Nato book eng_press

NATO SUMMIT
IN WARSAW –
OUTCOMES
FOR UKRAINE
(International Conference,
July 19, 2016, Kyiv)

NATO Summit in Warsaw – Outcomes for Ukraine
(International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv)
This publication collects opinions and assessments made in the wake of the Warsaw
Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (July 8-9, 2016) by Ukrainian and
NATO officials, by Ukrainian and Western defense and security experts.
These statements, made 10 days following the above historic event, were called
by their authors as pre-estimated. Discussion took place at the international con-
ference NATO Summit in Warsaw – Outcomes for Ukraine held on July 19, 2016
organized by the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies with the
financial support of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine.
The conference was attended by representatives of the Ukrainian government
(Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and Ministry of Defense of Ukraine), officials
and diplomats from NATO member countries, as well as experts, representatives of
private business, civil society, and the media.
The attendees were greeted by Natalia Nemyliwska, Director of the NATO Informa-
tion and Documentation Centre in Ukraine, Oksana Osadcha, Principal Policy Coor-
dinator of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine, and Valentyn Badrak, Director of the
Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.
Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine
2016

3
NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE
СONTENTS
WELCOME ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Successful Domestic Policy Must Be Ukraine’s Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Natalia NEMYLIWSKA
Warsaw Summit reiterated NATO’s strong commitment to continue
to support Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Alexander VINNIKOV
Ukraine in Fact Protects Peace of the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Valentyn BADRAK
PRESENTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Warsaw Summit Approved Our Strategy for the Longer Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Dr. Gerlinde NIEHUS
A Democratic Ukraine is of Paramount Importance for Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Rafał WOLSKI
NATO Is Not Ready to Talk About Granting Membership to Ukraine . . . . . . 14
Borys TARASYUK
Military Power Has Been Re-established as the Foundation
of the National Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO
Through the War in Donbas, Ukraine is Carrying out
NATO’s Strategy on Deterrence of Russia in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Ihor DOLHOV
The Kremlin is Stepping up Sabotage Efforts by Special Services
to Disrupt Ukraine from the Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Yevhen MARCHUK
Ukraine Can Receive Benefits, Acting Proactively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Ihor KABANENKO
Kyiv Received a Response in Kind from NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Valentyn BADRAK

4
On Deterrence – Preventing New Conflict, Not Provoking It . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
George P.KENT
The NATO Summit in Warsaw Was a True Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Iulian CHIFU
NATO Explicitly Condemns Russia’s Destabilizing Actions and Policies . . . . . 33
Jonas DANILIAUSKAS
Lack of Supplies of Weapons to Ukraine is Beyond My Understanding . . . . 36
Janusz Adam ONYSZKIEWICZ
NATO and the Issues of Energy Security in the Context
of the Warsaw Summit Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Mykhailo HONCHAR

5
F
irst of all I would like to under-
line that the NATO Summit has
clearly shown that independent,
sovereign, and stable Ukraine which
stands on fundamental principles of
democracy and rule of law is a guar-
antee of Euro-Atlantic security.
In this context, Ukraine’s priorities lie
in the area of domestic policy trans-
formations, including fighting cor-
ruption and implementing reforms,
particularly in the defence and secu-
rity sectors. A good step on the path
to these reforms was taken with the
approval of the Strategic Defence
Bulletin, as a roadmap for Ukraine’s
defence sector reforms that aims to
achieve full compatibility of Ukraine
with NATO’s standards by 2020.
Thus, step by step, Ukraine is ap-
proaching Euro-Atlantic integration,
while expanding and deepening its
cooperation with NATO.
In reality, over the past 2.5 years,
Ukraine has carried out a number of
transformations, both qualitative
and quantitative – yet our state’s
reporting on these achievements
and results requires a more holis-
tic vision and approach. Hence,
Ukraine and NATO established a
new form of strategic communica-
tions cooperation involving expert
and consulting assistance for the
Ukrainian state institutions in that
field. Ukraine has set its course to-
wards building a democratic and
independent state with a strong
rule of law, and is steadily proceed-
ing along that course. Therefore, it
is paramount that Ukraine’s voice
is confident, clear and understand-
able, and heard throughout the in-
ternational arena as well as by its
own citizens.
First and foremost, Ukraine must im-
plement all the above processes for
its own benefit, but we can be cer-
tain that NATO will provide Ukraine
with effective support along its way.
WELCOME ADDRESS
Successful Domestic Policy
Must Be Ukraine’s Priority
Natalia NEMYLIWSKA,
Director of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine

6
S
ince the beginning of the crisis
in and around Ukraine in 2014
the level of NATO’s engagement
with Ukraine – both political and
practical – has been unprecedented.
The reason for our commitment to
support Ukraine is simple. Allies
share the view that an independent,
sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly
committed to democracy and the
rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic
security. This political signal was re-
inforced in Warsaw, where Ukraine
was the only partner nation to have
a separate meeting with Allies at the
highest level in the framework of the
Summit.
The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine
Commission at the level of Heads of
State and Government featured two
key deliverables for Ukraine: one
political and one practical. The first
is a Joint Statement, a strong politi-
cal message of unwavering support.
Support for Ukraine’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity and for its
right to decide its own future and
foreign policy course free from out-
side interference. Allies stressed that
Russia continues to violate Ukraine’s
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
independence, despite repeated
calls by the Alliance and the inter-
national community to abide by in-
ternational law. These developments
have serious implications for the sta-
bility and security of the entire Euro-
Atlantic area.
Allies reiterated that they are com-
mitted to a peaceful solution to the
conflict in eastern Ukraine, which
has claimed nearly 10,000 lives,
and reintegration of those areas of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
of Ukraine currently controlled by
Russian-backed militants. NATO be-
lieves that full implementation of the
Minsk Agreements by all sides, based
on a comprehensive ceasefire and
internationally verified withdrawal
of weapons, is the only path to a
sustainable peace. In the Joint State-
ment Allies called on Russia to desist
from aggressive actions and to use
Warsaw Summit reiterated
NATO’s strong commitment to continue
to support Ukraine
Alexander VINNIKOV,
The Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine /
Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine

7
its considerable influence over the
militants to meet their commitments
in full, especially to allow for the ob-
servation of the ceasefire regime,
implementation of confidence-build-
ing measures, and disarmament. It is
stressed that Russia, as a signatory
to the Minsk Agreements, bears sig-
nificant responsibility. Despite its de-
clared commitment to Minsk, Russia
continues its deliberate destabilisa-
tion of eastern Ukraine, in violation
of international law.
Allies also recognized that under
challenging circumstances, Ukraine’s
government is making progress in
implementing wide-ranging reforms
towards European and Euro-Atlantic
standards, which will be essential in
promoting prosperity and long-term
stability. We welcomed the steps
taken by Ukraine to fight corruption,
meet International Monetary Fund
conditions, reform the judiciary,
and move towards decentralisation.
To be sure, much still remains to be
done. NATO encouraged Ukraine
to remain committed to the full
implementation of these and other
necessary reforms and to ensuring
their sustainability. Also Allies wel-
comed the adoption of the Strategic
Defence Bulletin as Ukraine’s road-
map for defence reform. Thus the
Warsaw Summit reiterated NATO’s
strong commitment to continue to
support Ukraine in carrying out its
reform agenda, including through
the Annual National Programme in
the framework of our Distinctive
Partnership.
The second deliverable of the War-
saw Summit for Ukraine is the Com-
prehensive Package of Assistance
(CAP). This is in many ways a unique
document. It is aimed at consolidat-
ing and enhancing NATO’s support
to Ukraine, including by tailored ca-
pability and capacity building mea-
sures for the security and defence
sector, which will contribute to en-
hance Ukraine’s resilience against
a wide array of threats, including
hybrid threats. NATO’s support will
continue to remain strong, and will
even be strengthened in areas that
are critical for Ukraine’s defence. We
already have many activities ongo-
ing through the Trust Funds estab-
lished at the Wales Summit, as well
as through the further enhance-
ment of long-running technical as-
sistance programmes. These activi-
ties cover areas like cyber defence,
logistics, communications, medical
rehabilitation of wounded soldiers,
and military personnel manage-
ment, military education, building
integrity, scientific research. In the
framework of the CAP we will also
launch work in important new ar-
eas of cooperation such as counter-
ing improvised explosive devices as
well as hybrid warfare.

8
It is also important to note that the
work of NATO’s advisory mission
in Ukraine will continue, to help
Ukraine modernize and reform its
security and defence sector in line
with Euro-Atlantic standards and
practices. Our advisers work with a
variety of institutions in Ukraine’s
security and defence sector and be-
yond. I believe this Allied expertise
has already had a beneficial impact
on the reform effort, and will hope-
fully continue to grow.
NATO-Ukraine cooperation is and
will remain an important part of
the Alliance’s contribution to the in-
ternational community’s efforts to
project stability in the Euro-Atlantic
area and beyond. Our focus right
now, as I have mentioned, is to help
Ukraine reform and modernize in ac-
cordance with NATO standards. And
Ukraine has a unique variety of tools
at its disposal to further deepen its
Distinctive Partnership with the Al-
liance, including Ukraine’s Annual
National Programme, the Compre-
hensive Assistance Package and the
Planning and Review Process.
Building on the above Warsaw deliv-
erables, NATO encourages Ukraine
to advance with even more deter-
mination on the path of reform.
And the NATO Representation to
Ukraine is here to help, every step
of the way. The window of opportu-
nity for reform is open, and time is
of the essence.

9
N
o doubt, the Warsaw Sum-
mit of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization on July
8-9, 2016 was an important mile-
stone for the functioning and devel-
opment of global security. During
the time of rapid changes, fast and
well-informed decision-making in
security sphere becomes a key fac-
tor for deterring aggression and de-
structive forces.
The summit’s specific decisions per-
taining to Ukraine were met with a
mixed response from the Ukrainian
expert and civil community. On the
one hand, it was essential that the
actions of present-day Russia were
defined as the main destabilizing fac-
tor. Ukrainians can also hardly over-
emphasize the importance of NATO
member countries’ consolidation in
maintaining sanctions against Russia
and pointing out the mandatory de-
occupation of Crimea by Russia. That
said, for Ukraine, all decisions of the
NATO summit remained at the level
of politics and moral support. On the
other hand, at the current develop-
ment stage of the Ukrainian state,
Ukrainians must see a clear way to-
wards practical cooperation with
NATO, both through implementation
of the existing decisions and through
creation of new opportunities. The
Ukrainian society is particularly con-
cerned whether Ukraine is going to
become an asset for NATO, or it is
viewed as a certain dangerous li-
ability. Experts and the civil commu-
nity alike are anxious to know: will
Ukraine remain in the grey, buffer
zone between two powerful forces,
or will it finally be included in the
Euro-Atlantic security system?
The decisions made at the July sum-
mit serve to strengthen NATO’s po-
sitions, within the military-political
bloc’s borders. Meanwhile, we are
hoping to move on towards a more
practical cooperation in the future,
and thus cannot ignore the fact that
none of the 139 decisions made at
the summit contain a clear message
about Ukraine’s prospects for future
NATO membership.
Ukraine, which is de facto defending
the peace of the Western countries,
is eager to see them making an ad-
equate contribution to the system
for deterrence of Russia, which has
ruined the existing system of inter-
national security.
Ukraine in Fact Protects Peace of the West
Valentyn BADRAK,
Director of the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies

10
A
s I am mindful of the old adage
from the poet Shelly quipping
in relation to his fellow poet
Lord Byron that “he has lost the art of
communication but unfortunately not
the habit of public speaking” – I shall
be concise and seek to give you the
broader picture.
To set the scene: Responding
to Evolving Challenges
One thing NATO has done well over
the decades is change with the times –
and the challenges. We’ve been able
to reinvent ourselves and our strate-
gies to reflect changing circumstances.
The Warsaw Summit like the pre-
vious summit in Wales took place
amidst a fundamentally changed se-
curity environment.
With its illegal annexation of Crimea,
Russia tore up the international rule-
book and challenged our post-Cold
War vision of a Europe whole, free
and at peace. 2014 stands out as a
watershed year.
Two years later, we face continued
Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine,
and an ongoing, unprovoked military
build-up from the Barents Sea to the
Baltic, and from the Black Sea to the
eastern Mediterranean.
Terrorism and turmoil across Middle
East and North Africa didn’t begin in
2014. But that year witnessed a step
change – for the worse – with the
emergence of the so-called Islamic
State or Daesh, and its declared ambi-
tion to establish a caliphate, beginning
in Iraq and Syria.
The effects have been the further es-
calation of the civil war in Syria, and
a worsening of the arc of crisis across
the Middle East and North Africa, with
direct consequences for our own se-
curity in the form of brutal terrorist
attacks – including Istanbul, Orlando,
Brussels and Paris – and the biggest
migrant and refugee crisis in Europe
since World War II.
In addition to these major challenges
to the East and South, we face long-
standing threats such as cyber-at-
PRESENTATIONS
Warsaw Summit Approved Our Strategy
for the Longer Term
Dr. Gerlinde NIEHUS,
Head of Engagements Section, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO HQ

11
tacks, nuclear proliferation and long-
range ballistic missiles. As the world
changes, NATO must continue to
adapt – and Warsaw was fundamen-
tally about adaptation and change.
Preparing for Warsaw
The Wales Summit in September 2014
was NATO’s immediate response to
these evolving security challenges.
Following Wales, we have delivered
the biggest reinforcement of our col-
lective defence in a generation. A few
concrete examples:
• We tripled the size of the NATO
Response Force to 40,000, with a
Spearhead Force at its core, able
to move within days.
• We set up eight new headquar-
ters to facilitate training and rein-
forcements in the eastern part of
our Alliance.
• We augmented the defences of
Turkey, the Ally most affected
by the turmoil in the south, with
AWACS planes and defensive mis-
sile systems.
• We sped up our decision-making,
and developed strategies to deal
with hybrid threats and complex
challenges from the south.
• And we agreed to increase our ca-
pacity for intelligence sharing and
being able to act on that intelli-
gence. We will soon create a new
Intelligence division at NATO. We
will better coordinate intelligence
gathering, to increase efficiency
and situational awareness.
Warsaw Summit: Shaping
the Future of NATO
Warsaw Summit approved our strat-
egy for the longer term, based on rec-
ognition that these challenges will be
with us for a long time to come.
Two overarching themes of the sum-
mit will determine NATO’s direction
for many years:
• Strengthening our collective de-
fence and deterrence and
• projecting stability beyond our
borders.
Both are long-term policies that will
require determination and persistence
in implementation.
Let me map out each briefly:
To protect our nations by strengthen-
ing collective defence and deterrence:
We have agreed on an Enhanced
Forward Presence: that means a
NATO deployment, by rotation, of
a robust, multinational battalion in
each of most exposed countries in
North East – Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania and Poland – and bolster pos-
ture in South East.This will make it
clear that an attack against one Ally
will be met by forces from across
the Alliance.

12
Allies committed to boosting their re-
silience, improving civil preparedness,
and ensuring we have the right mix of
capabilities to meet new challenges,
including hybrid warfare.
Cyber Security: We recognised cyber-
space as a new operational domain,
joining land, air and sea. And Allies
pledged to strengthen their own cyber
defences, and share more information
and best practices.
Relations with Russia: they have been
high on agenda in Warsaw. We pursue
a two-track policy: defence and dia-
logue. NATO does not seek confronta-
tion. Everything we do is defensive,
proportionate, and in line with our in-
ternational commitments.
• In the long term, we still seek a
constructive relationship if Russia
ends its aggression against Ukraine
and returns to compliance with in-
ternational law.
• In near term, dialogue is needed to
manage a difficult relationship, re-
store predictability, transparency,
and measures for risk reduction.
We want to ensure that a misun-
derstanding or an accident doesn’t
spiral out of control.
To project stability
beyond our borders –
east and south:
We will step up support for partners in
ourneighbourhood.Ifourpartnersare
more stable, we are more secure. This
means doing more to help our part-
ners provide for their own security,
build resilience against outside pres-
sure, and fight terrorism.
All 28 NATO Allies are contributing to
the US-led Global Coalition to Counter
ISIL. At Warsaw Summit, we decided
that NATO AWACS aircraft will provide
direct support to this Coalition.
We also agreed to expand our cur-
rent training and capacity building
programs for Iraqi military officers
into Iraq. We will continue enhancing
our cooperation with Jordan and our
preparations to assist Libya, if request-
ed.And we will sustain our long-term
commitment to train, advise and assist
the Afghan security forces.
In addition, NATO will provide more
support to Georgia, to continue to as-
sist the Republic of Moldova and to
enhance support to Ukraine.
For Ukraine, Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the NATO-Ukraine Com-
mission endorsed the comprehen-
sive Assistance Package for Ukraine.
This is a significant package to sup-
port Ukraine in its reform efforts. To
make your country more resilient
and able to better provide for your
own security.
We will also deepen our engagement
with partners in the Black and Baltic
Sea regions, and in the Western Bal-
kans. We will also maintain our impor-
tant operation in Kosovo.

13
Projecting stability touches on over-
lapping issues: countering terrorism
and turmoil, capacity building, work-
ing with partners, addressing the
migrant and refugee crisis, and mari-
time security.
Security and stability will be enhanced
through greater cooperation between
NATO and the European Union. It will
take time before we know the full con-
sequences of the United Kingdom’s
decision to leave the EU, but we know
this: the UK remains a staunch NATO
ally and NATO-EU cooperation has be-
come even more important.
So we are taking our cooperation to
the whole new level. NATO and the
EU will enhance civil preparedness,
boost cyber defense capabilities and
address broader maritime security
issues in the central Mediterranean –
building on NATO’s cooperation with
the EU to cut lines of international
human smuggling in the Aegean.
Goals include countering trafficking
and terrorism, upholding freedom
of navigation, and contributing to re-
gional capacity building.
The security we need:
Defence Spending Pledge
and Progress
Modern challenges require a mod-
ern Alliance. And they require the
right resources. The Warsaw Sum-
mit reviewed and reconfirmed the
Defence Investment Pledge made at
the Wales Summit.
2015 was the first year in many with
a small increase in defence spending.
Estimates for 2016 show a further in-
crease of 3% across European Allies
and Canada. This amounts to $8 billion
US dollars in extra defence spending.
We still have a long way to go. We
need to keep up the momentum. But
we have turned an important corner.
Concluding Thoughts:
Evolving Challenges,
Enduring Values
Our 67-year history has taught us
the importance of evolving as the
threats evolve. But some things
haven’t changed – nor should they.
Like our unbreakable bond between
Europe and North America, our com-
mitment to defend each other from
attack – under Article 5 of our trea-
ty – and our dedication to our funda-
mental values: democracy, individual
liberty, human rights and the rule of
law. These are NATO’s enduring val-
ues that keep us united and strong.
And we stand firm in our political and
practical support to Ukraine.
We have again underpinnedthat an
“independent, sovereign and stable
Ukraine, firmly committed to democ-
racy and the rule of law is key to Euro-
Atlantic security.”
We stand united in our support for
Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and its inherent right to decide its
own future and foreign policy course
free from outside interference.

14
F
or Poland, security is imple-
mented through cooperation
within NATO and with Ukraine.
In this context, Ukraine holds funda-
mental importance for Poland, and
the latter will continue providing the
Ukrainian side with necessary as-
sistance, including that required to
increase the combat potential of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. The assis-
tance package for Ukraine approved
by the NATO summit is unprece-
dented, as no non-member country
in NATO’s history has ever received
support on such scale.
The Warsaw summit made it clear
that Russia itself is a destabilizing
factor, and we must emphasize that
a democratic, independent Ukraine
plays a paramount role in the func-
tioning and development of Europe.
Among the summit’s results of par-
ticular importance to Ukraine are
the Distinctive Partnership between
Ukraine and NATO, as well as the
bilateral agreement on military and
technical cooperation and weap-
ons supply. As for the Agreement
on Military Cooperation between
Ukraine and Poland, it was signed
in Warsaw during the NATO summit,
by the heads of defence ministries
of Poland and Ukraine: Antoni Ma-
cierewicz, the Minister of National
Defence of Poland, and Stepan Pol-
torak, the Minister of Defence of
Ukraine. That Agreement on Military
and Technical Cooperation stipulates
supplies of armaments and military
equipment to Ukraine, and provision
of military and technical services. Po-
land will be investing in Ukraine for
the sake of its own security, because
a safe Poland is not possible without
a safe and independent Ukraine.
In addition to that, Ukrainian soldiers
are participating in joint military ex-
ercises and trainings in Yavoriv, Lviv
Region, together with the USA, Great
Britain, Canada, and Lithuania.
A Democratic Ukraine is of Paramount
Importance for Europe
Rafał WOLSKI,
Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of the Republic of Poland to Ukraine
(Deputy Head of the Diplomatic Mission)

15
W
hat are the results of the
NATO Warsaw summit
for Ukraine?
In terms of the form and content of
the decisions made, the NATO War-
saw summit was unprecedented –
both as regards the relations be-
tween NATO and Ukraine, and the
strategic decisions made by NATO at
the summit. To describe briefly the
NATO Warsaw summit’s decisions
and their impact on the interests of
Ukrainians, I believe we can use two
words. One is a hope. The second
one is disappointment.
If we speak of hope: the Warsaw
summit made unprecedented deci-
sions related to Ukraine. We are once
again grateful to NATO for showing
their solidarity with Ukraine in our
struggle against the Russian aggres-
sor. We are thankful for the com-
prehensive assistance package ap-
proved by NATO, the scope of which
is really unprecedented. That said, a
certain portion of this comprehen-
sive package repeats NATO’s past
decisions concerning Ukraine. This
summit was also unique in terms of
the level, format, and subject mat-
ter of the meetings attended by the
President of Ukraine. The level of
the Ukraine-NATO Commission, the
5+1 format of the summit – all those
are NATO’s nods of respect towards
Ukraine. All these are positive things.
Now, concerning disappointment.
We did not hear the words that
were recorded in the final declara-
tion of the NATO Bucharest sum-
mit, which, and I quote, said that
“Ukraine and Georgia will become
members of NATO.” We did not hear
anything along those lines in War-
saw, even though that summit made
reference to the decisions of some
previous summits, including the
Bucharest one. From that, we can
indirectly conclude that NATO sup-
ports, or rather, adheres to the deci-
sions that were approved, including
those made in Bucharest concerning
Ukraine. We did not hear a single
word about MAP. These are issues
that can be defined through certain
messages that were not sent to us in
NATO Is Not Ready to Talk About Granting
Membership to Ukraine
Borys TARASYUK,
Member of Parliament of Ukraine,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (1998-2000, 2005-2007)

16
Warsaw. At the same time, as a re-
minder: back in 2006, we were nego-
tiating with NATO leaders Ukraine’s
invitation to MAP. The speech by
[Viktor] Yanukovych on September
14, 2006, had essentially ruined
those plans and achievements. Dur-
ing the first two years of the Russian
aggression, we did not see any of
those steps, which is naturally dis-
appointing. Obviously, the calls for
solidarity with Ukraine, the calls for
Russia to cease its aggression against
Ukraine and observe the norms of
the international law – those are of
some help, but not much. Especially
not in the area of actual warfare, of
the armed conflict between Ukraine
and Russia.
At the summit we also did not hear
anything about supplies of modern
weaponry to Ukraine. This is also
disappointing. Behind this, we can
see the political decisions made in
Washington, whose administration
keeps to the principle: no weapons
supply to Ukraine regardless of the
US Congress’ decision.
To sum up the above, I will say that
today, NATO is not ready to address
the question of Ukraine’s member-
ship. However, the good news is that
NATO gave Ukraine an opportunity
to demonstrate that it is ready to re-
form its economy as well as its de-
fence and security sectors. I consider
that fact as positive, because any
future relations between Ukraine
and NATO will depend on Ukraine’s
ability to carry out in-depth reforms,
including those in the defence and
security sectors.

17
W
e must accept the fact
that the world is chang-
ing rapidly, with the de-
stabilization already spanning the
Caspian-Black Sea region, even with-
out regard for the 425-km front line
in the ATO zone in Donbas. The Cas-
pian-Black Sea region is destabilized,
as is evidenced, among other things,
by the recent events in Turkey and
Armenia. A real war is underway in
Ukraine, where the enemy continues
deploying heavy artillery day and
night, and where Ukrainian soldiers
die every day. This is why the future
of Ukraine’s prospective Euro-Atlan-
tic integration is being decided in the
combat zone.
The summit is important for Ukraine
because it indicates the re-emerging
power of NATO as the security foun-
dation, which Russia is trying to ruin.
This is of paramount importance. In
that context, it is feasible for Ukraine
to create its own military leverage as
an argument for additional defence
capacity. To that end, we need to
reform our defence sector. Ukraine
has already completed a cycle of
defence planning, with the drafting
and adoption of the new Military
Doctrine, National Security Strategy,
Strategic Defence Bulletin, and the
Strategy for Cyber Security. Thus,
we have every prerequisite and op-
portunity for successful reformation
and development of our country’s
defence sector.
By and large, we should bear in mind
several key conclusions of the War-
saw NATO summit.
One: Military power has been re-
established as the foundation of the
national security policy. In the cur-
rent environment of global trans-
formations, the military factor has
become the main tool of the foreign
policy. Thus, military power becomes
the main foreign policy tool. This is
a fundamental change, and we must
clearly understand this.
Two: Only those who can help them-
selves as much as possible may
count on outside assistance. Lack of
funds for full-fledged reforms and
Military Power Has Been
Re-established as the Foundation
of the National Security Policy
Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO,
Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine

18
rearmament puts a damper on creat-
ing a modern army in Ukraine in the
nearest future. The emergence of a
compact, but well-equipped army
with modern armaments is a matter
of the future. War costs money, and
today’s Ukraine is, let’s face it, one of
the poorest countries in Europe, so it
will not be able to afford large-scale
rearmament in the next few years.
Thus, when working with a limited
defence budget, the following fac-
tors are critical for increasing an
army’s combat readiness: efficient
use of the available arsenal of weap-
ons and military equipment; deep
modernization of Soviet-made ar-
maments; and a qualitative increase
in the efficiency of all defence and
security bodies, starting with com-
mand, control and intelligence.
Three: NATO has already made an
unprecedented move in providing
Ukraine with increased opportunities
to effect institutional reforms, and
Ukraine must use them. I should em-
phasize that there are realistic ways
of applying the existing mechanisms
of cooperation between Ukraine
and NATO, so let us start working on
specific projects. In particular, Kyiv’s
plans to shift Ukraine’s defence sec-
tor to NATO standards need to be
taken to the practical level.
This said, the military reform must
focus on a comprehensive change in
the ideology of the needs of the army
and a soldier. If a soldier is regarded
as nothing but a tool, no Euro-Atlan-
tic integration will be possible.
There is one final point I would like
to make. Ukraine highly appreci-
ates the assistance provided by
NATO and its member countries at
all levels, including in the sphere of
reforms. However, and this is im-
portant, the latter is being carried
out in the situation of an ongoing
information war. Ukraine is meet-
ing many of its allies’ requirements
rather precisely, and there is good
reason to say that the Armed Forces
of Ukraine are being changed dra-
matically and for the better.

19
T
oday, it’s important to rec-
ognize that the strategy of
deterring the Russian Federa-
tion is a dominant geopolitical fac-
tor that will continue shaping the
actions of NATO member countries
and other defence actors for a long
period of time. An important role in
this process is reserved for Ukraine,
even though for us, such deterrence
means an everyday war of attrition.
Nevertheless, this is our way of im-
plementing NATO’s strategy. This is
something we must realize, and use
that fact as the basis for any future
plans concerning Ukraine’s direction
of movement and respective steps
to that effect. In the context of de-
terrence, the partnership between
NATO and Ukraine becomes particu-
larly meaningful.
Thus, in the context of NATO part-
nership, Ukraine is located at the
very front line of strategic deter-
rence of the aggressor. It is defend-
ing not only itself, but the defence
space of NATO countries. We must
also emphasize that the distinctive
partnership status granted to our
country and the “comprehensive
assistance” package are crucial for
enabling our domestic reforms. Ide-
ally, we would like to see the stra-
tegic document package approved
by the President to be followed by
documents that set the goals of our
partnership with NATO, the annual
NATO Cooperation Plan, etc. In ad-
dition, in line with NATO practices,
each item on our programs must be
backed financially. This is something
we are often missing, that is why
even perfectly drafted plans fail to
be implemented.
Going back to the significance of
the latest NATO summit’s decisions
for Ukraine, I would like to highlight
three documents that, in my opinion,
point to the Alliance’s drastic change
of heart as relates to its commitment
to defending itself and deterring the
aggressor. These are such important
documents as “Assessment of the
Situation in the Baltic Sea Region,”
“Assessment of the Situation in the
Black Sea Region,” and the recogni-
Through the War in Donbas, Ukraine
is Carrying out NATO’s Strategy
on Deterrence of Russia in Europe
Ihor DOLHOV,
Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine

20
tion of the cyber space as the fourth
dimension of the operational war-
fare. Indeed, we are already being
subjected to cyber attacks, the ag-
gressor is actively testing new cyber
warfare methods, and cooperation
with allies in this field will allow us to
build up our own defence capacity.
Finally, another greatly important
summit decision was to create a joint
intelligence and data exchange sys-
tem. Given the increasing threat on
the part of Russia and international
terrorists, this step is very timely,
even if it does destroy certain stereo-
types and existing limitations typical
for the secret services of every single
NATO member and partner country.
Thus, the Warsaw summit created
real possibilities for a deeper part-
nership between Ukraine and NATO.
Moreover, we are offered assistance
with a prospect of its expansion, on
the principles of “more for more.”

21
T
he importance of NATO sup-
port for Ukraine in our con-
frontation with the aggres-
sor cannot be overestimated, as we
would have had a much more dif-
ficult time going it alone. Consider-
ing the ongoing negative changes
in Russia (deteriorating economy,
rehabilitation of Stalinism, rampant,
shameless and lying propaganda and
anti-NATO rhetoric, to name a few),
the Kremlin is stepping up sabotage
efforts by its special forces, striving
to disrupt Ukraine from the inside.
In this context, I would like to say
about the efficient work of the Se-
curity Service of Ukraine (SBU),
which, in the conditions of the on-
going war with Russia, successfully
prevented numerous terrorist at-
tacks that were being prepared by
the enemy in our cities, and did not
allow for the implementation of
scenarios that would have created
new hotbeds and seats of sepa-
ratism. Maybe the worst of them
could have been the creation of the
“Bessarabian People’s Republic.”
These successes reveal Ukraine’s
own potential, which can be useful
for its Western partners, especially
now that recent terrorist attacks in
France and Belgium showed that
the Western law-enforcement struc-
tures are not yet able to prevent the
spread of terrorism through their
territories. The attempted coup in
Turkey, the NATO member state,
also is worth mention. With this in
mind, the deterrence of the aggres-
sor is a function that reaches into
the future, especially in the current
situation, which will be our reality
for the years to come.
As a representative of the Ukrainian
side in the security subgroup of the
Minsk Tripartite Contact Group, I
speak in favour of experience shar-
The Kremlin is Stepping up Sabotage
Efforts by Special Services to Disrupt
Ukraine from the Inside
Yevhen MARCHUK,
Prime Minister of Ukraine (1995-1996),
Secretary of the National Security
and Defence Council of Ukraine (1999-2003),
Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2003-2004),
Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (1991 – 1994)

22
ing between the special services of
Ukraine and those of NATO coun-
tries. However, I must also caution
against an immediate reform of
Ukrainian special services. Let us be
honest: we have much to learn from
the special services of NATO coun-
tries, but our colleagues also have
much to learn from us, because de-
cades of peace in Europe served to
relax its special services. Which Eu-
ropean country has recent warfare
experience? None. Meanwhile, we
have colossal practice that no other
European country had the chance
to accumulate. Because of this, I
am not in a hurry to insist that we
implemented the existing recom-
mendations on reforming the Secu-
rity Service of Ukraine. What exactly
are they? They are based, for ex-
ample, on peaceful Switzerland. In
other words, the recommendations
for reforming the SBU are based on
the calm situation in Europe. We can
speak about reforming our special
services when the war is over, and
peace has been around for 10-15
years. That will be the time to con-
sider and implement such reforms.

23
I
would like to take rather a contro-
versial view of the decisions made
by the NATO Warsaw summit. Our
media are engaged in a lively discus-
sion of the summit’s results. Natu-
rally, these include a comprehensive
assistance package, an increased
number of joint events, advisory
support, and so on. No doubt, those
things are important and of funda-
mental value. They carry two mes-
sages. First, Ukraine must continue
reforming its defence and security
sectors. Second, we need to start
practical implementation of the Stra-
tegic Defence Bulletin, get the neces-
sary operational combat capabilities,
and so on.
However, I would like to discuss the
summit’s decisions related to the Al-
lied countries, specifically, in the as-
pect that translates to a more active
policy of deterrence of Russia and
strengthening collective security.
Why are they important? I believe
that Ukraine is currently at the front
line of deterring Russia. That is why
our country may claim certain ben-
efits and additional assistance – if we
are proactive. Proactive in terms of
participation in NATO events, full uti-
lization of our potential, offering our
capacities, experience, etc.
What does this entail? First of all, I
am talking about decisions dealing
with a more active deterrence poli-
cy, strengthening of NATO’s eastern
flank, creating of appropriate collec-
tive capabilities, and the use of vari-
ous instruments to expand those ca-
pabilities in the context of collective
security. In particular, this concerns
capacities in the maritime defence
zone. Before the Warsaw summit,
Romania proposed the creation of a
NATO joint naval group in the Black
Sea, which would serve as a deter-
rent for Russia against increasing its
combat capabilities in this region.
Unfortunately, as we know, this de-
Ukraine Can Receive Benefits,
Acting Proactively
Ihor KABANENKO,
President of UARPA,
Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2014),
First Deputy Head of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2012-2013),
Admiral of the Naval Forces of Ukraine

24
cision was not approved. Instead, it
was stated that the proposal would
be studied in more detail, but also
that there would be an increase in
naval exercises. Ukraine can partici-
pate in those developments.
The same refers to the development
of NATO’s air forces. Poland will take
part in those events, and, accord-
ingly, Ukraine can also try to be more
proactive and offer its capacities,
which are unfortunately limited, but
still, might be useful for the Alliance.
As a positive example of Ukraine’s
proactive position, let me remind
you of the successful Measures of
Strengthening Trust & Security in the
Black Sea Region initiative proposed
by Ukraine. That initiative became
the basis for the creation and im-
plementation of the BLACKSEAFOR
project. The BLACKSEAFOR docu-
ments laid down the basic operat-
ing principles of that initiative, also
suggested by Ukraine. BLACKSEAFOR
was rather successful, up until Rus-
sia’s occupation of the Crimea. This
example shows that we can be at
the forefront of similar projects, that
contribute to our own interests and
those of our partners alike.
Other initiatives of the summit’s
concern, for example, the increase
of early warning capabilities. Those
initiatives included exercises in
which Ukraine took part in 2005-
2008. Increased early warning ca-
pabilities will provide for a more
active and efficient response to
changes in circumstances and al-
low employment of the joint early
warning system to detect changes
in the situation. Such format can be
useful for both sides.
Another item raised at the summit
was presented by joint exercises
based on collective defence scenar-
ios. I believe that Ukraine has a great
potential here, to join and share ex-
perience with our NATO colleagues. I
also believe that this format requires
a proactive approach, because we do
possess considerable experience of
inter-compatibility in such exercises,
inter-compatibility within operation-
al capability concepts, and in other
programs that existed in the past.
However, our knowledge requires
practical implementation with real
actions in the context of decisions
made at the summit.
Other potentially interesting deci-
sions for Ukraine are those dealing
with the adaptation of infrastruc-
ture, and delegation of additional
authority from military-political to
military structures: from the North
Atlantic Council to the North At-
lantic Supreme Command. We can
start similar transitions on our end,
changing our governance system
asynchronously.

25
Another aspect I would like to em-
phasize is sharing experience. Again,
it would be advisable for us to create
an inter-compatibility field, with the
common understanding of the ongo-
ing situation, which we call hybrid
warfare, or new-generation armed
confrontation. Unfortunately, I guess
that in this respect, there are some
discrepancies in terminology, as well
as in priorities and selection of effi-
cient mechanisms. Meanwhile, it is a
very important area for the concen-
tration of efforts on important direc-
tions, and for the maximum use of
the existing potential. Unfortunately,
at this point of time, we have not
yet fully utilized all the capacities we
have, namely, in the field of public-
private partnership: both in Ukraine
and in bilateral or multilateral use of
such opportunities. Some efforts are
underway, but I would like to empha-
size that we are still under-utilizing
our potential, at multiple levels: stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical.
We understand that this war is
waged by more than just the classic
means of armed confrontation. The
ratio of military and non-military ac-
tions in this war is 1 to 4. The latter
include, among others, information
warfare and cyber security. This is
a field that, in my opinion and pro-
ceeding from the current evidence,
will growth further, along with the
naval sector. These are the two
spheres in which Ukraine and NATO
should cooperate more productively
and more regularly, relying on pub-
lic-private partnership.
Another aspect is presented by stra-
tegic communications. I believe that
in this issue, we still have a problem
with shared terminology, common
understanding, and clear definition
of the very concept of strategic com-
munications. Some think that stra-
tegic communications are nothing
but counter-propaganda but I be-
lieve those are two entirely different
things. Again, it will take the form of
specific, practical, and realistic joint
projects involving the state authori-
ties and civil society, to help us stand
strong in the current difficult situa-
tion, make progress, and build a so-
ciety we wish to have – founded on
the values of a liberal, democratic,
and market economy.

26
T
he NATO Summit in Warsaw
on July 8-9, 2016, did not re-
sult in any breakthroughs that
could give Ukraine an edge over its
external aggressor. However, we
must admit that by and large, Kyiv
got a response in kind from NATO,
being, to an extent, a logical continu-
ation of the West’s strategy of deter-
ring Russia.
We believe that the NATO summit’s
decisions concerning Ukraine –
namely, the adoption of the new
Comprehensive Assistance Package
for Ukraine, the prospect of Ukraine’s
participation in the Enhanced Op-
portunities Programme, and the ex-
tension of sanctions against Russia –
were just some of the steps NATO
could have taken.
On its part, the Ukrainian Govern-
ment has also carried out only some
oftheexistingtasks,whenitcomesto
defence reforms and preparation for
military-technological cooperation
with NATO countries – that is why
we cannot yet expect a real increase
in practical cooperation in creation
of armaments, or a near prospect of
lethal military aid for Ukraine. Mov-
ing on to specific military-techno-
logical cooperation (MTC) projects
requires significant modernization
of Ukraine’s regulatory-legal frame-
work, and a change in the principles
of governance in the defence sector.
These changes did not take place in
Ukraine. The Ukrainian state must
reconsider its approach and create a
new playing field, the one that would
make investors interested in working
in Ukraine, especially in its defence
industry. We should also be more
active on the international scene,
making attractive offers to investors.
It is not normal that, in spite of the
current situation, NATO countries
are using the Russian Volga-Dnepr
airlines for airlift, France continues
manufacturing thermal scopes for
Russian military equipment, and Ita-
ly supplies SKD sets for Russia’s Rys
armoured vehicles.
Besides, I am sure that European
NATO countries are acting mainly
within the paradigm of their own
security interests, and giving increas-
ingly more frequent signals about
their willingness to improve relations
Kyiv Received a Response
in Kind from NATO
Valentyn BADRAK,
Director of the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies

27
with Russia, including at the expense
of Ukraine’s interests. In practice,
these sentiments are seen in contin-
ued military-technological coopera-
tion between Russia and some NATO
countries. For example, despite the
sanctions, Italy and France continue
implementing joint MTC projects
with Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian
defence manufacturers and devel-
opers often face refusal, when try-
ing to buy certain components for
weapons and military equipment.
This does not just complicate the
idea of practical cooperation with
companies from NATO countries, but
also casts doubt about the plans to
phase out imports and fully give up
MTC with the Russian Federation in
the future.
In the current conditions, Ukraine
could make the most valuable
achievements in specific military-
technological cooperation projects,
involving joint production with
Western defence companies, receiv-
ing defence technologies, etc. For
now, we can expect from NATO such
things like: additional structures in
hybrid defence, intensified military
exercises and discipline for Ukrainian
defence forces; NATO will probably
provide assistance in the develop-
ment of the Special Operations Force
and the Ukrainian Naval Forces, as
well as in the creation of cyber de-
fence departments. Cooperation
with NATO may also develop in the
context of the trust funds created to
assist Ukraine.
However, the most important step
for Ukraine in cooperation with
NATO would be to start practical
cooperation in creation of new ar-
maments, which is the only way for
our Western partners to become our
real and practical allies. This shift
can happen only after a change of
the mindset, both of the NATO lead-
ers and the Ukrainian government,
and the resulting transformation of
Ukraine’s defence market into a clear
and transparent playing field for the
West. This would include adoption
of the necessary laws and programs,
beginning of transparent privatisa-
tion of some defence industry enter-
prises, and protection of private and
foreign investments. At this point of
time, the Ukrainian government is
not ready to make such steps, just
as it is not ready to step away from
“manual control” of the defence sec-
tor. Ukrainian society is in fact much
more ready for Ukraine’s integration
into NATO than its government.
We must emphasize that Ukraine
must break away from Russia, once
and for all, when it comes to defence
technologies and manufacturing of
weapons and military equipment.
Without such a break, we cannot
expect a realistic full-scale coopera-

28
tion in armaments with NATO coun-
tries. In this context, assistance from
NATO is a fundamental element for
Ukraine’s transformation.
Thus, the possibility of the full-scale
Euro-Atlantic integration, implemen-
tation of practical defence projects,
and creation of joint defence capa-
bilities remain unanswered ques-
tions for Ukraine. And the whole na-
tion is eager to hear the answers as
soon as possible.
UkraineshouldnotcometotheWest
asking for weapons, but rather, act
as a partner that possesses defence
technologies, proposing joint pro-
duction of modern armaments at its
facilities, through cooperation and
investments into the Ukrainian de-
fence sector. For example, resump-
tion of production of An-124 Ruslan
heavy transport aircraft would make
it possible to launch a number of
new projects and to bar Russia from
the international airlift market at a
time. Moreover, even as we speak,
the aggressor is looking for oppor-
tunities to modernize its heavy car-
go aircraft fleet, and poach experts
in that field, including from Ukraine.
On one hand, this is an attempt to
rescue Russia’s technologically ob-
solete aircraft production, on the
other, a threat for Ukraine, which
may lose a number of engineering
professionals. We cannot let that
happen. Other promising projects
may include target missile devel-
opment for the US National Missile
Defence, and subsequently, for the
European missile defence shield.
Creating capacities in Ukraine for
manufacturing of communication
technologies, strike drones, and
other military equipment would
also give way for important and lu-
crative projects.
Thus, the NATO summit became an-
other indication that cooperation
between Ukraine and NATO is a two-
way street that requires efforts and
decision-making from both sides,
which is not always easy. However,
this is an approach that can pro-
vide for practical transformation in
Ukraine, while giving the Alliance a
reliable and dependable ally on its
eastern border.

29
I
will share some thoughts on the
wider security environment, and
what NATO is doing to counter cur-
rent threats, through deterrence and
projecting stability.
• The strategic goal for the alliance
remainsthesame:AEuropewhole,
free, and at peace.
• As the world changes and threats
evolve, our nations are more se-
cure when we stand together.
NATO members are more than just
military allies and Article 5. We are
united by our enduring commit-
ment to shared values – democ-
racy, pluralism, and inclusive soci-
eties strengthened by our rich di-
versity of backgrounds and faiths.
• Russia’s occupation of Crimea in
2014, and subsequent aggression
in Donetsk and Luhansk, trans-
formed the strategic security envi-
ronment of Europe in the first ma-
jor shift since the breakup of the
Soviet Union 25 years ago.
• As President Obama said in his
news conference in Warsaw: “This
is a pivotal moment for the alli-
ance.” If that word sounds famil-
iar, you may recall when President
Obama came into office 7 years
ago, the U.S. administration talked
about a “pivot” to Asia. The cur-
rent focus on events in Europe is
crystal clear. He continued: “In the
nearly 70 years of NATO, perhaps
never have we faced such a range
of challenges all at once – security,
humanitarian, political.”
• Thus, we are not merely talking
about a clear threat from a more
aggressive Russia. The new secu-
rity environment is not a simple
return to the 20th century Cold
War East vs. West dynamic in NA-
TO’s early years.
• There is also the growing threat
from transnational terrorist or-
ganizations based in northern Af-
rica and the Middle East, as well
as the destabilizing force of mass
migration. We have seen over the
past year that terrorist groups,
including ISIL, have the ability
to strike at the heart of Europe,
even as their zones of insecurity
in the Middle East have led to un-
precedented waves of migrants
fleeing conflict. Cyber attacks
threaten Allied infrastructure as
much as Ukrainian infrastructure.
On Deterrence – Preventing
New Conflict, Not Provoking It
George P.KENT,
Deputy Chief of Mission, the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine

30
• The recent Warsaw Summit fo-
cused on adapting to new reali-
ties. NATO Allies will respond in
two major ways: deterrence; and
projecting stability beyond NA-
TO’s borders.
On Deterrence – preventing new con-
flict, not provoking it.
The core of the “new security environ-
ment” in 2016 and NATO prepared-
ness reflect Russian actions in Ukraine,
and the fear that Russia may repeat
such actions within the territory of
NATO countries. NATO’s Readiness Ac-
tion Plan includes the tripling in size of
the NATO Response Force with a bri-
gade-sized high-readiness spearhead
force at its core able to move within in
a matter of days.
• In Warsaw, the Allies agreed to en-
hance their force posture up and
down the eastern flank of the Alli-
ance that borders Russia.
• To the northeast, in the Baltic Sea
region, we have agreed to rotate
four battalions to Estonia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Poland in enhanced
forward presence. All four allies
have long requested deployments
for their defense, long seen by oth-
er members as not necessary. The
threat environment has changed,
and so has our posture.
• To the southeast, the Black Sea
region, NATO also agreed to cre-
ate a new multinational brigade
that we hope will become opera-
tional in the coming years.
• Finally, NATO agreed to the cre-
ation of a 13,000- strong NATO
Rapid Reaction Force, stationed
in Spain to be sure, but one that
could be deployed to the eastern
flank of Europe in a matter of
days to deter an offensive from
Russia. It is not just deterrence
that NATO is seeking to enhance,
but rapid deterrence.
On Projecting Stability Beyond NATO’s
Borders.
The other key theme of the Summit
was projecting stability beyond NA-
TO’s borders. While events in Ukraine
were a clear primary driving force, the
Summit also considered transnational
threats from northern Africa, the Mid-
dle East, and Afghanistan.
• Ukraine must be a key partner in
this effort. A democratic, stable
Ukraine that successfully imple-
ments economic and political
reforms, and is assured of its ter-
ritorial integrity and sovereignty,
is a key element of Euro-Atlantic
security.
• AndasPresidentObamastressed:
“Our alliance must do more on
behalf of global security, espe-
cially on Europe’s southern flank.
NATO should intensify its commit-
ment to the campaign to destroy
Isis and do more to help the EU
shut down criminal networks that
are exploiting desperate migrants
crossing the Mediterranean and
Aegean seas.”

31
M
y report will address some
strategic issues. I would like
to emphasize the impor-
tance of this conference. NATO rep-
resentatives permitted me to speak
more openly than in front of our
diplomatic friends. As I am a former
advisor to the President, I can be
more candid.
The first and most important point:
the NATO summit in Warsaw was
a true breakthrough. It showcased
a complete change of attitude to-
wards defence and deterrence,
compared to the Wales summit.
Despite any pessimistic assessment
by a number of experts, the changes
seen there were drastic.
Russia is mentioned in the Communi-
qué 52 times. This summit was very
much focused on the Russian prob-
lem, and the messages sent by it,
even the wording in the declaration,
became the part of the process for
the deterrence of Moscow. The final
text of the declaration was approved
by all parties, even the President of
France who recently said that Rus-
sia is France’s partner. The speech
of the NATO Secretary General was
very telling. In fact, this was the first
time when an Alliance leader “chal-
lenged” the head of the state who
addressed them. All these things
pertain to Russia. The final declara-
tion (the Communiqué) mentions the
threats caused by Russia’s actions,
namely: violation of its obligations,
military challenges, annexation, use
of force, and violence. In fact, these
are the case not only at the Europe-
an level, but also at the level of the
CIS, because none of the documents
signed by Russia in the CIS region
mentions its right to protect “Russian
patriots” in other countries. De facto,
Moscow’s own actions undermine its
proposals for further integration with
these countries.
Let me emphasize several im-
portant messages of the Warsaw
summit. The first one relates to
the NATO member countries. Ar-
ticle 14, relating to the northern
partners at the Alliance’s eastern
flank, addresses the issues of de-
terrence and countering a whole
range of risks. In this context, the
The NATO Summit in Warsaw
Was a True Breakthrough
Iulian CHIFU,
President of the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Romania)

32
four battalion battle groups are be-
ing brought up. If you really wish
to deter something, you simply
need to move forward. The process
was symbolically balanced to be a
proportionate response. We have
four international battalion battle
groups, in addition to the multina-
tional Romanian-Bulgarian brigade.
It is important that the Alliance’s
obligations to everyone are upheld.
Another issue discussed at the sum-
mit involved movement of NATO
troops through the Allies’ territo-
ries. If a NATO member country is
attacked, there will be no restric-
tions or borders for the movement
or troops. I would like to emphasize
that this is not about allocating large
numbers of troops to prevent an at-
tack on the Alliance’s border coun-
tries – but visible messages are being
sent to show the Alliance is ready to
defend its members.
I believe that this was the first time
that NATO stated that aggression
and threats against neighbour coun-
tries and partner countries consti-
tute a threat against the Alliance’s
operation. This refers to the use of
violence, military action, and the an-
nexation of Crimea. In fact, Crimea
is mentioned in the Communiqué 4
times, and the east of Ukraine, 12
times. We argued on every punctua-
tion mark in the final document to
make our stand on Russia as unam-
biguous as possible. True, it might
have been difficult to highlight cer-
tain points we saw as necessary…
Four official documents and eight
public addresses of the Alliance con-
tain all these statements dealing with
Ukraine. This also means a threat to
our own security. Because of this, we
are designing our security, and creat-
ing capabilities in the defence indus-
try in a number of countries.
How are we helping these countries?
We train their troops, we help them
create defence and security insti-
tutions to enable them to defend
themselves properly, if the exist-
ing aggression is aggravated or the
country is subjected to new attacks…
Another important point I would like
to emphasize is the definition of the
relations between NATO and Russia.
There are four separate articles that
regulate who can communicate with
Russia, who can take part in these re-
lations, for how long, and to what ex-
tent. All those things are very clearly
stipulated; we have military channels
that must deal with the conflict, mit-
igate risks, and avoid certain critical
points that may escalate into a con-
flict or incident.
However, all these pertain to the mili-
tary dimension. In the diplomatic field,
the articles say that we communicate

33
our opinion, but cannot be involved in
discussion. Our conditions are: respect
for the international law, respect for
prior commitments, changes within
the Russian Federation, particularly
in how it treats international rela-
tions... Concerning Ukraine, it is very
clearly stipulated that troops must be
removed, weapons laid down, and
Ukraine must be given back control
over its borders. Those are the condi-
tions for normal relations. I believe
that we can all clearly see these de-
mands, as well as the obligations that
the Alliance undertakes in relation to
Russia, while helping Ukraine.
In addition to the Communiqué, I
would like to draw your attention to
the Warsaw Declaration on Transat-
lantic Security, as it contains certain
obligations of NATO related to part-
ners. That document clearly states
that the Alliance supports not only
the deterrence policy, but also the
countries’ capabilities. We do have
a declaration on deterrence, by the
way. That document, the Declara-
tion of Transatlantic Security, states
that NATO assists with the creation
of conditions that contribute to
quick restoration of vital activities in
Ukraine. These are only some of the
commitments.
This is one of the items that cre-
ate great opportunities for Ukraine,
which it must make use of.
We also have reform-related com-
mitments. Among the forty-plus pro-
posals are those made by NATO to
Ukraine, to create appropriate insti-
tutions, and develop certain capabili-
ties in security and defence.
I believe that those commitments
regarding Ukraine are powerful
ones, and we simply need Ukraine
to take up a part of those commit-
ments as well. It is clearly stipulated
that the implementation of these
proposals must go hand-in-hand
with reforms. At this time, virtually
every document involving Ukraine
mentions the reforms that Kyiv
should implement.
Another point I would like to high-
light concerns our commitments
related to Ukraine’s ability to de-
fend itself. Dear friends, all NATO
countries do respond to threats
that the situation in Ukraine poses.
However, Ukraine itself must be the
first to respond to these threats to
its defence and security. The com-
mitment means that your country
must be the first to respond, and
NATO troops may respond subse-
quently. However, Kyiv must be the
first to respond to hybrid threats,
which include cyber-attacks and
the entire range of hybrid warfare.
This is why we must contribute to
Ukraine’s ability to quickly rebuild
in crisis conditions.

34
F
irst of all, I propose that we
take a closer look at the deci-
sions made in Warsaw. They
are presented in the three principal
documents:
1. The Warsaw summit Commu-
niqué.
2. The Warsaw Declaration on
Transatlantic Security.
3. The Joint Declaration by the
President of the European Coun-
cil, the President of the Euro-
pean Commission and the Secre-
tary General of NATO.
The main conclusions of those docu-
ments are as follows:
1. NATO’s main mission remains un-
changed: to guarantee that the
Alliance remains an unparalleled
community of freedom, peace,
security, and shared values.
2. NATO’s three core tasks as speci-
fied in the Strategic Concept of
2010 remain unchanged: collec-
tive defence, crisis management,
and cooperative security.
3. At the same time, global and
regional security trends and the
security environment are under-
going changes that call for an ap-
propriate response from NATO.
As the result, NATO is responding
by reinforcing collective defence,
enhancing capabilities, strength-
ening resilience, continuing insti-
tutional adaptation, and enhanc-
ing cooperation with partners.
4. The main threats and challeng-
es currently faced by NATO are:
terrorism, Russia’s actions and
policies, cyber threats, and hy-
brid warfare.
5. The summit’s Communiqué
clearly defines terrorism as an
immediate and direct threat. NA-
TO’s most direct response to that
is that all NATO allies are making
their contribution to the Global
Coalition to Counter ISIL. In addi-
tion to that, NATO provides intel-
ligence and logistics support to
the EU Operation Sophia in the
Mediterranean.
NATO Explicitly Condemns Russia’s
Destabilizing Actions and Policies
Jonas DANILIAUSKAS,
Minister Plenipotentiary,
The Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in Ukraine

35
6. The second gravest threat, even
though the term “threat” is not
used in NATO’s documents in this
case, for reasons of political cor-
rectness, is formed by Russia’s ac-
tions and policies. Russia is given
considerable attention in the War-
saw documents. Its destabilizing
actions and policies include: the
annexation of Crimea, violation
of sovereign frontiers by force,
destabilization of Eastern Ukraine,
large-scale exercises, provocative
military activities near NATO’s
borders, irresponsible and aggres-
sive nuclear rhetoric, violation of
NATO’s airspace, and military in-
tervention in Syria, complete with
its support for Assad’s regime.
7. NATO’s response to this is to in-
crease its deterrence and defence
capabilities, which includes a num-
ber of important components:
increasing defence expenditures;
forward presence in the territories
of NATO’s Eastern European mem-
bers; and suspension of any practi-
cal cooperation with Russia. Letme
briefly elaborate on each of these.
8. Concerning defence expenditures:
at the Wales summit in 2014, it
was decided to increase the mili-
tary budgets of NATO member
countries – the so-called Defence
Investment Pledge. To be more
specific, the decision was to re-
verse the trend of decreasing de-
fence budgets. Considerable prog-
ress has been made since then:
NATO allies defence expenditures
increased in 2016, for the first
time since 2009. Looking back to
2010, only 8 allies increased their
defence budgets, while collective
defence expenditures dropped by
5.48%. Today, in 2016, we have a
new situation, where 22 allies in-
creased their defence budgets,
and collective expenditures grew
by 2.65%. Even though, even to-
day, only 5 of them meet 2% of
NATO’s guideline, the positive
trend is obvious, and if the current
trend persists, there will be more
of such allies after several years.
9. Concerning forward presence: in
2014, Russia’s aggressive actions
and the war against Ukraine in-
creased the feeling of vulnerabil-
ity among the eastern members
of the Alliance. Two things were
clearly necessary: first, to allevi-
ate these feelings of vulnerability
with some assurances; and sec-
ond, to send Russia a clear mes-
sage, in case it decides to test
NATO’s solidarity. As the result, at
the Wales summit and following
it, the Readiness Action Plan was
approved, NATO Response Force
strengthened, 8 multinational
NATO Force Integration Units cre-
ated, and a more ambitious NATO
exercise program was unveiled.
The Warsaw summit added more

36
decisions in these issues, in par-
ticular, to increase the forward
presence in the Baltic countries
and in Poland (allocation of 4 bat-
talion-sized battlegroups). In ad-
dition to that, similar efforts were
made as relates to NATO’s Black
Sea members.
10. Concerning suspending any practi-
cal cooperation with Russia: com-
munication channels with Russia
remain open, primarily, to put
pressure on Russia to change its
aggressive policy, especially in
Ukraine; at the same time, there
can be no “business as usual” in
terms of practical cooperation.
11. Concerning increased coopera-
tion with partners, we must note
several important trends reflected
in the Warsaw documents: first
of all, increased cooperation with
Finland and Sweden; secondly, in-
tensified cooperation with and as-
sistance for Ukraine and Georgia;
and thirdly, expanded cooperation
between NATO and the EU.
12. In Warsaw, it was decided that
NATO and the EU have to resolve
several issues as a matter of ur-
gency: provide for the ability to
deflect hybrid threats; expand
and adapt operational coopera-
tion, including at sea and in the
issues of migration; and expand
coordination in the issues of cy-
ber-security and defence.
13. The last two issues that must be
noted are cyber defence and hy-
brid warfare. Anew and crucial
decision made in Warsaw was to
recognize the cyber space as an
area of which NATO must defend
itself. In other words, a cyber-
attack is legitimate grounds to
apply Article 5.
14. Concerning hybrid warfare: while
the main responsibility to respond
to hybrid threat or attack rests
with the affected country, NATO
is prepared to grant assistance to
defend against hybrid warfare,
and the North Atlantic Council can
make a decision to apply Article 5.
To sum up, the Summit’s main deci-
sions were:
1. To create strengthened forward
presence in the Baltic Countries
and Poland.
2. The cyber space is now an area in
which NATO must defend itself.
3. Joint assurance of NATO and the
EU to expand cooperation and
joint projects.
4. Explicit condemnation by NATO
of Russia’s destabilizing actions
and policies.
5. Clear political and practical assis-
tance for Ukraine, including the
approval of the Comprehensive
Assistance Package.

37
O
ver 20 years ago, a famous
US politician said that
NATO faced a dilemma: ei-
ther the Alliance will act out of its
area, or it will be “out of business”.
Today, especially after the NATO
Warsaw summit, the options have
changed: either NATO operates
within its territory, or it loses its
relevance altogether.
These serious changes are related to
the changes in Russia’s policy. Today,
the Alliance is viewing Russia as an
important participant in the resolu-
tion of certain issues in the Middle
East or North Korea. However, when
it comes to Europe, Russia is seen as
a source of the problem rather than
a mechanism for its solution.
There can be no argument that the
decisions made during the NATO
Warsaw summit were historic and
very significant. However, there are
numerous questions left about their
practical implementation – and these
questions are really difficult. Which
countries will allocate units to mul-
tinational battalions? Who will com-
mand them? When will the process
of their formation be over? What
rules of engagement will be used
during joint combat operations? This
list is not exhaustive.
For a minor example: I recall that
when I first became the defence
minister, there was an urgent need
to deploy a company of servicemen
to the Balkans, due to the crisis in Al-
bania. Everything was prepared and
the unit was aboard the train, when
it turned out that there is a problem
with the permission to cross the
Hungarian border, because Hungar-
ian Parliament could not pass such a
resolution at the time. The problem
is that certain countries have legal
norms that forbid the presence of
Lack of Supplies of Weapons to Ukraine
is Beyond My Understanding
Janusz Adam ONYSZKIEWICZ,
Advisor to the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Poland,
Minister of National Defence of the Republic
of Poland (1992-1993, 1997-2000),
Deputy of the Sejm of X, I, II and III convocations,
Vice President of the European Parliament’s Committee
on Foreign Affairs (2007 -2009)

38
foreign contingents of a certain size
at their national territories, at any
time. Resolving problems like this
requires amendment of the legis-
lation of European countries, and
in some cases, even their consti-
tutions. There is a whole range of
other problem issues that must be
resolved. Otherwise, NATO’s entire
process of rapid response to exter-
nal threats and challenges will be in
vain. Why have units be ready to de-
ploy in 48 hours, if all necessary ap-
proval formalities are going to take
two weeks or more?
By and large, NATO’s Warsaw sum-
mit became a breakthrough in
terms of the change of attitudes
and approaches to defence expen-
ditures, in particular, spending on
armaments, materiel, and equip-
ment. Many Allies are going to face
problems meeting the specified cri-
teria, which means that we must
be patient and comprehend all pro-
cesses at hand.
Naturally, the Ukrainian question
is crucial. A lot has been said at dif-
ferent levels about the assistance
we must provide to Kyiv. Mr. Yevhen
Marchuk (Ukrainian civil activist and
the Prime Minister of Ukraine in
1995-1996 – Ed.) drew attention to
an important fact: we can learn a lot
from Ukraine, because your coun-
try possesses unique experience of
an ongoing struggle with an enemy
that deploys modern equipment and
weapon systems. This experience
would be priceless for the Alliance.
We are talking about a specific war,
some aspects of which might not re-
peat again – for example, the lack of
the aviation component. This experi-
ence definitely must be studied by
other countries.
Ukraine must receive the complete
required assistance package. We
must realize and remember that Rus-
sia is considering the possibility of a
large-scale war as a tool of pressure
on Kyiv. Moscow will not abandon its
attempts to destabilize Ukraine and
to disrupt the functioning of all its
state systems and institutions. At this
time, this process is going on.
We in Europe must understand that
Kremlin is providing support, includ-
ing financial, to various extremist
groups in many European countries.
The geography of such support is
expanding, and that is a fact. The
political leanings of such groups are
irrelevant. Countering this “expan-
sion” requires new and comprehen-
sive approaches.
Among other areas, the Internet
space is also under attack. We are
actually dealing with an attack on a
system of values by weapons of pro-
paganda. We must understand that
we cannot counter such intervention

39
from far away, as no country in Eu-
rope can withstand this on its own,
and neither can Ukraine... We have
to join efforts to counter non-mili-
tary types of attack.
It is entirely logical that cyber secu-
rity is mentioned more and more of-
ten at all levels. Meanwhile, Ukraine
has considerable capabilities and po-
tential in the sphere of information
technologies.
Another sphere of cooperation that
must be promoted both ways is the
exchange of intelligence informa-
tion. I will be frank: this exchange is
necessary to convince NATO mem-
bers that Ukraine is a reliable part-
ner, and there are no information
leaks (that is a separate problem).
Now, a few words about NATO’s spe-
cific assistance to Ukraine. First of
all, I believe that we should lift the
restriction on supply of weapons to
Ukraine. I personally cannot under-
stand why this process is hindered.
In particular, I do not understand the
reasoning behind the claim that the
conflict will be intensified in case
Ukraine receives supplies of lethal
weapons. In fact, after everything
that happened, we appear to be
afraid of strengthening the victim
country, and afraid of calling Russia
an aggressor...
If the Ukrainian Army is not strong
enough to fight the aggressor,
losses will only increase over time.
The absence of weapon supplies to
Ukraine is absolutely beyond my un-
derstanding.
Generally, I believe that the Western
countries must do much more for
Ukraine: not only supplying Ukraine
with weapons on an almost daily ba-
sis, but making an open statement
that in case of a large-scale conflict
with Russia, Kyiv will receive mas-
sive and comprehensive assistance
as part of the new land-lease policy.
After all, if your neighbour’s house
is on fire, you must help him to put
it out.
Finally, there is one more important
point I would like to draw your at-
tention to. A number of countries,
which are not NATO members, have
a similar defence and security vi-
sion with the Alliance, for example,
Finland and Sweden. I believe that
NATO should work out a mechanism
for cooperation with those countries,
perhaps establish a certain status for
them, like an associated NATO mem-
ber – a status that would cover the
first four articles of the Washington
Treaty and clearly define situations
and cooperation mechanisms in case
if the security situation deteriorates.

40
T
he Communiqué of the Warsaw
NATO summit singles out the
problems of energy security,
similarly to the findings of the 2008 Bu-
charestsummitandthe2009Rigasum-
mit. Paragraph 135 formulates NATO’s
consensus on the subject as follows:
“Energy developments can have signifi-
cant political and security implications
for Allies and the Alliance, as demon-
strated by the crises to NATO’s east and
south. A stable and reliable energy sup-
ply, the diversification of import routes,
suppliers and energy resources, and the
interconnectivity of energy networks
are of critical importance and increase
our resilience against political and eco-
nomic pressure. While these issues are
primarily the responsibility of national
governments and other international
organizations, NATO closely follows the
security implications of relevant energy
developments and attaches particular
importance to diversification of energy
supply in the Euro-Atlantic region. We
will therefore further enhance our stra-
tegic awareness in this regard, includ-
ing through sharing intelligence and
through expanding our links with other
international organizations such as the
International Energy Agency and the
EU, as appropriate. We will consult and
share information on energy security is-
sues of particular concern to Allies and
the Alliance, with a view to providing
a comprehensive picture of the evolv-
ing energy landscape, concentrating on
areas where NATO can add value. We
will also continue to develop NATO’s ca-
pacity to support national authorities in
protectingcriticalinfrastructure,aswell
asenhancingtheirresilienceagainsten-
ergysupplydisruptionsthatcouldaffect
national and collective defence, includ-
ing hybrid and cyber threats.”
This statement shows that the Alliance
somewhat underestimates the impor-
tance of the problems of energy securi-
ty, and does not completely realize how
energy resources and infrastructures
can be used unconventionally in new-
generation warfare. Russia is a case in
pointinthisrespect,especiallybeingan
aggressively behaving country and the
number one challenge for NATO in the
modern world.
So, what is the driving force of the Rus-
sian expansion and aggression? Look-
NATO and the Issues of Energy
Security in the Context of the Warsaw
Summit Decisions
Mykhailo HONCHAR,
President of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI,”
Consultant to the Secretary of the National Security
and Defence Council (1996-2000)

41
ing at statistics in the energy sector and
economy, one can see that the engine
of the Russian aggression is fuelled by
petro- and gas dollars, which the Rus-
sian Federation receives as revenues
from fuel exports.
Here is the reason why the West’s sanc-
tions are not always efficient enough,
being able to hinder Moscow’s aggres-
sion but not to deter it. Its sanctions
have not affected the vital force of the
aggression: Russia’s energy exports.
Stopping Russian aggression requires a
combination of low oil prices and strict
sanctions, similar to the case of Iran (EU
restrictions on purchases of Russian oil,
disconnection from SWIFT, etc.), cou-
pled with the EU’s refusal to take part
in politically motivated projects (such
as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline), which
servetoexportbothgasandcorruption
to the EU. Corruption is a very effective
weapon that can successfully be used in
place of tank corps and air forces.
The Russian Federation is relatively
successful using energy resources and
the infrastructure for their delivery to
achieve geopolitical and geo-economic
goals. Energy-related motives are also
present in Russia’s geopolitical, geo-
economic, and military activities. The
weaponization of Russia’s energy policy
is hardly a new development. Its con-
ceptual roots date back to the 2003
Energy Strategy of Russia, which opens
with a fairly straight statement: “Russia
has at its disposal significant energy
resources and a powerful fuel and en-
ergy complex, which is the basis for its
economic development, and a tool of
domestic and foreign policy.”
Europe always assessed Russia’s ac-
tivities in the energy sector only in the
business context, but a look into Rus-
sia’s behaviour in the 2000s shows
that it has been consistently moving
towards using energy resources as a
weapon, carefully concealing such use
as commercial disputes with the post-
Soviet buyers of Russian fossil fuels.
Energy weapon is effective in the con-
ditions of monopolized external sup-
ply, surplus pipeline capacity, and cold
Table 1.Russia’s energy exports and their share in total exports
of the Russian Federation, USD billion
Export item 2012 2013 2014 2015
Oil and petroleum products 280.0 282.9 269.7 157.0
Natural gas 63.0 67.2 55.2 46.4
Black coal 13.0 11.8 11.6 9.5
Electricity 1.0 1.0 0.73 0.74
Total energy exports
366.0
[69.7%]
362.9
[68.9%]
346.1
[69.5%]
213.6
[61.7%]
Total exports of the Russian Federation 524.7 526.4 496.9 345.9
Source: Official statistics of the Russian Federation authorities

42
winters that drive up demand for fuel
and result in its deficit.
Fast forwarding to the beginning of
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in
2014, we will see that the Kremlin’s ac-
tions had a strong energy background.
Considering that Russia has always
tended to create anti-competitive and
monopolistic schemes, occupation of
the Crimean Peninsula allowed Russia
to achieve several strategic objectives:
• to disrupt promising large-scale
Black Sea shelf gas mining projects,
previously initiated by Ukraine with
participation of major European
and US companies, posing a chal-
lenge for Russian state companies;
• to expel US and European oil and
gas companies out of the north-
ern regions of the Black Sea, thus
eliminating competition for Russian
state companies;
• to deprive Ukraine of access to the
bulk of gas resources on the Black
Sea shelf and other prospective off-
shore fossil fuel deposits;
• to create prerequisites for adjust-
ing the trans-Black-Sea gas pipe-
line route (at the time, the South
Stream, later to become Turkish
Stream and then Bulgarian Stream),
so as to lay part of it along or across
the Crimean Peninsula and the
Black Sea shelf.
If we extrapolate from these facts, we
can easily see Russia’s perceived ap-
proach to its relations with the EU per-
taining to the gas industry, which has
critical importance for Europe. Russia
is working hard to compromise the
traditional gas transit route to Europe
via Ukraine, resorting to various propa-
ganda tools: about Ukraine’s gas transit
system being allegedly obsolete and
unreliable, the “civil war” in Ukraine,
gas theft, and other equally bogus al-
legations. In 2014, the start of Russia’s
hybression [hybrid aggression] brought
several acts of sabotage along the
Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline,
masked as mechanical breakdowns.
However,thankstotheuniquestructure
of Ukraine’s gas transport system and
its high level of interconnectivity, this
sabotage did not disrupt the gas supply
to the EU even for a second. It is worth
noting that, according to our estimates,
full disruption of gas supply to the EU
from the territory of Ukraine requires
simultaneous sabotage at 29 gas transit
system sites, being a virtually impossible
task in a hybrid war situation. Ukraine’s
gas transit system has been successfully
passing the “trial by fire” for two years
and beyond, ensuring uninterrupted
transitofSiberiangastoEurope.
Signs of Russian sabotage were also ap-
parentinanothercountry:Turkey,which
Moscowviewsasanewroutefortransit
of non-Russian fossil fuels to Europe, by-
passing Russia. In the summer of 2015,
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, the
product of the KGB First Chief Director-
ate the Cold War era Soviet Union) de-
cided to sabotage all principal gas pipe-
linesintheeastofTurkey,“forunknown
reasons.” Both the sudden flare-up of
the Karabakh conflict in early April 2016,
and the demonstrative missile strikes on

43
SyriafromtheCaspianSeaaremessages
toEurope,theCaspianRegioncountries,
and any major Western companies in-
vesting in oil and gas extraction in that
area: Russia is ready to quickly assume
control or simply disrupt any projects of
gasandoilsupplytotheEUfromCentral
AsiaandAzerbaijan.
Russia’s ambitions are global, but pri-
marily focused on the neighbouring re-
gions and the countries with large fossil
fuel deposits, viewed by Moscow as its
competitors in the energy sector. Mos-
cow is pursuing a biparallel strategy. On
one hand, Russia wishes to increase
Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil
fuels by insistently pushing projects of
non-transitpipelines.Ontheother,Rus-
sia wants to neutralize its competitors,
especially since they are mainly former
Sovietrepublics,whichMoscowcontin-
ues to regard as “its own domain.”
Based on our research, we can argue
that such countries as Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are at
risk of either a coup, potentially initiat-
ed by Russia to assume complete con-
trol of competitors, or a hybrid aggres-
sionfromRussia,aimingtobringchaos
to the competing country and disrupt
its mineral extraction and exports.
Another such country may be Alge-
ria. Even though Algeria is not among
Russia’s neighbours, and is viewed by
Moscow as its anti-crisis partner in
the North Africa and the Middle East,
Moscow is still interested in its desta-
bilization. Algeria is the third largest
gas supplier to the EU (after Russia
and Norway), and any decrease in its
gas exports to Europe will leave a gap
that will be quickly filled by Russia.
We should also not underestimate Rus-
sia’s ambitions in the Arctic Region,
which it traditionally claims its own.
Fossil fuel reserves in the Arctic Region
exceed those of the Persian Gulf, with
the bulk of them concentrated in the
Euro-Arctic region. Control over the
Northern Sea Route is also an impor-
tant factor, especially considering that
the Arctic Ocean is shedding a lot of its
ice due to the global warming. Russia
already has an advantage in the Arctic,
and is increasing its energy-related and
military presence there. Say, the Spits-
bergen archipelago (called Svabald in
Norway and Grumant in Russia) may
end up as the first casualty of the Rus-
sianArcticexpansioninthe21st
century.
Coming back to the military dimension
of the hybrid warfare, we must note
that Russia pays some heed to the use
of civilian infrastructure, particularly in
the energy sector, for unconventional
delivery of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. To name just one example: un-
derwater pipelines (specifically under-
water, not land-based) can be used to
deliver weapons of mass destruction. A
container with a bacteriological agent
can be delivered to the enemy territory
under the guise of a diagnostic device,
and so can a nuclear payload. This is
why we should pay less attention to
the provocative show flights by Russian
strategic bombers, and more, to the
technological innovation being devel-
oped in strict secrecy.

44
Going back to the subject of Ukraine,
we should note that we have already
been successful in neutralizing the
Kremlin’s “gas weapon” in the condi-
tionsofthehybridaggression.Ukraine’s
gas stocks have always depended on
supplies from or through Russia, and
the gas sector was Ukraine’s traditional
vulnerability in its relations with Russia.
Decreased gas consumption and re-
versegassuppliesfromtheEUbrought
Russia’s gas-related leverage against
Ukraine to noughts.
The greatest risks for Ukraine during the
2015-2016 winter season were related
with electricity industry. Cyber warfare
against Ukraine’s energy sector facili-
ties was a threat that became a reality:
namely, Ukraine faced a massive cyber-
attack on December 23, 2015. However,
our energy sector proved more resilient
than anyone had expected. Without go-
ingtoodeepintothedetailsofcyberwar-
fare, I will simply quote the US experts
whose assessment of the situation was
as follows: “the hackers who attacked
Ukrainian electric power plants … had
been planning their attack for many
months.TheyhadresearchedUkraine’s
domestic networks, sourced operator
data,andcarriedoutasynchronizedat-
tack.” Thus, in the conditions of Russia’s
hybrid aggression against Ukraine, cyber
protection of the critically important
energy infrastructure becomes a top
priority. The same is true for the EU and
NATO, and especially Germany. The Ger-
man energy networks are at risk of mas-
sive cyber-attacks, especially in winter
time, and an artificially created blackout
can sabotage further development of
renewable energy in Germany. Instead,
Russia is ready to offer Germany more
gasandNordStream2 –somethingthat
the German side is already willing to ac-
cept, without fully understanding Rus-
sia’sdeep-seatedmotives.
Summing up the above, we can say that
Russia will use proxy methods to co-
vertly hinder the EU’s attempts to diver-
sify its energy sources and its projects
to receive gas from sources other than
Russia. Russian activities within NATO
countries and the rest of the EU should
be closely monitored. In line with the
new-generation warfare methods, a lot
of Russian actions will be effected from
within, including the use of lobbies and
corruption leverage built up during the
decades of fossil fuel supply to Europe.
Russia will aim cyber-attacks against Eu-
rope’s energy networks, attempting to
cause a large-scale blackout. Countering
hybrid aggression requires alternative
models of peace enforcement by non-
military means or modelling scenarios
of complex crises caused from within.
More about the specifics of Russia’s hy-
brid warfare can be found in the paper
titled Putin’s Hybression: Non-Military
Aspects of New-Generation Warfare by
the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy
XXI.” “Hybression” is a portmanteau for
“hybrid aggression.” This paper is part
ofourAntaresresearchproject,donein
cooperation with the Centre for Army,
Conversion and Disarmament Stud-
ies. As part of the Antares project, the
expert group of “Strategy XXI” is also
researching the energy component of
new-generation warfare, with support
from the International Monetary Fund.

Nato book eng_press

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

Destacado

Destacado (7)

Similar a Nato book eng_press

Similar a Nato book eng_press (20)

Más de cacds_ukraine

Más de cacds_ukraine (20)

Último

Último (20)

Nato book eng_press