Risk and emergency management in high-rise building disasters caused by fire, structural collapse, earthquake, hurricane or terrorism.

1. High-Rise
Buildings
in Disaster
High-Rise
Buildings
in Disaster
David Alexander
University College London
Grozny 2013

2. The Towering Inferno is a rather silly, inaccurate film:
it is sobering to see it turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
1974 2017

3. High-rise building disasters –
my practical introduction to the field
High-rise building disasters –
my practical introduction to the field
Pirelli Building, Milan
(32 storeys),
1958-2002

4. • a fully-engineered structure• a fully-engineered structure
• reinforced concrete or steel frame• reinforced concrete or steel frame
• NFPA: >6 storeys (25m); underwriters: >9 st. (36m)• NFPA: >6 storeys (25m); underwriters: >9 st. (36m)
• higher than longest aerial ladder (c. 40 m)• higher than longest aerial ladder (c. 40 m)
• a single high-rise could contain 50,000 people.• a single high-rise could contain 50,000 people.
What is a high-rise building?What is a high-rise building?

5. EarthquakeEarthquake
Chile, 27 February 2010
• total or partial collapse of building• total or partial collapse of building
• collapse of façade or glass on exterior• collapse of façade or glass on exterior
• foundation failure• foundation failure
• damage to interior fittings.• damage to interior fittings.
• collapse of exit stairs• collapse of exit stairs

6. • racking (swaying distortion)• racking (swaying distortion)
• loss of window glass (racking, ballistic
impact, wind pressure, faulty installation)
• loss of window glass (racking, ballistic
impact, wind pressure, faulty installation)
• wind and water damage inside the building.• wind and water damage inside the building.
HurricaneHurricane

7. Structural collapseStructural collapse
Ronan Point, Canning Town, 16 May 1968
(22 storeys), 1968
4 dead

8. South Tower, WTC
(110 storeys), 2001
TerrorismTerrorism
WTC: 1.2 million tonnes
of debris; one of the
most challenging, and
least successful, SAR
operations ever mounted.
WTC: 1.2 million tonnes
of debris; one of the
most challenging, and
least successful, SAR
operations ever mounted.

9. In the absence of fire-retarding materials,
design and mechanisms, fire will rapidly climb
the building, either internally or externally..
In the absence of fire-retarding materials,
design and mechanisms, fire will rapidly climb
the building, either internally or externally..
FireFire

10. • stairs and stairwell design: fire-protected• stairs and stairwell design: fire-protected
• floors, columns, interior fire-walls of
4-hour, fire-resistant construction
• floors, columns, interior fire-walls of
4-hour, fire-resistant construction
• vertical window spacing limits
ability of fire to spread up outside
• vertical window spacing limits
ability of fire to spread up outside
Fire protection – design and construction measuresFire protection – design and construction measures
• lifts return to lobby when alarm activates.• lifts return to lobby when alarm activates.

11. • automatic pressurised sprinkler systems• automatic pressurised sprinkler systems
• water pumps and wet stand-pipe systems• water pumps and wet stand-pipe systems
• air conditioners vent smoke from building• air conditioners vent smoke from building
• back-up electrical systems• back-up electrical systems
• ‘smart’ alarm systems (addressable, transmitting).• ‘smart’ alarm systems (addressable, transmitting).
Fire protection – safety systemsFire protection – safety systems

12. • trained fire wardens and deputies on each floor• trained fire wardens and deputies on each floor
• regular fire drills for all building users• regular fire drills for all building users
• maintenance detects poor workmanship
and removes flammable materials.
• maintenance detects poor workmanship
and removes flammable materials.
Fire protection – human systemsFire protection – human systems

13. Behaviour
Vulnerability of the
built environment
InteractionInteraction
Force majeure:
the impact
Perception
Knowledge, habit,
custom and training

14. Evacuees follow
behaviour patterns
dictated by
familiarity and
past drills.
Evacuees follow
behaviour patterns
dictated by
familiarity and
past drills.
Arnold et al. 1982Arnold et al. 1982

15. Disaster response and
emergency planning procedures
Disaster response and
emergency planning procedures

16. Main cordon
INCIDENT
WITH VICTIMS
INCIDENT
WITH VICTIMS
Helicopter
Secondary
assembly
area
Minor
injuries
treatment
Mass
media
post
Incident
command
post
Mortuary
area
Road blockAmbulance
loading area
Triage
area
Firstaid
medicalpost
Primary
assembly
area
Medical post
for rescuers
Rescue
loop

17. Pedestrians only
Cordon
III for
traffic
control
Cordon
III for
traffic
control Multi-agency
operations
command.
Multi-agency
operations
command.
Public
assembly area
Public
assembly area
Rescuers'
assembly point
Rescuers'
assembly point
Points of
access to
cordoned
off areas
Points of
access to
cordoned
off areas
Only
rescuers
Cordon ICordon I
Only authorised
personnel Cordon IICordon II
Incident

18. High-rise
building
incident
emergency
response
the Las Vegas
model

19. • specific alert procedures• specific alert procedures
• triage point at one exit: emergency
vehicles and equipment directed here
• triage point at one exit: emergency
vehicles and equipment directed here
• specialised triage tags for victims• specialised triage tags for victims
• secondary triage point for lightly injured:
buses to get them there
• secondary triage point for lightly injured:
buses to get them there
• pre-designated transport routes to hospitals.• pre-designated transport routes to hospitals.
At the scene...At the scene...

20. • burns and pulmonary units needed• burns and pulmonary units needed
• specialised, ingegrated disaster and EMS plans• specialised, ingegrated disaster and EMS plans
At the secondary treatment centre...At the secondary treatment centre...
• specialised emergency and triage plan.• specialised emergency and triage plan.
At the receiving hospitals...At the receiving hospitals...

21. Temporary
Mortuary
Mortuary
Scene
RETRIEVAL OF BODIESRETRIEVAL OF BODIES
Body
Holding Area

22. • mass-casualty facilities and plan• mass-casualty facilities and plan
• specific coroner's autopsy arrangements• specific coroner's autopsy arrangements
• plans for notifying next-of-kin and identifying bodies.• plans for notifying next-of-kin and identifying bodies.
At the mortuary...At the mortuary...
The London temporary mortuary

23. Case histories

24. World Trade
Center
towers,
11 Sept.
2001:
calculated
evacuation
time, fully
occupied,
3 hrs 50
mins: time
available
45-60 mins.
World Trade
Center
towers,
11 Sept.
2001:
calculated
evacuation
time, fully
occupied,
3 hrs 50
mins: time
available
45-60 mins.

25. Evacuation is
not usually a
priority in
tall building
design.
WTC towers:
Stairwell
width
< 1 metre.
Evacuation is
not usually a
priority in
tall building
design.
WTC towers:
Stairwell
width
< 1 metre.

26. • the time factor for entrance and rescue• the time factor for entrance and rescue
• breakdown in scene command• breakdown in scene command
• slow movement with equipment• slow movement with equipment
• failure of communication above floor 30• failure of communication above floor 30
• self-sacrifice (but not the desire to be heroes)?.• self-sacrifice (but not the desire to be heroes)?.
Some 343 firefighters and 78 police died in NYC's 9/11Some 343 firefighters and 78 police died in NYC's 9/11

27. Irvine, Ayrshire,
1999 1 dead
Stevenage, Hertfordshire,
2005, 3 dead
Lakanal Tower, London,
2009, 6 dead
Southampton,
2010, 2 dead
Grenfell Tower, London,
2017, 71 dead
Irvine, Ayrshire,
1999 1 dead
Stevenage, Hertfordshire,
2005, 3 dead
Lakanal Tower, London,
2009, 6 dead
Southampton,
2010, 2 dead
Grenfell Tower, London,
2017, 71 dead

28. Lakanal House,
South London
14 storeys
98 apartments
2009 fire
6 dead
"The fire spread unexpectedly fast, both laterally
and vertically, trapping people in their homes,
with the exterior cladding panels burning through
in just four and a half minutes."

29. Highly inflammable
cladding allows fire
to jump up from
floor to floor and
resist retardation by
'compartmentalisation'.
Highly inflammable
cladding allows fire
to jump up from
floor to floor and
resist retardation by
'compartmentalisation'.
Scenario says people
should not evacuate
(too risky)
fire will remain
compartmentalised
- it didn't.
Scenario says people
should not evacuate
(too risky)
fire will remain
compartmentalised
- it didn't.

30. 'Should' ratio: 0.48'Should' ratio: 0.48
Weakened regulations
Weakened inspection
Weakened enforcement
Weakened regulations
Weakened inspection
Weakened enforcement

31. To save money, the richest borough in the land housed
some of its citizens in acutely dangerous conditions.
To save money, the richest borough in the land housed
some of its citizens in acutely dangerous conditions.
Emergency response across London is not uniformly good.Emergency response across London is not uniformly good.
In the UK, there is deep, highly politicised resistance
to the introduction and enforcement of safety measures.
In the UK, there is deep, highly politicised resistance
to the introduction and enforcement of safety measures.
Security seems to be more important than safety.Security seems to be more important than safety.
Whose lives matter?.Whose lives matter?.
Grenfell TowerGrenfell Tower

32. • public enquiry• public enquiry
• litigation• litigation
• rehousing and rehabilitation• rehousing and rehabilitation
• compensation• compensation
• demolition.• demolition.
£1 billion:-£1 billion:-

33. • 457 residential tower blocks deemed unsafe in UK• 457 residential tower blocks deemed unsafe in UK
• major 'instant' evacuations in Camden, London• major 'instant' evacuations in Camden, London
• fire wardens hired at high cost• fire wardens hired at high cost
• disputes over who pays for recladding• disputes over who pays for recladding
• apartments in tower blocks lose their sale value.• apartments in tower blocks lose their sale value.
Cascading effects of the Grenfell Tower tragedy:-Cascading effects of the Grenfell Tower tragedy:-

37. Conclusions
Dubai, 2013

38. Learning
processes
Improved
safety
Lesson
learned
Change and
innovation
Change and
innovation
Experience
and theory
Experience
and theory
Recognition and
comprehension
Recognition and
comprehension
Lesson to
be learned
• Unexpected
event
• New
circumstance
• Error
• New
practice

39. Disaster
Public
outcry Rhetoric
Logic
Laws
Safety
culture
The evolution of
a safety culture
The evolution of
a safety culture
Source: Prof. Ian Davis

40. Personal
or private
interests
Personal
or private
interestsPublic
interest
Public
interest
Cultural
acceptability
Cultural
acceptability
LESSONS
...LEARNED?
LESSONS
...LEARNED?
Sustainable
lessons
Sustainable
lessons Uncertainty,
unpredictability
Uncertainty,
unpredictability
LESSONS
...LEARNED?
Incentives
to learn
Incentives
to learn

41. External
hazards
External
hazards
Technological,
economic and
social issues
Technological,
economic and
social issues
Operational and
policy risks
Operational and
policy risks
Stewardship
role
Regulatory
role
Management
role
GOVERNMENTGOVERNMENT

42. Recent fires in residential
and commercial premises
have called into question
the moral and practical
basis of government's role
in protecting its citizens.
Recent fires in residential
and commercial premises
have called into question
the moral and practical
basis of government's role
in protecting its citizens.

43. Thank you
for listening.
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