1. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1
U.S. SECURITIESAND EXCHANGE 1
COMMISSION, 1
100 F. Street, NE 1
Washington, D.C. 20549
Plaintiff, Case: 1:08-cv-02167
Assigned To : Leon, Richard J.
V. Assign. Date : 1211212008
Description: General Civil
SIEMENSAKTIENGESELLSCHAFT J
Wittelsbacherplatz 2 1
D-80333Munich 1
Federal Republic of Germany 1
1
Defendant. 1
1
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission(the "Commission7'),alleges:
SUMMARY
1. Between March 12,2001 and September30,2007 (the "Relevant
Period"), SiemensAktiengesellschaft ("Siemens" or the "Company7')violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 115U.S.C. 5 78dd-11(the "FCPA") by engaging in a
widespread and systematicpractice of paying bribes to foreign government oEcials to
obtain business. Siemens created elaboratepayment schemesto conceal the nature of its
corruptpayments, and the Company's inadequate internal controlsallowed the illicit
conductto flourish. The misconduct involved employeesat all levels of the Company,
including former seniormanagement, and reveals a corporate culture that had long been
at odds with the FCPA.

2. 2. Duringthis period, Siemensmadethousands of separatepaymentsto third
parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of,the money.
At least4,283 ofthose payments, totaling approximately$1.4 billion, were used to bribe
governmentofficialsin return for business to Siemensaroundthe world. Amongthe
transactions on which Siemenspaid bribes were those to design and build metro transit
linesin Venezuela;metro trains and signalingdevicesin China;power plants in Israel;
high voltagetransmission lines in China; mobiletelephone networksin Bangladesh;
telecommunicationsprojects inNigeria; national identitycardsin Argentina;medical
devicesin Vietnam, China, and Russia;trafficcontrolsystemsin Russia; refineries in
Mexico; and mobile communicationsnetworks in Vietnam. Siemensalsopaid kickbacks
to Iraqi ministries in connectionwith salesof power stationsand equipmentto Iraq under
the UnitedNations Oil forFood Program. Siemensearned over $1.1 billion inprofits on
thesefourteencategoriesof transactionsthat comprised332 individualprojects or
individual sales.
3. InNovember 2006, Siemens' current management began to implement
reformsto the Company's internalcontrols. Thesereforms substantiallyreduced, but did'
not entirelyeliminate, corruptpayments. All but $27.5 million ofthe corruptpayments
occurredprior to November 15,2006.
4. Siemensviolated Section30A ofthe SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934
("Exchange Act7')[15U.S.C. 578dd-11by making illicitpaymentsto foreign
government officialsin orderto obtainor retain business. Siemensviolated Section
13(b)(2)(B)of the Exchange Act by failing to have an adequate internal control system in
place to detect andprevent the illicitpayments. Siemensviolated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of

3. the Exchange Act by improperlyrecording each of those payments in its accounting
books and records.
JURISDICTION
5. This Courthasjurisdiction overthis action under Sections21(d), 21(e),
and 27 of the Exchange Act 115U.S.C. $9 78u(d), 78u(e) and 78aaI. Siemens, directlyor
indirectly,made use of the means or instrumentalitiesof interstate commerce, of the
mails, or ofthe facilitiesof a national securitiesexchangein connectionwith the
transactions,acts, practices, and coursesof business alleged in this Complaint.
6. Venue is appropriateinthis Courtunder Section27 ofthe Exchange Act
[15 U.S.C. 5 78aaI or 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(d).
DEFENDANT
7. Siemensis a German corporation with its executiveoffices in Munich,
Federal Republicof Germany. Siemensis one of the world's largestmanufacturersof
industrialand consumer products. Siemensbuilds locomotives, traffic control systems
and electricalpower plants. The Companyalso manufacturesbuilding control systems,
medical equipmentand electrical components,and formerlymanufactured
communicationsnetworks. Siemensemploysapproximately428,200people and
operatesin approximately 190countriesworldwide. Siemensreported net revenue of
$116.5 billion and net incomeof $8.9 billion for its fiscal year ended September 30,
2008.
8. In accordancewith Germanlaw, Siemenshas a SupervisoryBoard and a
ManagingBoard. The SupervisoryBoard is generally comparableto the board of
directorsof a corporationin the United Statesin that it overseesmanagement but with

4. less oversightpower under G e m law. The Managing Board -or "Vorstand" -
generallyperformsthe dutiesand responsibilities of seniormanagement of a corporation
in the United Statesand includesthe Company's Chief ExecutiveOfficer ("CEO") and
Chief Financial Officer ("CFO").
9. Prior to a recent reorganization, Siemensoperated through a complex
array of business groups and regional companies. Thebusiness groupsare divisions
within Siemensand arenot separatelegal entities. Theregional companies arewholly-
or partly-owned subsidiariesof Siemens. Thethirteenprincipalbusiness groupsduring
the RelevantPeriod were: Communications("COM"), SiemensBusiness Services
("SBS"), Automationand Drives ("A&D9'), Industrial Solutionsand Services("I&S"),
SiemensBuildingTechnologies("SBT"), Power Generation("PG"),PowerTransmission
and Distribution("PTD), TransportationSystems("Tv, SiemensVDO Automotive
("SV"), Medical Solutions("MED"), Osram MiddleEast, SiemensFinancial Services
("SFS"), and SiemensReal Estate ("SRE"). In 2008, Siemensreorganizedthe groups
into three Sectors-Energy, Healthcareand Industry.
10. SinceMarch 12,2001, Siemens' American Depository Shareshave been
registeredwith the Commissionpursuantto Section 12(b)of the Exchange Act. [15
U.S.C. 5781(b)]. Siemens' American Depository Sharestrade ontheNew York Stock
Exchange ('WSE") under the symbol"SI."
FACTS
A. Background
11. Siemenstracesits originsto 1847and for over 160years has been one of
the most successfulconglomeratecompaniesin Germany. After World War 11, Siemens

5. had difficultycompetingfor business in many Western countries and responded by
seekingbusiness opportunitiesin certain less developed countrieswhere corrupt business
practices were common.
12. Duringthe pre-1999period, thefist period, bribery at Siemenswas
largely unregulated. German law did not prohibit foreign bribery and allowed tax
deductionsfor bribes paid in foreigncountries. Siemenswas not yet listed on theNYSE
and thereforewas not subjectto U.S. regulation. Undeterredby foreign lawsthat
prohibited bribery, Siemensput severalpaymentmechanismsin place, including the use
of cash and off-booksaccounts,to make payments as necessaryto win business.
13. ThetermNiitzlicheAufwendungen ("NAY')or ''useful expenditures" was a
commonlyused tax lawterm and was commonlylisted on Siemens' cost calculation
sheetsto denotepaymentsto third parties, includingillicitpaymentsto foreignofficials.
Though aslarule Siemensrequired two signatureson all major documentsin accordance
with an i n t e d controlknownas the "four-eyes" principle,many exceptionsto the rule
weremade to ensure quick accessto cashto make illicit payments.
14. Overtime, Siemensdevelopedanetwork of payment mechanisms
designed to funnelmoney throughthird parties in a way that obscuredthe purpose and
ultimate recipient of the funds. On at.least oneproject, bribesto high ranking
governmentofficialswerearrangedpersonallyby a member ofthe Vorstand.. The
successof Siemens' bribery systemwasmaintainedby lax internal controls over
corruptionrelated activities and an acceptanceof suchactivitiesby membersof senior
management and the compliance, internal audit, legal and financedepartments.

6. 1. NYSE Listing
15. From 1999to 2003, the secondperiod,theVorstand was ineffectivein
implementingcontrolsto addressconstraints imposed by Germany's 1999adoptionof
the OrganizationforEconomic Cooperationand Development ("OECD) anti-bribery
conventionthat outlawedforeignbribery. OnFebruary 15,1999,the very daythat
Germanyratified the OECD Convention,the then-CEO of Siemens"expressed his
concern at the number of criminal and other investigationsinto members of the
Company," furthernotingthat "[als the Board could possiblybe held responsiblefor
various offenses, it was importantto takeprotective measures." However,bribery
continuedfor years afterward.
16. The Vorstandwas also ineffectivein meeting the U.S. regulatory and anti-
bribery requirementsthat Siemenswas subjectto followingitsMarch 12,2001,listing on
theNYSE.
17. The changesin the legal landscapecaused by Germany's ratificationof
the QECD Conventionand Siemens' listing on theNYSE should have put an endto
bribery at Siemens. Unfortunately, they did not. Instead, a steady flowof improper
payments continuedto emanatefiom the Company, in largepart because of certain
actionsand inactionstaken by the Vorstand.
18. For instancein mid-2000, as Siemensprepared for itsNYSE listing, its
legal departmentforwardeda memorandum to the SupervisoryBoard Chairmanand CFO
identifying certainoff-books accounts. The memorandummade it clearthat Siemens'
accountshad to be maintained "in harmony with the principlesof orderly accounting.

7. Otherwisesanctionsare likelyunder criminal law." The Vorstand failedto act, and the
off-booksaccountscontinuedto exist even after Siemens"YSE listing:
19. In addition,the Vorstand failed to adoptmeaningll compliance measures,
failed to adequatelystaff Siemens' compliancefunction and, attimes, failed to adopt
reasonablerecommendationsdesignedto enhance complianceprocedures at the
Company. As illustrated herein, many of the improperpaymentsmade by Siemens
involved the use of business consultants and business consultingagreementsto funnel
illicitpaymentsto third parties, includinggovernment officials. In April 2000, the
Vorstand rejected a proposal by the Company's General Counselto create a Company-
wide list of business consultants and a committeeto reviewthese relationships. Although
Siemensissuedvariousprinciples and recommendationsregardingbusiness consultants,
Siemenshad no mandatoryand comprehensiveCompany-widerules inplace governing
the use of business consultants until Juneof 2005.
2. Red Flags (CommunicationsGrouv -Nigeria)
20. From 2003 to 2006, the thirdperiod, members of theVorstand failed to
respond appropriatelyto indicationsthat bribery was widespreadat Siemens. Red flags
that the Vorstand membersmissed or ignored included substantialcashpayments in
Nigeria by seniorlevel employeeswithinthe COMbusinessgroup. In the fall of 2003,
Siemens' outside auditor KPMG identified €4.12 million in cashthat was brought to
Nigeria by COMemployeesand flaggedthe paymentsforreview. A compliance
attorneyatthe Company conducteda one-day investigationofthe payments andwrotea
report indicatingthat COM employeesadmittedthat it was not an isolated event and
warned of numerous possibleviolations of law. Thoughthe compliancereport was

8. reviewed inNovember 2003 by Siemens' then-CFO, no disciplinaryaction was taken, no
furtherinvestigativework was conducted,and the report was not provided to or discussed
with the Vorstand as a whole or the Company's auditcommittee. COM employees
identified in thereport, includinga former COM manager, continuedto pay bribes
through a seriesof slush fundsuntil at least November 2006, when they were arrested
followinga raid of Siemens' offices (the"Dawn Raid") by criminal authoritiesin
Munich, Germany. Had seniormanagement responded differently,bribes paid by the
COM group could have been reduced or eliminated.
3. ,
Red Flags mower GenerationGrour,-Italv)
21. During the thirdperiod, the Vorstand alsofailedto respond appropriately
to multi-million dollar bribes paid in Italy by managersof the SiemensPG business
group. In July2003, the news media reported that prosecutorsin Milanwere
investigatingbribespaid to employeesof ENEL, an energy companypartly-ownedby the
Italian government, in connectionwith two power plant projects. SiemensPGmanagers
made approximately€6 million in corrupt paymentsto two ENEL officials. The corrupt
paymentswere routedthrough slushfunds in Liechtensteinusing a Dubai-based business
consultant.
22. In April 2004, ajudge in Milan issued a written opinion concludingthat
the evidence indicatedthat Siemensviewed bribery "at leastas a possible business
strategy." In or aroundMay 2004, a legalmemorandumconcerningthe rulingwas sent
to members of the Vorstand, includingthe then-CEO andthen-CFO ofthe Company.
Anothermemorandum,sentto membersof the Vorstand, includingthe then-CEO and the
then-CFO in April 2004, detailed severancepackagesthat had been givento the PG

9. managers and attacheda September2003 memorandumprepared by an American law
firm.Thelegal memorandum suggestedthat Siemensshould immediately review and
assureproper functioningof its FCPA complianceprogram, that the allegations and steps
taken to addressthem shouldbe reportedto the board, and that the employeesinvolved
should be disciplined.
23. Subsequently, Siemens,alongwith two of its PG managers, entered into a
plea bargainwith criminal authoritiesin Italypursuant to which Siemenspaid a €0.5
million fine, gaveup €6.2 million inprofits and was barred fiom sellinggas turbinesin
Italy for oneyear. Despitetheir criminalconduct,the two PG managers involvedinthe
ENELmatter received earlyretirementwith fullretirement benefits. The PG CFO
received a€1.8 million severancepackage from Siemenswhen he leftthe Companyas a
result of the ENELmatter. In a related criminalproceedingin Germany, the longtime
CFO of PG confessedto authorizingthebribes. Siemens' corporateresponse to bribery
assuredcertainemployeesthat they could expectto be taken careof if and when caught
paying bribes on behalf of the Company.
24. There were additional significantred flags of corruptionincluding
admissionsof bribery or so called"bonus payments" to governmentofficialsin March
2006 by a manager at SiemensGreeceof over€37 million, as well as anApril 2006
KPMG audit identificationof over 250 suspiciouspaymentsmade through an
intermediaryon behalf of Informationand Communication Mobile, a corporate
predecessorof COM, and SiemensS.p.A in Italy.

10. 4. Tone at the Top
25. The Vorstand's responseto the situationsinNigeria and Italy
demonstrated a tone at thetop of Siemensthat was inconsistentwith an effectiveFCPA
complianceprogram and createda corporateculturein which bribery was tolerated and
evenrewarded atthehighestlevelsof the company.
26. Siemensimplementedcertainimprovementsto its complianceprogram in
responseto the situationin Italy. These included an anti-briberyspeechdeliveredby the
then-CFOto high-levelbusiness managers in summer2004 and the establishmentof a
Corporate ComplianceOffice in October2004. In addition, the Companyissuedpolicies
overbank accounts,includingrequirementsrelatingto the initiation and use of Company
accountsand authorizationsregarding cash. However, it was not until oneyear later, in
June 2005, thatthe Companyissued mandatoryrules governingthe use of business
consultants,e.g. prohibiting success fees and requiring complianceofficersto sign off on
businessconsultingagreements. While thesemeasures appearto have been partially
effective,improper payments continuedat leastuntil the DawnRaid inNovember 2006.
27. Despitethe Vorstand's knowledgeof bribery at two of its largest groups-
COM and PG -the CorporateComplianceOffice continuedto have a conflictedmandate
and lacked resources. Therewas aninherentconflict inthe Corporate Compliance Office
mandate, which included both defendingthe Company, and preventingcompliance
breaches. TheCorporateComplianceOfficewas significantlyunderstaffed, with a part-
time ChiefCompliance Officer,and up to six fuil-time lawyersuntil 2007. Despite
knowledge of numerousinstancesof corruption in multiple areasofthe business,the
Company did not implementmandatory FCPA compliancetraining until 2007.

11. B. IllicitPaymentMechanismsUsed to Pay Bribes
28. Duringthe RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade thousands ofpaymentsto third
parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and ultimate recipient of, the money. The
principalpaymentmechanismsused to facilitateillicit were business
consultants,payment intermediaries,slushfunds, cash, and intercompanyaccounts.
29. Throughits use of business consultants and payment intermediaries,
Siemensfunneledmore than $982.7 million to thirdparties, including government
officials. All but $27.5 million ofthe paymentsweremadeprior to November 15,2006.
Businessconsultantswere typicallyhired pursmt to business consultantagreements,
contractsthat on their face obligated Siemensto pay for legitimate consultingservices.
In reality, many business consultantagreementswere shamsin that the business
consultantsperformedno servicesbeyond funnelingbribes. PG had specificinstructions
on how to use a "confidential payment systemyyto conceal paymentsto business
consultants. Payment intermediarieswere additionalentitiesand individualsthrough
which Siemensfunneledbribes. Inmany cases, Siemenswould pay the intermediaryan
amount and simultaneouslydirect that the money be transferredto a third-party bank
account, less a smallportion asthe intermediary's fee.
30. Siemensalsofunneledmore than $211million through slush fundsfor use
as bribes. All but $2.3 million of the piiymentswere made prior to September30,2004.
Slushfundswere bank accountsheld inthe name of currentor formersenior Siemens
employees,third parties, or affiliated entities. The most notable slush funds were
maintained by a former COM manager recently convictedin Germanyfor his role in the

12. payment of bribesto foreign officials, which included several slushfunds held inthe
name of U.S. shell companies.
31. . Siemensalsoused cash and cash equivalentsto h e 1more than $160.4
million to thirdparties. All but $9.2 million ofthe payments weremade prior to
September30,2004. SiemensCOM employeesused cash desksmaintainedby the
SiemensReal Estate Groupto obtain large amountsof cashto pay bribes. Often,
employeeswould obtainhundredsofthousandsof dollarsand, at times, even $1million
in various currenciesfiom the cash desks in Germany. Thecash was transported,
sometimesin suitcases,acrossinternationalborders intovarious countries. At times, the
cashwas then storedin safesmaintainedby Siemensemployeesto ensureready accessto
cashto pay bribes.
32. Lastly, Siemensused various types of internalaccountsto funnel more
than $16.2 millionto third parties. Approximately99% of thepayments were made prior
to September 30,2005. An intercompany account is a type of Siemens7internal account
that is used to makepaymentsontransactionsbetweentwo Siemensentities, i.e., for
entity to entity business. Siemensused the intercompanyaccountsto make third party
payments and in a number of instances, Siemensmaintainedthe accountsin thenames of
unconsolidatedentities aroundthe globe, including Ecuador andNicaragua, in orderto
avoid detection. Someofthe intercompany accountsmaintainedat unconsolidated
entitieswere known to, andpossibly createdby, a formermember ofthe Vorstand, who
had oversightresponsibilityfor LatinAmerica.
33. As earlyas 2004, a SiemensCorporateFinanceFinancial Audit employee
raised concernsaboutthe use of intercompany accounts. He was phased out of hisjob

13. and assigned to work on "special projects" fkom his home until leavingthe Company in
2005. Siemensthereafter began closingsome of the accountsand eventuallyclosed all of
them.
34. Another type of internal accountthat employeesabused was Siemens
MED internal commissionaccounts. These balance-sheet accountswere intendedto be
used to record commissionsMED earned on transactionswith other Siemensentities.
Theseaccountswere used to make third party payments. Many of the intercompany
accountpaymentsandthe MED internal commissionaccountpaymentswere done
manually to bypass Siemens' automatedpayment system. Themanual payments,
executedthrough SFS, did not require the submissionof documentationin supportof a
payment.
35. Siemensuied a host ofother schemesto make more than $25.3 million in
paymentsto third parties. In particular, Siemensused sham supplieragreements,
receivablesand otherwrite-offsto generatepayments.
C. Breakdown of Third Partv Pavments
36. Duringthe RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade 4,283 separatepayments
totaling approximately$1-4billion to bribe governmentofficials in foreign countries
throughoutthe world. An additionalapproximately 1,185separatepaymentsto third
parties totaling approximately$39lmillionwere not properly controlledand were used, at
least inpart, for illicitpurposes, includingcommercialbribery and embezzlement. The
followingchartbreaksdownthe $1-4billion in illicit payments to foreign government
officialsby business group.
. .

14. D. Bribery of Government Officials
37. The followingparagraphsprovide examplesof bribery schemesinvolving
projects and individual salescarried out by Siemensusing U.S. means duringthe
Relevant Period with profits,of over $1.1 billion.
1. Metro TransitLines in Venezuela
38. Between 2001 and 2007, SiemensTS and SiemensS.A., a regional
companyin Venezuela, paid an estimated$16.7 million in bribesto Venezuelan
governmentofficials in connectionwiththe constructionof metro transit systemsin the
'citiesof Valencia and Maracaibo, Venezuela. Thetwo projects, Metro Valencia and
Metro Maracaibo, generated approximately$642 million in revenue to Siemens. The
Metro Valenciaproject was awarded to a TS entityin the United Statesand later
transferred to Siemens, and the Metro Maracaibo project was awardedto Siemensand

15. part of the work was assignedto the U.S. TS entity. Each of the contractswas financed
in part by the U.S. Export-Import Bank in Washington,D.C. The corrupt paymentswere
made using fourseparate, overlappingpayment schemes.
39. Underthe first scheme, Siemensmaintaineda numbered, off-booksbank
account in Panama and eithermaintained a similar accountin Miami or had contactsto a
banker in Miami who had accessto suchaccounts. Theseaccountswere controlledby
two CEOsandtwo CFOs of Siemens' regional subsidiaryin Venezuela. One ofthe
regional CFOs estimatedthat between 2001 and 2003 hepaid $5 to $6millionper year
out of the accounts, a portion of which went to governmentofficialsin supportof the
Venezuelanprojects. Theregional CFOperiodically destroyedthe account statements.
40. Under the second scheme, Siemenspaid over $6.8millionto fourU.S.-
based entitiescontrolledby a longtime Siemensbusiness consultant. Siemenscalled
upon the consultant,known as a political "fixer" in Venezuelaand who had been an
advisorto formerVenezuelanpresidents,to ensurepolitical supportfor the Maracaibo
and Valenciaprojects and for Siemens' role in them. Siemensmade paymentsinto the
U.S. bank accountsofthe fourcontrolledentitiespursuant to shamconsultingagreements
in returnfor no legitimate work. Bank records reveal paymentsto Venezuelan
govemmentofficialsandpolitically-connectedindividuals, includinga high-ranking
member ofthe central government, two prominentVenezuelanattorneysactingon behalf
of government officials, a formerVenezuelandefense minister and diplomat, and a
relative of a local politician, all of whom had influence overthese and other Siemens
contractsin Venezuela. Siemenstransferred an additional $4.9 millionto one of the

16. controlled entitiesbetween 2006 and 2007 by artificiallyinflatingthe terms of a contract
with a U.S. engineering firm.
41. Under thethird scheme, Siemensused a Cyprus-based business consultant
as an intermediaryto fundup to $2.5 million in bribe payments on the Valencia project.
Shamagreementswere enteredinto with the business consultantthat purported to be for
other Siemensprojects, but were actually designed to transfermoney to Valencia. This
payment schemewas authorized by a former CFO of the Turnkey Division within the TS
group at Siemens.
42. Under the fourth scheme, Siemensin 2002and 2003 entered into a sham
agreementwith a Dubai-based business consultantto supplyMetro Maracaibo with
approximately$2.6millionin workshop equipment. The equipmentwas actually
suppliedby another supplier, andthe business consultantdid not supplyany goodsunder
the contract. Afterthebusiness consultantcame under suspicionas a result of its
involvementin the investigationof possiblebribespaid to ENEL managers in Italy, the
CFO of Siemens' TurnkeyDivision's successorwas orderedto terminatethe contract.
Instead, the new CFO arrangedthe assignment of the contractto anotherDubai-based
business consultantthat continuedthe shamworkshop equipment arrangement.
2. MetroTrains and Simaling:Devicesin China
43. Between2002 and 2007, SiemensTSpaid approximately$22million to
business consultantswho used someportion ofthose funds to bribe foreign officialsin
connectionwith sevenprojects forthe constructionof metro trains and signalingdevices
on behalf of governmentcustomersin China. The total value of the projectswas over $1
billion. After experiencingdifficultybreaking into the modern Chinesemarket, Siemens

17. began using a Hong-Kong based business consultant and related entitiesto pay bribes to
influencethe award of contractsto Siemens. Siemenstypicallyhired the business
consultantbased on an oral agreementto pay a successfee equalto a percentage of the
project value and would enter into a written business consultingagreementafterthe
governmentcontractwas awardedto Siemens. In connectionwith one Shanghaiproject,
fourwholly-owned subsidiariesof the Hong Kong business consultantsubmittedinvoices
totaling $11.7 million to Siemensand requestedpayment routed through a U.S.
correspondentbank andthento various Swissaccounti The illicitarrangementwas
enteredinto by a Sales& Marketingmanager, who later became a Vice President of
SiemensTS in Chinawith the knowledgeand approvalof his supervisors. Therewere
few, if any, legitimate servicesprovided by the business consultant;backdated
agreementsand phony work product were used to supportat least some of thepayments.
E-mails relating to a varietyof projects indicatethat the businessconsultantwas
funnelingmoneyto governmentofficialsand "friends"with inside informationand
influenceover governmentcontractingdecisions.
3. Power Plants in Israel
44. Between 2002 and 2005, SiemensPG paid approximately $20 million in
bribesto aformer Director of the state-ownedIsraelElectricCompany ("IEC"). The
bribeswere paid in connectionwith fourcontractsto build and servicepowerplants in
Israel. The total value of the contracts was approximately$786 million: Siemensrouted
the corruptpaymentsthrough a business consultant owned andmanaged by the brother
in-law of the CEOofSiemensIsrael Limited, a regional subsidiary. Thebusiness
consultantwas ostensiblypaid to "identify and defrne salesopportunities, providemarket

18. intelligence," and support contractnegotiations. In reality, the business consultant was a
Hong Kong-based clothingcompany with no expertisein the power generationindustry.
Thebusiness consultantneverprovided the services called for under its business
consultant agreement.
45. Someofthe money paid to the business consultantwas traced to the
formerIEC Director,who was in aposition to influencethe award of the contractswon
by Siemens. A portion ofthe funds passed through U.S. bank accounts.
4. Hieh -VoltaeeTransmissionLines in China
46. Between 2002 and 2003, SiemensPTD paid approximately$25million in
bribes to govenunentcustomersin connectionwithtwo forthe installationof
high voltagetransmission lines in SouthChina.. Thetotal value ofthe projects was
approximately$838million. The paymentswere funneledthroughmultiple
intermediaries,includinga Dubai-based business consultingfirm controlled by,aformer
SiemensPTD employeeand then paid to severalentities associatedwith a Chinese
business consultantwho held a U.S passport and maintained a U.S. residence. Payments
to the Dubai-based business consultantwere supported by phony distribution contracts.
Seniormanagement of PTD in Germany approvedthe paymentswith the understanding
thattheywould be sharedwith "partners" in China, includinggovernmentofficials. In
2002, Siemensused U.S. banks to funnel $1.2 million in bribesto anotherbusiness
consultantwhose principal shareholdersheld U.S. passports. That business consultant
also enteredinto a shambusiness consultantagreementwith Siemensunder which no
legitimateserviceswereprovided.

19. 5. MobileTelephone Servicesin Bangladesh
47. Between 2004 and 2006, SiemensCOM paid approximately$5.3 million
in bribesto government officials in Bangladeshin connectionwith a contractwith the
Bangladesh Telegraph& Telephone Board ("BT'TB) to install mobiletelephone
services. The.total value of the contractwas approximately$40.9 million. Thepayments
'weremade to three businessconsultantspursuant to sham agreementscallingfor services
associatedwith the mobiletelephoneproject. The ultimate recipients of the payments
includedthe son of the then-PrimeMinister in Bangladesh, the Minister of the Ministry
of Posts & Telecommunicationsin Bangladesh, and the BTTB Director of Procurement.
In addition, SiemensLimited Bangladesh, a regional company, hired relatives.of two
otherBTTB and Ministryof Post and Telecomofficials. Most of the money paid to the
business consultantswaS routed through correspondentaccountsin the United States,
with at least onepayment originating&oma U.S. account. Since approximately
September2004, a Siemensbusiness consultantwho served as a principal payment
intermediaryon the Bangladesh bribe paymentshasbeen resident inthe United States.
At least $1.7 million of the bribe paymentsmade throughthis intermediarywere paid into
a Hong Kongbank accountwhilethe intermediarywas residing inthe United States.
48. Theinvolvementof seniorofficialsat Siemens' regional companyin
Bangladesh, including a formerCEOand the directorofthe regional company's COM
division, in the bribery schemeis revealedboth in statementsby the officialsand in
internal emailmessages, severalof which includethe tagline, "kindly deletethis mail
oncethe purpose is done."

20. 6. Four TelecommunicationsProiectsin Nigeria
49. SiemensCOMmade approximately$12.7 million in suspiciouspayments
in connectionwith Nigerianprojects, with at least $4.5 millionpaid as bribes in
connectionwith fourtelecommunicationsprojects with governmentcustomersin Nigeria,
includingNigeria TelecommunicationsLimited and the Ministryof Communications.
Thetotal value of the four contractswas approximately$130million. Thepractice of
paying bribesby SiemensCOMinNigeria was long-standingand systematic. According
to a highranking official within SiemensLimitedNigeria, a regional company, corrupt
payments in 2000 and 2001 commonlyreached 15to 30% of the contracts' value. Bribe
payments weretypically documentedusing fictitiousbusiness consultantagreements
under which no actual serviceswereperformed. The CEO of SiemensLimitedNigeria
forwardedrequests for "commission" paymentsto Siemensheadquartersin Germany.
The illicitpayments were then made through a number of means, frequentlyincluding
largecashwithdrawalsfrom cash desksthat were then hand-carried in suitcasesto
Nigeria.
50. In the fourtelecommunicationsprojects, approximately$2.8 million ofthe
bribepaymentswas routed through a bank account in Potomac, Maryland, in the,pameof
the wife of a formerNigerian Vice President. TheVice President's wife, a dualU.S.-
Nigeriancitizenlivingin the United States, served asthe representativeof a business
consultantthat enteredinto fictitiousbusiness consultantagreementsto perform "supply,
installation, and commissioning" servicesbut did no actual work for Siemens. The
purpose ofthesepaymentswas to bribe government officials. Other compt payments
includedthe purchase of approximately$172,000 in watchesforNigerian officials

21. designated in internal Siemensrecords as "P." and "V.P.," likely referringto the
Presidentand Vice-PresidentofNigeria.
7. Identitv card Proiectin Argentina
51. Between 1998and 2004, Siemenspaid over $40million in bribes to senior
officialsof the governmentof Argentinain an effortto securea $1billion project to
produce national identity cards. Siemensofficialsbetween 1998and 1999,includingthe
then-CEO of Siemensregional company in Argentina, SiemensS.A., caused $19million
to be paid to business consultantsforbribes. At least $2.6 million was transferred from
the business consultants' accountsdirectlyto the Presidentof Argentina,the Minister of
the Interior, and the Head of ImmigrationControlto obtainthe contract. Duringthis
period, Siemensofficialspromised to pay an additional $30million or moreto the
Presidentand his Cabinetministers. In late 1999,the Argentine President ended his term
whenhis party was voted out of office, and the new administrationthreatenedto
terminatethe contract on the ground that it had beenprocured by fiaud. In an effortto
head off that possibility, Siemenspaid $6 million in additionalbribesto officialsin the
new Argentineadministration. Despitethese payments, the contractwas nonetheless
canceled in May 2001.
52. Overthe followingfouryears, Siemensofficialsreceived a seriesof
payment demandsand threats against its employeesin Argentina if it did not fulfill its
past commitmentto pay additionalbribes. Between 2002 and 2004, Siemenspaid over
$23million to settlethese demands. The Siemensofficials involved in authorizingthe
payments included a member of the Vorstand,who in 2003personallyflewto the United
Statesto meet with Siemens' principal intermediaryto negotiatethe payment terms, as

22. well asthe CEO and CFO of Siemens' regional company in Argentina. Approximately
$9.5 million of thesepaymentswere routed through the books of an unrelated PTD
transmissionproject in China in an effortto conceal the paymentsfiom Siemens' internal
auditors. other were made through^.^. bank accountsbased on fictitious
invoicesfor non-existent past servicesin connectionwith the identity cardproject and
otherprojects inthe region, includingpaymentsto a former governmentMinister and
member ofthe ArgentineCongress.
8. Medical Devices in Vietnam
53. SiemensMED paid $183,000 in early 2005 and $200,000 in early 2006 in
connectionwiththe saleof approximately$6million of medical devicesontwo projects
involvingthe VietnameseMinistryof Health. After learningthat bribe paymentswere
required in Vietnam, SiemensMED soughtthe name of the business consultantentrusted
by SiemensTS to conductbusinessin that market, includingmakingits bribepayments.
SiemensMED then enteredinto an agreementwith an affiliate of the group of Hong-
Kongbased business consultantsused by SiemensTS to act as SiemensMEDYspayment
intermediary. Thepaymentswere routedthrough a U.S. correspondentbank and then to
Singaporebank accountsof t h e ' ~ o n ~on^ business consultant. The amountswere then
withdrawn iricash and transportedto Vietnam. Project calculation sheets connectedto
the salesdesdribethe paymentsto the intermediaryas relatingto "room preparation." A
number of Siemensseniormanagers, includingthe then-CFO of Siemens7business in
Vietnam, admittedthat the purpose ofthe paymentswasto bribe governmentofficials.
54. With regard to the $183,000paymentthat wasmade in early 2005, the
former CFO of SiemensLimited Vietnam ("SLV") describedhow he and the then CEO

23. of Siemens SLVpicked up an envelope with $183,000 cash at a hotel in Singapore "fi-om
a Hong Kong business man" and flew to the Hanoi airport where the money was left with
the then-head of Siemens MED in Vietnam, who had primary responsibility for contract
negotiationswith officialsat the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.
9. Medical Devices in China
55. Between 2003 and 2007, SiemensMED paid approximately $14.4 million
in bribes to the same intermediary described above in connectionwith $295 million in
sales of medical equipment to five Chinese-ownedhospitals, as well as to fund lavish
trips for Chinese doctors. The formercontroller of Siemensoversawthe business
relationship between Siemens and the affiliateof the Hong-Kong-basedintermediarythat
it used to pay the bribes. A majority of the sales on which the intermediary received a
payment involved a bribe to a government official. The same intermediarywas used by
SiemensTS to pay bribes in China and by Siemens MED to pay bribes in Vietnam.
56. For example, Siemenspaid $64,800 in May 2006 in connectionwith the
sale of a $1.5 million MRI system to the SongyuanCity Central Hospital in China. The
payment was sentto a U.S. bank account, and later routed to a Singaporebank account in
the name of the intermediary. A project calculation sheet signed by the then-CFO of
SiemensMED China describedthe payment as relating to "expenses (commission)";
however, no serviceswere provided by the intermediary aside from acting as a vehicle
for the transfer of bribe payments. In or around March 2008, SongyuanHospital's
deputy director and head of the radiology departmentwas convictedin China of
corruptioncharges, including a charge for accepting a $60,000bribe from a

24. Siemenssalespersonin connectionwith the sale ofthe MRI system and sentencedto
fourteenyears inprison.
57. Siemensalsoused the Hong Kong intermediaryto pay $9 million in travel
costs for "study trips" Men by doctorswho worked at government-ownedhospitals in
China. The studytrips, which included lavishtripsto Las Vegas, Miami, and other
vacation spotsinthe United States,were connectedto at least 231separatesalesto
hospitalsawardedto Siemenswith revenueof approximately$235million. Theformer
CFO of SiemensMED in Chinausedthe intermediaryto pay for studytrips because of
. concernsaboutthe lavishness and "non-scientific content" of thetrips, which were taken
by doctorswho were in a positionto awardbusinessto Siemens.
58. Bribes were alsopaid to securesalesofmedical equipmentto hospitals in
Chinaon behalf oftwo SiemensU.S.-based subsidiaries,Oncology Care Solutions
("OCS") in Californiaand MolecularImaging("MI") in Illinois. For OCS, Siemens
developed a schemeto minimizethe risk of anti-briberyprosecution in the United States
forthese transactions by routing the approvalof business consultingagreementsand the
paymentof business consultantsthrough Siemens' headquartersin Germanyrather than
intheUnited States. Between 1998and 2004, this schemewas usedto approveimproper
paymentsof approximately$650,000 to Chinesebusiness consultantsin connectionwith
the U.S.-related sales. A seniormanagerat SiemensMED in Germany and officialsof
the U.S.-based subsidiaries, includingthe CFOsof OCS and MI were aware of the
businessconsultantpayments and facilitatedthe schemeby verifyingthe amountsto be
paid and thatthepayments were due and owing. At onepoint afterapprovingtwenty-six
suchpayments, the seniormanager at SiemensMED refbsedto continuethepayment

25. scheme, citingconcern forthe welfare of his family if he were sentto prison. The CFO .
of MED attemptedto pressurethe seniormanagerto keepthe payment scheme going, but
without success.
59. In 2005, theseofficialsalso verified that "clean up" paymentstotaling
over $500,000 were owedto Siemens' Hong Kong-based intermediaryin connection with
salesby OCS and MI in China. The outstandingpayments were forbribes owedto third
parties on behalf of Siemens. After receivingconfiation from OCS and MIthat the
paymentswere outstanding, the formercontrollerof SiemensMed authorizedthree
"clean up" payments in 2005for $377,400, $140,000 and $44,000.
10. TrafficControl Svstem in Russia
60. From 2004 to 2006, SiemensI&S and 000 Siemens, a regional company
in Russia, paid approximately$741,419in bribesto governmentofficialsin connection
with a WorldBank-funded project forthe designand installationof a $27milliontraffic
control systemin Moscow cged the MoscowThird Ring Project. First, Siemenspaid
money to its business consultantwho simultaneouslyworked as a technicalconsultantfor
the MoscowProjectImplementationUnit (the "MPIU"), a quasi-governmentalunit that
ran the MoscowThirdRingproject. The MPIU hired the technical consultantat
Siemens' suggestion. From 2004 to 2006, Siemenspaid approximately $313,000to three
entitiesassociatedwiththetechnicalconsultant, with at least $141,419 of the payment in
exchangefor favorabletreatment in thetenderingprocess. Thetechnical consultantused
his position at the MPIU to createtender specificationsfavorableto Siemens,to provide
tender documentsto Siemensbefore their officialpublication, to evaluate projectbids in

26. a waythat ensured Siemenswould win the contract, and to assistduringthe
implementation phase of the project.
61. Second, Siemenscolludedwith a competitorwho agreed to inflate its
project bid to ensure Siemenswon the project. In return, Siemenshired the competitorat
an inflatedrate of approximately$800,000. Siemensalso hired two of the competitor's
former consortiummembers to become subcontractorsto Siemenson the project
("Subcontractor A and SubcontractorB ) . Siemenspaid SubcontractorA approximately
$1.3 million for a shamtrafficstudy and approximately$1.4 millionto SubcontractorB
for otheralleged services. In fact, both subcontractorswere used to funnel at least
$600,000 of the $741,419 describedin paragraph 60 to seniorofficials of the MPN.
11. RefinervModernizationProiectin Mexico
62. In late2004, SiemensPG and SiemensS.A. de CV, a regional entity,
madethree separate.illicitpayments totaling approximately$2.6 million to a politically-
connectedbusiness consultantto assistin settlingcostoverrun claims in connectionwith
three refmery modernizationprojects in Mexico. Someportion ofthese payments were
routed through the business consultantto a senior official of the Mexican state-owned
petroleum company,PetroleosMexicanos(Ternex"). The official was in a positionto
influencetbe settlement. Thepaymentswere made withthe knowledge and approval of
the then-CEO of Siemens' regional company in Mexico. Thepaymentsw& supported .
by invoicesreflecting consultingservicesthat were not provided or only vaguely
described. A portion of Siemens' work on the contractswas performed by aregional
subsidiary in Atlanta, and someof the contractfinancing was providedby theU.S.
Export-ImportBank in Washington, DC.

27. 12. Medical Devices in Russia
63. Between 2000 and 2007, SiemensMED made improperpayments of over
$55millionto a Dubai-based business consultant in connectionwith sales ofmedical
equipmentinRussia. Thebusiness consuItant was used as a payment intermediaryfor
bribesto government-owned customersin Russia. The former CFO of SiemensMED
knew of and approved the payments. Senior Siemensofficials estimatedthat up to 80%
of Siemens' MED business in Russia involvedillicitpayments. On one suchtransaction
in 2006, siemensmade payments of approximately$287,914, some of which was used
forbribes, in connectionwith the $2.5million saleof a computertomograph systemto a
public hospital in Ekaterinburg. On this contract,the bribes wereroutedthrough the
Dubai-based business consultant, aswell as a secondbusiness consultantthat was
registeredin Des Moines, Iowa.
13. GSMMobileNetwork Servicesin Vietnam
64. In 2002, SiemensCOMpaid approximately$140,000in bribes in
connectionwith a tender worth approximately$35million forthe supplyof equipment
and servicesrelated to a Global Systemsmobilenetwork for Vietel, a government owned
telecommunications provider foundedby the VietnameseMinistryof Defense. Two
separatepaymentstotaling $140,000 weremade tothe Singaporeaccountof a Siemens
businessconsultant. Thepaymentswerethenrouted through a U.S. correspondent
account and likelypaid to officialsat the VietnameseMinistryof Defense. Thepayments
were part of a much largerbribery scheme concocted by high-levelmanagersat Siemens
regional companyin Vietnam, SLV,to pay bribes to government officialsat Vietel and
the VietnameseMinistry of Defensein orderto acquirePhaseI ofthe Vietel GSM tender.

28. In a June 2002, facsimilethat discussedthe bribery scheme, the formerhead of COM
sales for the regional company described Siemens' explicitagreementto pay 8%of the
value of the Vietel projectto officials at the Ministry of Defense and 14%ofthe project
value to officials at Vietel. In August and September2002, Siemenssigned agreements
with two business consultantswho were retained for the solepurpose of funnelingthe
bribesto governmentofficialsconnected to Vietel. Ultimately, Siemenswas
unsuccessfulin its pursuit of theVietel project and lostthe tender beforepaying
additionalbribes.
E. The Oil for Food Program
65. The Oil for Food Program was intendedto provide humanitarianrelief for
the Iraqipopulation, which faced severehardship under the internationaltrade sanctions
that followedIraq's 1990invasionof Kuwait. TheProgram permittedthe Iraqi
governmentto sell its crude oil and usetheproceeds to purchase food, medicine, and
critical idiastructure supplies. Theproceeds ofthe oil sales were transferred directly
fiomthe buyers to an escrowaccount(the"U.N. EscrowAccount") maintained inNew
York by the UnitedNations 661 Committee. Funds inthe U.N. EscrowAccountwere
availableforthe purchase of humanitarian supplies, subjectto U.N. approvaland
supervision. The intent ofthis structurewasto preventthe proceeds of Iraq's crude oil
salesfiomunderminingthe sanctionsregimeby supplyingcashto SaddamHussein.
66. Corruptionwas rampantwithinthe Program. By mid-2000, Iraqi
ministrieson the instructionoftop government officialsinstituted apolicy requiring
suppliersof humanitariangoodsto pay a ten percent kickback on each contract. This
kickback requirementwas euphemisticallyreferred to as an "after-sales service" fee

29. ("ASSF"); however, lio serviceswere provided. Supplierscompetingto obtain contracts
underthe Program were encouragedto include a ten percent markup in their bids or
purchase orders. The inflatedcontractprices were incorporated into the Oil for Food
contractsas a way to permitthe suppliersto recover fiomthe U.N. Escrow Accountthe
kickbackpaymentsthey had paid secretlyto Iraq. Following the 2004 release of a report
by the U.S. General AccountingOfficeexposingsomeofthe abuses,the U.N.
commissionedan independentinquiry committee, headed by former FederalReserve
ChairmanPaul Volcker (the "Volcker Committee"), to investigatethe Program's
performance. That committee's October 27,2005, final report estimatedthatthe Iraqi
governmenthad diverted $1-7billion in illicit incomefiom the Program.
1. Siemens' Involvementin the Oil for Food Program
67. Siemensparticipated inthe Programthroughtwo of its regional
companies, SiemensS.A.S. ("Siemens France") and Siemens Sanayive TicaretA.S.
("Siemens Turkey") andtwo subsidiaries,Osram Middle East FZE ("Osram ME") and
GasTurbine Technologies SpA("GT). In total, 42 Oil for Food contractswere entered
into, and secretkickback paymentsof approximately $1.7 millionwere madeto Iraqi
controlled accountsin orderto avoid detectionby the U.N. Total revenueson the
contractswere over $124millionwith profitsof approximately $38,226,537. The
paymentswere characterized as after salesservicefees; however,no serviceswere
actually rendered. The ASSFs were effectivelybribespaid to the Iraqi regime, which
Siemensimproperlydisguised on its books andrecords by rnischaracterizingthe bribes as
legitimate commissions.

30. 2. SiemensFrance
68. From approximatelySeptember2000to July 2001, SiemensFrance
enteredintotwelvecontracts coveringpower stationrenovation, servicingand spareparts
with the Iraqi Ministryof Electricity and paid illicitASSFs of approximately$321,745.
The contractswere artificially inflated by 10%and then submittedto the U.N. for
payment. The U.N. was not informedthat the contractshad been inflated orthat Siemens
France intendedto pay illicit kickbacksto Iraq.
69. For instance, in July2000 Siemenssubmitteda bid forthe rehbishment
of cranes at the DauraPower Stationin Iraq. The purchase order was subsequently
signed inNovember 2000, and included a 10%increase in the contractvalue. Shortly
thereafter, in January2001, Siemenssigned a Supplementto its business consultant
agreementwith its local agent in Iraq providing for a 10%commissionto the agent for
"after sales servicesand activities." Thedocumentwas unusual becauseit provided a
. .
higher agent compensationthanwas usually provided on such contracts; it was
"inconsistent with Siemens' practice" which required specificationand pricing of any
true after salesservices; and becausethere was only one Siemenssignatoryonthe
contract. In various lettersand memoranda, oneformer Siemenssalesman documented
discussionsthat he had with Iraqi officialsregardingthe requirementof ASSFs. In a
memorandumwritten by another Siemensemployeediscussinghow to makethe ASSF
payments, the employeestatedthat Siemens' agent in Iraq told himthat another Siemens
subsidiary, SiemensTurkey, had chosento pay ASSFs in cash "so that no names appear
onpaper."

31. 70. SiemensFranceused a local agent in Iraqto deposit the ASSF payments
in cash into a Jordanianbank accountheld by two Iraqi officials, which were later
transferredto an account controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. The local agent
confirmedthe bank depositswere made on behalf of Siemensand bank records reflect the
payments. Whenmakingthe ASSF payments, the local agentused the name of an
acquaintancewho did not work for Siemenssoasto concealhis true identity.
3. SiemensTurkev
71. From approximatelySeptember 2000to June 2002, SiemensTurkey
enteredintotwenty contracts relatingto the building and rehabilitation ofpower stations,
andpaid after salesservicefeestotaling approximately$1,243,119. Many aspects of
SiemensTurkey's involvementinthe Oil for Food Program were similarto those of
SiemensFrance. Both companiesused the samelocal agent in Iraq and both dealt
principallywith the Ministry of Electricity intheirpaymentof illicitASSFs. As
described above, a Siemensemployeestated'thatthe agent informedhim that Siemens
Turkeywas payingASSFsin cash "so that no names appearonpaper." Siemens' local
agent alsodeposited someASSFs into a Jordanianbank accountcontrolledby Iraqi
officials.
4. OsramMiddleEast
72. From approximatelyMay 2000 to June2002, Osram MiddleEast
("Osram"), a Siemenssubsidiary, enteredinto six contractswithstatecompanieswithin
the Ministryof Oil, and paid ASSFs of approximately $89,250 forthe sale of lighting
equipment. Osram employeesadmittedthat Siemens' local agentrelayedthe Ministry of
Oil's demand for ASSFs sometimein late2000. On three of the contracts, Osram entered

32. into secretsideagreementsagreeingto pay a 10%kickback to the Iraqi ministry. The
local agent signed each of the sideletterson Osram's behalf. The contracts between
Osram and the Ministry of Oil typically contained a 10%markup for ASSFs. The
inflated contractswere submittedto the U.N. for approval,but the U.N. was not informed
that the contractswere inflated andthe side letterswere not disclosed. Theagent
admitted that he made the ASSF paymentsto Jordanian bank accountsheld forthe
benefit ofthe IraqiMinistryof Oil on Osram's behalf.
5- -GTT
73. Beginning in 2001, GTT entered into four contractswith the Ministryof
Electricityin which ASSFs of $81,962 were paid. For eachcontract, the value of the
contractwas increased by approximately 10%betweenthe submissionof the initial bid
and the signingofthe purchase order. GTT employeesadmitto the ASSF kickback
scheme, and documentsreflectthat GTT's agent in Iraq informed GITthat ASSF
payments were a conditionto obtainingcontracts. Though all of the contractswere
signed before 2003, none were performed before the start ofthe Iraqi war. After the war
began, the U.N asked GTTto amend each contractto decreaseits value by the 10%
ASSF.
P. SiemensEm~IovedU.S. Means to Engagein Bribery
74. Intotal, Siemensmade bribe payments directly or indirectlyto foreign
govemmentofficialsin connectionwith at least290projects or individual salesinvolving
business in Venezuela, China, Israel, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Argentina, Vietnam, Russia,
and Mexico that employed the mails and othermeans and instnunentalitiesof U.S.
interstate commerce. The corrupt paymentswere made to governmentofficialsortheir

33. designees for the purpose of obtaining or retainingbusiness in connectionto the above
projects. The use of interstatecommercein connectionwith bribery includedinvolving
U.S.-based Siemenssubsidiariesand their employees inthe bribery schemes; financingof
three underlying projects by the World Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank; making
illegalpaymentsthrough U.S. banks; usingU-S-based companiesas intermediaries,
business consultants,and holders of slushfunds; conductingmeetings in the United
Statesin furtheranceof a bribery scheme; and transmitting mail, electronicmail, and
facsimilemessagesinto and out of the United States.
G. SiemensFailed to Maintain Its Books and Records
75. During the RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade thousands ofpaymentsto third
parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and the ultimate recipientsof, the
payments. Inparticular, Siemenspaid approximately $1.4 billion in bribesto foreign
governmentofficials. Doing so involvedthe falsificationof Siemens' books and records
by employeesthroughoutthe Company. Specifically, Siemensfailedto keep accurate
books and recordsby: 1)establishingand funding secret, off-books accounts; 2)
establishingand using a system of payment intermediariesto obscurethe sourceand
destination'offunds;3) making paymentspursuant to business consultantagreementsthat
inaccuratelydescribedtheservicesprovided; 4) generatingfalse invoicesand other false
documentstojustify payments; 5)disbursingmillionsin cashfrom cashdeskswith
inaccurate documentationauthorizingor supportingthe withdrawals;6) usingpost-it
notes for thepurpose of concealingthe identity of persons authorizingillicitpayments;
7)recording illicit ASSFpaymentsas legitimate commissionsin Oilfor Food

34. transactions; 8) falsifymg U.N. documents in connectionwith the Oil forFood Program;
and 9) recording bribes as payment for legitimate services.
H. SiemensFailedto Maintain AdequateInternal Controls
76. Siemensfailedto implementadequateinternal controlsto complywith the
Company's NYSE listing, includingthe detection and prevention of violations of the
FCPA. First, Siemensengaged inthe knowing falsificationof books and records.
Siemensestablishednumerousoff-booksaccountsand secretslushfundsfor thepurpose
of obscuringthe purpose for, and ultimate recipientof, illicitpayments. Elaborate
payment mechanismswere used to concealthe fact that bribe payments were made
around the globeto obtainbusiness, includingthe PG confidentialpayment systemand
extensiveuse of business consultants and intermediariesto h e 1bribes. False invoices
and payment documentationwas created to make payments to business consultantsunder
falsebusiness consultant agreementsthat identifiedservicesthat were never intendedto
be rendered. Illicitpayments were falselyrecorded as expensesfor management fees,
consultingfees, supply contracts, room preparation fees, and commissions. Documents
related to its participation in the Oilfor Food Program were alsoinaccurate. Siemens
inflatedU.N. contracts, signed sideagreementswi6 Iraqi ministriesthat were not
disclosedto the U.N., andrecorded the ASSF payments aslegitimate commissions
despiteU.N., US., and international sanctionsagainst suchpayments.
77. Second, Siemensemployeesroutinely circumventedthe internal controls
the Companyhad in place. Slushfundswere opened inthe names of former and current
employees and maintainedoff-books. At any givenpoint, Siemenshad no central record
of the true number of bank accountsopenedon its'behalf,from which, millions in illicit

35. paymentswere made. Despite a "four-eyes" policy that required two signatureson
Companydocumentsto authorizetransactions, a significantnumber of business
consultantagreementswere enteredinto and a significantnumber of payments were
authorizedin violation ofthe policy. In many instances, signatures authorizingthe
withdrawalof hundreds ofthousands of dollars from cash deskswere placed onpost-it
notes and later removed in orderto eradicateanypermanent record of the approvals. In
numerousinstances, officialssigningdocumentsfailedto conductany review of the
documents. For example, an official who authorizedpayments on behalf of Siemens'
Russianregional subsidiaryauthorizedpaymentsdespitehis inability to read the
languagein which the supportingdocumentationofthe paymentswere prepared.
Siemensofficialsfiequentlymisused internal accountsby transferringmoney &omone
Siemensentityto mother without any legitimate business purpose or proper
documentationof the disposition of the funds. Siemensofficialsmodified the formatof
agreementsto avoid internal controlsonthe use of business consultants by backdating
agreements, misidentifjingcounterpartiesas"agents" rather than "business consultants,"
and obscuringthe amountspaid to business consultantsby splittingthe payments among
separateagreements.
78. Finally, Siemensfailedto establishadequate internalcontrolsdespite its
knowledgethat corruptionwas rampant. Siemensdid not issuemandatory and
comprehensiveCompany-widecontrolsregarding the use of business consultants until
June2005, well after senior officialswere awareof widespreadbribery in the Company's
two largest divisions,COMand PG. Despitethose controls,due diligenceon business
consultantsremained largely inadequate, and payments continuedto be made without

36. adequateproof of servicesrendered. Siemensfailed to establish controlsover numerous
off-booksaccountsheld on its behalf aroundthe world. The Companymaintained no
central list of corporateaccountsheld at unconsolidated entitiesor in the names of
individual Siemensofficials. Siemensfailedto establish controlsover cash
disbursements,allowed manualpayments withoutdocumentation,and failedto ensurethe
proper use of intercompany accounts. Siemensfailedto establish an effectivecentral
compliancefunction. The complianceoffice lacked independenceand was severely
understaffed. Siemenstone atthe top was inadequatefor a law abidingentity, and
employees engaged in bribery and othermisconduct on behalf of the Companywere not
adequately disciplined. Siemensalso failedto conduct appropriate anti-bribery and
corruptiontraining.
CLAWISFOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM
[Violationsof Section30A of the ExchangeAct]
Paragraphs 1through 78 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference.
79. As describedabove, Siemens,through its officers, agents, and
subsidiaries,corruptlyoffered,promised to pay, or authorizedpaymentsto oneor more
persons, whileknowing that all or a portion ofthose payments would be offered, given,
or promised, directly or indirectly,to foreignofficialsforthe purpose of influencingtheir
acts or decisionsin their official capacity, inducingthem to do or omit to do actionsin
violation of their official duties, securingan improper advantage, or inducingsuch
foreign officialsto use their influencewith foreigngovernmentsor instrumentalities
thereof to assist Siemensin obtaining or retaining business.

37. 80. By reason of the foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoinedwill
continueto violate, Section 30A of the ExchangeAct. [15 U.S.C. S78dd-11
SECONDCLAIM
[Violations of Section13@)(2)(A)of the ExchangeAct]
Paragraphs 1through 80 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference.
81. As described above, Siemens, through its officers, agentsand subsidiaries,
failedto keep books, records, and accounts,which, in reasonabledetail, accuratelyand
fairlyreflected its transactionsand dispositionsof its assets.
82. By reason of the foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoinedwill
continueto violate, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the ExchangeAct. [15 U.S.C.
§ 7 8 m ~ ( 2 ) ( ~ ) 1
THIRDCLAIM
[Violations of Section 13@)(2)@)of the ExchangeAct]
Paragraphs 1through 82 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference.
83. As described above, Siemensfailedto devise and maintaina system of
internal accountingcontrolssufficientto provide reasonableassurancesthat:
(i) transactionswere executedin accordancewith management's generalor specific
authorization;and (ii) transactions were recorded as necessary (I)to permit preparation of
financial statementsin conformitywith generally acceptedaccountingprinciples or any
other criteria applicableto such statements,and (II) to maintainaccountabilityfor its
assets.

38. 84. By reason ofthe foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoined will
continueto violate, Section 13@)(2)@) of the Exchange Act. 115U.S.C.
9 78m(b)(2)(~)1
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORJ3, the Commissionrespectfullyrequeststhatthis Court enter a final
judgment:
A. Permanentlyrestraining and enjoining Siemensfrom violating Sections
30A, 13@)(2)(~)and 13@)(2)@) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 8578dd-1,
B. OrderingSiemensto disgorgeill-gottengainswrongfully obtainedasa
result of its illegal conduct; and
C.. Grantingsuchfurtherrelief asthe Cow may deemjust and appropriate.
Dated: /z2008
Respecthlly submitted,
d
Cheryl J. carboro @.C. Bar No. 2175)
~ e i d ~ .Muoio
Tracy L. Price
Denise Hansberry
Robert I. Dodge
, AttorneysforPlaintiff,
U.S; Securitiesagd Exchange.Commission
100F Street,NE
Mail Stop6030 SPII
Washington,.DC 20549-6030
(202) 551-4403(Scarboro)

39. 4
T0 000001
T1INHALT: 000002
T1------------ 000003
T1 000004
T1Teil 1: Allgemeine Beschreibung der Leistung 000005
T1 000006
T1Teil 2: Angaben zur Ausfhrung 000007
T1 000008
T1Teil 3: Leistungsverzeichnis mit Langtext 000009
T1 000010
T1 000011
T1 000012
T1Weitere Unterlagen zur Leistungsbeschreibung: 000013
T1 000014
T1Anlage 1: M”gliche Kommunikationsbeziehungen bei der OP- Steuerung 000015
T1 (schematische Darstellung) 000016
T1 000017
T1 000018
T1Anlage 2: Schnittstellenbeziehung zwischen dem TKSys, dem Identity- 000019
T1 Management (IDM) und dem OP- Managementsystem (OPM), 000020
T1 schematische Darstellung 000021
T1 000022
T1 000023
T1Anlage 3: M”gliche Szenarien fr die Verschlsselung und 000024
T1 Authentifikation auf verschiedenen Verbindungswegen 000025
T1 sowie daraus resultierende Anforderungen 000026
T1 000027
T1 000028
T1Anlage 4: Bieterangaben 000029
T1 000030
T0 000031
T1TEIL 1: ALLGEMEINE BESCHREIBUNG DER LEISTUNG 000032
T1============================================= 000033
T1 000034
T1 000035
T1 000036
T1INHALT 000037
T1----------- 000038
T1 000039
T101. Projektbeschreibung 000040
T1 000041
T11.1 Gegenstand und Ziel der Ausschreibung 000042
T11.2 Bestehende TK- Systeme 000043
T11.3 TKSys- Grundkonzeption 000044
T11.4 Spezielle Projektanforderungen 000045
T1 000046
T1 000047
T102. Organisatorische Besonderheiten 000048
T1 000049
T12.1 Projektorganisation 000050
T12.2 Terminplanung und Terminkontrolle 000051
T12.3 Vorbereitung der Ausfhrung, Antragstellung 000052
Seite 1

40. 4
T1 u.Genehmigungsverfahren 000053
T12.4 Personal 000054
T12.5 Auftragsabwicklung allgemein 000055
T12.6 Durchfhrungsplanung und Installation 000056
T12.7 Aufbau und Test des TKSys (Systemtest, 000057
T1 Typabnahme und Grundkonfiguration) 000058
T12.8 Technische und organoisatorische Angaben 000059
T1 000060
T1 000061
T103. Bauliche Angaben 000062
T1 000063
T13.1 Standorte 000064
T0 000065
T101. Projektbeschreibung 000066
T1 000067
T11.1 Gegenstand und Ziel der Ausschreibung 000068
T1 000069
T1.1 Gesamt- Kommunikationsl”sung (TKSys) fr den 000070
T1 Dienstbetrieb 000071
T1 000072
T1Das Klinikum der Universit„t Mnchen - nachfolgend KUM 000073
T1genannt- beabsichtigt im Zuge einer gemeinsamen 000074
T1Maánahme die bestehenden Telekommunikationssysteme fr 000075
T1den Dienstbetrieb am Campus Groáhadern und am Campus 000076
T1Innenstadtkliniken in Form einer Gesamt- 000077
T1Kommunikationsl”sung einschl. aller zentralen und 000078
T1dezentralen Komponenten sowie Applikationen 000079
T1nachfolgend TKSys genannt - zu erneuern einschl. einer 000080
T1Erweiterung um die Teilnehmer fr das derzeit im Bau 000081
T1befindliche OPZ (OP- Zentrum) und das CSD (Centrum fr 000082
T1Schlaganfall und Demenz). 000083
T1 000084
T1Innerhalb der geplanten Gesamt- Kommunikationsl”sung 000085
T1ist eine bergreifende Sprachkommunikation einschl. 000086
T1aller Applikationen und zentraler Funktionen, netz- 000087
T1bergreifende Leistungsmerkmale, Synergieeffekte bei 000088
T1der Administration und im Betrieb, eine gleichlaufende 000089
T1Software- Wartung aller Anlagenteile nach neuestem 000090
T1technischen Stand sowie insbesondere eine optimale 000091
T1Untersttzung klinischer Prozesse zu realisieren. 000092
T1 000093
T1Fr die bestehenden Systeme in Groáhadern bzw. der 000094
T1Innenstadtkliniken wird zuknftig aus Altersgrnden der 000095
T1Support durch den Hersteller eingestellt. Die 000096
T1bestehenden Anlagenteile in Groáhadern bzw. der 000097
T1Innenstadtkliniken werden in ihrem jetzigen Zustand bis 000098
T1zur Realisierung der Gesamtmaánahme belassen, d.h. 000099
T1nicht mehr hochgerstet. 000100
T1 000101
T1Gegenstand und Ziel dieser Ausschreibung ist somit die 000102
T1Schaffung eines bergreifenden TKSys ber alle 000103
T1Standorte, einschl. betriebsfertiger Montage, 000104
Seite 2

41. 4
T1Einrichtung und Gesamt- Konfiguration, Inbetriebnahme, 000105
T1Dokumentation und Einweisung. 000106
T1 000107
T1 000108
T1.2 TK- Systeme fr die Patiententelefonie 000109
T1 000110
T1Die derzeit zus„tzlich bestehenden TK- Systeme fr die 000111
T1Patiententelefonie in beiden H„usern werden durch 000112
T1externe Firmen ber Gestattungsvertr„ge betrieben und 000113
T1sind nicht Gegenstand der Ausschreibung. 000114
T1 000115
T1 000116
T11.2 Bestehende TK- Systeme 000117
T1 000118
T1.1 TK- System Groáhadern 000119
T1 000120
T1Die Sprachkommunikation des KUM Groáhadern wird derzeit 000121
T1ber ein klassisches leitungsvermitteltendes TK- System 000122
T1realisiert. 000123
T1 000124
T1Eckdaten: 000125
T1 000126
T1Fabrikat/Typ: 000127
T1 Siemens, Hicom 300/350 H 000128
T1Baujahr: 000129
T1 1998 000130
T1Errichter u. Instandhalter: 000131
T1 Fa. MTG, Mnchen 000132
T1Kaufm„nnischer Status: 000133
T1 Kaufanlage 000134
T1Leitungsnetz: 000135
T1 2- Aderverkabelung bis zum Endger„t 000136
T1Stromversorgung: 000137
T1 Integrierte unterbrechungsfreie 000138
T1 Stromversorgung an der Zentrale 000139
T1Amtsanschaltungen: 000140
T1 10 x S2M 000141
T1 Rufnummer 089 / 7095-0. 9999 000142
T1Abgesetzte Anlagenteile: 000143
T1 Anlagenteil Forschungspavillion, 000144
T1 Anlagenteil Max-Lebsche-Platz 000145
T1Quer- und Festverbindungen: 000146
T1 KUM Innenstadtkliniken ber 1 x S2M 000147
T1 Patientenanlage ber 1 x S2M 000148
T1Vermittlungspl„tze: 000149
T1 8 Pl„tze, automatische Abfragestelle 000150
T1Applikationen: 000151
T1 Verbindungsdatenauswertung 000152
T1 VoiceMailsystem 000153
T1 Netzwerkmanagement 000154
T1 Verkehrsmessung 000155
T1 ACD- L”sung 000156
Seite 3

42. 4
T1 Alarmierungsserver 000157
T1 Sprachaufzeichnung an der Vermittlung 000158
T1 Diktier- Server 000159
T1 Dokusystem Leitungsnetz 000160
T1Sonderanschaltungen: 000161
T1 3 Personensuchanlagen (TMOM) 000162
T1 Nottelefone mit sog. Funkfinger 000163
T1Privatgespr„chsabrechnung: 000164
T1 Inkassosystem ber 000165
T1 Kassenautomat 000166
T1Patientenabrechnung: 000167
T1 Extern, mit eigener Anlage und 000168
T1 eigenem Inkassosystem 000169
T1 000170
T1Teilnehmer 000171
T1 000172
T1TK- Zentrale Groáhadern (Hauptsystem): 000173
T1 3.840 Teilnehmer 000174
T1Forschungspavillion (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000175
T1 124 Teilnehmer 000176
T1Max-Lebsche-Platz (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000177
T1 48 Teilnehmer 000178
T1 000179
T1Gesamt 4.012 Teilnehmer 000180
T1 000181
T1davon DECT: 000182
T1 127 Teilnehmer (124 Basisstationen) 000183
T1 000184
T1 000185
T1.2 TK- System Innenstadtkliniken 000186
T1 000187
T1Die Sprachkommunikation der Innenstadtkliniken wird 000188
T1derzeit ebenso ber ein klassisches 000189
T1leitungsvermitteltendes TK- System realisiert. 000190
T1 000191
T1Eckdaten: 000192
T1 000193
T1Fabrikat/Typ: 000194
T1 2 x Siemens, Hicom 350 H, V 3.0, 000195
T1 vernetzt ber 12 x S2M 000196
T1Baujahr: 000197
T1 2001 000198
T1Errichter u. Instandhalter: 000199
T1 Fa. Siemens 000200
T1Kaufm„nnischer Status: 000201
T1 Kaufanlage 000202
T1Leitungsnetz: 000203
T1 2- Aderverkabelung bis zum Endger„t 000204
T1Stromversorgung: 000205
T1 Integrierte unterbrechungsfreie 000206
T1 Stromversorgung an der Zentrale 000207
T1Amtsanschaltungen: 000208
Seite 4

43. 4
T1 8 x S2M (jeweils 4 pro Anlage), 000209
T1 Rufnummer 089 / 5160-0. 9999 000210
T1Abgesetzte Anlagenteile: 000211
T1 Hicom 3x3 V3.4, Schillerstr. 000212
T1 40 ber 2 x S2M (LWL), 000213
T1 HiPath 4300 V1.0 Schillerstr. 53 ber 2 x S2M, 000214
T1 HiPath 4300 V1.0 Bavariaring ber 2 x S2M, 000215
T1 Hicom 350E V1 Frauenlobstr. 9, Dermatologie (derzeit 000216
T1 gemeinsam mit Patientenanlage St„dt. KH Thalkirchen) 000217
T1 ber 4 x S2M, 000218
T1 Anlagenteil Pathologie (entf„llt bis zur Erneuerung) 000219
T1 ber 2 x S2M, 000220
T1 Anlagenteil Pharmakologie (derzeit demontiert wegen 000221
T1 Baumaánahmen) ber 2 x S2M 000222
T1Quer- und Festverbindungen: 000223
T1 Patientenanlage ber 1 x S2M 000224
T1 LMU Mnchen ber 1 x S2M 000225
T1 KUM Groáhadern ber 1 x S2M 000226
T1Vermittlungspl„tze: 000227
T1 5 Pl„tze, Automatische Abfragestelle, 000228
T1Applikationen: 000229
T1 Verbindungsdatenauswertung 000230
T1 VoiceMailsystem 000231
T1 Netzwerkmanagement 000232
T1 Verkehrsmessung 000233
T1 ACD- L”sung 000234
T1 Alarmierungsserver 000235
T1Sonderanschaltungen: 000236
T1 2 Personensuchanlagen (TMOM) 000237
T1 Synchrone Ansagen VPL (TMOM) 000238
T1 Synchrone Ansagen SA (TMOM) 000239
T1 Nottelefone mit sog. Funkfinger 000240
T1Privatgespr„chsabrechnung: 000241
T1 Manuell per Auswertung 000242
T1Patientenabrechnung: 000243
T1 Extern, mit eigener Anlage und 000244
T1 eigenem Inkassosystem 000245
T1 000246
T1 000247
T1Teilnehmer 000248
T1 000249
T1TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptsystem): 000250
T1 4.320 Teilnehmer 000251
T1Schillerstr. 40 (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000252
T1 75 Teilnehmer 000253
T1Schillerstr. 53 (M845, abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000254
T1 127 Teilnehmer 000255
T1Bavariaring (M 846, abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000256
T1 25 Teilnehmer 000257
T1Dermatologie (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000258
T1 203 Teilnehmer 000259
T1 000260
Seite 5

44. 4
T1Gesamt 4.750 Teilnehmer 000261
T1 000262
T1Nach vollst„ndiger Umstellung auf die neue Gesamt- 000263
T1Kommunikationsl”sung sind die bestehenden TK- Systeme 000264
T1einschl.aller Anlagenkomponenten, der 000265
T1Stromversorgungseinrichtungen und der Endger„te in 000266
T1Abstimmung mit dem Auftraggeber zu demontieren und 000267
T1fachgerecht zu entsorgen. 000268
T1 000269
T1 000270
T1 000271
T11.3 TKSys- Grundkonzeption 000272
T1 000273
T1 .1 Hauptfunktionen, Applikationen und Schnittstellen 000274
T1 000275
T1Das neue TKSys ist fr einen m”glichen Endausbau fr 000276
T1bis zu 000277
T1 000278
T1 16.000 Teilnehmern, 000279
T1 000280
T1mit folgenden Hauptmerkmalen, Funktionen und 000281
T1Applikationen 000282
T1 000283
T1- Paketvermittelnde Voice- over- IP (VoIP) Technik 000284
T1- SIP und ggf. dezidierter Einsatz propriet„rer 000285
T1 (herstellerspezifischer) Session-/Kommunikationsprotokolle 000286
T1- VoWLAN (Voice over WLAN) 000287
T1- Zentrales, mandantenf„higes Managementsystem 000288
T1- ZBDB (Zentrale Basisdatenbank) 000289
T1- Zentrale, mandantenf„hige Abfragestelle (Vermittlung) 000290
T1- ACD (automatische Anrufverteilung) 000291
T1- VDE/VDA (Verbindungsdatenerfassung und Auswertung) 000292
T1- ETB (Elektronisches Telefonbuch) 000293
T1- UMS (Unified Messaging, Voice- und Faxmail) 000294
T1- CTI (Computer- Telephony- Integration) 000295
T1- FMC (Fixed Mobile Convergenz / One- Number- Konzept) 000296
T1- Nachrichten- Managementsystem (Alarmierungs- u. 000297
T1 Konferenz- Managementsystem) 000298
T1 000299
T1sowie mit folgenden Schnittstellen auszustatten: 000300
T1 000301
T1- Anbindung an ein IDM (Identity- Managementsystem, 000302
T1 Verzeichnisdienst) 000303
T1- Anbindung an ein OPM (OP- Managementsystem) 000304
T1- Identifizierung, Lokalisierung und Ortung von 000305
T1 Endger„ten 000306
T1- Anschaltung externer PSA (Personensuchanlagen) 000307
T1- Anschaltung externer Lichtrufanlagen 000308
T1- Anschaltung externer, SIP- basierter Sprechstellen und 000309
T1 šbertragungseinrichtungen 000310
T1- Native Anbindung eines externen Videokonferenzsystems. 000311
T1 000312
Seite 6

45. 4
T1Alle Telefonendger„te des Bestandes werden durch neue 000313
T1VoIP- Endger„te ersetzt. 000314
T1 000315
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen, 000316
T1Systembedingungen, Spezifikationen, Leistungsmerkmale 000317
T1und Applikationen sowie Schnittstellen zu Fremdsystemen 000318
T1oder externen Anwendungen sind nachstehenden 000319
T1Ausfhrungen sowie den detaillierten technischen 000320
T1Festlegungen im Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung) bzw. im 000321
T1Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000322
T1Langtext- Beschreibung) zu entnehmen. 000323
T1 000324
T1Vernetzung mit den TK-Systemen fr die 000325
T1Patiententelefonie 000326
T1 000327
T1Das zuknftige TKSys ist weiterhin mit den bestehenden 000328
T1TK-Systemen fr die Patiententelefonie an beiden 000329
T1Hauptstandorten ber S2M-Querverbindungen (Qsig) zu 000330
T1vernetzen. 000331
T1 000332
T1Die Vermittlung von Anrufen zu den Patiententelefonen 000333
T1erfolgt weiterhin ber die Vermittlungspl„tze des neuen 000334
T1TKSys. 000335
T1 000336
T1 000337
T1.2 Zentrale Anlagenteile 000338
T1 000339
T1Die Ausfhrung der Gesamt- Kommunikationsl”sung in Form 000340
T1eines neu zu errichtenden TKSys erfolgt in Voice- over- 000341
T1IP (VoIP) Technik, fr alle Teilnehmer des Klinikums 000342
T1der Universit„t, mit ISDN- Amtsanschaltung an das 000343
T1”ffentliche Telefonnetz und SIP- Trunks an 000344
T1entsprechende Netzbetreiber. 000345
T1 000346
T1Als Session-/ Kommunikationsprotokolle ist als 000347
T1Grundstandard SIP einzusetzen, wobei zur Realisierung 000348
T1bestimmter Leistungsmerkmale auch zus„tzlich 000349
T1herstellerspezifische, propriet„re Protokolle fr 000350
T1dezidierten Einsatz zugelassen werden. 000351
T1 000352
T1Die Vernetzung der zentralen Anlagenteile des TKSys 000353
T1untereinander sowie die Anbindung der VoIP- Endger„te 000354
T1erfolgt ber das geb„ude- und campus- bergreifende 000355
T1IT- Netz des Klinikums der Universit„t. 000356
T1 000357
T1Die Hauptstandorte fr die Installation zentraler 000358
T1Komponenten sind: 000359
T1 000360
T1 000361
T1Klinikum Groáhadern 000362
T1 000363
T1- TK- Zentrale Groáhadern (Hauptstandort 1) 000364
Seite 7

46. 4
T1- Forschungspavillion 000365
T1- Max-Lebsche-Platz 000366
T1 000367
T1 000368
T1Innenstadtkliniken 000369
T1 000370
T1- TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptstandort 2) 000371
T1- Schillerstr. 40 000372
T1- Bavariaring 000373
T1- Dermatologie 000374
T1 000375
T1Alle integrierten oder adaptierten zentralen 000376
T1Anlagenteile und Funktionen sind auf Basis einer 000377
T1einheitlichen Kommunikationsstruktur (einheitliche 000378
T1digitale šbertragung ber IP) fr Sprach- und 000379
T1Datenkommunikation vorzusehen, so dass die Vernetzung 000380
T1der zentralen Anlagenteile untereinander ber das IT- 000381
T1Netz der Universit„t erfolgen kann. 000382
T1 000383
T1Neben der Anschaltung von Endger„ten ber IP muss auch 000384
T1der Betrieb von leitungsvermittelten analogen 000385
T1Endger„ten sowie standardisierten S0-Schnittstellen 000386
T1ber entsprechende Gateways realisiert werden k”nnen. 000387
T1 000388
T1 000389
T1.3 Redundanz und Ausfallsicherheit 000390
T1 000391
T1Verfgbarkeit allgemein 000392
T1 000393
T1Es ist ein hochverfgbarer und blockadefreier Betrieb 000394
T1fr alle zentralen Komponenten einschl. der 000395
T1vorgesehenen Applikationen im Umfang des geforderten 000396
T1Endausbaus und bei voller Auslastung zu gew„hrleisten. 000397
T1 000398
T1Hierbei muá durch den Einsatz entsprechender 000399
T1redundanter Komponenten sowie durch weitere Maánahmen 000400
T1zur Ausfallsicherheit eine Verfgbarkeit von 99,99% 000401
T1gew„hrleistet werden k”nnen. 000402
T1 000403
T1 000404
T1Technische Redundanz von Komponenten der zentralen 000405
T1Vermittlungseinrichtung 000406
T1 000407
T1Die folgenden Anforderungen gelten fr das TKSys im 000408
T1weitesten Sinne, also auch fr die mit dem TKSys 000409
T1anzubietenden Applikationen sowie alle fr die Funktion 000410
T1erforderlichen zus„tzlichen Komponenten (z.B. DNS-, 000411
T1DHCP- und Radius-Server sowie Session Border- Controler 000412
T1etc.). 000413
T1 000414
T1Zur Erh”hung der Ausfallsicherheit der zentralen 000415
T1Steuerung des TKSys ist ein redundanter, d.h. 000416
Seite 8

47. 4
T1dezentraler und ”rtlich getrennter Aufbau zentraler 000417
T1Anlagenkomponenten vorgesehen. 000418
T1 000419
T1Es sind jeweils Callserver an den beiden 000420
T1Hauptstandorten Groáhadern und Innenstadt (jeweils ein 000421
T1Callserver) vorzusehen, die in einem Clusterverbund 000422
T1eine gegenseitige Vollredundanz bilden. Die Callserver 000423
T1sind an unterschiedliche Core-Switches anzubinden. 000424
T1 000425
T1Die Redundanz ist so zu konfigurieren, dass eine 000426
T1standortbergreifende Redundanz 000427
T1der zentralen Komponenten des TKSys gegeben ist. 000428
T1 000429
T1Im Normalbetrieb bernehmen die lokalen Callserver die 000430
T1Steuerungsfunktionen fr den jeweiligen Standort. 000431
T1 000432
T1Im St”rungsfall mssen die jeweils in Funktion 000433
T1befindlichen Komponenten die kompletten Funktionen und 000434
T1Leistungsmerkmale fr das gesamte TKSys zur Verfgung 000435
T1stellen. 000436
T1 000437
T1šber die hauptstandortbergreifende Redundanz mssen 000438
T1fr die vollst„ndige Funktionalit„t des TKSys und der 000439
T1zentralen Applikationen mindestens folgende 000440
T1Notfallszenarien gew„hrleistet werden k”nnen: 000441
T1 000442
T11. Bei Ausfall der zentralen Komponenten des TKSys an 000443
T1 einem Standort bernehmen die zentralen Komponenten des 000444
T1 TKSys am anderen Standort die vollst„ndige Steuerung 000445
T1 der Endstellen des ausgefallenen Standortes. 000446
T1 000447
T12. Bei Ausfall der WAN-Verbindung zwischen den Standorten 000448
T1 bernehmen die zentralen Komponenten des TKSys an den 000449
T1 jeweiligen Standorten die Steuerung der lokalen 000450
T1 Endstellen, Verbindungen zwischen den Standorten sind 000451
T1 ber das ”ffentliche Netz zu routen. 000452
T1 000453
T1Auáer den vorgenannten Redundanzmaánahmen der Zentralen 000454
T1Komponenten an den Hauptstandorten 000455
T1 000456
T1* TK- Zentrale Groáhadern (Hauptstandort 1) 000457
T1* TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptstandort 2) 000458
T1 000459
T1sind an den weiteren Standorten, wie 000460
T1 000461
T1- Forschungspavillion (Groáhadern) 000462
T1- Max-Lebsche-Platz (Groáhadern) 000463
T1- Schillerstr. 40 (Innenstadtkliniken) 000464
T1- Bavariaring (Innenstadtkliniken) 000465
T1- Dermatologie (Innenstadtkliniken), 000466
T1 000467
T1an denen Gateways (z.B. fr a/b-/ S0- Teilnehmer oder 000468
Seite 9

48. 4
T1Amtsgateways) eingesetzt werden, jeweils Komponenten 000469
T1mit autarker Steuerfunktion fr den Weiterbetrieb von 000470
T1internen, standortbezogenen Telefonie- Funktionen bei 000471
T1Ausfall der betreffenden WAN-Verbindung vorzusehen. 000472
T1 000473
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000474
T1Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung, Titel 04 und 05) sowie 000475
T1dem Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000476
T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 01) zu entnehmen. 000477
T1 000478
T1Durch den Bieter sind die herstellerspezifische L”sung 000479
T1der Redundanz, der Ausfallsicherheit und die m”gliche 000480
T1Konfiguration darzustellen. 000481
T1 000482
T1 000483
T1.4 Amtszug„nge 000484
T1 000485
T1Allgemein 000486
T1 000487
T1Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Amtsanschaltung mit 000488
T1verschiedenen Rufnummern fr die beiden Hauptstandorte 000489
T1wird zuknftig eine gemeinsame Kopfnummer mit 000490
T15-stelligem Rufnummernblock 000491
T1(089 / 4400-xxxxx) fr die beiden Hauptstandorte 000492
T1Groáhadern und Innenstadt im Benehmen mit dem 000493
T1Netzbetreiber realisiert. 000494
T1 000495
T1 000496
T1Dimensionierung 000497
T1 000498
T1Die Anbindung des neuen TKSys an das ”ffentliche 000499
T1Telekommunikationsnetz erfolgt im Erstausbau ber 18 000500
T1ISDN-Prim„rmultiplex-Anschlsse (S2M). Diese werden auf 000501
T1die beiden Hauptstandorte wie folgt verteilt: 000502
T1 000503
T1- Groáhadern: 10 x S2M 000504
T1- Innenstadtkliniken: 8 x S2M 000505
T1 000506
T1Die Anbindung des TKSys an das ”ffentliche 000507
T1Telekommunikationsnetz muss grunds„tzlich auch ber 000508
T1SIP-Trunks m”glich sein. 000509
T1 000510
T1Im Erstausbau erfolgt kein anlagenseitiges Routing fr 000511
T1šberl„ufe an weitere Netzbetreiber fr den 000512
T1St”rungsfall, was jedoch grunds„tzlich anlagentechnisch 000513
T1je S2M-Amtsgateway oder SIP- Trunk m”glich sein muss. 000514
T1 000515
T1 000516
T1Redundanz und Lastteilung 000517
T1 000518
T1Das Routing von Verbindungen in das ”ffentliche 000519
T1Telekommunikationsnetz muss so erfolgen, dass eine 000520
Seite 10

49. 4
T1optimale Auslastung der Amtsanschlsse an beiden 000521
T1Hauptstandorten bei m”glichst geringer Auslastung der 000522
T1internen Strecken zwischen den Standorten erreicht 000523
T1wird. 000524
T1 000525
T1Bei St”rung von Amtsanschlssen muss ein Routing zu den 000526
T1verbleibenden, nicht gest”rten Amtsanschlssen 000527
T1erfolgen. 000528
T1 000529
T1Eine Optimierung bzw. Žnderung der Dimensionierung der 000530
T1Amtszug„nge hinsichtlich der ben”tigten Kan„le unter 000531
T1Bercksichtigung eines verbundbergreifenden 000532
T1Redundanzkonzeptes erfolgt ggf. nach kompletter 000533
T1Inbetriebnahme des TKSys und einer entsprechenden 000534
T1Verkehrsmessung zur Ermittlung der tats„chlichen 000535
T1Medienstr”me fr den internen bzw. externen Verkehr. 000536
T1 000537
T1 000538
T1.5 Rufnummern- Organisation 000539
T1 000540
T1Bedingt durch die neue gemeinsame Rufnummer mit 000541
T15-stelligem Rufnummernblock ist eine šbernahme der 000542
T1bisherigen getrennten Rufnummern mit jeweils 000543
T14-stelligem Rufnummernblock nicht m”glich. 000544
T1 000545
T1Anforderungen an die Migration auf neue Rufnummer mit 000546
T15-stelligen Rufnummernblock: 000547
T1 000548
T1Externe Erreichbarkeit: 000549
T1 000550
T1Fr die Migration auf die neue Rufnummer bestehen zwei 000551
T1Hauptanforderungen an die externe Erreichbarkeit: 000552
T1 000553
T11. Sofortige Erreichbarkeit aller Nebenstellen des KUM 000554
T1 ber die neue zentrale Einwahl 089 / 4400-xxxxx. 000555
T1 000556
T12. Tempor„re Erreichbarkeit unter den bisherigen 000557
T1 Rufnummern 089 / 5160 - xxxx (Innenstadt) und 089 / 000558
T1 7095 - xxxx (Groáhadern), Umwertung der alten 000559
T1 Rufnummern in neue Rufnummern beim Carrier w„hrend 000560
T1 eines definierten šbergangszeitraumes. 000561
T1 000562
T1Interne Erreichbarkeit: 000563
T1 000564
T1Um sowohl aus technischer als auch aus 000565
T1organisatorischer Sicht eine reibungslose Umstellung 000566
T1auf die neue einheitliche Rufnummer zu gew„hrleisten, 000567
T1ist zun„chst vorgesehen, die bisherigen 4-stelligen 000568
T1Nebenstellennummern durch eine vorangestellte 000569
T1Standortkennziffer auf 5 Stellen zu erweitern, 000570
T1Beispiel: 000571
T1 000572
Seite 11

50. 4
T1- Standortkennziffer 5 + alte 4-stellige Rufnummer der 000573
T1 Nebenstellen in Groáhadern 000574
T1- Standortkennziffer 7 + alte 4-stellige Rufnummer der 000575
T1 Nebenstellen in Innenstadt 000576
T1 000577
T1Der aus dem 5-stelligen Rufnummernblock resultierende 000578
T1grӇere Rufnummernhaushalt erlaubt die Realisierung 000579
T1flexibler, an die Organisationsstruktur des KUM 000580
T1orientierter Rufnummernkonzepte. Unter anderem soll 000581
T1die Realisierung folgender Rufnummernstrukturen m”glich 000582
T1sein: 000583
T1 000584
T1- Vergabe von pers”nlichen Rufnummern fr jeden 000585
T1 Mitarbeiter des KUM, unabh„ngig von der Funktion 000586
T1- Vergabe von Funktions-Rufnummern (auf Basis der 000587
T1 Organisationsstruktur des KUM) 000588
T1- Vergabe neuer Rufnummernbereiche bei Umstrukturierungen 000589
T1 Mitarbeiter mssen gleichzeitig ber ihre Funktion als 000590
T1 auch ber ihre pers”nliche Rufnummer erreichbar sein. 000591
T1 000592
T0 000593
T11.4 Spezielle Projektanforderungen 000594
T1 000595
T1Grundziel und Voraussetzung bei der Realisierung der 000596
T1neuen Kommunikationsl”sung ist eine optimale 000597
T1Untersttzung klinischer Prozesse. 000598
T1 000599
T1Betriebsablauftechnische Belange im Sinne 000600
T1organisatorischer und medizinischer Prozesse sind durch 000601
T1die einzusetzende Kommunikationsl”sung weitgehend zu 000602
T1untersttzen und somit zu optimieren. 000603
T1 000604
T1Zu diesem Zweck sind auáer den vorgenannten 000605
T1Grundanforderungen an das TKSys insbesondere folgende 000606
T1Komponenten bzw. Funktionen hinsichtlich der 000607
T1Realisierung dieser optimalen Kommunikation vorgesehen: 000608
T1 000609
T11. Funktions-/Rollen-/Personenprinzip fr Endstellen / 000610
T1 Teilnehmer 000611
T12. Synchronisation mit einem IDM (Identity- 000612
T1 Managementsystem) 000613
T13. Identifizierung, Lokalisierung und Ortung von 000614
T1 Endger„ten 000615
T14. Untersttzung eines OPM (OP- Managementsystem) 000616
T15. Zusammenwirken des TKSys mit dem IDM und dem OPM 000617
T16. Nachrichten- Managementsystem 000618
T1 -Benachrichtigung / Alarmierung 000619
T1 -Gesicherte und quittierbare šbermittlung von 000620
T1 Textnachrichten 000621
T1 -Erfordernisse durch die Kopplung an das OPM 000622
T1 -Erfordernisse durch die Anschaltung externer 000623
T1 Lichtrufanlagen 000624
Seite 12

51. 4
T1 -Aufschaltung und Weiterleitung von Brandmelde- Alarmen 000625
T1 -Aufschaltung und Weiterleitung von Herzalarmen 000626
T1 -Konferenzmanagement 000627
T17. Mobile Kommunikation (VoWLAN, FMC) 000628
T18. Abfragestelle (Vermittlung) 000629
T19. CTI (Computer Telephony Integration) 000630
T110. Anschaltung externer PSA (Personensuchanlagen) 000631
T111. Anschaltung externer Kommunikations- und 000632
T1 šbertragungsanlagen 000633
T112. Native Anbindung eines externen Videokonferenzsystems 000634
T113. Entwicklung von Sonderl”sungen 000635
T1 000636
T1 000637
T11. Funktions-/Rollen-/Personen- Prinzip 000638
T1 000639
T1Als grundlegende Voraussetzung fr die Aufbereitung, 000640
T1Organisation und šbermittlung von Information durch 000641
T1bzw. ber das TKSys werden die Grunddaten (Identit„ten) 000642
T1fr die Definition von Endstellen / Teilnehmern durch 000643
T1den Auftraggeber nach folgendem Prinzip bereitgestellt: 000644
T1 000645
T1* funktionsstellenbezogen 000646
T1 000647
T1* rollenbezogen (auch Gruppen) 000648
T1 000649
T1* personenbezogen 000650
T1 000651
T1Als Endstellen / Teilnehmer sind alle an das TKSys 000652
T1angeschalteten Sprach- Endger„te, wie station„r 000653
T1angeschaltete Endger„te (IP-Phones, IP-Softphones, 000654
T1analoge Endger„te, ISDN-Endger„te etc.) und mobile 000655
T1Endger„te (WLAN-Endger„te, GSM-Endger„te) zu verstehen. 000656
T1 000657
T1 000658
T12. IDM (Identity- Management) 000659
T1 000660
T1Anforderungen 000661
T1 000662
T1Der Auftraggeber stellt einen Meta-Verzeichnisdienst - 000663
T1das Identit„tsmanagement IDM - zur Verfgung. Das IDM 000664
T1dient der Verwaltung von Personen, den allgemeinen 000665
T1Attributen sowie deren Rollen bzw. Funktionen. Diese 000666
T1Information wird auch dazu genutzt, um damit Personen 000667
T1individuelle Benutzerrechte in IT-Systemen zuzuteilen. 000668
T1 000669
T1Im IDM werden keine Patientendaten verwaltet. 000670
T1 000671
T1Aus dem IDM werden alle Basisdaten, d.h. Grunddaten zu 000672
T1Funktionsstellen, Rollen oder Personen zur šbernahme 000673
T1durch das TKSys und zur laufenden Synchronisation 000674
T1bereitgestellt. 000675
T1 000676
Seite 13

52. 4
T1Das TKSys sowie die mit dem TKSys verbundenen Dienste, 000677
T1Funktionen und Applikationen, wie 000678
T1 000679
T1- Managementsystem 000680
T1- ZBDB 000681
T1- Abfragestelle (Vermittlung) 000682
T1- ACD 000683
T1- VDE/VDA (Verbindungsdatenerfassung und Auswertung) 000684
T1- ETB (internes elektronisches Telefonbuch) 000685
T1- FMC 000686
T1- UMS 000687
T1- CTI 000688
T1- Nachrichten- Managementsystem (Alarmierungs- u. 000689
T1 Konferenz- Managementsystem) 000690
T1 000691
T1haben sich bzgl. dieser Basisdaten ausschlieálich mit 000692
T1dem IDM zu synchronisieren. 000693
T1Das IDM ist das fhrende System (Datenquelle) bei der 000694
T1Synchronisation der Basisdaten, so dass ausschlieálich 000695
T1die aus dem IDM bereitgestellten Basisdaten zu 000696
T1verwenden sind. 000697
T1 000698
T1Die Synchronisation des TKSys mit dem IDM erfolgt 000699
T1ausschlieálich ber LDAP v3. 000700
T1 000701
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000702
T1Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung, Titel 04 und 05) sowie 000703
T1dem Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000704
T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 04) zu entnehmen. 000705
T1 000706
T1 000707
T1Teilnehmerverwaltung am TKSys 000708
T1 000709
T1Teilnehmerbasisdaten 000710
T1 000711
T1Das IDM als fhrendes System stellt grunds„tzlich die 000712
T1Teilnehmerbasisdaten zur Verfgung. Die fr die 000713
T1Teilnehmerverwaltung zu synchronisierenden Datenfelder 000714
T1sind zwischen Auftraggeber und Auftragnehmer 000715
T1abzustimmen. Prinzipiell sollen hierbei alle Daten und 000716
T1Attribute, welche im IDM und im TKSys verwendet werden, 000717
T1vom IDM bereitgestellt werden. 000718
T1 000719
T1Im TKSys muss die Administration der Daten bzw. 000720
T1Attribute, welche vom IDM bernommen werden, gesperrt 000721
T1sein. 000722
T1 000723
T1Rufnummernverwaltung (Rufnummernvergabe im IDM) 000724
T1 000725
T11) Anlegen eines neuen Teilnehmers 000726
T1 000727
T1 a) šber das IDM wird ein Account fr einen neuen 000728
Seite 14

53. 4
T1 Teilnehmer inkl. pers”nlicher Rufnummer angelegt. 000729
T1 000730
T1 b) Nach der Synchronisation mit dem TKSys ist der neue 000731
T1 Teilnehmer mit Rufnummer im TKSys angelegt. 000732
T1 000733
T12) Žnderung eines oder mehrerer Teilnehmer (Umzge, 000734
T1 Rufnummerntausch): 000735
T1 000736
T1 Die Žnderung des Namens oder der Rufnummer des 000737
T1 Teilnehmers sowie weitere im IDM hinterlegte 000738
T1 Informationen zu dieser Rufnummer erfolgen im IDM mit 000739
T1 anschlieáender Synchronisation mit dem TKSys. 000740
T1 000741
T1Erweiterte Teilnehmerdaten 000742
T1 000743
T1Zus„tzliche, TK-spezifische Daten, Attribute und 000744
T1Berechtigungen, welche nur im TKSys administriert und 000745
T1vorgehalten werden, mssen nach Neuanlegen oder 000746
T1Žnderungen von Teilnehmern durch den Administrator des 000747
T1TKSys eingetragen und konfiguriert werden. Eine 000748
T1Synchronisation dieser Daten mit dem IDM erfolgt nicht. 000749
T1 000750
T0 000751
T13. Identifizierung, Lokalisierung und Ortung von 000752
T1 Endger„ten 000753
T1 000754
T1Zuknftig muss jedes fest angeschaltete Endger„t 000755
T1eindeutig zu identifizieren und zu lokalisieren sein, 000756
T1WLAN- Endger„te mssen zu identifizieren und Access- 000757
T1Point- genau zu orten sein. 000758
T1 000759
T1Die Daten zur Identifikation und Lokalisierung mssen 000760
T1an der gerufenen Endstelle angezeigt werden k”nnen, 000761
T1wobei grunds„tzlich auch Angaben zur rufenden Funktion, 000762
T1Rolle oder Person mit gesendet bzw. angezeigt werden 000763
T1mssen. 000764
T1 000765
T1Die erforderlichen Zusatzinformationen fr die 000766
T1Identifizierung, Lokalisierung und Ortung der Endger„te 000767
T1und der entsprechenden Anzeige am gerufenen Endger„t 000768
T1wird ber eine spezielle Server- Applikation des 000769
T1Auftraggebers zur šbernahme in das TKSys 000770
T1bereitgestellt. 000771
T1 000772
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000773
T1Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000774
T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 01) zu entnehmen. 000775
T1 000776
T1 000777
T1 000778
T14. OPM (OP- Managementsystem) 000779
T1 000780
Seite 15

54. 4
T1Eine der grundlegenden Anforderungen an das neue TK- 000781
T1System hinsichtlich vorgenannter Optimierung klinischer 000782
T1Betriebsabl„ufe ist unter Anderem die Untersttzung der 000783
T1OP- Kommunikation. 000784
T1 000785
T1Fr die Opimierung organisatorsche Belange wird im 000786
T1neuen OP- Zentrum ein sog. OPM (OP- Managementsystem) 000787
T1realisiert. 000788
T1 000789
T1Die Realisierung dieses OPM basiert auf "i.s.h. med", 000790
T1das bereits am KUM eingesetzt ist. "i.s.h. med" ist ein 000791
T1klinisches Arbeitsplatzsystem der Siemens Medical 000792
T1Solutions GSD GmbH auf Basis von "SAP- IS-H (SAP- 000793
T1Branchenl”sung fr Gesundheitseinrichtungen)", in 000794
T1diesem Fall vorgesehen fr die Optimierung der 000795
T1OP-Planung. 000796
T1 000797
T1Im Zusammenspiel mit dem OPM muss das TKSys auáer der 000798
T1Sprachbertragung grunds„tzlich auch eine zeitgleiche 000799
T1und gesicherte Benachrichtigung von einzelnen oder 000800
T1mehreren Endstellen /Teilnehmern sowie Pagern 000801
T1angeschlossener Personensuchanlagen (PSA) per 000802
T1Textbertragung realisieren k”nnen. 000803
T1 000804
T1Das OPM bermittelt an das TKSys folgende 000805
T1Informationen: 000806
T1 000807
T1- die alarmausl”sende Stelle (OPM) 000808
T1 000809
T1- die zu alarmierende Funktion, Rolle, Gruppe oder Person 000810
T1 000811
T1- die Priorit„t der Nachricht 000812
T1 000813
T1- den Text der Nachricht 000814
T1 000815
T1Durch das TKSys sind insofern folgende Funktionen 000816
T1bidirektional im Zusammenspiel mit dem OPM 000817
T1bereitzustellen: 000818
T1 000819
T1- Nachrichtenversand (automatisch und gesichert) an 000820
T1 mehrere Endstellen / Teilnehmer und/oder Gruppen in 000821
T1 einem Vorgang 000822
T1 000823
T1- Priorisierter Nachrichtenversand 000824
T1 000825
T1- Vorzugsanzeige an der Endstelle bei eingegangener 000826
T1 Nachricht 000827
T1 000828
T1- Quittierm”glichkeit der erhaltenen und/oder gelesenen 000829
T1 Nachrichten als Best„tigungsmeldung der Endstelle 000830
T1 (Rckbest„tigung an das OPM), um ggf. 000831
T1 Eskalationsverfahren durch das OPM bei ausbleibender 000832
Seite 16

55. 4
T1 Quittierung zu untersttzen. 000833
T1 000834
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000835
T1Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung, Titel 04 und 05) sowie 000836
T1dem Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000837
T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 04) zu entnehmen. 000838
T1 000839
T1 000840
T1 000841
T15. Zusammenwirken des TKSys mit dem IDM und dem OPM 000842
T1 000843
T1Allgemeine Anforderungen 000844
T1 000845
T1Im Wesentlichen geht es bei der geforderten 000846
T1Untersttzung der OP- Kommunikation um die die 000847
T1Optimierung der erforderlichen Kommunikationsschritte 000848
T1zwischen den Beteiligten, wie z.B.: 000849
T1 000850
T1- Abruf und Verlegung von Patienten, 000851
T1 Krankentransportdienst 000852
T1- Anforderung und Organisation an das OP- Team 000853
T1- Anforderung von Laborleistungen, Blutkonserven etc. 000854
T1- Informationen an das und vom OPM 000855
T1 000856
T1M”gliche Kommunikationsbeziehungen bei der OP- 000857
T1Steuerung siehe schematische Darstellung in der Anlage 000858
T11 zur Leistungsbeschreibung. 000859
T1 000860
T1 000861
T1Technische Voraussetzungen 000862
T1 000863
T1Hinsichtlich der vorstehenden Anforderungen zur 000864
T1Datenbergabe bzw. Datenbernahme, der bidirektionalen 000865
T1Nachrichtenbermittlung und der Quittierm”glichkeit 000866
T1sind folgende Schnittstellen zu den auftraggeberseitig 000867
T1bereitzustellenden Komponenten IDM und OPM vorzusehen: 000868
T1 000869
T1Schnittstelle zum IDM 000870
T1 000871
T1Aus dem IDM werden per LDAP alle Informationen 000872
T1(Teilnehmerbasisdaten) zu Funktionsstellen, Rollen oder 000873
T1Personen sowohl fr das OPM, als auch fr das TKSys 000874
T1bereitgestellt (siehe auch schematische Darstellung in 000875
T1der Anlage 2 zur Leistungsbeschreibung). 000876
T1 000877
T1- Das IDM bzw. das OPM sind die fhrenden Systeme fr 000878
T1 funktionsstellen-, rollen- und personenbezogene Daten. 000879
T1 000880
T1- Die Teilnehmerbasisdaten fr das OPM werden aus dem 000881
T1 IDM bezogen. 000882
T1 000883
T1- Das OPM h„lt auáer den Teilnehmerbasisdaten (aus dem 000884
Seite 17

56. 4
T1 IDM) ggf. weitere Daten (jedoch keine 000885
T1 patientenbezogenen Daten) vor. 000886
T1 000887
T1- Das TKSys synchronisiert sich bzgl. der Grunddaten nur 000888
T1 mit dem IDM, nicht mit dem OPM. 000889
T1 000890
T1 000891
T1Funktionale Anforderungen an die Schnittstellen zum 000892
T1OPM: 000893
T1 000894
T1- šber das OPM erfolgt jeweils eine Einzelanforderung 000895
T1 einer Nachrichtenbermittlung an das TKSys als jeweils 000896
T1 einzelner Vorgang, es erfolgen keine automatisierten 000897
T1 Eskalationsstufen oder weitere Verknpfungen. 000898
T1 000899
T1- Die Ausl”sung der Anforderung einer 000900
T1 Nachrichtenbermittlung an das TKSys erfolgt manuell 000901
T1 durch das OPM- Personal. 000902
T1 000903
T1- Die Anforderungen werden durch das TKSys einzeln 000904
T1 abgearbeitet, es muss je Einzelanforderung eine 000905
T1 Quittierung von der Endstelle ber das TKSys an das OPM 000906
T1 erfolgen k”nnen. 000907
T1 000908
T1- šber das OPM werden auf Basis dieser jeweiligen 000909
T1 Rckinformation (Quittierung) ggf. weitere Schritte je 000910
T1 Einzelanforderung eingeleitet. 000911
T1 000912
T1- Zus„tzlich zur Nachrichtenbermittlung mssen ber das 000913
T1 OPM bzw. den Operator am OPM auch individuelle oder 000914
T1 voreingestellte Konferenzen zu Endstellen / Teilnehmern 000915
T1 eingeleitet werden k”nnen. 000916
T1 000917
T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000918
T1Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung, Titel 04 und 05) sowie 000919
T1dem Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000920
T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 05.08) zu entnehmen. 000921
T1 000922
T1 000923
T0 000924
T16. Nachrichten- Management- System 000925
T1 000926
T1Allgemein 000927
T1 000928
T1Als wesentliche zentrale Komponente des neuen TKSys ist 000929
T1hinsichtlich der Untersttzung vielf„ltiger Anwendungen 000930
T1des KUM ein sog. Nachrichten- Management- System zu 000931
T1realisieren. 000932
T1 000933
T1Das System ist fr die Untersttzung technischer 000934
T1Anforderungen bzw. Anwendungen und/oder 000935
T1organisatorischer Aufgabenstellungen im Sinne der 000936
Seite 18