Aspects (Internet Artifacts) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Automated monitoring Automated pipeline Automated deployment Automated testing Delivering software in small increments CountofInternetArtifacts
  • 13. 13 RQ1: Empirical Findings – Negative Aspects (Internet Artifacts) 0 1 2 Use of immature automated deployment tools Use of inappropriate software metrics Inadequate monitoring of collaboration CountofInternetArtifacts
  • 14. 14 RQ2: Empirical Findings – Automation Practices (Internet Artifacts) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Automation of monitoring Automation of testing Automation of code review Automation of software licensing Automation of software defined firewall CountofInternetArtifacts
  • 15. 15 RQ2: Empirical Findings – Non Automation Practices (Internet Artifacts) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Security requirements analysis Performing security configurations Performing security policies Performing manual security tests Performing compliance requirements Design review Input validation Isolation of untrusted inputs Threat modeling Risk analysis CountofInternetArtifacts
  • 16. 16 RQ1: Empirical Findings – Positive Aspects (Survey) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Use of automated monitoring Use of automated pipeline to deploy software Automatic deployment of software Automatic testing of software changes Delivering software in small increments CountofOrganizations Yes No
  • 17. 17 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Automation of monitoring Automation of testing Automation of code review Automation of software defined firewall Automation of software licensing CountofOrganizations Yes No RQ2: Empirical Findings – Automation Practices (Survey)
  • 18. 18 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Performing security policies Performing manual security tests Input validation Performing compliance requirements Performing security configurations Risk analysis Isolation of untrusted inputs Threat modeling Design review Security requirements analysis CountofOrganizations Yes No RQ2: Empirical Findings – Non Automation Practices (Survey)
  • 19. 19 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dev&Ops Dev&Sec Sec&Ops CountofOrganizations Lowest Low Moderate High Highest RQ2: Empirical Findings – Collaboration (Survey)
  • 20. 20 Summary • Answer to RQ1: – A certain set of DevOps activities are perceived to be beneficial for system’s security • Answer to RQ2: – A certain set of DevOps specific automated and non-automated activities are used to implement security – Moderate to strong collaboration exists between teams
  • 21. 21 Limitations • Incomprehensive set of Internet artifacts • Incomprehensive set of security practices • Generalizability of empirical findings • Impact of collaboration on practice usage
  • 22. 22 Conclusion • Commonly used DevOps activities can be helpful to a system’s security. • Security teams actively collaborate with development and operations teams in established DevOps organizations. • Security awareness is prevalent amongst established DevOps organizations

Notas del editor

  1. Image Reference: http://www.mmatechs.com/solutions.html http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2867917 Gartner: a leading software engineering research and advisory company