This document summarizes lessons learned from the 2008 Jerusalem bulldozer attack terrorist incident. It analyzes the actions and decision-making of the police officers, security personnel, soldiers, and civilians who responded to neutralize the threat. Key lessons include the importance of immediately neutralizing any active killer threat, following the Israeli military principle of "constant push for contact." It also discusses the complex issues around confirming neutralization of a threat, and how rules of engagement and legal procedures can unintentionally delay an effective response. The summary emphasizes the value of studying such cases to improve response protocols.

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Extreme Situations
Extreme Measures
Lessons Learned from the Jerusalem Bulldozer Attack
By Dov Zwerling
An Israeli police officer
stands guard in front of a
bulldozer at the scene of an attack
in Jerusalem July 22, 2008. A bulldozer
went on a rampage in Jewish west Jerusalem,
in the second such attack in July, and rammed into
cars before the bulldozer’s driver was shot dead, police
said. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun (JERUSALEM)
Vol.14, No.4
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

2. On Wednesday July 2, 2008, at head, discharging four rounds, three rules of engagement; often those Active Shooter?
approximately 12 noon in on one of the
of which struck the assailant in the rules are stricter than those facing Or Active Killer?
head. At the same time a member American officers. Every morning
of the Jerusalem Special Patrol team the Israeli cop is told in the brief- The Active Shooter is the profes-
busiest streets in downtown Jerusalem, managed to climb onto the cab and ing- If you see “Weapon and Intent” sional phrase for a person who has
Hussam Dewayt, an Israeli Arab from fired one more round to the head of you can use deadly force “BUT only used deadly force and continues
the terrorist. if there is no other way to stop the to use deadly force while having
the Jerusalem village of Zur Bakher, threat AND you are not making the unrestricted access to additional
Each of the bystanders and police situation worse AND you must keep victims. - (Sheriff’s Office Policy
climbed into a Caterpillar bulldozer officers who reacted during the the damage to a minimum.” That is and Procedure Manual. Colorado
course of the attack behaved differ- a lot for any cop to consider while Springs, Colorado, USA: El Paso
being used for local road works and ently. This article examines how under pressure. County Sheriff’s Office, “Chapter
training and perception affected the 7”, 2004-01-01.)
began a four minute terror rampage. mindset of the players involved in During the bulldozer attack, Police-
Dewayt drove a few hundred yards, the response to the attack. woman “E” and Security Guard “O”, Numerous examples of killing
the first on the scene, recognized both sprees can be listed. Vehicular
running over vehicles, bus stops and As is common practice following Weapon and Intent and, consistent attacks, multiple knife assaults,
terror attacks in Israel, the actions with rules of engagement, opened fire acid attacks, throwing of blunt
over-turning a bus filled with innocent of those involved are evaluated on the driver. After the driver stopped objects from height are all situa-
in order to maximize the amount and was believed to be incapacitated, tions that we have encountered in
passengers. He continued to attack of information that can be used to the two believed the “intent” to no Israel and fall within the category
confront and/or prevent future at- longer be a factor. of “Active Shooter” – or perhaps
civilians with the bulldozer’s powerful tacks. After speaking with a number more suitably referred to as the
shovel until he was neutralized by a few of those directly involved, I will lay Once the driver awoke (after being “Active Killer.”
out the lessons that we have learned shot multiple times) and again started
armed bystanders and policemen. from this attack. to attack with the vehicle, the three In most cases the active shooter
who were in the cab with the attacker is thought of as someone with a
Although the nature of the bulldozer needed to hold on for dear life as the gun or a rifle; these are easiest to
The first to intercede were a female attack is unconventional there are bulldozer crushed another car and identify because they are loud, obvi-
police officer and an armed bank still similarities to other well-known a police motorcycle. At this point ously violent and rare - the violent
guard who witnessed the terrorist’s attacks that occurred in Israel and the Special Patrol Unit officer “E”, nature of these attacks reduces the
use of the bulldozer as a weapon. the United States. On July 6, 1989, armed with an AR-15, was on the consideration involved in rules of
Understanding his deadly intent, on the Tel Aviv - Jerusalem High- ground but could not get a clear shot. engagement and thus make the situ-
they opened fire on the terrorist. way, a Palestinian terrorist walked to He had to take into consideration the ation easier for law enforcement to
After apparently being shot, Dewayt the front of bus 405 and, with perfect condition of “not making the situa- face. The more complicated situa-
slouched, bleeding from his head, timing, grabbed the steering wheel, tion worse” by inadvertently killing tion of “active shooter” is when the
and the bulldozer came to a halt. steering the bus off of a cliff. Four- one of the three people in the cab who suspect is not shooting at all (in this
Another passing patrol officer (an teen civilians were killed and thirty were struggling with the attacker. case the Active Shooter, as defined,
Israeli Arab himself) climbed up to injured. A number of does not necessarily
the cab, reportedly checked the ter- other vehicular attacks have to be shooting,
rorist’s vitals and decided that he was have been successful but may be killing,
no longer a threat. The armed guard including an attack in as in the case of the
stepped back and the policeman took Israel in which a ter- bulldozer).
control of the scene. Two more by- rorist stole a bus and
standers, one an armed civilian and went on a killing spree, The single answer
the second an unarmed and off-duty running over soldiers at
The single answer to any situation of
to any situation of
soldier, climbed up to the cab to as- bus stops. The use of an the “Active Killer” is the immediate need the “Active Killer”
sist the officer in taking the terrorists innocent vehicle for the is the immediate
legs off of the gas pedal, turning off purpose of terror, while to neutralize the perpetrator. The Israeli need to neutral-
the tractor and applying the brakes. on a grander scale, was ize the perpetra-
For all those on the scene appeared also implemented in the military’s (IDF) “Constant Push for Contact” is t o r. T h e I s r a e l i
as if the event was over. 9/11 attacks. military’s (IDF)
one of its most important maxims. Although “Constant Push for
An angry civilian threw a rock at Weapon it is a military tactic, this philosophy is easily Contact” is one of
the driver that hit him in the head, and Intent its most important
awakening him. In fact the driver applied to civilian law enforcement ¬- one maxims. Although
hadn’t been shot at all; the blood In my lectures to U.S. it is a military tac-
on his head came from ricochets law enforcement about that many civilian police regulations may tic, this philosophy
of class from the windshield. Sud- the tactical consid- is easily applied
denly, the terrorist screamed “Allah erations of Suicide lack. It is the understanding that once it is to civilian law
Huakbar”, slammed his foot on the Bomber Interdiction or enforcement one
gas as the bulldozer lurched forward, Patrol Officers in Active realized that a situation is “Active Killer”, that many civilian
running over and killing one more Shooter Situations, I am police regulations
civilian. The policeman and the constantly bombarded
every second that is wasted on other actions
may lack. It is the
armed civilian who had climbed with the complaint that, can and will cost lives. understanding that
to the cab remained on the moving “You in Israel have lax once it is realized
bulldozer, attempting to remove the rules of engagement, that a situation is
terrorist’s hands and feet from the we can’t do that here in “Active Killer”, every
controls. The off-duty soldier drew the States.” Most are surprised second that is wasted on
a weapon from the civilian’s holster when I tell them that law enforce- other actions can and will
and aimed into the cab, at Dewayt’s ment in Israel indeed has stringent cost lives.

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Procedure the price of finding out what is ing hit 4 times in the chest. When the see, lessons were learned and applied
is Confusing indeed enough may prove to be on-duty Special Patrol Unit arrived, on both sides. Apparently the first
too high. two officers with tactical scopes aimed bulldozer attack received some poetic
When we look at the actions of the at the terrorists head, and waited. He applause from some Arab media seeing
players in the bulldozer event, the doc- According to this protocol the Police- was still alive, and had the M-16 still the bulldozer as a symbol of occupa-
trines become clear. The off-duty sol- man “S” who climbed up onto the in his grip with his finger on the trig- tion, and the “poor mans tank”. This
dier, fresh out of special-forces basic cab of the bulldozer and decided not ger. They saw the subject repeating type of justification was used with the
training, apparently had no hesitation to confirm neutralization was justi- something to himself, most likely airplanes of the 9/11 attack called “the
in his decision to shoot the terrorist fied in his actions even though the something from the Koran. He then poor man’s missiles”.
in the head. The policeman “S”, an killing continued afterwards. From pulled the trigger getting off six more
Israeli Arab who did not serve in the my experience as an Israeli police of- rounds before both officers double- Conclusion
IDF, and who checked the terrorist ficer, there is a possibility that if “S” tapped their AR-15s to his head.
after he believed he was neutralized, did reconfirm neutralization, there The decision to take another’s life is
was one of the few Israeli Policemen may have been pressure from certain After this, within the patrol unit an often not an easy one. Every officer,
who have no military experience and rights groups to press charges. This is argument ensued whether the gunman soldier, and security professional usu-
therefore the idea of confirmation of and will continue to be a burden that was still a threat before he shot those ally imagines a classic shooter where
neutralization was not an integral part law enforcement and armed civilians final rounds – he still had the weapon the threat is obvious, imminent, with
of his training. will bear when encountering deadly and the intent. What would have been weapon and intent. But this is the easy
situations and deciding to face pos- the consensus if one of the officers had case; instinct does the job for us.
The Special Patrol Unit member “E”, sible legal ramifications as a result of been injured or killed by those last
who did have IDF training, and who neutralizing the terror threat. six rounds? Most likely the question, When one of those components is
arrived on the scene towards the end “Why didn’t they finish the job?” missing, we start to second guess our
of the event, had nothing else on his The issue of Confirmation of Neutral- instinct. While this is a good thing and
mind except neutralizing the threat. ization in Israel has always been an The final example of the importance keeps many innocent people alive,
In a conversation with “E” after the explosive issue (no pun intended). The of confirmation of neutralization was it is important that the second guess
event, he told the me, that ‘even most well-known event in Israel was the Dimona attack from March of this does not take more than what it is – a
though I saw the off-duty soldier shoot the decision made by then Jerusalem year. Two suicide Bombers arrived second. Any more than that and we
the terrorist, I, as the policeman trained District Chief of Police Mickey Levy at an outside shopping center, the may be threatening other innocent
specifically for interdiction of events in March 2002. Levy, who was not at first one detonating himself, killing civilians. The best way to keep that
like this, had to be sure that the threat the site of the event, gave the order to himself and one other civilian, and second guess or decision making
was neutralized’. shoot a suicide bomber in the head injuring 10 others, one of which was process as short as possible is to study
over the two-way radio. the second bomber. First responders these types of events.
Police protocol and legal procedure arrived at the scene to give first aid
can be confusing, causing many po- This act sounds obvious until you and while checking one of the casual- Case studies of most shootings exist,
licemen to hesitate in the split-second add the fact that the bomber was ties, it was discovered that he was the but that is not enough. We must put
decision-making process. The mili- handcuffed and on his knees. Levy’s second bomber. The first responders ourselves in the intervening shooter’s
tary virtue of “Constant Push for Con- decision making process has been the yelled for everyone to get away. The shoes, and then change some of the
tact” means using all means necessary theme for many of his public speaking first police officer on the scene saw components to see how the thought
in order to come into contact with the engagements about leadership and that the second bomber was lying process flows. We used to make
perpetrator as soon as possible and to decision-making. The March 2002 on the ground attempting to operate these situations come to life by creat-
neutralize him. This means that ac- suicide bomber had a large explosive the switch; he knelt down and fired ing nearly impossible situations in a
tions taken may have less regard for device strapped to his body with the 4 shots killing him. His actions saved classroom, range, or briefing room.
injured civilians, injured colleagues detention switch on his stomach. After the other injured civilians that were In many of our briefings we would
or personal security, issues of which he was hand-cuffed he continued to still in the scene of the attack. let someone else in the unit bring up
all three are fundamental to police dance and try to fall down in order to an idea for a terror attack and others
training. This protocol dictates that, operate the bomb and most likely kill As I am writing this, another Jerusa- would give ideas on how we would
a police officer, sworn to protect the the policemen who were attempting lem bulldozer attack has been reported neutralize the threat.
public, may have to jump into the line to hold him. in the news. This bulldozer attack, on
of fire without backup, coordination King David Road in Jerusalem was There is a saying in Hebrew, “The
with other officers, or proper tacti- Another shooting attack in downtown the second of its kind in three weeks. reality of it... goes beyond all imagi-
cal gear. Jerusalem only two months before that This time the attack was cut short by nation”. We would be told by our
event was a textbook case example of the quick and decisive actions of a commanders, “The attacker uses his
Confirmation of the need to confirm neutralization and civilian and a Border Patrol Police imagination to plan an attack; use your
Neutralization vs to continuously reassess the situation. Officer. The attacking driver was imagination, your resourcefulness to
Confirmation On January 21, 2002 a lone gunman once again from East Jerusalem, in counter it, and do it quick- that is the
of Death with an M-16 opened fire on civilians village of Um Tuba. He too carried an only way you can beat them!”
waiting for a bus on busy Jaffa Road. It Identification card allowing him free
During my military service in the was a period of many attacks in Israel movement about the country. About the Author
IDF it was still called a “Kill- and especially in the capital, so there
shot”. By the time I joined the was a police presence in the area. In this attack no one was killed and Dov Zwerling is the Tactical Director and an Intelligence
Israel Police, it had been changed there were fewer people injured thanks Coordinator at the Institute of Terrorism Research and
to confirmation of neutralization. An undercover officer returned fire to the clear and now obvious outcome Response (ITRR). He served in the Israel Defense Forces
This was a correct decision because and pushed him back into an alley needed to end the attack. Although the and in the Jerusalem Special Patrol Unit- Rapid Response
although the easiest way to confirm way while an off-duty Special Patrol shooters acted quicker, the driver had Team. Mr. Zwerling has hands-on experience at scores
neutralization was a point-blank Unit policeman cut him off on the also applied lessons he had learned by of terror attacks and is an expert in issues of
head-shot, it was in some instances other side of the alley. A close range upgrading his security. He had closed terrorism response, a topic on which he has
unnecessary. The argument is that firefight ensued with the terrorist be- and locked the doors to the cab. As we lectured on around the world.
50 Vol.14, No.4
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International