SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 31
NETWORK SECURITY A PAPER ON  P ITFALLS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IP-SPOOFING Arpit Gupta Deepika Chug
Bad Practices Spread It is easy to see the faults of others but not so easy to see one’s own faults If I just open a bunch of ports in the firewall my app will work. I think I will wedge the computer room door open. Much easier. They have blocked my favorite Web site. Lucky I have a modem. I think I will use my first name as a password. Say, we run a network too. How do you configure your firewalls? Why do we need the door locked? Hey, nice modem. What's the number of that line? I can never think of a good password. What do you use?
Understanding The Landscape Author Script-Kiddie Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
An Evolving Threat Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Largest area by volume Largest area by $ lost Script-Kiddie Largest segment by  $ spent on defense Fastest  growing  segment Author Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
IP  ->  Internet Protocol.. Spoofing  ->  Hiding.. It is a trick played on servers to fool the target computers into thinking that it is receiving data from source other than the trusted host. This Attack is actually a  Trust-Relationship  Exploitation. “ Things are not what they seem and that is why the world gets conned” WHAT IS IP-SPOOFING ???
A B C B  is on line A   disguising his voice,making it sound  more like that of   B If we now,replace the 3 people by computers and change the term “voice” with “IP-Address” then you would know what we mean by  IP-SPOOFING… REAL LIFE EXAMPLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS  IP SPOOFING.
HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Datagram (Data Packets) Trusted Host Attacking Host  IP  SPOOFING
C B A CLIENT HOST A B C PACKETS DISCRIPTION: SYN =client’s ISN (4894305) ACK= 0 SYN= Host’s ISN (1896955367) ACK= client’s ISN +1 (4894306)  ACK=  Host’s ISN +1 (1896955368) THE 3-WAY HANDSHAKE ..
THE ATTACK IN BRIEF …… ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],-- ON SUCCESS THE ATTACKER ISSUES A SIMPLE  COMMAND TO LEAVE A  BACKDOOR --
THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Packets with IP Address  of Trusted Host (FAKE) Attacking Host
THE ATTACK VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , Remote Host
As soon as we find the  TRUSTED-HOST ( FAKE),our next Step is to disable it.  WHY ???? “ -- FAKE must not at any time respond to the SYN/ACK  packet send by VICTIM -- “  How  to  do  it ???? Use up all the memory of TRUSTED-HOST so  that it will not able to respond to the SYN/ACK  packet sent to it by the VICTIM . So one very easy method of doing so is to Perform the  SYN Flooding Denial of Service Attack TRUSTED HOST DISABLING..
SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN QUEUE FULL There is a upper limit of how many concurrent SYN request TCP can process for a given socket, this limit is called  BACKLOG LIMIT B A C k L O G Q U E U E Backlog limit = length (Queue)  SO what is SYN FLOODing ???
BLIND ATTACK FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host   HACKER 203.45.98.01 Attacking Host
THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host SYN/ACK Packets acknowledging  Trusted  Host  has received  SYN/ACK Packets Attacking Host
Detection ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
1.Packet Filtering   2. Firewall  3.Initial Sequence Number Randomizing Preventive  Measures
Packet Filtering ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out?
Our network is secure, right? Oh sure, Don’t worry. We have several firewalls
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) Randomizing ISN   Incrementation At every connection --incremented by 64,000 At every sec. – incremented by 128,000 Its value gets wrapped every 9.32hrs. So,it’s easy for any genius to do the guesswork and calculate the correct sequence number
 
CONCLUSION   IP-Spoofing is an exploitation of trust-based relationship and can be curbed effectively if proper measures are used.Understanding how and why spoofing attacks are used , combined with a few simple prevention methods, can help protect networks from these malicious cloaking and cracking techniques.
Make your Network Secure
IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 1 : Target is being attacked  192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 Target is being attacked  With the UDP packets, when No measures were taken UDP 192.168.1.20
IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 2 :  Target is being attacked  but the software is interface to this  192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 The s/w UDP 192.168.1.20 UDP 192.168.1.20
IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3: The s/w Role as an Interface 1)Scans all the Registered IP Addresses for their Authenticity. myip log file (List of registered clients) While scanning these it also resolves  The respective Mac Address at runtime.  2) (Maintains the list of spoofed  Clients) log file
IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3.1: The s/w Role as an Interface 3) Maintains the list of Registered Clients  whenever they communicate. myhost log file (List of registered clients) 4)The unauthorised user is blocked.
 
UDP HEADER 16   32   Source port  Destination port  Length   Checksum  Data
16  32 bits  Source port  Destination port  Sequence number  Acknowledgement number  Offset  Resrvd  U  A  P  R  S  F  Window  Checksum  Urgent pointer  Option + Padding  Data  TCP header structure
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many other
Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many otherSpoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many other
Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many otherPankaj Dubey
 
Social engineering hacking attack
Social engineering hacking attackSocial engineering hacking attack
Social engineering hacking attackPankaj Dubey
 
P H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N GP H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N Gbensonoo
 
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)LJ PROJECTS
 
Social engineering
Social engineeringSocial engineering
Social engineeringRobert Hood
 
Ip spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksIp spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksApijay Kumar
 
Phishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptPhishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptAryan Ragu
 
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)Gaurav Sharma
 
Man in the middle attack (mitm)
Man in the middle attack (mitm)Man in the middle attack (mitm)
Man in the middle attack (mitm)Hemal Joshi
 
Brute force attack
Brute force attackBrute force attack
Brute force attackjoycruiser
 
Anti phishing presentation
Anti phishing presentationAnti phishing presentation
Anti phishing presentationBokangMalunga
 
Intrusion detection system ppt
Intrusion detection system pptIntrusion detection system ppt
Intrusion detection system pptSheetal Verma
 
Cyber crime & security final tapan
Cyber crime & security final tapanCyber crime & security final tapan
Cyber crime & security final tapanTapan Khilar
 

La actualidad más candente (20)

Ip Spoofing
Ip SpoofingIp Spoofing
Ip Spoofing
 
Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many other
Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many otherSpoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many other
Spoofing attack: Learn about Email spoofing, IP address spoofing and many other
 
Social engineering hacking attack
Social engineering hacking attackSocial engineering hacking attack
Social engineering hacking attack
 
Web security
Web securityWeb security
Web security
 
Ceh v5 module 07 sniffers
Ceh v5 module 07 sniffersCeh v5 module 07 sniffers
Ceh v5 module 07 sniffers
 
Presentation1
Presentation1Presentation1
Presentation1
 
P H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N GP H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N G
 
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection(IDS/IPS)
 
Social engineering
Social engineeringSocial engineering
Social engineering
 
Ip spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksIp spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacks
 
Cyber fraud
Cyber fraudCyber fraud
Cyber fraud
 
PPT on Phishing
PPT on PhishingPPT on Phishing
PPT on Phishing
 
Phishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptPhishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks ppt
 
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)
Denial of Service Attacks (DoS/DDoS)
 
Man in the middle attack (mitm)
Man in the middle attack (mitm)Man in the middle attack (mitm)
Man in the middle attack (mitm)
 
Brute force attack
Brute force attackBrute force attack
Brute force attack
 
Anti phishing presentation
Anti phishing presentationAnti phishing presentation
Anti phishing presentation
 
Intrusion detection system ppt
Intrusion detection system pptIntrusion detection system ppt
Intrusion detection system ppt
 
Cyber crime & security final tapan
Cyber crime & security final tapanCyber crime & security final tapan
Cyber crime & security final tapan
 
DDoS ATTACKS
DDoS ATTACKSDDoS ATTACKS
DDoS ATTACKS
 

Similar a Ip Spoofing

Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosDetection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosOleh Stupak
 
CEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionCEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionManish Luintel
 
Networkin new
Networkin newNetworkin new
Networkin newrajujast
 
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Mehedi Hasan
 
Attacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsAttacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsMukesh Chaudhari
 
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 FinalExploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Finalmasoodnt10
 
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeDDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeMyNOG
 
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network TrafficRio Ap
 

Similar a Ip Spoofing (20)

ip spoofing
ip spoofingip spoofing
ip spoofing
 
Hacking Cisco
Hacking CiscoHacking Cisco
Hacking Cisco
 
Sudheer tech seminor
Sudheer tech seminorSudheer tech seminor
Sudheer tech seminor
 
My ppt..priya
My ppt..priyaMy ppt..priya
My ppt..priya
 
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosDetection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
 
Hacking tutorial
Hacking tutorialHacking tutorial
Hacking tutorial
 
Hacking In Detail
Hacking In DetailHacking In Detail
Hacking In Detail
 
Internet Security
Internet SecurityInternet Security
Internet Security
 
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
 
CEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionCEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question Collection
 
Network security
Network securityNetwork security
Network security
 
3.Network
3.Network3.Network
3.Network
 
Networkin new
Networkin newNetworkin new
Networkin new
 
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
 
Hacking
HackingHacking
Hacking
 
Attacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsAttacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigations
 
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 FinalExploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
 
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeDDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
 
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
 
Hacking
HackingHacking
Hacking
 

Último

APIForce Zurich 5 April Automation LPDG
APIForce Zurich 5 April  Automation LPDGAPIForce Zurich 5 April  Automation LPDG
APIForce Zurich 5 April Automation LPDGMarianaLemus7
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksSoftradix Technologies
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxMaximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxOnBoard
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphNeo4j
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machinePadma Pradeep
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonetsnaman860154
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsMemoori
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersThousandEyes
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationSafe Software
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 

Último (20)

APIForce Zurich 5 April Automation LPDG
APIForce Zurich 5 April  Automation LPDGAPIForce Zurich 5 April  Automation LPDG
APIForce Zurich 5 April Automation LPDG
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxMaximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
 
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdfThe transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 

Ip Spoofing

  • 1. NETWORK SECURITY A PAPER ON P ITFALLS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IP-SPOOFING Arpit Gupta Deepika Chug
  • 2. Bad Practices Spread It is easy to see the faults of others but not so easy to see one’s own faults If I just open a bunch of ports in the firewall my app will work. I think I will wedge the computer room door open. Much easier. They have blocked my favorite Web site. Lucky I have a modem. I think I will use my first name as a password. Say, we run a network too. How do you configure your firewalls? Why do we need the door locked? Hey, nice modem. What's the number of that line? I can never think of a good password. What do you use?
  • 3. Understanding The Landscape Author Script-Kiddie Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
  • 4. An Evolving Threat Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Largest area by volume Largest area by $ lost Script-Kiddie Largest segment by $ spent on defense Fastest growing segment Author Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
  • 5. IP -> Internet Protocol.. Spoofing -> Hiding.. It is a trick played on servers to fool the target computers into thinking that it is receiving data from source other than the trusted host. This Attack is actually a Trust-Relationship Exploitation. “ Things are not what they seem and that is why the world gets conned” WHAT IS IP-SPOOFING ???
  • 6. A B C B is on line A disguising his voice,making it sound more like that of B If we now,replace the 3 people by computers and change the term “voice” with “IP-Address” then you would know what we mean by IP-SPOOFING… REAL LIFE EXAMPLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS IP SPOOFING.
  • 7. HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Datagram (Data Packets) Trusted Host Attacking Host IP SPOOFING
  • 8. C B A CLIENT HOST A B C PACKETS DISCRIPTION: SYN =client’s ISN (4894305) ACK= 0 SYN= Host’s ISN (1896955367) ACK= client’s ISN +1 (4894306) ACK= Host’s ISN +1 (1896955368) THE 3-WAY HANDSHAKE ..
  • 9.
  • 10. THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Packets with IP Address of Trusted Host (FAKE) Attacking Host
  • 11. THE ATTACK VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , Remote Host
  • 12. As soon as we find the TRUSTED-HOST ( FAKE),our next Step is to disable it. WHY ???? “ -- FAKE must not at any time respond to the SYN/ACK packet send by VICTIM -- “ How to do it ???? Use up all the memory of TRUSTED-HOST so that it will not able to respond to the SYN/ACK packet sent to it by the VICTIM . So one very easy method of doing so is to Perform the SYN Flooding Denial of Service Attack TRUSTED HOST DISABLING..
  • 13. SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN QUEUE FULL There is a upper limit of how many concurrent SYN request TCP can process for a given socket, this limit is called BACKLOG LIMIT B A C k L O G Q U E U E Backlog limit = length (Queue) SO what is SYN FLOODing ???
  • 14. BLIND ATTACK FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host HACKER 203.45.98.01 Attacking Host
  • 15. THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host SYN/ACK Packets acknowledging Trusted Host has received SYN/ACK Packets Attacking Host
  • 16.
  • 17. 1.Packet Filtering 2. Firewall 3.Initial Sequence Number Randomizing Preventive Measures
  • 18.
  • 19. Our network is secure, right? Oh sure, Don’t worry. We have several firewalls
  • 20. Initial Sequence Number (ISN) Randomizing ISN Incrementation At every connection --incremented by 64,000 At every sec. – incremented by 128,000 Its value gets wrapped every 9.32hrs. So,it’s easy for any genius to do the guesswork and calculate the correct sequence number
  • 21.  
  • 22. CONCLUSION IP-Spoofing is an exploitation of trust-based relationship and can be curbed effectively if proper measures are used.Understanding how and why spoofing attacks are used , combined with a few simple prevention methods, can help protect networks from these malicious cloaking and cracking techniques.
  • 24. IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 1 : Target is being attacked 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 Target is being attacked With the UDP packets, when No measures were taken UDP 192.168.1.20
  • 25. IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 2 : Target is being attacked but the software is interface to this 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 The s/w UDP 192.168.1.20 UDP 192.168.1.20
  • 26. IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3: The s/w Role as an Interface 1)Scans all the Registered IP Addresses for their Authenticity. myip log file (List of registered clients) While scanning these it also resolves The respective Mac Address at runtime. 2) (Maintains the list of spoofed Clients) log file
  • 27. IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3.1: The s/w Role as an Interface 3) Maintains the list of Registered Clients whenever they communicate. myhost log file (List of registered clients) 4)The unauthorised user is blocked.
  • 28.  
  • 29. UDP HEADER 16 32 Source port Destination port Length Checksum Data
  • 30. 16 32 bits Source port Destination port Sequence number Acknowledgement number Offset Resrvd U A P R S F Window Checksum Urgent pointer Option + Padding Data TCP header structure
  • 31.