1. Factors that Influence Crisis Managers and their Decision Making Ability
During Extreme Events
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to review the major problem areas that are
considered when emergency professionals make decisions responding to
extreme events. ―An emergency is by definition a unique and unpredictable
event, and it is seldom possible, even in retrospect, to assess what the outcome
of an emergency response would have been if alternative measures had been
followed‖ (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999, p. 92).
The problems are unambiguous and recurring themes appear in the literature.
Clausewitz offers a cohesive observation outlining these problematic areas:
―A commander must continually face situations involving
uncertainties, questionable or incomplete data or several
possible alternatives. As the primary decision maker, he, with
the assistance of his staff, must not only decide what to do and
how to do it, but he must also recognize if and when he must
make a decision‖ (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 383).
This research is important because the needs of the EM must be identified from
the literature found within the emergency domain. It is important for the results
of studies confirming the task type, needs and considerations of the practitioners
themselves to be observed so that technology, exercises, policy and procedures
can be developed to support the needs of decision makers for a rapid response
and recovery given a catastrophic even has occurred.
Stress is an understandable emotion felt by EM. EM must make life and death
decisions especially where such tragedies requiring triage may have to be
decided in the selection criterion between groups of people (Kowalski-
Trakofler, Vaught and Scharf, 2003). Another source of stress arises when
decisions must be made under severe time constraints (Rodriquez, 1997,
Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003). DMs have to forecast and make predictions
given the uncertainty in expectations of future events (Rodriguez, 1997). Time
is precious, and accurate decisions must be made along a time line at particular
points in time over the duration of the event as a disaster evolves (Brehmer,
1987; Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999). ―The operational commander
continually faces an uncertain environment‖ (Rodriguez, 1997, p. 5).
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2. Critical judgments must be made where large amounts of information are
available for consderation creating information overload. To make matters
worse, this information can be wrong or incomplete (Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al,
2003) or sufficient time may be lacking to gain the perfect and complete
information needed before the decision is made (Rodriquez, 1997). ―In dealing
with the uncertainty of a continually changing environment, the decision maker
must achieve a trade-off between the cost of action and the risk of non-action‖
(Kowalski-Trakofler and Vaught, 2003, p. 283). Sometimes these decisions are
made on the decision maker‘s (DM) assumptions and intuition when
information is not attainable (Rodriquez, 1997).
Small events occur frequently, and catastrophic events occur rarely (Hyndman
and Hyndman, 2006). Protocols or heuristics can be used for the emergencies
that are smaller and occur frequently. However, management is posed with the
problem of not having any or little prior experience to larger events where
national boundaries are ignored and the demands of the resources needed far
exceed the availability of supply. Research reveals that extreme events have
different characteristics from smaller disasters (Skertchly and Skertchly, 2001).
This calls for a dynamic approach to decision making to fit the task due to the
overwhelming nature of these extreme events considered with the limitations of
a human‘s mental capacity and ability to manage a large set of ongoing
problems at any one time. A major problem exists in a decision maker‘s ability
to effectively manage all of the ongoing events simultaneously during an
extreme event (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999; Kerstholt, 1996).
One person is in charge of making the final decision for action, but this is a
collaborative effort of numerous stakeholders sharing numerous overlapping
tasks. ―As complexity increases, it becomes impossible for a single individual
with the limited information processing capacity to gain control‖ (Danieisson
and Ohisson, 1999, p. 93). A dynamic decision making approach is a much
needed method due to the inherent nature of the chaos characteristic of extreme
events (Danielsson and Ohlsson 1999). Extreme events need to be managed
using structure with flexibility to improvise or adapt where necessary to achieve
agility (Harrald, 2009).
In the remainder of this chapter, these facets will be elaborated, further probing
deeper into the needs of emergency managers. First, how extreme events are
different from small emergencies and must be approached as a different task
type is covered. Second, extreme events are a wicked problem, and these
characteristics are laid out and matched with extreme events. Good versus bad
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3. characteristics in EM decision making from the literature are listed. Third,
types of bias that are specific in emergency situations and decision making are
covered. Next, literature findings concerning time, stress and information
overload are provided. Methods describing how EM handles information
presently are discussed and related to other research concepts already explored
in this research effort. Next, research indicating how feedback and expert
intuition are used to manage uncertainty is examined.
Extreme Events
Large scale extreme events are not like small emergencies. Small emergencies
occur regularly where most decisions are rule based due to the experience of the
event (Rasmussen, 1983). This is referred to as procedural expertise (Adams
and Ericsson, 2000). In the event that a small emergency should occur, the EM
may not even be notified because firefighters, police and emergency medical
attendants already know how to proceed (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999). On
the other hand, extreme events present a different set of characteristics due to
the problem type and task structure (Campbell, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; McLellan,
et. al, 2003).
In large-scale operations, the cognitive demands on the EM are severe
(Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999). Team coordination strategies will evolve from
explicit coordination under low workload conditions to implicit coordination as
work load increases. Large-scale emergency operations imply distributed
decision making in that decisions are disseminated among many stakeholders,
of which no single individual has complete knowledge of the current situation
(Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Kowalski-Trakofler and
Vaught, 2003).
Wicked Problems
Extreme events possess characteristics, are problem types and have task
structures that are categorized as wicked. Wicked problems are volatile and of a
very dynamic nature with considerable uncertainty and ambiguity (Horn, 2005).
Wicked problems are ongoing and have no stopping rule (Rittel and Webber,
1973, Digh, 2000). They are never resolved and change over time (Conklin,
1998). Wicked problems are solved per se when they no longer are of interest
to the stakeholders, when resources are depleted or when the political agenda
changes (Horst and Webber, 1973). Many stakeholders with multiple value
conflicts redefine what the problem is repeatedly, reconsider what the causal
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4. factors are and have multiple views of how to approach and hopefully deal with
the problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973, Conklin, 1998, Digh, 2000). Getting and
maintaining agreement amongst the stakeholders is most difficult because each
has their own perception and, thus, opinion of what is best (Rittel and Webber,
1973).
Extreme events possess the characteristics of those found within the definitions
of wicked problems. ―Each dysfunctional event has its own unique
characteristics, impacts, and legacies‖ (Skertchly and Skertchly, 2001, p. 23).
For example, catastrophic disasters have the following attributes and
dimensions many of which are the same as those described in wicked problems:
 *They don‘t have any rules.
 Often, emergency services are insufficient to cope with the demands given
the limited amount of available resources.
 Vital resources are damaged and nonfunctional.
 *Procedures for dealing with the situation are inadequate.
 *No solutions for resolution exist on a short-term basis.
 *Events continue to escalate.
 *Serious differences of opinion arise about how things should be
managed.
 The government of the day and the bureaucracy becomes seriously
involved.
 The public takes an armchair position and is fed by the media.
 *The number of authorities and officials involved are growing.
 *Sometimes simply trying to identify which of the emergency services and
investigative bodies is doing what results in complete chaos.
 The need to know who is in charge is urgent (Campbell 1999, 52).
*are characteristic of wicked problems
EM tasks differ from control task types in that, no two events are the same so
different decision processes are required to be implemented. Interacting
variables are many, and the domain is ill defined and unknown at times
(Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999). An EM cannot project any future decisions
with any degree of accuracy due to all of the variables that are involved and all
of the different scenarios that can exist due to the great amount of uncertainty
involved and lack of experience of the unknown (Newport: 1996).
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5. Decision Making in Emergency Management
Decision tasks are perceived to be difficult by the EM where issues involving
life saving operations such as evacuations or triage have the potential to have
devastating results if not conducted accurately (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999).
Studies show an EMs most difficult aspects of work are:
 Lack of routine and practice–refers to the infrequency of major
accidents, making it difficult to get experiences of the command and
control proper.
 Communicational shortcomings
o Information overload is salient during the initial phase of an
emergency response and is seen as especially severe if no staff
members are available to perform communication duties.
o Technical equipment inadequacy
o Lack of skills in handling communication equipment
 Feelings of isolation–lack of peers with whom to discuss common
problems (Danielsson and Ohlsson 1999, p. 94).
Other psychological processes are associated with decisions made by EMs.
Effective decision makers must take many factors of the environment into
consideration to understand that these are complex, dynamic, time-pressured,
high-stakes, multi-person task environments (McLellan, et. al, 2003).
Some hazard conceptualization and management problems developed from
Mitchell, 1999 are presented:
 *Lack of agreement about definition and identification of problems
 *Lack of awareness of natural and unnatural (human-made)
hazards
 *Lack of future forecasting capabilities
 *Misperception of misjudgment of risks associated with hazards
 Deliberate misrepresentation of hazards and risks
 *Lack of awareness of appropriate responses
 *Lack of expertise to make use of responses
 Lack of money or resources to pay for responses
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6.  *Lack of coordination among institutions and organizations
 Lack of attention to relationship between ‗disasters‘ and
‗development‘
 Failure to treat hazards as contextual problem whose components
require simultaneous attention
 Lack of access by affected populations to decision making
 Lack of public confidence in scientific knowledge
 Lack of capable and enlightened political leadership
 *Conflicting goals among populations at risk
 *Fluctuating salience of hazards
 Public opposition by negatively affected individuals and groups.
*wicked characteristics
Many of these are also characteristic of the wicked problem types defined
earlier and have characteristics in common with those of extreme events (Rittel
and Webber, 1973; Campbell 1999).
Time
―Time lost is always a disadvantage that is bound in some way
to weaken he who loses it‖ (Clauswitz, 1976, p. 383).
Time is a critical factor that further complicates the decision making process. In
extreme events, an EM must consider an enormous number of factors quickly
(Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003). Decisions must be made, sometimes forced
due to time constraints. ―The faster a decision has to be made, the less time the
information processing system has to convert or gather enough accurate
information to convert assumptions to facts‖ (Rodriquez, 1997, p7-8). This
means that decisions are made under uncertainty and without full consideration.
An EM must weigh delaying the decision making against the negative
consequences that may occur while waiting for more requested information
(Kowalski-Trakofler and Vaught, 2003). Once time has passed, alternative
actions are no longer possible and perhaps the best decision has been bypassed
leaving only less optimal conditions from which to choose.
Kowalski-Trakofler and Vaught conducted a study of good decision making
characteristics under life threatening situations. They found that, during any
phase of the decision making process, a set of factors could significantly impact
one‘s ability to deal with complex problems under time critical situations.
These factors are:
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7.  Psychomotor skills, knowledge and attitude
 Information quality and completeness
 Stress–generated both by the problem at hand and any existing
background problem
 The complexity of elements that must be attended (2003, p. 285).
One research finding indicates that performance can be maintained under time
pressure if the communication changes from explicit to implicit (Serfaty and
Entin, 1993). They found that ―Implicit coordination patterns, anticipatory
behavior, and redirection of the team communication strategy are evident under
conditions of increased time-pressure. The authors conclude that effective
changes in communication patterns may involve updating team members,
regularly anticipating the needs of others by offering unrequested information,
minimizing interruptions, and articulating plans at a high level in order to allow
flexibility in the role of front-line emergency responders‖ (Serfaty and Entin,
1993).
Stress
Stress is defined as ―a process by which certain work demands evoke an
appraisal process in which perceived demands exceed resources and result in
undesirable physiological, emotional, cognitive and social changes‖ (Salas,
Driskell, and Hughs, 1996, p.6).
Information during an emergency can be the source of stress in many ways
(Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003). First, due to technical malfunctions or just
poor implementation, the initial warnings can be ambiguous and create a greater
need for clarity in a situation. This causes the situation to be interpreted
differently and leads to different interpretations in how people are to respond.
Another stressor due to information mismanagement is when people do not fully
understand what is going on or have disagreement between stakeholders on the
situation; the right information is not gathered. This wastes time and causes
more stress and aggravation. Other stressors come from poor leadership. If
leadership is weak, then it adds to worse decisions or no decisions being made
and can result in confusion. Last, when technology or other apparatus fails, this
leaves people without information and the inability to keep current with
response efforts and will add more stress (Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003).
Stress is a major factor in decision making especially during life critical
situations (Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003). One of the primary stressors is the
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8. lack of information immediately after the event during the early phase of the
emergency response where it concerns determining scale and the characteristics
of damage (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999).
A major problem occurs when people are making decisions under stress that
leads to poor decision making. Research shows all of the feasible choices are
not considered, and a decision is likely to be made prematurely (Keinan,
Friedland, and Ben-Porath, 1987). This is not good because no matter how
experienced a DM may be, they will be confronted with situations they have not
experienced previously (Harrald, 2009). So, all of the influential information
that time allows should be considered in order to make the most appropriate
decision.
Information Overload
Good incident commanders function as if they have a good practical
understanding of the limitations of their information processing system, and the
corresponding limitations of others (McLellan, et. al, 2003). In particular, they
operated in such a manner that (a) their effective working memory capacity was
not exceeded, (b) they monitored and regulated their emotions and their arousal
level, and (c) they communicated with subordinates in ways that took into
account subordinates‘ working memory capacity limitations. The foundation of
their ability to manage their own information load effectively seems to be prior
learning from past experience.
Studies show that during an emergency, information quality varies on three
dimensions: reliability, availability and relevance (Danielsson and Ohlsson,
1999). The decision to use information at any given time and the weight of the
usage of the information is based on these dimensions.
Bias
Many forms of bias exist when it comes to decision making, but emergency
management has a set that is associated with disastrous leadership. Research
indicates that this is from a lack of self awareness which is a normal reaction
concerning information processing. Table 2.1 lists the bias types along with a
brief description derived by Adams & Ericsson (2000).
Table Bias in Emergency Management Decision Making
Bias Type Description
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9. Sunk- Persisting with a tactic, which to the dispassionate observer
costs is demonstrably ineffectual, simply because time and
resources have already been invested in the tactic.
Optimism Choosing a course of action which necessitates nothing
whatsoever going wrong if it is to succeed. For example,
positioning a crew on steep sloping terrain with high levels
of burnable material above and below them.
Need for Good incident commanders frequently report having to
Action deliberately exercise self-restraint so as not to precipitately
commit resources to a course of action before completing a
thorough situation assessment
Linear Associated with disastrous incident command at wildland
Rate of fires; human beings seem to be incapable of accurately
Change predicting non-linear rates of change.
Muddling Through
A large amount of information must be considered in a very small amount of
time. Time to fully explore all alternatives is lacking not to mention, stress has
a tendency to make DM focus narrowly on the list of available alternatives.
Studies found that good DM only focus on the most feasible and reliable
solutions and eliminate the nonessential information (Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al,
2003). This does not compromise the DM ability to make good decisions, but
rather, simplifies the process allowing them to focus on the critical issues.
This same approach was validated by other research studying decision processes
of good DM (McLellan, et. al, 2003). The study indicated that all of the
information was scanned but focus was only considered on a ‗need to know‘
basis and only on the relevant factors which needed to be considered.
This decision making strategy is described by Charles Lindblom that he refers
to as Muddling Through (Lindblom, 1959, Lindblom 1979). This employs
methods that help a (DM) focus on the most relevant subgroup, given a list of
alternatives from which to choose for any given task. Muddling through a
problem guides decision makers to direct their focus into selecting incremental
changes.
Uncertainty
The demands on emergency management are described by The Catastrophic
Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP; DHS 2004): ―A detailed and
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10. credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or
longer). ―As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a
detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment‖ (Harrald, 2006, p.
258). Due to the nature of an extreme event, many judgments must be made
with information that is often ambiguous, wrong and incomplete (Kowalski-
Trakofler, et. al, 2003). The operational activities involve ―hierarchical teams
of trained individuals, using specialized equipment, whose efforts must be
coordinated via command, control, and communication processes to achieve
specified objectives under conditions of threat, uncertainty, and limited
resources, both human and material‖ (McLellan, et. al, 2003, p. 2).
Not only are the decisions made presently under dicey information, but
forecasting future events also poses a challenge due to the uncertainty in the
future events as they play out over the duration of the extreme event
(Rodriguez, 1997). ―To make decisions about an uncertain future, the
commander must make many assumptions. Intuitive thinking is an important
skill in the ability to make a sound assumption‖ (Rodriguez, 1997, p1). This is
where the experts are using intuition to fill gaps in information needs.
Feedback
Timely and reliable feedback is one means to help DM make good judgments.
One type of uncertainty is from the lack of feedback or reported information
from the initial assessment from affected areas. Particularly annoying to EM
can be in the lack of feedback where the next decision cannot be made without
the present information acquired especially when the damage cannot be
visualized (Danielsson and Ohlsson, 1999). This can have detrimental effects
on the outcome of the event, because the DM performance is diminished.
Expert Intuition
Assumptions are used by DM to fill in gaps where uncertainty exists
(Rodruguez, 1997). Intuition plays a large role in filling in these gaps and can
have good consequences from those with experience. ―For experienced
commanders, intuition fills in the decision making processes where imperfect
information leaves off‖ (Battle Command, 1994, p. 25).
A study conducted on a large group of top executives supports the concept that
intuition was used to guide critical decision making situations. The situations
and environments in which intuition was mostly used and helpful were found to
be where:
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11.  A high level of uncertainty exists
 The event has little previous precedent
 Variables are often not scientifically predictable
 ―Facts are limited‖
 Facts do not clearly point the way to go
 Time is limited and the pressure is to be right
 Several plausible alternative solutions are available to choose from, with
good arguments for each (Argot, 1986, p 18)
When considering the issue of analytical versus intuition judgment, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reported:
“The point here is that research which focuses on judgment
must include scrutiny not only of decisions that are made, but
also of real-world variables that influence them. The quality of
any decision may have little or no direct relationship to the
eventual outcome of its execution in a given situation. This is
because a decision-maker is constrained not only by the stress
of the situation or personal knowledge and attitudes, but also
because he or she can only weigh information that is available”
(Kowalski-Trakofler, et. al, 2003, p. 286).
Normal decision making techniques do not suffice in such complex situations as
extreme events. Characteristics were identified as:
 Novelty—the officer had never encountered such a situation before,
 Opacity—needed information was not available,
 Resource inadequacy—the resources currently available were not
sufficient to permit an optimal response (McLellan, et. al, 2003, p. 3).
The EM is continually facing an uncertain environment. There is insufficient
time for the EM to get the correct information they need and this must be
weighed against the need to make a decision at a particular time, so he/she must
rely on assumptions and intuition. Intuition helps the DM to make decisions
faster and more accurately, contributing to initiative and agility (Rodriguez,
1997).
Conclusion
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12. Decision making by emergency managers in extreme events has problem areas
that need support in order to minimize the disastrous effects that can cripple the
outcome and recovery efforts. This is a review of the research literature
specifically from the emergency domain. The problem areas identified are time,
stress, information overload, bias, and delayed feedback. Considerations must
be made when developing technology, writing policies, conducting exercises
and such occur. Flexibility needs to be incorporated so that a basic set of rules
or procedures can be modified or implemented to fit the various needs and
scenarios that can play out given an extreme event.
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