Vulnerability Assessment of Middleware Packages Supplied by EMI: VOMS Core Case
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This document describes a vulnerability assessment of the VOMS Core middleware package using a First Principles Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA) approach. The FPVA involves analyzing the VOMS Core architecture, resources, privileges, and components. No serious security vulnerabilities were found except for a potential denial of service issue. The VOMS Core design limits attacks through secure communication, privilege separation, and input validation. However, a lack of limits on simultaneous connections could enable a denial of service attack.
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Vulnerability Assessment of Middleware Packages Supplied by EMI: VOMS Core Case
- 1. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 EGI-InSPIRE www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Vulnerability Assessment of Middleware Packages Supplied by EMI: VOMS Core Case Manuel Brugnoli, Elisa Heymann UAB
- 2. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Outline • First Principles Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA) • VOMS Core • VOMS Core assessment using FPVA • Conclusions Contents
- 3. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 “Is a primarily analyst-centric (manual) approach to assessment, whose aim is to focus the analyst’s attention on the parts of the software system and its resources that are mostly likely to contain vulnerabilities that would provide access to high-value assets”* * James A. Kupsch, Barton P. Miller, Eduardo César, and Elisa Heymann, "First Principles Vulnerability Assessment" (extended version), MIST Project Technical Report, September 2009. First Principles Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA)
- 4. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Architecture Resources Privileges Components Dissemination to identify the major structural components of the system, including modules, threads, processes, and hosts.to identify the key resources accessed by each component, and the operations supported on those resources.identifies the trust assumptions about each component, answering such questions as how are they protected and who can access them? is to examine each component in depth. A key aspect is that this step is guided by information obtained in the first three steps, helping to prioritize the work so that highvalue targets are evaluated first. artifacts produced by this step are vulnerability reports, perhaps with suggested fixes, to be provided to the middleware developers. First Principles Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA)
- 5. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) serves as a central repository for user authorization information, providing support for sorting users into a general group hierarchy, keeping track of their roles, etc. VOMS Core is the server that receives requests from a VOMS client and returns information about the user. We worked with VOMS Core 2.0.2. VOMS Core assessment using FPVA
- 6. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 VOMS Server Host DB VOMS Admin (Tomcat) VOMS daemon User Host Web Browser VOMS Client VOMS Admin Client HTTPS SOAP over SSL Ancillary Utilities GSI Connection OS privileges user daemon root DB privileges VO_Server Command Line Command Line Web Command Line Step 1: VOMS 2.0.2 Architecture Analysis
- 7. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Step 1: VOMS Client-Server Interaction
- 8. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Step 2: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Resource Analysis
- 9. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Step 2: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Resource Analysis
- 10. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 Step 3: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Privilege Analysis
- 11. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Resource permissions: • Evaluated the permissions of files that have a high security value (certificate private keys, database and configuration files). • The permissions of these files appeared to be correct. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 12. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • User privileges: • Client side: • No privilege problems in the client commands. • Server side: • The voms daemon runs with root operating system privileges. • Evaluated the source code looking for flaws that may compromise the server. • No privilege problems were found. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 13. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Dangerous functions: • Evaluated the use of functions that commonly result in security problems, such as system or exec family functions. • No vulnerabilities related to dangerous functions were found. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 14. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Authentication Issues: • Mutual authentication is performed between the client and server. • VOMS design makes the system quite strong, and reduces many possible threats. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 15. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Network Layer Security: • VOMS server creates a secure communication channel via Globus GSI with the VOMS Clients. • The use of a encrypted channel provides strong end-to-end data encryption and integrity. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 16. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Injection Attacks: • Evaluated the source code to ensure VOMS correctly parses and checks the arguments passed through the command line. • Appropriate parsing is performed to protect against command injection vulnerabilities. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 17. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Buffer overflows: • VOMS Core is written in C/C++ → Checked for potential buffer overflow problems. • No dangerous behavior was detected. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 18. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 • Denial of Service Attacks: • A DoS vulnerability was discovered and reported to the VOMS developers. • This vulnerability is caused by lack of limits on the number of simultaneous connections. • Full details about this were reported in the vulnerability report VOMS-CORE-2011-0001. Step 4: VOMS Core 2.0.2 Component Analysis
- 19. www.egi.euEGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 ConclusionsConclusions No serious security problems in VOMS Core 2.0.2 was found: • The attack surface in VOMS Core is very small. • VOMS Core correctly parses and checks the arguments sent from the client. • The VOMS server uses a forking server model to handle all requests from VOMS clients. • The recommended operational configuration of a VOMS server node is a highly secured host with limited local user access and other services. • All communication between the VOMS server and VOMS clients is secure. • A DoS vulnerability was found.