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AVG Community Powered
    Threat Report




       Q1 2012
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
   Q1 2012 Highlights ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Key Points – Q1 2012 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
   Web Threats – ’Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model of Blackhole Crimeware .............................................................................................................. 4
   Mobile Threats – Increase Use of Social Networks to Infect Android™ Devices ......................................................................................................................... 4
Quarterly Key Metrics: January-March 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
   Metrics - Web Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
       Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
       Top 10 Malware Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 ............................................................................................................................................................... 6
       Behavior Categories Chart Q1 2012 ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
       Top Exploit Toolkits Seen in Q1 2012....................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
   Metrics - Mobile Threats.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
       Distribution of Android Threats Q1 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
   Metrics - Email Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
       Top Domains in Spam Messages Q1 2012                                / Top 5 Languages in Spam Messages Q1 2012 .............................................................................................. 8
       Top Countries of Spam Senders Q1 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Web Risks & Threats ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
   Blackhole Exploit Toolkit .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
       Blackhole and Vulnerable TimThumb Utility on WordPress sites ........................................................................................................................................... 9
       The Dominance of Blackhole in the Exploit Kit Scene............................................................................................................................................................ 10
       ‘Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10
       Blackhole Ever Changing Attack Methods ............................................................................................................................................................................. 10
Mobile Devices Risks & Threats ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
   Android Malware is Spread via Facebook or Twitter................................................................................................................................................................. 13
       How Facebook is Used to Spread Malware ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13
       How Twitter is Used to Spread Malware ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Other reports from AVG Technologies .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG and Ponemon Institute: ‘Smartphone Security - Survey of U.S. consumers’ ................................................................................................................ 16
       Anatomy of a major Blackhole attack .................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q1 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q2 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG and Future Laboratories: ’Cybercrime Futures’ ............................................................................................................................................................. 16
       AVG and GfK: ‘AVG SMB Market Landscape Report 2011’ .................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q3 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
       AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q4 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
About AVG Technologies (NYSE: AVG) ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 16




                                                                                                                         2
Introduction

The AVG Community Protection Network is an online neighborhood watch, where community members work to protect each other. Information about the
latest threats is collected from customers who participate in the product improvement program and shared with the community to make sure everyone
receives the best possible protection.

The AVG Community Powered Threat Report is based on the Community Protection Network traffic and data collected from participating AVG users over a
three-month period, followed by analysis by AVG. It provides an overview of web, mobile devices, spam risks and threats. All statistics referenced are
obtained from the AVG Community Protection Network.

AVG has focused on building communities that help millions of online participants support each other on computer security issues and actively contribute
to AVG’s research efforts.


Q1 2012 Highlights



                   Web Threats
                                                                                The most active threat on the Web,
                                  Blackhole Exploit Kit                         43.55% of detected malware
                                                                                The most prevalent exploit toolkit in the
                                         Blackhole                              wild; accounts for 39.4% of toolkits
                                                                                Percentage of exploit toolkits that
                                            45%                                 account for 58% of all threat activity on
                                                                                malicious websites
                                                                                Percentage of malware uses external
                                           10.6%                                hardware devices (e.g. flash drives) as a
                                                                                distribution method (AutoRun)
                   Mobile Threats
                                                                                The most popular malicious Android™
                                           tp5x.WGt12                           application
                                                                                Number of malicious events detected
                                             360,000                            during Q1 2012
                   Messaging Threats (Spam)
                                                                                The top spam source country
                                      United States
                                                                                Number of spam messages originated
                                           48.3%                                from the USA, followed by the UK with
                                                                                9.7%
                                     Facebook.com                               The top domain in spam messages
                                                                                The top language used in spam
                                          English                               messages (69.3%)




                                                                            3
Key Points – Q1 2012
       Consumers are going mobile and so are cyber criminals; social media platforms on mobile devices have become hugely popular and cyber criminals
       are waiting around the corner. Cyber criminals watch the trends closely and adjust their attack methods accordingly.

          Cyber criminals have realized that through social networks, they have access to a large number of potential victims that can be converted into a
           considerable amount of income.

          A quick way to generate substantial revenue is by using malware which is designed to send text messages to premium rate services. Android™,
           with its significant market share, is the clear focus for cyber criminals.

          Cyber criminals are adopting an increasingly professional attitude through the marketing of ‘commercial’ crimeware kits.

          Other commercial crimeware kits lost market share to the most advanced crimeware, the Blackhole exploit kit.


The main stories spotted by AVG Threat Labs during Q1/2012 were:

Web Threats – ’Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model of Blackhole Crimeware
       AVG research shows that the Blackhole toolkit was most popular and the toolkit of choice for cyber criminals, with on average 70 per cent of attacks
       performed by variants of Blackhole. Blackhole is a sophisticated and powerful exploit kit, mainly due to its polymorphic nature, and it is heavily
       obfuscated to evade detection by anti-malware solutions. These are the main reasons why it has a high success rate.

       Blackhole’s creators ‘commercialized’ their product by providing a subscription-based service. The people who purchase the Blackhole exploit kit
       from the creators are criminals themselves and will try to recover the cost by selling it on to others. However, Blackhole’s creators have found a
       unique way to keep the money stream by releasing many updates to paying customers only and, along the way, reducing the numbers of non-
       paying customers.

Mobile Threats – Increase Use of Social Networks to Infect Android™ Devices
       The trend of malware targeting Android devices continues to grow, with social networks becoming an important attack vector. There are over 300
       million Android phones already activated (over 850,000 phones and tablets per day1). Meanwhile, Twitter® has more than 140 million active users2,
       Facebook® has over 845 million users3 and, as reported by comScore4, 34 per cent of mobile users access social networking sites or blogs. Because
       mobile devices are easier to monetize they are a popular target for cyber criminals. So it is to be expected that the combination of social networks
       and mobile platforms will be used by cyber criminals to launch attacks.

       In this report, we’ll show examples of methods that use both Twitter and Facebook to lure device owners into installing malicious applications.

       Cyber criminals know their audience, know what people are looking for and take advantage of it by posting tweets with links to malicious sites that
       include popular keywords. It appears that cyber criminals are tracking mobile usage trends, and if they see that many mobile users are searching
       for news, for example, the content of the tweets will be changed accordingly. In the EU’s five biggest markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United
       Kingdom), smartphone owners accessing news sites via an application or browser at least once a month increased 74 per cent to 39.5 million during
       the three-month average ending January 20125.




1
  https://plus.google.com/u/0/112599748506977857728/posts/Btey7rJBaLF
2
  http://blog.twitter.com/2012/03/twitter-turns-six.html
3
  http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22
4
  http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/3/comScore_Reports_January_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share
5
  http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/3/Number_of_European_Smartphone_Users_Accessing_News_Surges_74_Percent_Over_Past_Year



                                                                             4
Quarterly Key Metrics: January-March 2012
Metrics - Web Threats
Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012
   This prevalence table shows the top web threats as reported by the AVG
                                                                                                 Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Chart Q1 2012
   community

                                  Pages containing script code characteristics of
    Blackhole Exploit Kit         the Blackhole exploit kit which is used to install                    1.27%                    Blackhole Exploit Kit
                                  a range of malware                                                            0.98%
                                                                                                                                 Rogue Scanner
                                                                                                        3.40%   0.98%
                                                                                                3.69%
                                  Pages containing fake virus scanners, or appear       4.03%                                    Pharmacy Spam Site
                                  to be pages pushing fake antivirus products.          4.70%
                                                                                                                        43.55%   Facebook Scam
                                  Such pages intend either (or both) to lure end                7.71%
    Rogue Scanner
                                  user to buy worthless software, or to install                                                  Script Injection
                                  malware under the cover of seemingly useful                       27.32%
                                                                                                                                 Phoenix exploit kit
                                  software
                                                                                                                                 Link to Exploit Site
                                  The Pharmacy Spam sites appear to be
                                                                                                                                 Blackhat SEO
                                  legitimate online pharmacies, but usually are
                                  facsimiles of real sites. These fake pharmacies                                                Fake Codec
    Pharmacy Spam Site
                                  often supply generic, or even fake, drugs rather
                                  than the brands advertised, and reportedly
                                  often deliver no drugs at all

    Facebook Scam                 A scam targeting users of Facebook

                                  Injection of code by an attacker, into a
    Script Injection              computer program to change the course of
                                  execution

                                  Exploit toolkit which is used to install a range of
    Phoenix Exploit Kit
                                  malware

                                  These pages contain links to known exploit
                                  sites. In some cases, malicious code is
    Link to Exploit Site
                                  automatically downloaded without any user
                                  intervention

                                  Unethical or frowned upon Search Engine
    Blackhat SEO
                                  Optimization techniques

                                  An attempt to trick users into installing malware
    Fake Codec                    by suggesting they need to install a codec to
                                  watch a particular video

    Invisible IFrame              Malicious code injected into legitimate sites but
    Injection                     invisible to normal users




                                                                              5
Top 10 Malware Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012
  This table presents top traditional malware as detected by                                   Top 10 Malware Prevalence Chart Q1 2012
  AVG Threat Labs
  Worm/AutoRun
                                        10.6%
   Win32/Heur                           8.6%
                                                                                                                                          Worm/AutoRun
   Worm/Downadup                        5.3%
                                                                                                             2.6%                         Win32/Heur
                                                                                                     2.8%                  10.6%
   Luhe.Hifo.B                          3.5%                                                 2.8%                                         Worm/Downadup
                                                                                      2.9%
                                                                                                                                          Luhe.Hifo.B
   Win32/Cryptor                        3.5%
                                                                                    3.4%
                                                                                                                                          Win32/Cryptor
                                                                                                                                   8.6%
   Fsg                                  3.4%                                           3.5%                                               fsg
                                                                                                    3.5%                                  Generic20.GJD
   Generic20.GJD                        2.9%                                                                        5.3%
                                                                                                                                          JS/Redir
   JS/Redir                             2.8%
                                                                                                                                          HTML/Framer
   HTML/Framer                          2.8%                                                                                              Worm/Generic_c.ZS

   Worm/Generic_c.ZS                    2.6%




Behavior Categories Chart Q1 2012
This table presents threats prevalence as detected by the patent-pending technology in AVG’s Identity Protection engine. Using various classifiers and
advanced algorithms, this technology determines the hostile behavior of files and prevents their execution




                                                                    2.77%
                                                                    3.44%   2.26%
                                                            4.94%
                                                    6.45%
                                                                                                    40.91%
                                                        6.80%
                                                       7.30%

                                                            7.93%
                                                                             17.19%




                                       Trojan                                         Adware/Spyware

                                       Downloader                                     Adware

                                       signed                                         Virus

                                       Malware                                        PUA - Potentially Unwanted Application

                                       Network Worm                                   Backdoor




                                                                              6
Top Exploit Toolkits Seen in Q1 2012
These metrics present the top five exploit toolkits in terms of malicious web
activities. Criminals are increasingly utilizing toolkits to carry out cyber attacks.
In many cases, using these attack toolkits does not require technical expertise
                                   Blackhole                               39.4%
   1
                                   Phoenix                                32.6%
   2
                                    Fragus                                18.5%
   3
                                   Seosploit                                8.2%
   4
                                 Bleeding Life                              1.2%
   5


Metrics - Mobile Threats
Distribution of Android Threats Q1 2012




                                                                                        Hacking Tools
                                                                                            16%

                                                                                                        Malware
                                                                                                         18%
                                                           Rooting Tools
                                                               66%




                                                               Hacking Tools       Malware     Rooting Tools




                                                                                    7
Metrics - Email Threats
Top Domains in Spam Messages Q1 2012                       Top 5 Languages in Spam Messages Q1 2012
    Top domains used in spam messages
                                                                Top languages used in global spam messages
        1             No domains in message    18.5%

        2                                                        1                English                    69.3%
                      facebook.com             6.8%
                                                                 2                Portuguese                 7.5%

       3              twitter.com              4.9%
                                                                 3                French                     5.2%

       4              gmail.com                2.6%
                                                                 4                Dutch                      3.1%
                                               2.4%
       5              yahoo.com                                  5                German                     2.4%

       6              hotmail.com              2.2%

       7              chtah.com                2.0%

       8              emv3.com                 1.7%

       9              linkedin.com             1.7%

      10              doubleclick.net          1.5%




Top Countries of Spam Senders Q1 2012


     Top spam source countries

      1             United States             48.3%

      2             United Kingdom            9.7%

      3             France                    5.3%

      4             Germany                   4.5%

      5             Brazil                    3.3%

      6             Netherlands               3.1%

      7             Australia                 2.8%

      8             Canada                    2.2%

      9             Italy                     1.8%

     10             South Africa              1.5%




                                                       8
Web Risks & Threats
Blackhole Exploit Toolkit
The Blackhole crimeware toolkit dominated the malware scene over the past year. From the moment it appeared, it quickly gained ’market share’. As AVG
presented in our reports at that time, Blackhole’s market share in the global malware market is on average 35 per cent, and its market share among the
crimeware toolkits is on average 70 per cent. Blackhole is a sophisticated and powerful exploit kit, mainly due to its polymorphic nature; it is heavily
obfuscated to evade detection by anti-malware solutions.

A crimeware toolkit is a “commercial” software program that can be used by novices and experts alike to facilitate the launch of widespread attacks on
networked computers. With the attack toolkit, the cyber criminals can easily launch an attack using pre-written malicious code that exploits a number of
vulnerabilities in popular applications. These attacks often target un-patched security bugs in widely used products such as Adobe® Flash® Player, Adobe®
Reader, Internet Explorer® and the Java Runtime Environment.

The ease of use and accessibility of these toolkits gaining popularity in recent years have opened the doors to more cyber criminals who would otherwise
lack the required technical expertise to succeed in the cybercrime underground.

In the past, cyber criminals had to write their own malicious code from scratch, so the field was dominated by more technically savvy criminals. Quite
quickly, they realized that they could ’monetize’ their efforts by selling toolkits to less savvy individuals who would pay good money for them. The Blackhole
creators have taken that commercialization one step further by ensuring users of the exploit kit need to keep paying the creators to receive the most recent
and effective versions. The success of the kit lies in its straightforward user interface, sophisticated design, encryption, and seemingly successful marketing
model. As a crimeware toolkit, Blackhole is developed and maintained by cyber criminals but sold just like legitimate software.

Blackhole and Vulnerable TimThumb Utility on WordPress sites
WordPress™ is a popular blogging tool and publishing platform. Free to install and use, WordPress is used by over 14.7% of the Internet's ’top 1 million’
websites, according to Alexa, and, as of August 2011, manages 22 per cent of all new websites6. WordPress is currently the most popular Content
Management System in use on the Internet7 and has a large community of developers producing themes and plug-ins. Over the years, many WordPress
installations have been vulnerable to compromises making it possible to serve malware to unsuspecting users8.

At this point, we will discuss the TimThumb image utility. TimThumb is a simple, flexible PHP script that resizes images. The php script has a series of
parameters passed to it through a query string. While TimThumb has found a home in WordPress themes, it is by no means limited to them; TimThumb can
be used on any website to resize almost any image9. The reason that TimThumb poses a risk is because it writes files to a directory when it fetches images
from a remote server and resizes them, and this directory can be accessed by the site’s visitors and used to launch web attacks. TimThumb versions prior to
2.0 were included in many WordPress theme kits. These older versions do not correctly manage long file names or site names and provide an opportunity
for cyber criminals to upload and execute a malicious piece of code in the cache directory by taking advantage of TimThumb flaw and using a Blackhole
toolkit to exploit it.

TimThumb is important here because if vulnerability is fixed in the official code but that code is not updated in third-party plugins and themes, the
vulnerability persists on many WordPress installations. Many WordPress users are customizing their themes and therefore using external plug-ins and
scripts; consequently, TimThumb has become widely distributed. The majority of WordPress sites are maintained by ordinary users, not by security experts,
and those users do not necessarily have the skills to analyze compromised machines and to diagnose the problem. Moreover, a piecemeal approach by
replacing one file that appears to be compromised may not fix the problem. A thorough approach would include a backup of the content database, removal
of the entire site, installation of the latest WordPress version with only the needed plug-ins.

It is recommended WordPress users follow these security measures:
       Install updates promptly
       Backup database and files regularly (especially the .htaccess file)
       Run through one of the WordPress security checklists
       Install a security-checking plug-in, available from WordPress, to remove unnecessary files (such as sample sites and test files)
       Strengthen passwords (especially the admin) and change default ones (especially the admin)
       Use the “limit login attempts” plug-in
       Prevent the disclosure of the WordPress version number with the functions.php file of the theme
       Do not use FTP for access; use SSL to connect with the dashboard
       Do not allow guests to post content
       Do not allow guests to register (settings tab -> ’membership’ area -> uncheck ’anyone can register’)
       Use the .htaccess file to disallow directory listing and limit access to the wp-config.php file
       Ban undesirable users and bots with a ’deny’ entry in .htaccess
       WordPress can use shared databases, which creates a security exposure; create a database just for WordPress, limit access to SQL commands and
          create a strong database password




6
  http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/19/wordpress-now-powers-22-percent-of-new-active-websites-in-the-us/
7
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WordPress
8
  https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=wordpress
9
  http://www.binarymoon.co.uk/2010/08/timthumb/



                                                                               9
The Dominance of Blackhole in the Exploit Kit Scene
The Blackhole kit is sold on a subscription basis to customers who install it on malicious or compromised web sites to download a wide variety of malware
onto victims’ machines. Money drives this business model, and the customers purchase the Blackhole kit from its creators. These customers can then use it
to make money themselves through credit card and banking frauds and by installing rogue security products or through ransomware and other payloads.

Blackhole is one crimeware toolkit among many others including: Phoenix, Fragus, SEOSploit, BleedingLife, Aurora, CRiMEPACK, Eleonore, NeoSploit,
WebAttacker and more. AVG research shows that Blackhole is the most popular and widely used, and during 2011, achieved on average 70 per cent of
attacks were performed by variants of Blackhole (Figure 2).

  100.00%
   90.00%          86.68%
                                                                     80.20%
   80.00%                             75.83%

   70.00%
   60.00%
   50.00%
                                                         38.60%
   40.00%
   30.00%
   20.00%
   10.00%
    0.00%
                  Q1/2011            Q2/2011            Q3/2011     Q4/2011

Figure 1 - Blackhole "Market Share" Among the Crimeware Toolkits

Blackhole came to the attention of researchers in January 2011, though it was already in circulation in late 2010 as samples of the code showed unique
encryption techniques. Some of the values used in decrypting were derived from a formula based on the current date. Resulting values were used to
decrypt a fairly unremarkable multisploit that used MDAC, malicious Java .jar files and malicious .PDF files.

Researchers found variants on public sites that would not work after the end of year 2010. From these samples, it was obvious that the Blackhole exploit kit
was active at least as early as end 2010. The creators of older exploit kits clearly spent an enormous amount of time writing code to avoid detection as new
numbered versions of the kits emerge every few months. Most disappear after a while, although the Phoenix exploit kit continues to circulate. Blackhole
has been different, though, with fresh variants that started emerging at an accelerating rate at the beginning of 2011. By the autumn of 2011, researchers
were seeing three to five new Blackhole variants each week.

The Blackhole Kit is mainly an encryption tool. It is designed using very odd though valid and predictable javascript to hide its workings. Initially, researchers
saw Blackhole encryption hiding multiple exploits, like the older NeoSploit tool kit did (while it was active). Blackhole code would first try a MDAC-based
exploit, then perhaps one based on Windows® Help, followed by an attack using a malicious .pdf and a Java .jar file with a malicious .class in it.

At one point, the Blackhole writers switched to code that obfuscates redirects to malicious servers. That strategy allowed injected Blackhole script to be
hidden on compromised mainstream websites where, due to its size, it has more chances to escape notice. Most recently (as explained above), AVG Threat
Labs have detected numerous sites using WordPress blogging software infected with Blackhole. WordPress tool scripts have been injected with relatively
small Blackhole encrypted scripts, when decrypted they redirect to sites that serving malware.


‘Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model
Due to the illegality of the practice, it is reasonable to assume that the Blackhole creators expect some of their customers to redistribute or resell copies of
the tool kit that they purchased. This is akin to software piracy.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the Blackhole creators don’t try hard to encrypt the exploit code. Decrypting Blackhole isn’t particularly difficult for
anti-virus researchers. The ease of decryption of the code by the security industry provide sort of ‘planned obsolescence’ of their product. Any version of
the kit which is more than a few days old would be useless. This means that the creators can create a revenue stream from new versions, and they can
release updates only to paying subscribers.

With the planned obsolescence business model, Blackhole creators are assuring themselves of a recurring stream of revenue from their subscribers.

Blackhole Ever Changing Attack Methods
The Blackhole exploit kit has used a wide range of vulnerabilities to install itself and do its work. Below is a list of exploits the Blackhole admin panel records
in order to show how successful infections rates. As you can see, the Java exploits have a better rate of infecting a victim’s computer (Figure 3). Each version
includes a different set of un-patched vulnerabilities (Figure 4).




                                                                                10
Figure 2 - Blackhole Admin Panel

September 2010                         February 2011     August 2011       December 2011   February 2012

                                        Version 1.0.0    Version 1.1.0     Version 1.2.1   Version 1.2.2



Java X                                 Java X            JAVA SKYLINE      Java Rhino      Java Pack

PDF                                    Java SMB          Java OBE          MDAC            PDF LIBTIFF

Java DES                               PDF               PDF LIBTIFF       PDF ALL         PDF ALL

Java SMB                               Java DES          Java Trust        PDF LIBTIFF     HCP
MDAC
                                       MDAC              PDF ALL           HCP             MDAC

                                                         Java SMB          Java OBE        FLASH



Figure 3 - Blackhole Targeted Zero Day Vulnerabilities




                                                                      11
An analysis of Blackhole’s malicious mechanisms and encryption in the last year shows a steady change of techniques that its creators have used to evade
detection and analysis by security researchers and to infect victim machines:

February, 2011

   Loads a .jar without trying to hide it

   Contains a multisploit (in cyphertext) containing an MDAC, PDF and possibly a SWF exploit. The ciphertext is a comma-delimited list of character codes
    in a hidden textarea element. It uses document.getElementsByTagName("textarea") to access it. It also fetches "String.fromCharCode" from a
    stylesheet. These strategies are very familiar even a year later

   The "Page Is Loading" message isn't present yet

   The eval at the end is fairly easy to spot, despite eval being put in a variable "zmkvq". This makes decryption relatively simple

   The decrypted string is stored in the easy-to-spot variable named "s”

May 2011 (File: serpbe_net)

   The java exploit (.jar) is hidden in ciphertext

   The victim will see a 404 error page in his or her browser. Later it will display "Page Is Loading"

   The ciphertext is stored in a <div> section in the page .html code instead of a <textarea>. It is still hidden

   Key-like information is stored in another <div>, and a paragraph tag. All hidden from the user

   The decryptor script is formatted, making it easier to read and to identify the call to eval at the end (now "hidden" in a variable named"e")

   The decrypted string to execute is still stored in the file named "s"

August 2011 File: adenpshabvf_com

   The decrypt is mostly the same as May, with different URLs and names for the downloaded files

   Decryption is much simpler and easier to decode: the eval and ciphertext arrays are not hidden. The code writers simply call
    "eval(String.fromCharCode)" on the array, which isn't even in a variable. Decoding is trivial

   The code subtracts a variable named "z" (in this case 5) from every element in the array. This is clearly a move to thwart scanners, not decryptors

November 2011 File: kkkkkkkkkl_coom_in

   The fake 404 error message has been replaced with "Please wait while loading..." (see figure 5)

   There's a .jar file loaded plainly at the top of the page, not in the ciphertext

   An SWF exploit seems to have been added to the ciphertext

   The ciphertext array is within another array, within an object definition, but the eval is easier to spot than ever - literally 'window["eval"]'. The
    decryptor is still nicely formatted as well. The coders continue to make no effort to avoid decryption, just detection

   The creators also split "fromCharCode" into "fromCharCo"+"d"+'e', presumably to avoid a particular signature

March 2012 File: kmkndkbc_findhere_org

   The decrypt seems essentially identical to the one from kkkkkkkkkl_coom_in in November. Obfuscation has changed significantly

   The .jar file is loaded in the same way as November, though with different filenames

   The major difference in the code development is that the ciphertext (in a paragraph tag this time) is delimited by the character "p" instead of commas.

   The decryptor is slightly more complicated as a result, but still neatly indented

   The code writers are intentionally failing "try" statements to run code in the "catch" sections. This doesn't seem like it would slow decryption, but it
    makes new anti-virus scanner signatures necessary

   The code writers continue to split strings with quote-plus-quote




                                                                                 12
Figure 4 - Blackhole 11/2011 version

You can read more about Blackhole on AVG Threat Labs reports:

        http://blogs.avg.com/news-threats/avg-web-threat-update-week-12/
        http://blogs.avg.com/news-threats/weekly-threat-update-week-14/
        http://aa-download.avg.com/filedir/press/AVG_Community_Powered_Threat_Report_Q3_2011.pdf




Mobile Devices Risks & Threats

Android Malware is Spread via Facebook or Twitter
For malware authors, most users are an easy target; if you follow your target closely, you can predict its moves. Malware authors know how to catch users
when they pay less attention or when they are too curious. This is why social engineering techniques are so powerful.

Malware authors follow trends and change their techniques accordingly. Therefore, the combination of smart phones and social networks have become a
malware author’s playground.

Recently, we have witnessed an increase in techniques used to spread malware among Android users via Facebook and Twitter applications.

How Facebook is Used to Spread Malware
It is not uncommon to receive a friend request on Facebook from people we don’t know. As the proverb states ’curiosity killed the cat’, curiosity is a human
nature which is taken advantage by the malware’s authors.

Even if we don’t know that person, curiosity takes over, and we are tempted to know more about this specific person. But one errant click and the malicious
application gets downloaded to our Smartphone. However, the malicious application is downloaded but not automatically installed, which is especially
dangerous for the novice user who does not check permissions before installing an application. The malware’s authors can then trick these users into
installing the application (Figure 6). As said above, the malware authors know exactly what the ‘victim’ will do next and just wait around the corner.

In this specific case, the link to the malware web page was included in the requestor’s Facebook profile, the first place to look for more information about
the requestor. When clicking on the link, it redirects the browser to a website that automatically downloads an application to the Android device. After the
application has been installed by the user, it can send text messages to premium rate services. The downloaded application pretends to be a legitimate
opera browser.




                                                                             13
Figure 5 - Automatic Application Download

How Twitter is Used to Spread Malware
The method selected by malware authors is simple; they create many bogus Twitter accounts. Using these accounts, malware authors post multiple tweets
(figure 8) using a combination of URL shortening services and a use of popular keywords which combined, direct to malicious sites. Popular keywords or
hashtags are used to categorize a message (tweet) like #Iran, #Egypt or popular topics like porn, diet, computers, mobile etc.

When a victim searches for information on one of these popular topics, they can potentially infect their mobile devices with malware since, unlike search
engine results, the most recent tweets appear at the top of the search results. Cyber criminals do not have to invest in SEO, for that matter.

When clicking on the link, the victim is redirected to the malicious website. This website contains a malicious Android application which in some cases is
being automatically downloaded to the victim’s device and in other cases, disguises itself as a legitimate application such as Opera Mini browser and lures
the victim to download and install the application. These applications send SMS or call to premium rate services.

It is hard for a novice user to figure out which links are malicious since the links are masked behind URL shortening services.

Below is an example of a Twitter account spreading malware (Figure 7):




        Figure 6 – Malicious Accounts (screen capture from Twitter.com &
        Topsy.com)
                                                                                 14
Figure 7 - Many Tweets in a few days (taken from Topsy.com)


Recommendations:
          Prior to installing any application, carry out a background check on the developer and the application, especially when downloading it
           from Android markets other than the official Google Play™.
          When installing new apps to your Android device, always look at the permissions application requests to approve and make sure the list
           seems appropriate.
          Only download apps from trusted application stores, sites and developers, and always check the app’s star rating, developer
           information and user reviews to make sure you know what you are downloading.
          If you receive a Facebook invitation from a person you don’t know, don’t be tempted but treat it with suspicion.
          Twitter background check prior to clicking on any link:
               o Usually bogus Twitter users do not have any followers.
               o Usually they do send lots of similar tweets in a short period of time (few days).
          Set your Android device to download apps from Google Play only.
          Keep your device protected by installing an anti-virus application such as AVG Mobilation™.
          Discovered a spam account? Report it to Twitter10.


Android™, Google® and Google Play™ are trademarks of Google, Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. Adobe® Flash® Player and Adobe® Reader are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated
registered in the United States and in other countries. Facebook® is a trademark of Facebook, Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. Internet Explorer® and Windows® are registered
trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries. Java is a trademark or registered trademark of Oracle, Inc. in the United States and other countries. Twitter® is a trademark of Twitter
Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. WordPress™ is a trademark of the WordPress Foundation.




10
     http://support.twitter.com/articles/64986-how-to-report-spam-on-twitter



                                                                                                          15
Other reports from AVG Technologies

AVG and Ponemon Institute: ‘Smartphone Security - Survey of U.S. consumers’ – March 2011
http://aa-download.avg.com/filedir/other/Smartphone.pdf

Anatomy of a major Blackhole attack – March 2011
http://www.avg.com/filedir/other/blackhole.pdf

AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q1 2011 – April 2011
http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-129

AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q2 2011 – June 2011
http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-1563

AVG and Future Laboratories: ’Cybercrime Futures’ – September 2011
http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-1953

AVG and GfK: ‘AVG SMB Market Landscape Report 2011’ – September 2011
http://download.avg.com/filedir/news/AVG_SMB_Market_Landscape_Report_2011.pdf

AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q3 2011 – October 2011
http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-2323

AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q4 2011 – January 2012
http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-3723


About AVG Technologies (NYSE: AVG)
AVG’s mission is to simplify, optimize and secure the Internet experience, providing peace of mind to a connected world. AVG’s powerful yet easy-to-use
software and online services put users in control of their Internet experience. By choosing AVG’s software and services, users become part of a trusted
global community that benefits from inherent network effects, mutual protection and support. AVG has grown its user base to approximately 108 million
active users as of December 31, 2011 and offers a product portfolio that targets the consumer and small business markets and includes Internet security, PC
performance optimization, online backup, mobile security, identity protection and family safety software.

www.avg.com




                                                                            16

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AVG Community Powered Threat Report: Q1 2012

  • 1. AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q1 2012
  • 2. Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Q1 2012 Highlights ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Key Points – Q1 2012 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Web Threats – ’Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model of Blackhole Crimeware .............................................................................................................. 4 Mobile Threats – Increase Use of Social Networks to Infect Android™ Devices ......................................................................................................................... 4 Quarterly Key Metrics: January-March 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Metrics - Web Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Top 10 Malware Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 ............................................................................................................................................................... 6 Behavior Categories Chart Q1 2012 ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Top Exploit Toolkits Seen in Q1 2012....................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Metrics - Mobile Threats.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Distribution of Android Threats Q1 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Metrics - Email Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Top Domains in Spam Messages Q1 2012 / Top 5 Languages in Spam Messages Q1 2012 .............................................................................................. 8 Top Countries of Spam Senders Q1 2012 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Web Risks & Threats ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 Blackhole Exploit Toolkit .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 Blackhole and Vulnerable TimThumb Utility on WordPress sites ........................................................................................................................................... 9 The Dominance of Blackhole in the Exploit Kit Scene............................................................................................................................................................ 10 ‘Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Blackhole Ever Changing Attack Methods ............................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Mobile Devices Risks & Threats ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Android Malware is Spread via Facebook or Twitter................................................................................................................................................................. 13 How Facebook is Used to Spread Malware ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 How Twitter is Used to Spread Malware ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Other reports from AVG Technologies .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG and Ponemon Institute: ‘Smartphone Security - Survey of U.S. consumers’ ................................................................................................................ 16 Anatomy of a major Blackhole attack .................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q1 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q2 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG and Future Laboratories: ’Cybercrime Futures’ ............................................................................................................................................................. 16 AVG and GfK: ‘AVG SMB Market Landscape Report 2011’ .................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q3 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q4 2011 ............................................................................................................................................................... 16 About AVG Technologies (NYSE: AVG) ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 2
  • 3. Introduction The AVG Community Protection Network is an online neighborhood watch, where community members work to protect each other. Information about the latest threats is collected from customers who participate in the product improvement program and shared with the community to make sure everyone receives the best possible protection. The AVG Community Powered Threat Report is based on the Community Protection Network traffic and data collected from participating AVG users over a three-month period, followed by analysis by AVG. It provides an overview of web, mobile devices, spam risks and threats. All statistics referenced are obtained from the AVG Community Protection Network. AVG has focused on building communities that help millions of online participants support each other on computer security issues and actively contribute to AVG’s research efforts. Q1 2012 Highlights Web Threats The most active threat on the Web, Blackhole Exploit Kit 43.55% of detected malware The most prevalent exploit toolkit in the Blackhole wild; accounts for 39.4% of toolkits Percentage of exploit toolkits that 45% account for 58% of all threat activity on malicious websites Percentage of malware uses external 10.6% hardware devices (e.g. flash drives) as a distribution method (AutoRun) Mobile Threats The most popular malicious Android™ tp5x.WGt12 application Number of malicious events detected 360,000 during Q1 2012 Messaging Threats (Spam) The top spam source country United States Number of spam messages originated 48.3% from the USA, followed by the UK with 9.7% Facebook.com The top domain in spam messages The top language used in spam English messages (69.3%) 3
  • 4. Key Points – Q1 2012 Consumers are going mobile and so are cyber criminals; social media platforms on mobile devices have become hugely popular and cyber criminals are waiting around the corner. Cyber criminals watch the trends closely and adjust their attack methods accordingly.  Cyber criminals have realized that through social networks, they have access to a large number of potential victims that can be converted into a considerable amount of income.  A quick way to generate substantial revenue is by using malware which is designed to send text messages to premium rate services. Android™, with its significant market share, is the clear focus for cyber criminals.  Cyber criminals are adopting an increasingly professional attitude through the marketing of ‘commercial’ crimeware kits.  Other commercial crimeware kits lost market share to the most advanced crimeware, the Blackhole exploit kit. The main stories spotted by AVG Threat Labs during Q1/2012 were: Web Threats – ’Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model of Blackhole Crimeware AVG research shows that the Blackhole toolkit was most popular and the toolkit of choice for cyber criminals, with on average 70 per cent of attacks performed by variants of Blackhole. Blackhole is a sophisticated and powerful exploit kit, mainly due to its polymorphic nature, and it is heavily obfuscated to evade detection by anti-malware solutions. These are the main reasons why it has a high success rate. Blackhole’s creators ‘commercialized’ their product by providing a subscription-based service. The people who purchase the Blackhole exploit kit from the creators are criminals themselves and will try to recover the cost by selling it on to others. However, Blackhole’s creators have found a unique way to keep the money stream by releasing many updates to paying customers only and, along the way, reducing the numbers of non- paying customers. Mobile Threats – Increase Use of Social Networks to Infect Android™ Devices The trend of malware targeting Android devices continues to grow, with social networks becoming an important attack vector. There are over 300 million Android phones already activated (over 850,000 phones and tablets per day1). Meanwhile, Twitter® has more than 140 million active users2, Facebook® has over 845 million users3 and, as reported by comScore4, 34 per cent of mobile users access social networking sites or blogs. Because mobile devices are easier to monetize they are a popular target for cyber criminals. So it is to be expected that the combination of social networks and mobile platforms will be used by cyber criminals to launch attacks. In this report, we’ll show examples of methods that use both Twitter and Facebook to lure device owners into installing malicious applications. Cyber criminals know their audience, know what people are looking for and take advantage of it by posting tweets with links to malicious sites that include popular keywords. It appears that cyber criminals are tracking mobile usage trends, and if they see that many mobile users are searching for news, for example, the content of the tweets will be changed accordingly. In the EU’s five biggest markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom), smartphone owners accessing news sites via an application or browser at least once a month increased 74 per cent to 39.5 million during the three-month average ending January 20125. 1 https://plus.google.com/u/0/112599748506977857728/posts/Btey7rJBaLF 2 http://blog.twitter.com/2012/03/twitter-turns-six.html 3 http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 4 http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/3/comScore_Reports_January_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share 5 http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/3/Number_of_European_Smartphone_Users_Accessing_News_Surges_74_Percent_Over_Past_Year 4
  • 5. Quarterly Key Metrics: January-March 2012 Metrics - Web Threats Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 This prevalence table shows the top web threats as reported by the AVG Top 10 Web Threats Prevalence Chart Q1 2012 community Pages containing script code characteristics of Blackhole Exploit Kit the Blackhole exploit kit which is used to install 1.27% Blackhole Exploit Kit a range of malware 0.98% Rogue Scanner 3.40% 0.98% 3.69% Pages containing fake virus scanners, or appear 4.03% Pharmacy Spam Site to be pages pushing fake antivirus products. 4.70% 43.55% Facebook Scam Such pages intend either (or both) to lure end 7.71% Rogue Scanner user to buy worthless software, or to install Script Injection malware under the cover of seemingly useful 27.32% Phoenix exploit kit software Link to Exploit Site The Pharmacy Spam sites appear to be Blackhat SEO legitimate online pharmacies, but usually are facsimiles of real sites. These fake pharmacies Fake Codec Pharmacy Spam Site often supply generic, or even fake, drugs rather than the brands advertised, and reportedly often deliver no drugs at all Facebook Scam A scam targeting users of Facebook Injection of code by an attacker, into a Script Injection computer program to change the course of execution Exploit toolkit which is used to install a range of Phoenix Exploit Kit malware These pages contain links to known exploit sites. In some cases, malicious code is Link to Exploit Site automatically downloaded without any user intervention Unethical or frowned upon Search Engine Blackhat SEO Optimization techniques An attempt to trick users into installing malware Fake Codec by suggesting they need to install a codec to watch a particular video Invisible IFrame Malicious code injected into legitimate sites but Injection invisible to normal users 5
  • 6. Top 10 Malware Threats Prevalence Table Q1 2012 This table presents top traditional malware as detected by Top 10 Malware Prevalence Chart Q1 2012 AVG Threat Labs Worm/AutoRun 10.6% Win32/Heur 8.6% Worm/AutoRun Worm/Downadup 5.3% 2.6% Win32/Heur 2.8% 10.6% Luhe.Hifo.B 3.5% 2.8% Worm/Downadup 2.9% Luhe.Hifo.B Win32/Cryptor 3.5% 3.4% Win32/Cryptor 8.6% Fsg 3.4% 3.5% fsg 3.5% Generic20.GJD Generic20.GJD 2.9% 5.3% JS/Redir JS/Redir 2.8% HTML/Framer HTML/Framer 2.8% Worm/Generic_c.ZS Worm/Generic_c.ZS 2.6% Behavior Categories Chart Q1 2012 This table presents threats prevalence as detected by the patent-pending technology in AVG’s Identity Protection engine. Using various classifiers and advanced algorithms, this technology determines the hostile behavior of files and prevents their execution 2.77% 3.44% 2.26% 4.94% 6.45% 40.91% 6.80% 7.30% 7.93% 17.19% Trojan Adware/Spyware Downloader Adware signed Virus Malware PUA - Potentially Unwanted Application Network Worm Backdoor 6
  • 7. Top Exploit Toolkits Seen in Q1 2012 These metrics present the top five exploit toolkits in terms of malicious web activities. Criminals are increasingly utilizing toolkits to carry out cyber attacks. In many cases, using these attack toolkits does not require technical expertise Blackhole 39.4% 1 Phoenix 32.6% 2 Fragus 18.5% 3 Seosploit 8.2% 4 Bleeding Life 1.2% 5 Metrics - Mobile Threats Distribution of Android Threats Q1 2012 Hacking Tools 16% Malware 18% Rooting Tools 66% Hacking Tools Malware Rooting Tools 7
  • 8. Metrics - Email Threats Top Domains in Spam Messages Q1 2012 Top 5 Languages in Spam Messages Q1 2012 Top domains used in spam messages Top languages used in global spam messages 1 No domains in message 18.5% 2 1 English 69.3% facebook.com 6.8% 2 Portuguese 7.5% 3 twitter.com 4.9% 3 French 5.2% 4 gmail.com 2.6% 4 Dutch 3.1% 2.4% 5 yahoo.com 5 German 2.4% 6 hotmail.com 2.2% 7 chtah.com 2.0% 8 emv3.com 1.7% 9 linkedin.com 1.7% 10 doubleclick.net 1.5% Top Countries of Spam Senders Q1 2012 Top spam source countries 1 United States 48.3% 2 United Kingdom 9.7% 3 France 5.3% 4 Germany 4.5% 5 Brazil 3.3% 6 Netherlands 3.1% 7 Australia 2.8% 8 Canada 2.2% 9 Italy 1.8% 10 South Africa 1.5% 8
  • 9. Web Risks & Threats Blackhole Exploit Toolkit The Blackhole crimeware toolkit dominated the malware scene over the past year. From the moment it appeared, it quickly gained ’market share’. As AVG presented in our reports at that time, Blackhole’s market share in the global malware market is on average 35 per cent, and its market share among the crimeware toolkits is on average 70 per cent. Blackhole is a sophisticated and powerful exploit kit, mainly due to its polymorphic nature; it is heavily obfuscated to evade detection by anti-malware solutions. A crimeware toolkit is a “commercial” software program that can be used by novices and experts alike to facilitate the launch of widespread attacks on networked computers. With the attack toolkit, the cyber criminals can easily launch an attack using pre-written malicious code that exploits a number of vulnerabilities in popular applications. These attacks often target un-patched security bugs in widely used products such as Adobe® Flash® Player, Adobe® Reader, Internet Explorer® and the Java Runtime Environment. The ease of use and accessibility of these toolkits gaining popularity in recent years have opened the doors to more cyber criminals who would otherwise lack the required technical expertise to succeed in the cybercrime underground. In the past, cyber criminals had to write their own malicious code from scratch, so the field was dominated by more technically savvy criminals. Quite quickly, they realized that they could ’monetize’ their efforts by selling toolkits to less savvy individuals who would pay good money for them. The Blackhole creators have taken that commercialization one step further by ensuring users of the exploit kit need to keep paying the creators to receive the most recent and effective versions. The success of the kit lies in its straightforward user interface, sophisticated design, encryption, and seemingly successful marketing model. As a crimeware toolkit, Blackhole is developed and maintained by cyber criminals but sold just like legitimate software. Blackhole and Vulnerable TimThumb Utility on WordPress sites WordPress™ is a popular blogging tool and publishing platform. Free to install and use, WordPress is used by over 14.7% of the Internet's ’top 1 million’ websites, according to Alexa, and, as of August 2011, manages 22 per cent of all new websites6. WordPress is currently the most popular Content Management System in use on the Internet7 and has a large community of developers producing themes and plug-ins. Over the years, many WordPress installations have been vulnerable to compromises making it possible to serve malware to unsuspecting users8. At this point, we will discuss the TimThumb image utility. TimThumb is a simple, flexible PHP script that resizes images. The php script has a series of parameters passed to it through a query string. While TimThumb has found a home in WordPress themes, it is by no means limited to them; TimThumb can be used on any website to resize almost any image9. The reason that TimThumb poses a risk is because it writes files to a directory when it fetches images from a remote server and resizes them, and this directory can be accessed by the site’s visitors and used to launch web attacks. TimThumb versions prior to 2.0 were included in many WordPress theme kits. These older versions do not correctly manage long file names or site names and provide an opportunity for cyber criminals to upload and execute a malicious piece of code in the cache directory by taking advantage of TimThumb flaw and using a Blackhole toolkit to exploit it. TimThumb is important here because if vulnerability is fixed in the official code but that code is not updated in third-party plugins and themes, the vulnerability persists on many WordPress installations. Many WordPress users are customizing their themes and therefore using external plug-ins and scripts; consequently, TimThumb has become widely distributed. The majority of WordPress sites are maintained by ordinary users, not by security experts, and those users do not necessarily have the skills to analyze compromised machines and to diagnose the problem. Moreover, a piecemeal approach by replacing one file that appears to be compromised may not fix the problem. A thorough approach would include a backup of the content database, removal of the entire site, installation of the latest WordPress version with only the needed plug-ins. It is recommended WordPress users follow these security measures:  Install updates promptly  Backup database and files regularly (especially the .htaccess file)  Run through one of the WordPress security checklists  Install a security-checking plug-in, available from WordPress, to remove unnecessary files (such as sample sites and test files)  Strengthen passwords (especially the admin) and change default ones (especially the admin)  Use the “limit login attempts” plug-in  Prevent the disclosure of the WordPress version number with the functions.php file of the theme  Do not use FTP for access; use SSL to connect with the dashboard  Do not allow guests to post content  Do not allow guests to register (settings tab -> ’membership’ area -> uncheck ’anyone can register’)  Use the .htaccess file to disallow directory listing and limit access to the wp-config.php file  Ban undesirable users and bots with a ’deny’ entry in .htaccess  WordPress can use shared databases, which creates a security exposure; create a database just for WordPress, limit access to SQL commands and create a strong database password 6 http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/19/wordpress-now-powers-22-percent-of-new-active-websites-in-the-us/ 7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WordPress 8 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=wordpress 9 http://www.binarymoon.co.uk/2010/08/timthumb/ 9
  • 10. The Dominance of Blackhole in the Exploit Kit Scene The Blackhole kit is sold on a subscription basis to customers who install it on malicious or compromised web sites to download a wide variety of malware onto victims’ machines. Money drives this business model, and the customers purchase the Blackhole kit from its creators. These customers can then use it to make money themselves through credit card and banking frauds and by installing rogue security products or through ransomware and other payloads. Blackhole is one crimeware toolkit among many others including: Phoenix, Fragus, SEOSploit, BleedingLife, Aurora, CRiMEPACK, Eleonore, NeoSploit, WebAttacker and more. AVG research shows that Blackhole is the most popular and widely used, and during 2011, achieved on average 70 per cent of attacks were performed by variants of Blackhole (Figure 2). 100.00% 90.00% 86.68% 80.20% 80.00% 75.83% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 38.60% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Q1/2011 Q2/2011 Q3/2011 Q4/2011 Figure 1 - Blackhole "Market Share" Among the Crimeware Toolkits Blackhole came to the attention of researchers in January 2011, though it was already in circulation in late 2010 as samples of the code showed unique encryption techniques. Some of the values used in decrypting were derived from a formula based on the current date. Resulting values were used to decrypt a fairly unremarkable multisploit that used MDAC, malicious Java .jar files and malicious .PDF files. Researchers found variants on public sites that would not work after the end of year 2010. From these samples, it was obvious that the Blackhole exploit kit was active at least as early as end 2010. The creators of older exploit kits clearly spent an enormous amount of time writing code to avoid detection as new numbered versions of the kits emerge every few months. Most disappear after a while, although the Phoenix exploit kit continues to circulate. Blackhole has been different, though, with fresh variants that started emerging at an accelerating rate at the beginning of 2011. By the autumn of 2011, researchers were seeing three to five new Blackhole variants each week. The Blackhole Kit is mainly an encryption tool. It is designed using very odd though valid and predictable javascript to hide its workings. Initially, researchers saw Blackhole encryption hiding multiple exploits, like the older NeoSploit tool kit did (while it was active). Blackhole code would first try a MDAC-based exploit, then perhaps one based on Windows® Help, followed by an attack using a malicious .pdf and a Java .jar file with a malicious .class in it. At one point, the Blackhole writers switched to code that obfuscates redirects to malicious servers. That strategy allowed injected Blackhole script to be hidden on compromised mainstream websites where, due to its size, it has more chances to escape notice. Most recently (as explained above), AVG Threat Labs have detected numerous sites using WordPress blogging software infected with Blackhole. WordPress tool scripts have been injected with relatively small Blackhole encrypted scripts, when decrypted they redirect to sites that serving malware. ‘Planned Obsolescence’ as a Business Model Due to the illegality of the practice, it is reasonable to assume that the Blackhole creators expect some of their customers to redistribute or resell copies of the tool kit that they purchased. This is akin to software piracy. We cannot rule out the possibility that the Blackhole creators don’t try hard to encrypt the exploit code. Decrypting Blackhole isn’t particularly difficult for anti-virus researchers. The ease of decryption of the code by the security industry provide sort of ‘planned obsolescence’ of their product. Any version of the kit which is more than a few days old would be useless. This means that the creators can create a revenue stream from new versions, and they can release updates only to paying subscribers. With the planned obsolescence business model, Blackhole creators are assuring themselves of a recurring stream of revenue from their subscribers. Blackhole Ever Changing Attack Methods The Blackhole exploit kit has used a wide range of vulnerabilities to install itself and do its work. Below is a list of exploits the Blackhole admin panel records in order to show how successful infections rates. As you can see, the Java exploits have a better rate of infecting a victim’s computer (Figure 3). Each version includes a different set of un-patched vulnerabilities (Figure 4). 10
  • 11. Figure 2 - Blackhole Admin Panel September 2010 February 2011 August 2011 December 2011 February 2012 Version 1.0.0 Version 1.1.0 Version 1.2.1 Version 1.2.2 Java X Java X JAVA SKYLINE Java Rhino Java Pack PDF Java SMB Java OBE MDAC PDF LIBTIFF Java DES PDF PDF LIBTIFF PDF ALL PDF ALL Java SMB Java DES Java Trust PDF LIBTIFF HCP MDAC MDAC PDF ALL HCP MDAC Java SMB Java OBE FLASH Figure 3 - Blackhole Targeted Zero Day Vulnerabilities 11
  • 12. An analysis of Blackhole’s malicious mechanisms and encryption in the last year shows a steady change of techniques that its creators have used to evade detection and analysis by security researchers and to infect victim machines: February, 2011  Loads a .jar without trying to hide it  Contains a multisploit (in cyphertext) containing an MDAC, PDF and possibly a SWF exploit. The ciphertext is a comma-delimited list of character codes in a hidden textarea element. It uses document.getElementsByTagName("textarea") to access it. It also fetches "String.fromCharCode" from a stylesheet. These strategies are very familiar even a year later  The "Page Is Loading" message isn't present yet  The eval at the end is fairly easy to spot, despite eval being put in a variable "zmkvq". This makes decryption relatively simple  The decrypted string is stored in the easy-to-spot variable named "s” May 2011 (File: serpbe_net)  The java exploit (.jar) is hidden in ciphertext  The victim will see a 404 error page in his or her browser. Later it will display "Page Is Loading"  The ciphertext is stored in a <div> section in the page .html code instead of a <textarea>. It is still hidden  Key-like information is stored in another <div>, and a paragraph tag. All hidden from the user  The decryptor script is formatted, making it easier to read and to identify the call to eval at the end (now "hidden" in a variable named"e")  The decrypted string to execute is still stored in the file named "s" August 2011 File: adenpshabvf_com  The decrypt is mostly the same as May, with different URLs and names for the downloaded files  Decryption is much simpler and easier to decode: the eval and ciphertext arrays are not hidden. The code writers simply call "eval(String.fromCharCode)" on the array, which isn't even in a variable. Decoding is trivial  The code subtracts a variable named "z" (in this case 5) from every element in the array. This is clearly a move to thwart scanners, not decryptors November 2011 File: kkkkkkkkkl_coom_in  The fake 404 error message has been replaced with "Please wait while loading..." (see figure 5)  There's a .jar file loaded plainly at the top of the page, not in the ciphertext  An SWF exploit seems to have been added to the ciphertext  The ciphertext array is within another array, within an object definition, but the eval is easier to spot than ever - literally 'window["eval"]'. The decryptor is still nicely formatted as well. The coders continue to make no effort to avoid decryption, just detection  The creators also split "fromCharCode" into "fromCharCo"+"d"+'e', presumably to avoid a particular signature March 2012 File: kmkndkbc_findhere_org  The decrypt seems essentially identical to the one from kkkkkkkkkl_coom_in in November. Obfuscation has changed significantly  The .jar file is loaded in the same way as November, though with different filenames  The major difference in the code development is that the ciphertext (in a paragraph tag this time) is delimited by the character "p" instead of commas.  The decryptor is slightly more complicated as a result, but still neatly indented  The code writers are intentionally failing "try" statements to run code in the "catch" sections. This doesn't seem like it would slow decryption, but it makes new anti-virus scanner signatures necessary  The code writers continue to split strings with quote-plus-quote 12
  • 13. Figure 4 - Blackhole 11/2011 version You can read more about Blackhole on AVG Threat Labs reports:  http://blogs.avg.com/news-threats/avg-web-threat-update-week-12/  http://blogs.avg.com/news-threats/weekly-threat-update-week-14/  http://aa-download.avg.com/filedir/press/AVG_Community_Powered_Threat_Report_Q3_2011.pdf Mobile Devices Risks & Threats Android Malware is Spread via Facebook or Twitter For malware authors, most users are an easy target; if you follow your target closely, you can predict its moves. Malware authors know how to catch users when they pay less attention or when they are too curious. This is why social engineering techniques are so powerful. Malware authors follow trends and change their techniques accordingly. Therefore, the combination of smart phones and social networks have become a malware author’s playground. Recently, we have witnessed an increase in techniques used to spread malware among Android users via Facebook and Twitter applications. How Facebook is Used to Spread Malware It is not uncommon to receive a friend request on Facebook from people we don’t know. As the proverb states ’curiosity killed the cat’, curiosity is a human nature which is taken advantage by the malware’s authors. Even if we don’t know that person, curiosity takes over, and we are tempted to know more about this specific person. But one errant click and the malicious application gets downloaded to our Smartphone. However, the malicious application is downloaded but not automatically installed, which is especially dangerous for the novice user who does not check permissions before installing an application. The malware’s authors can then trick these users into installing the application (Figure 6). As said above, the malware authors know exactly what the ‘victim’ will do next and just wait around the corner. In this specific case, the link to the malware web page was included in the requestor’s Facebook profile, the first place to look for more information about the requestor. When clicking on the link, it redirects the browser to a website that automatically downloads an application to the Android device. After the application has been installed by the user, it can send text messages to premium rate services. The downloaded application pretends to be a legitimate opera browser. 13
  • 14. Figure 5 - Automatic Application Download How Twitter is Used to Spread Malware The method selected by malware authors is simple; they create many bogus Twitter accounts. Using these accounts, malware authors post multiple tweets (figure 8) using a combination of URL shortening services and a use of popular keywords which combined, direct to malicious sites. Popular keywords or hashtags are used to categorize a message (tweet) like #Iran, #Egypt or popular topics like porn, diet, computers, mobile etc. When a victim searches for information on one of these popular topics, they can potentially infect their mobile devices with malware since, unlike search engine results, the most recent tweets appear at the top of the search results. Cyber criminals do not have to invest in SEO, for that matter. When clicking on the link, the victim is redirected to the malicious website. This website contains a malicious Android application which in some cases is being automatically downloaded to the victim’s device and in other cases, disguises itself as a legitimate application such as Opera Mini browser and lures the victim to download and install the application. These applications send SMS or call to premium rate services. It is hard for a novice user to figure out which links are malicious since the links are masked behind URL shortening services. Below is an example of a Twitter account spreading malware (Figure 7): Figure 6 – Malicious Accounts (screen capture from Twitter.com & Topsy.com) 14
  • 15. Figure 7 - Many Tweets in a few days (taken from Topsy.com) Recommendations:  Prior to installing any application, carry out a background check on the developer and the application, especially when downloading it from Android markets other than the official Google Play™.  When installing new apps to your Android device, always look at the permissions application requests to approve and make sure the list seems appropriate.  Only download apps from trusted application stores, sites and developers, and always check the app’s star rating, developer information and user reviews to make sure you know what you are downloading.  If you receive a Facebook invitation from a person you don’t know, don’t be tempted but treat it with suspicion.  Twitter background check prior to clicking on any link: o Usually bogus Twitter users do not have any followers. o Usually they do send lots of similar tweets in a short period of time (few days).  Set your Android device to download apps from Google Play only.  Keep your device protected by installing an anti-virus application such as AVG Mobilation™.  Discovered a spam account? Report it to Twitter10. Android™, Google® and Google Play™ are trademarks of Google, Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. Adobe® Flash® Player and Adobe® Reader are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated registered in the United States and in other countries. Facebook® is a trademark of Facebook, Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. Internet Explorer® and Windows® are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries. Java is a trademark or registered trademark of Oracle, Inc. in the United States and other countries. Twitter® is a trademark of Twitter Inc., registered in the United States and in other countries. WordPress™ is a trademark of the WordPress Foundation. 10 http://support.twitter.com/articles/64986-how-to-report-spam-on-twitter 15
  • 16. Other reports from AVG Technologies AVG and Ponemon Institute: ‘Smartphone Security - Survey of U.S. consumers’ – March 2011 http://aa-download.avg.com/filedir/other/Smartphone.pdf Anatomy of a major Blackhole attack – March 2011 http://www.avg.com/filedir/other/blackhole.pdf AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q1 2011 – April 2011 http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-129 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q2 2011 – June 2011 http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-1563 AVG and Future Laboratories: ’Cybercrime Futures’ – September 2011 http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-1953 AVG and GfK: ‘AVG SMB Market Landscape Report 2011’ – September 2011 http://download.avg.com/filedir/news/AVG_SMB_Market_Landscape_Report_2011.pdf AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q3 2011 – October 2011 http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-2323 AVG Community Powered Threat Report Q4 2011 – January 2012 http://www.avg.com/press-releases-news.ndi-3723 About AVG Technologies (NYSE: AVG) AVG’s mission is to simplify, optimize and secure the Internet experience, providing peace of mind to a connected world. AVG’s powerful yet easy-to-use software and online services put users in control of their Internet experience. By choosing AVG’s software and services, users become part of a trusted global community that benefits from inherent network effects, mutual protection and support. AVG has grown its user base to approximately 108 million active users as of December 31, 2011 and offers a product portfolio that targets the consumer and small business markets and includes Internet security, PC performance optimization, online backup, mobile security, identity protection and family safety software. www.avg.com 16