Landkreis Emsland is a district in Lower Saxony, Germany was one of the first to implement a Emergency Response, Management & Control strategy based upon EU 1099/2009. This presentation provides an overview of the consequences of recent large-scale outbreaks and how a successful strategy could contribute to prevent them socio-economic consequenses.

1. 海外悪性伝染病対策 欧州先進事例紹介合同セミナー
The Emsland model
Could this Emergency response approach work in Asia?
Presented by Harm Kiezebrink
Principal consultant
www.n2gf.com
AVT AB © 1

2. OVERVIEW
 Disease control models: the  Key elements to successful
traditional approach response
 General objectives  The Emsland model
International standards
 From virus to biomass
 The end of the traditional
 Processes in 10 steps
approach within the EU
 Would the model work in
 Fundamental questions Asia?
 EU Directive 1099/2009  Fundamental questions
AVT AB © 2

3. Disease control models:
Traditional approach
 Government/veterinary authorities are overall responsible for
management, control, and field response
 National level: declaration of the disease (on suspicion/after
confirmation)
 Regional level: Organizing and coordinating response activities;
inspection/reporting; surveillance/epidemiology;
sampling/laboratory, (pre) financing & compensation; logistics,
etc.
 Local level: Carrying out all response activities; organizing rapid
response/culling/disposal/cleaning & disinfection etc.
 Industry is responsible for biosecurity and prevention
AVT AB © 3

4. General objectives of
International standards
 To safeguard the production and distribution of
food/feed that is safe for consumers/animals
 To maintain the trust of the general public, the
distributors and retailers in food safety:
 Demonstrable
 Transparent
 Without unnecessary risks for public health, animal
welfare and the environment
AVT AB © 4

5. The end of the traditional
approach within the EU
 The EU legislation changed after a series of outbreaks in the
UK and Holland with devastating consequences
 The traditional approach was not based on modern large
scale production in concentrated farming areas
 Both the Government as well as the industry failed to
reduce the impact of the large scale outbreaks
 The public was extremely upset and blamed the large scale
production for causing the slaughter of millions of innocent
animals
AVT AB © 5

6. Financial consequences
1997: Total financial impact Dutch Classic Swine fever outbreak
 £ 2,4 billion 0.5兆円
2001: Total financial impact UK FMD outbreak:
 £13 billion 2.5兆円
2003: Total financial impact Dutch AI outbreak:
 € 1,275 billion 0.2兆円
Quite usual damage, also today:
2011: Estimated financial impact Korean MFD outbreak:
 W 3 trillion 0.3兆円
2010: Estimated financial impact on Japanese MFD/AI outbreak:
 JPY 140 billion 0.2兆円
(post crisis report of Whiting T, 2003)
AVT AB © 6

7. Organizational conclusions
2001: UK FMD outbreak:
 Untrained veterinary staff
 Lack of adequate policy, monitoring and oversight
 Using the military instead of trained agricultural staff
 Logistics competition due to chaotic contracting of suppliers
 Lack of planning
 No equipment
 Lack of Disposal/burial
(post crisis report of Whiting T, 2003)
AVT AB © 7

8. Organizational conclusions
2003: Dutch AI outbreak:
 Wrong planning based on FMD response plan
 Insufficient equipment at the start
 Inadequately trained response personnel in quality and
quantity
 Insufficient rendering capacity
 Insufficient monitoring
 Outdated policy based on using Cyanide
(post crisis report of RIVM 2003)
AVT AB © 8

9. Health related conclusions
2003: Dutch AI outbreak:
 4,500 people were in contact with diseased birds
 2,250 persons (50%) carried antibodies
 453 people showed symptoms
 89 people were diseased with H7N7 (3 were not in direct
contact with diseased birds)
 1 veterinarian died; Approx. 4,050 family members, relatives
and friends carried antibodies
 Increased stress under veterinary staff, farmers, field workers
and their family
(post crisis report of RIVM 2003)
AVT AB © 9

10. Destruction of agricultural
infrastructure
2001: UK FMD outbreak, spreading throughout the EU:
 10 million sheep and cattle in the UK where killed
 270,000 cattle in Holland where killed
 843 infected locations in the UK
 Huge impact on tourism
(post crisis report of RIVM 2003)
AVT AB © 10

11. Conclusions by the public:
Rejection of the industry
AVT AB © 11

12. Dutch public campaign
2006 against the industry
Translation: Stop the virus, don’t eat chicken!
AVT AB © 12

13. Fundamental questions
 Question 1: Who invests in Emergency control?
 Question 2: Who suffers the losses?
 Question 3: Who is responsible when things go wrong?
 Question 4: Why can’t the industry insure the risks?
AVT AB © 13

14. Fundamental changes
Through EU Directive 1099/2009
 Joint responsibility between Government & Industry
 Prevention & biosecurity is mandatory for the entire industry
 Response strategy is a joint effort of the Government, Veterinary
authorities and the industry
 Animal disease insurance policy co-financed by the Government
and the industry
 Freedom to introduce vaccination strategy on country level
AVT AB © 14

15. Key elements of a successful
response approach
 Continuous monitoring  Competent response
 Early recognition  Veterinary authorities
 Quick and reliable diagnose  Branch organizations
 Timely warning to the Veterinary  Farmers
authorities  Farming related Industry
 Minimizing the risks  Response by a well-trained
professional organization
 Spreading of the disease
 Maximum response within 24
 Financial losses and costs
hours
 Minimizing contacts between
animals and humans
 Paid through the animal
disease insurance fund
AVT AB © 15

16. The Emsland model
 Pigs in Lower Saxony Landkreis Emsland
 7.000.000; 25% of all pigs in Germany  Close cooperation between authorities
and Industry
 One of the highest pig concentrations
in Europe: Landkreis Emsland  Veterinary tasks: Inspection and control
 Veterinary tasks during field response are
 Poultry in Emsland carried out by regional private veterinary
service, specialized in pigs and poultry
 Emsland: County of the German State
of Lower Saxony  Farmers are responsible for response
 One of Europe’s most dense poultry  Specialized private emergency response
area’s contractor is carrying out all response
tasks, on behalf of the farmers
 Total population: 310,000 people  All farmers pay a contribution per animal
to the animal disease insurance fund
 Poultry stock: 28,5 million birds
 All investments in equipment and training
 2,900 km2 = 10,000 birds per Km2 are covered by the fund
 1,500 poultry farms = 19.000 per farm  Burial of carcasses is strictly forbidden!
AVT AB © 16

17. How does the Emsland model work in practice?
 The risks are insured on the basis of a farm biosecurity plan authorized by
the Veterinary authorities, including an extended compensation scheme
 A specialized emergency response contractor is responsible for all non-
veterinary tasks and responsibilities, capable of processing 1,000 MT per 24
hours
 Only specialized equipment is used, stored within the area to guarantee a
response time of 8 hours
 The insurance fund is used to pre-finance the investments in equipment,
stocks and training of qualified response staff
 Most response activities take place within the stables, minimizing the risks
of escape of the virus
 Minimum of one joint simulation drill per animal type/per year
AVT AB © 17

18. Example for Pigs under Asian conditions – From virus to biomass -
AVT AB © 18

19. Processes in 10 steps
① Site preparation is a joint effort of ⑥ All animals are weighted on site
the farmer, the veterinarian and
⑦ An electronic file is created per
contractor
animal (pigs)/batch of animals
② Animals are handled by the farmers (poultry), including video and other
own staff to avoid unnecessary relevant electronic data
stress & pain ⑧ A mobile cleaning and disinfection
unit is on site
③ The animals are killed by the most
appropriate method within the ⑨ In case carcasses are
stable maceratored and transformed into
biomass, the bulk is safely
④ The veterinary staff only monitors transported to a biomass
the response activities installation
⑤ The entire process is registered on ⑩ All non-animal materials used are
video collected and destructed
AVT AB © 19

20. Under witch conditions
could the model work in Asia?
 Cooperation between Government, Veterinary services
and the Industry, in line with the EU model
 Introduction of farmers responsibility for organizing the
response on their farm
 Creation of an Animal Disease Insurance Fund to pre-
finance the investments in equipment and training
 Creation of a professional private response organization to
carry out all response activities
 Allowing alternative disposal methods, like biomass, to
avoid the risks of reintroduction of the virus
AVT AB © 20

21. Fundamental questions:
Question 1: Is the industry willing to cooperate with the authorities?
Question 2: Can you afford more future losses?
Question 3: Are you willing to bare the joint responsibility?
Question 4: Are the authorities willing to accept the industry as partner?
Question 5: Are you willing to pay a fee per animal to the insurance fund?
AVT AB © 21

22. Don’t buy weapons during wartime
Thank you for your attention
Chaoyang Park West road Building 3/ 11A,
Beijing PR China. 100125 22