1. Integrating
humanitarian operations
David Alexander
University College London

2. Setting the stage...

3. Hazard
x
Vulnerability
= Risk
Impact
Response
Exposure

4. Vulnerability &
marginalisation
in the Peruvian
Andes, Eastern
Cordillera
Debris
slide-falls
Houses
destroyed

5. "informal settlement"
Normal river level
Flood level
Buriganga River, central Bangladesh

6. Urbanisation spreads onto the floodplain
in Tunja, Boyacá, Colombia

7. In places like Port au Prince, Haiti,
and Luanda, Angola, the status
quo ante has often seemed as bad
as any disaster impact.

8. The "informal housing"
of the poor is usually
relegated to the
least safe places

9. The 'megacity' problem

10. Tehran

11. Tehran

12. Kathmandu

13. Kathmandu

14. İstanbul

15. İstanbul

16. Relatively minor damage to transportation
systems can paralyse a megacity

17. • can have very complex patterns, but
these are capable of being understood
• results from knowledge not utilised
• poses complex problems of rescue
• casualties are heavily concentrated
in urban-metropolitan areas
• reveals poverty-vulnerability linkage.
Seismic vulnerability

18. Stairwells are
often the most
vulnerable part
of the building
during
earthquakes,
and the first
part that people
use as they try
to escape.

19. Humanitarian
missions

20. Situations that are complex
• logistically
• culturally
• ethically
• morally
...requiring
huge levels of
sustained
commitment...

21. • typically in internationally
declared disasters up to 70 nations
participate in the relief effort
• in the Haiti earthquake of 2010
more than 120 countries contributed
• very large fluxes of relief goods
managed with inadequate port facilities
• disputes arose over distribution priorities
• ad hoc strategy does not take
adequate account of all factors.
The problem of international co-ordination

22. The dilemmas of humanitarian
assistance in the modern world:-
• faced with situations of injustice
and political polarisation it may be
impossible to maintain neutrality
• humanitarian assistance can cause
unexpected and undesired effects
• the strong reaction to major
disasters masks a lack of
prevention and preparedness
• badly planned assistance can
do more harm than good.

23. • 12 nations affected = 12 different
disasters - complex situation
• temporary export of European
health and civil protection
systems to Asian countries
• huge imbalance of donations
• the Swedish case (SEMA)
• difficulties with mass mortality:
body handling arrangements,
arrangements for the bereaved.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of Dec. 2004

24. • International assistance
should complement, not
substitute, local resources
Humanitarian assistance should
help a country reach general
development goals, not only
help disaster victims to survive.
Two principles

25. • it is slow to mobilise
• it is constrained by national sovreignty
• it includes highly varied motivations
and levels of professionality
• it is a reactive system that does little
or nothing to reduce disaster risk.
The international disaster relief
system is expensive and inefficient

26. • 43 FFHs studied in three disasters
• average cost: $2000/bed/day
• occupancy <50%
• "No FFH arrived early
enough to provide emergency
medical trauma care".
Foreign field hospitals: Von Schreeb et al.
[2008 - PDM 23(2): 144 et seq.]

27. Non era una situazione insolita....
In the Bam, Iran, earthquake of
2003, 1,600 rescuers from 43
nations saved only 30 people

28. In the January 2010 earthquake in
Haiti only 133 people were rescued,
and only nine of them after day five

29. • lacking in the necessary equipment
• inefficient and often ineffective
• dangerous for the responders
• dangerous for the rescued person
• no substitute for professional rescue.
Operations such as this are...

30. • areas at risk need local fully
trained and equipped SAR groups
• technology and expertise need
to be transferred preventatively
to where they are needed
• twinning, exchange between SAR groups
• better building standards, more
understanding of SAR requirements.
To avoid scenes like this...

31. More than 1000 humanitatian agencies
work in Dhaka, capital of Bangladesh

32. The essential role of governance:
decision making by
democratic participation

34. • logistical support adequate in the field?
• can disaster-related problems be
distinguished from endemic ones?
• can local leaders and stakeholder groups
be identified and dialogue started?
• what sort of assistance is really needed?
• is inter-agency co-ordination adequate?.
Some practical considerations

35. The controversy over transitional shelter:
post-disaster shelter solutions have
seldom considered urban area problems:-
• lack of space for building
• need for high-density solutions
• intensive provision of services.

36. Analyse
the context
Assess
needs
Build
scenarios
Set
prioritiesPlan the
response
Issue a
consolidated
or flash
appeal
Monitor
and revise
Report
on actions
UN-OCHA Humanitarian Actions

37. UN-OCHA Clusters:-
• Emergency telecommunications
• Water and sanitation (WASH)
• Emergency shelter
• Infrastructure
• Early recovery
• Agriculture
• Education
• Health
• Food

38. • radical changes are needed to adapt
the world relief system to new realities
• currently the system is inefficient
and still too heavily based on
reaction rather than prevention
• integration is a matter of voluntary
collaboration among a heterogeneous
group of agencies, according to
a somewhat arbitrary set of rules.
In synthesis...

39. • emerging risks,
pandemics
• climate change
& sea-level rise
• millennial events
• poverty/vulnerability
complex
• wealth gap.
The imperatives:-

40. www.slideshare.net
/dealexander
www.emergency-
planning.blogspot.com
david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk